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Abstract 
 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the World Bank and the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) competed to shape the global pension reform agenda. Inspired by the 
privatisation of Chile’s pension system in 1981 and its spread across Latin America, the 
World Bank promoted a partial privatisation of public pension systems across the globe. 
It was vehemently opposed by the ILO. The World Bank was able to use its lending 
capacity as leverage into the pension reform debates of the countries of Central Eastern 
Europe during their transition to market-based capitalism. It supplanted the ILO as the 
dominant international organisation in the pension reform arena as most countries in 
the region adopted the World Bank’s preferred pension model. However, at the onset of 
the of the global economic crisis, the trend went into reverse. Most countries in Latin 
American and Central and Eastern Europe either scaled back on their privatisation or 
completely abandoned it.  
 
This thesis investigates the impact of these reversals on global pension policy. It draws 
on an analysis of 104 pension documents and 25 elite interviews from senior policy 
makers in the World Bank, ILO and Central and Eastern Europe to analyse global pension 
policy. It deploys an Agency, Structure, Institutions, Discourse (ASID) framework to 
explore the process of pension reform and counter-reform in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the development of the pension policies of the ILO and World Bank, and the 
relationship between them. The thesis tells the story of how the ILO has managed to 
reassert itself in the global debate and international agenda-setting process through the 
promotion of its flagship national social protection floors. It now works much more 
closely with the World Bank, which abandoned its pension privatisation campaign and 
works closely with the ILO to extend pensions coverage. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
In March 2018, Sebastián Piñera was re-elected to the presidency of Chile. This was 
despite being ejected by voters four years earlier, leaving office as one of the most 
unpopular presidents in the country’s history (Mander, 2018). His cornerstone campaign 
promise, in his dramatic return to power in 2018, was to reform Chile’s pension system 
– a system designed nearly four decades earlier by his older brother, José Piñera 
(Weyland, 2005). The privatisation of Chile’s pension system in 1981, under the 
authoritarian leadership of Augustus Pinochet, was held up as a beacon for all pension 
systems by some international organisations, such as the World Bank (World Bank, 
1994). It had been designed by a group of radical neoliberal reformers nicknamed the 
‘Chicago Boys’. These had studied under the tutelage of Milton Friedman at University 
of Chicago and upon their return to Chile, set up an affiliate institute at the Pontifical 
Catholic University of Chile. This institution was the laboratory for a number of neoliberal 
experiments, of which the most radical, was the complete privatisation of the public 
pension system (Borzutzky, 2005). The privatisation involved diverting pension 
contributions from taxpayers into individual fully-funded pension accounts (IFAs). By any 
means, this represented a radical redrawing of the social contract in Chile: from the state 
to the market and from a collective, societal responsibility to provide an income in 
retirement, to individual responsibility. 
 
From the mid-1980s up until the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the Chilean economy grew 
at an average annual rate of 7.2 percent (Büchi, 2006). This impressive performance was 
argued to be a result of the development of the capital market that the pension 
privatisation had stimulated (Holzmann, 1997; World Bank, 1994). It aligned with the 
wider agenda of the World Bank and motivated it to lead a campaign to enact these 
reforms across the globe. The campaign persuaded thirty countries to fully or partially 
privatise their public pension system (Orenstein, 2011).  
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However, the Chilean reforms had been highly controversial. Over time, the system 
generated sustained opposition, attacking its failure to pay adequate pensions to large 
proportions of the population (Mesa‐Lago & Bertranou, 2016). The exorbitant fees were 
also attacked, as they siphoned off a large proportion of the accumulated funds of those 
drawing a pension from the new system, hence reducing retirement income (Mesa‐Lago 
& Bertranou, 2016). In addition, the poor coverage of the system across the population 
of Chile offered further ammunition for its opponents (Gill, Packard, & Yermo, 2005). 
Reforms were undertaken in 2008 by President Michelle Bachelet to strengthen the 
retirement income of the poorest and to enhance gender equality – amidst calls for a 
complete abolishment of the private system (Kritzer, 2008). The forthcoming reforms, to 
be undertaken by President Piñera, will involve an even larger role for the state in 
providing pensions. They were also drafted by his successor and opponent, President 
Bachelet – signalling the political consensus on the need to reform the system. In 2014, 
President Bachelet launched a commission of national and international policymakers to 
advise on the reform. In a further example of the symbolism of the Chilean system, it 
included a senior adviser from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) advising on 
the reforms, but not one from the World Bank (Pensiones Comisión Asesora Presidencial 
sobre el Sistema de, 2015). The reforms will leave in place a role for the private sector in 
pension provision, but the role of the state in alleviating pensioner poverty, is no longer 
contested in Chilean politics (Mesa‐Lago & Bertranou, 2016).  
 
In many ways, the fate of the Chilean pension system, the transnational actors who have 
influenced it, and the debates within Chilean pension politics about the role of the state 
and the market help to tell the story of this thesis. It is a debate that has been played out 
at a global level over the past 25 years between various international organisations and 
transnational actors. This thesis tells the story of this global debate and its role in 
international agenda-setting. It outlines how it was shaped by political and economic 
events and how a consensus has begun to emerge between two previous opponents in 
global pension policy: The World Bank and the International Labour Organisation. The 
thesis demonstrates how these organisations came to be involved in the pension reform 
arena and the dynamics that shaped this involvement.  It explores the development of 
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their pension policies over time and how they were driven by both internal and external 
politics.  
 
Motivations to Study Global Pension Policy and the Development of the Thesis Idea 
 
I first encountered global pension policy in 2011 as a master’s student in Social Policy 
and Administration at the University of Nottingham. As a mature student, returning to 
higher education, my main challenge appeared to be narrowing my vast interests in the 
field down to something focused enough to write a dissertation. Whilst reading a book 
on the financing of the welfare state, The Welfare State as Piggy Bank by Nicholas Barr 
(2001), I first discovered that Chile had privatised its public pension system. I was 
completely shocked. The implications of this became immediately clear to me. As will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter Two, it transferred responsibility for income security in old 
age completely to the individual. Reading around the subject some more, I discovered 
the privatisation of public pension systems had been a growing trend across the globe. 
The Chilean pension reform had been modified and diffused across most of Latin America 
(Brooks, 2005; Weyland, 2005). A coalition led by the World Bank had also played a 
crucial role in bringing Chilean style pension reform to Central and Eastern Europe in its 
transition from state-planned socialism to market-based capitalism (Müller, 1999; 
Orenstein, 2008).  
 
I decided to write my dissertation on the partial-privatisation of the Hungarian and Polish 
pension systems. The discovery that these reforms had been inspired by transnational 
actors violated many of the theories on welfare state development, which have 
traditionally stressed domestic factors such as the growth in the power of the working 
class (Huber & Stephens, 2001) or openness to trade (Cameron, 1978). The privatisation 
of the public system also violated the assumption within theories on welfare state 
development that reforms are path-dependent on previous policies (Pierson, 1994). This 
literature on transnational pension politics formed part of a growing scholarship on 
global social policy: a branch of social policy that focuses on the role of transnational 
actors in shaping domestic welfare policies (Deacon, et al., 1997; Fergusson & Yeates, 
2014; Kaasch, 2013; Orenstein, 2008). The reforms in Hungary and Poland were also part 
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of the emerging literature on social policy in the transition countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. This literature focuses on their unique process of undergoing the twin 
transition from socialism to capitalism and from one-party authoritarianism to liberal 
democracy (Cerami & Vanhuysse, 2009; Szikra & Tomka, 2009; Inglot, 2008; Fultz, 2006; 
Müller, 1999;). It seemed an interesting region to study given its propensity for neoliberal 
reforms.  
 
However, the dissertation proved to be far more dramatic than I had originally 
envisaged. Just two weeks before the deadline, I discovered that Poland was in the 
process of scaling down its private system and that Hungary had just completely 
abandoned it, by renationalising it (Fultz, 2012).  After the initial shock on the 
implications for my dissertation, it became clear this process represented an enormous 
opportunity. First, my dissertation had already hinted these reforms might not be stable, 
given that it was only a partial-privatisation, and that it generated significant upfront 
costs (which will be discussed in more detail throughout the thesis). It therefore only 
required a small rewrite to incorporate the counter-reforms that were taking place. 
Second, Hungary and Poland were not alone. As will be shown, reversals to pension 
privatisation were being carried out across the globe in the wake of the global economic 
crisis (Arza, 2012; Datz & Dansci, 2013; Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012; Holzmann, 
2012). I now had a topic that I was certain warranted further investigation. The master’s 
dissertation would not be the end of my engagement with pension privatisation or multi-
pillar pension reform, as others call it, but rather the beginning, as there was a need to 
further understand these developments.  
 
The Positioning of the Thesis 
 
This is a thesis about global social policy, with a specific focus on pensions. It contributes 
to the literature on the role of transnational actors in setting reform agendas. The reform 
of welfare systems – including pension reforms – from a global perspective, remains an 
under-explored aspect of social policy. In the rapidly growing literature on globalisation 
and its impact on the welfare state, the focus has often been on economic and 
technological forces, rather than ideational ones (Ervik et al., 2009; Yeates, 2002). This 
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thesis is explicitly concerned with the role of ideas, promoted by actors within 
international organisations.  
 
Within the study of pensions, the field is still dominated by studies that prioritise national 
policy making processes, such as debates between national representatives of labour 
and employees, with the state either mediating these processes, or actively intervening 
for political advantage. The thesis seeks to challenge this “methodological nationalism” 
with an approach that fosters “methodological transnationalism”. It focuses on 
international organisations as a specific type of political actor which have been shown to 
have a considerable influence over national social policies, in particular in developing 
and middle-income countries (Armingeon & Beyeler, 2004; Deacon 2007; Ervik, 2005; 
Müller, 1999; Queisser, 2000; Orenstein, 2008). The emphasis on international 
organisations involves focusing on them as institutions and their organisational makeup, 
alongside the actors within them and the policies they promote. It also focuses on the 
political and economic context in which they operate and in which they also shape and 
influence.  
 
Global social policy was born out of the analysis of Deacon et al. (1997), who observed 
the growing influence of international organisations in social policy-making. They 
characterised this contestation as:  
 
“something a ‘war of position’ between those agencies and actors within them 
who have argued for a more selective, residual role for the state with a larger role 
for private actors in health, social protection and education provision and those 
who take the opposite view” (Deacon, 2007 p. 171).  
 
In their seminal work in the field, Deacon and colleagues (1997) painted global social 
policy as a battleground, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank on 
one side arguing for a liberal approach to social policy, against the corporatist approach 
favoured by the ILO and European Union (EU). Kaasch (2013) has challenged this 
approach to global social policy as an arena solely characterised by contestation. In the 
field of health policy, there is not one dominant model for international organizations to 
promote as a beacon for others to aspire to. In addition, international organisations are 
 6 
 
 
pressured to justify their own activities in the field. There are therefore better incentives 
for cooperation rather than competing for the exclusive right to shape policy. The policy 
environment portrayed in this thesis demonstrates evidence of both conflict and 
cooperation within and between organisations.  
 
Moreover, where Deacon characterised international organisations as monolithic blocs, 
this thesis finds they are open systems, which respond to the global and regional policy 
environment they operate in, and furthermore, respond to the institutional environment 
in which their policies are implemented, and adapted. As a consequence, the World Bank 
and IMF cannot simply be labelled as neoliberal and the ILO cannot be assumed to be 
corporatist or social-democratic. There are competing views inside international 
organisations, both between the separate departments and policy areas, and within 
them. 
 
Bøås & McNeill (2004) take the view that powerful international organisations are 
predisposed to neoliberal policy prescriptions, with very little room for others to 
challenge this. They argue that:  
 
“Powerful states (notably the USA), powerful organisations (such as the IMF) and 
even powerful disciplines (economics) exercise their power largely by ‘framing’: 
which serves to limit the power of potentially radical ideas to achieve change” 
(Bøås and McNeill, 2004 p. 1). 
 
 
This thesis challenges this dominant view of the global policy process. Firstly, the role of 
the US in global pension policy is ambiguous. As Béland & Orenstein (2013) note, multi-
pillar pension reform was rejected by Congress in 2005. It therefore is not logical to 
assert this type of reform is an American idea. Secondly, the thesis shows that the power 
balance between international organisations and the recipients of their funding is not 
fixed. It will be shown that the World Bank lost leverage in the countries where it 
promoted its pension model and had to adapt as a consequence. It also shows how the 
ILO, which is not as well-resourced as the World Bank, was able to reassert itself into the 
global pension policy debates. The thesis therefore contributes to the international 
political economy literature by challenging the realist assumptions that only powerful 
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states matter in the global economy and that the International Financial Institutions they 
finance are the only influential organisations in the global economy.  
 
In many ways, the thesis is a sequel to the work of Orenstein (2008), who analysed the 
role transnational actors had played in persuading a number of countries across the 
globe to partially privatise their pension system. His analysis showed how the World 
Bank supplanted ILO as the dominant global actor in pension reform. Following the 
publication of its seminal document on pension reform titled Averting the Old Age Crisis: 
Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth in 1994, it led a coalition, which included 
the Cato Institute, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
the pensions industry, to campaign for countries to partially privatise their pension 
systems. Instead of a full privatisation, like Chile, most countries opted for a multi-pillar 
system whereby the public pension pillar was reduced in size to focus on poverty relief 
and the remaining funds diverted into a second pillar – a  private pillar – which had the 
aim of smoothing income over the life course (World Bank, 1994). 
 
A rival coalition led by the ILO and International Social Security Association (ISSA) fought 
to contain this spread of pension privatisation, but in the mid-1990s it was fighting a 
losing battle. As Chapter Five shows in detail, the global political and economic 
environment was favourable for this type of reform. In total, more than thirty countries 
either fully, or partially, privatised their pension system. Most of these were in two 
regions: Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. Orenstein made a significant 
contribution: transnational actors had shaped an important area of social policy. 
However, just as his book was published, the whole process of pension privatisation 
went into reverse.  
 
In 2008, Argentina became the first country to renationalise its private pension system, 
when President de Kirchner authorised the nationalisation of $30bn of pension assets 
(Datz & Dansci, 2013). In the immediate global economic crisis period, as a response to 
being locked out of international capital markets, it subsumed the private pension assets 
into the state coffers. In 2010, Hungary did the same thing. Viktor Orbán’s supermajority 
enabled the swift nationalisation of pension assets. At first this looked like the isolated 
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actions of two authoritarian leaders struggling to raise international finance (Arza, 2012). 
However, the trend spread. Bolivia, Kazakhstan, and Poland also renationalised their 
private pension pillars in the years that followed (Naczyk & Domonkos, 2016). Moreover, 
the Baltic States and Russia temporarily suspended payments into private pensions, 
diverting the contributions back into the public pillar in order to alleviate the fiscal crisis 
(Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012). Slovakia did the same but on a permanent basis. The 
case of the Czech Republic, however, is an unusual one. Whilst the rest of the region had 
privatised their pension systems in the late-1990s and early-2000s, the Czech Republic 
had kept its public system unreformed. In 2011 though, it bucked the trend and partially 
privatised its pension system. However, it was short-lived. By 2013 the private pillar was 
closed down, bringing the Czech system into line with the others.  
 
The thesis analyses global pension policy in light of these recent developments. It focuses 
on the World Band and ILO, as these are the only two organisations that have dominated 
global pension policy agendas at one time or another – the rise of Pay-As-You-Go pension 
systems in the case of the ILO and the rise of pension privatisation in the case of the 
World Bank (Orenstein 2003; 2008). While many other organisations have been involved 
in the campaign for pension privatisation, including the OECD, European Union, and 
USAID, the World Bank dedicated greater resources to policy research, research 
dissemination, and policy planning, seeking to establish a global agenda for reform. 
During this period, it supplanted the ILO, which had played a key role in establishing 
PAYG pension systems worldwide, as the top global agenda-setter for pension reform 
(Orenstein, 2008). In addition, the qualitative approach of the research is deployed in 
order to generate rich, nuanced and in-depth data. This can only be achieved with a 
smaller number of cases. This is a further reason the ILO and World Bank were exclusively 
analysed for the thesis.  
 
The focus of the thesis is on the global policy debates that take place within –  and 
between – these international organisations. It analyses their role in the policy 
development and agenda-setting stages of the policy cycle. It does not seek to negate 
the role of domestic politics and domestic actors in the pension reform process. It 
recognises that many other actors are involved in the reform of pension systems. For 
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example, the ‘power resources’ model has argued that welfare state development is 
determined by the strength of the labour movement (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Korpi, 
1983; Stephens, 1979). In particular, the success of left-wing parties can adopt 
universalist policies to serve the interests of the working class once they are in office. 
The general level of generosity has also been shown to be determined by the electoral 
success of left-wing parties (Myles, 1985). From a corporatist perspective, trade unions 
and employers’ representatives will also be principal actors in the pension reform arena. 
In the politics of retrenchment, trade unions will mobilise to protect the generosity of 
pension. Reformers therefore adopt a strategy of ‘blame avoidance’ in order to carry out 
pension reforms (Myles & Pierson, 2001). However, whilst these domestic actors are an 
important component of the process of many countries’ pension reforms, the focus of 
this thesis is on the role of international organisations in the pension reform process.  
 
The analysis focuses extensively on Central and Eastern Europe. This is because the 
region is most closely associated with global pensions policy. As Deacon (1997) and later 
Orenstein (2008) showed, in the region’s transformation – from state-planned socialism 
to market-based capitalism and from authoritarianism to democracy – international 
organisations competed to shape the welfare policies of the countries in the region. 
During the communist era, the state had a complete monopoly over pension provision 
(Inglot, 2008). For this reason, organised interests never developed in the same way that 
they have in Western Europe (Naczyk, 2018). The propensity of pension reforms to be 
an elite-driven activity gave the World Bank influence over the pension reform process. 
As Müller (1999) argued, the indebtedness of the transition countries brought the 
Ministry of Finance into the pension reform debates. This gave the World Bank leverage 
into the process, as it has the closest relationship with finance ministers who tended to 
have a neoliberal disposition (Müller, 1999; Orenstein, 2000). The Bank also offered 
significant technical assistance for the countries that adopted the reforms. 
 
Central and Eastern Europe represented a key battleground in the struggle between 
international organisations to influence welfare trajectories. With the exceptions of 
Serbia and Slovenia, every country in the region adopted a mandatory, private second 
pillar as part of their reformed pension systems. Despite the ILO opening up a Budapest 
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office, in an effort to shape the agenda in a more social-democratic direction, it was 
unable to contain the spread of pension privatisation in the region. This contrasts with 
Latin America, the other region which adopted mandatory private pension pillars. 
Whereas Central and Eastern Europe’s pension reforms were inspired by transnational 
actors, in Latin America the reforms were domestically generated (Brooks, 2005; 
Weyland, 2005). For this reason, the analysis gives an extensive focus on Central and 
Eastern Europe, given the activity of international organisations in the region.  
 
With the exception of Croatia, every former communist country that adopted multi-pillar 
pension reforms amended them in some way after the global economic crisis. This entire 
episode raises significant questions about these types of reforms and global pension 
policy in general. Thus, the main aim of the thesis is to explore global pension policy in 
light of the number of reform reversals to the multi-pillar model. It is guided by the 
following research questions:  
 
1) What processes led to the pension reforms and counter-reforms in Central and 
Eastern Europe? 
2) How did this episode influence the perspectives and development of pension 
policies of the World Bank and ILO? 
3) How did it influence the relationship between the World Bank and the ILO? 
 
In order to answer these questions on global pension policy, the thesis deploys the 
Agency, Structure, Institutions Discourse (ASID) framework (Moulaert & Jessop, 2006) as 
a multi-faceted analysis of the development of global pensions policy. This has been 
argued by Deacon and Stubbs (2013) to provide a comprehensive framework for global 
social policy studies. With the exception of Deacon’s (2013) analysis of the ILO, the ASID 
framework is has not been used in global social policy studies. The thesis therefore offers 
a further application and refinement of the framework. Each of the empirical chapters 
of the thesis is dedicated to one of these four components of the model. 
 
The thesis analyses the global structural dynamics that have driven multi-pillar pension 
reform and counter-reform; outlining the global political and economic environment 
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that both shapes the conduct of international organisations, and is in turn, shaped by 
them (Barnett & Duvall, 2004). The analysis shows how global pension policy has been 
fashioned by the prevailing paradigm or zeitgeist. During the post-war period, the 
prevailing paradigm precipitated an active role for the state in welfare provision. It was 
during this time that the ILO was able to establish itself as the leading international 
organisation in global pension policy, by promoting PAYG pension systems (Orenstein, 
2003). The breaking down of the ‘golden age of welfare’ (Esping-Andersen, 1996)  
ushered in the neoliberal era. This new zeitgeist facilitated the World Bank to supplant 
the ILO as the leading international organisation, promoting a new neoliberal pension 
model. The fall of the Berlin Wall precipitated an intense period of activity as 
international organisations competed to shape the direction of the new democracies 
(Deacon, 1997). Next, it will be shown that the global economic crisis played a large role 
in bringing about the conditions for pension reform reversal. The crisis also created the 
conditions for the World Bank and ILO to work much more closely on extending pension 
provision. 
 
It also analyses the pensions institutions, and how these interact with global pension 
ideas. The policy legacies of communism will be shown to have constrained the options 
for privatisation as the upfront costs of a full privatisation – such as Chile’s reform – were 
too large (Muller, 1999). The countries in the region instead opted for a partial-
privatisation. Over time, the transition costs acted as a thorn in the side of the pension 
system, this came to a head during the global economic crisis and the reversals were a 
consequence. The analysis shines a light on how this process has been interpreted by the 
proponents and opponents of multi-pillar pension reform. It analyses how ideas have 
evolved following the whole process by analysing the perspective of the transnational 
actors involved in the reforms.  
 
The discourses component of the ASID framework focuses on the development of 
pension policy. It analyses how global pension debates have been framed by both 
organisations. The analysis shows the significant contribution of Averting the Old Age 
Crisis (1994) to the pension reform debate. After its publication, the global debate on 
pensions intensified significantly. Averting was able to shift the debate away from a 
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preoccupation with the adequacy of pensions to a concern with their sustainability. It 
represented the first accumulation of international and comparative pensions data on a 
global scale. The publication also opened up a secondary debate on the role of  the 
pension system in the macro economy and the labour market. It went far beyond the 
reach of the OECD, targeting its message at middle- and low-income countries as well as 
high-income countries. The analysis shows how, over time, the priorities of the World 
Bank shifted towards pensions coverage. This aligned with the agenda of the ILO, which 
had also shifted its priority to extending pension coverage in developing countries (ILO, 
2001). The chapter on institutions explores how the series of pension reform reversals 
influenced the policies of the World Bank and ILO, what the similarities are in their 
approach now, and what differences remain.  
 
The final component of the ASID framework to be explored is agency. The chapter on 
agency focuses on the internal politics of the World Bank and ILO. It shows how both 
organisations at different times have been characterised by internal policy coherency 
and policy fragmentation. During times of internal coherence each organisation was able 
to influence the international agenda, in particular when it aligned with the prevailing 
global paradigm. The chapter demonstrates how key individuals were instrumental in 
this process. The analysis also shows that fragmentation and a lack of a clear policy 
direction led to each of the organisations cede influence over their rival. In the case of 
the ILO, in the mid-2000s internal rivalries prevented the organisation developing a clear 
policy position to challenge the World Bank. However, the World Bank would later 
experience fragmentation as its multi-pillar pension policy was abandoned. The policy 
was first challenged from within by opponents. Next, as it began to be reversed by 
countries that had adopted it and finally, when key personnel who had supported the 
reforms, left the organisation.  
 
The ASID framework enables each of the research questions to be analysed from a multi-
faceted perspective. For example, as each of the chapters will demonstrate in detail, the 
process of pension privatisation and reversal is a consequence of  global structural 
dynamics and the institutional setting of Central and Eastern Europe. The success of the 
World Bank’s multi-pillar pension model was also a result of how it was framed, its 
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message on sustainability and economic development proved attractive to reformers in 
Central and Eastern Europe. None of this would have happened without the initial 
success of reformers inside the Bank pushing this type of reform onto the agenda and 
promoting it ahead of rival ideas. The development of pension ideas at the World Bank 
and ILO has also been shaped by the global political economy, the interaction of 
neoliberal pension ideas with the institutions of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
evaluations of its performance prior to the reversal – and following –  alongside the 
internal politics of the organisations. Finally, the relationship between the ILO and World 
Bank has been shaped by the global political economy by evaluations and development 
of their pension policies and by the internal politics of each organisation.  
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
 
The thesis makes a number of empirical contributions to the field of global pension 
policy. This remains an under-explored aspect of social policy, particularly since the wide-
scale reversal of the World Bank’s model. The first contribution is to offer a 
comprehensive account of how pension reform has been conducted at a global level 
throughout the last century and into the current one. Where the work of Orenstein 
(2008) primarily focused on the transnational campaign to privatise pension systems, 
this analysis goes further back, demonstrating how the ILO has been shaping pension 
systems since its inception at the end of the First World War. The thesis offers insights 
into how the global political and economic environment offers international 
organisations leverage into domestic policymaking and how the World Bank used the 
conditions in the early 1990s to enter the reform debate. The thesis also goes beyond 
the privatisation campaign. It analyses the waning of the World Bank’s influence and how 
the ILO reasserted itself into the global debate.   
 
The academic literature on pension reform reversals is still in its infancy. To date, the it 
has analysed individual countries or regions, offering explanations for the reversals. 
However, there has not yet been an analysis of these developments from the perspective 
of the international organisations that competed to enact or oppose these reforms. It is 
here that the thesis makes its major contribution to knowledge. Its main contribution is 
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to outline the process in which the World Bank and ILO have ceased to compete within 
the field of pensions and instead cooperate to extend the coverage of pensions to those 
in the informal labour market who have no coverage. This process has been shaped by 
both external political and economic events as well as internal evaluations of pension 
policies and the internal politics of both organisations. It makes a significant contribution 
by elucidating the perspectives of the transnational actors who both promoted and 
opposed multi-pillar pension reform. It uses elite interviews to analyse the perspectives 
of senior policy makers in the international organisations involved in global pension 
policy.  
 
In addition, the thesis draws on the perspective of domestic actors and analyses their 
interaction with transnational actors in the pensions field. The thesis offers an insight in 
to the debates that take place inside international organisations as well as between 
them. It also offers a comprehensive account of the pension policy positions of the World 
Bank and ILO. It analyses the policy documents of each organisation alongside interview 
data from actors inside each organisation to outline the main preoccupations and how 
these have evolved over time. The thesis shows how the ILO was able to reassert itself 
into global pension policy debates through the promotion of its flagship national social 
protection floors policy. It sets out how the ILO’s Social Security Department came to 
focus on this policy idea and how it interacted with developments in the World Bank to 
enable a collaborative and cooperative relationship between the one-time rivals in global 
pension policy.  
 
The second contribution is theoretical. The thesis positions itself within the global social 
policy literature; and within this literature, the relationship between ideas and 
institutions has been underexplored. Where scholars have analysed this relationship in 
the past, ideas have been deployed as an independent variable in institutional change 
(Béland, 2009; Orenstein, 2008). This thesis shows that institutions can also shape ideas. 
Through the processes of path dependency and continuity, the stickiness of institutions 
can alter the perception of different policy ideas, leading to ideational change. The thesis 
shows how the global perception of pension privatisation, of both its proponents and 
opponents, was shaped by its interaction with the pension institutions of Central and 
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Eastern Europe. The pension policy legacies and institutions obstructed a full 
privatisation in the region and undermined the viability of the pension system. In turn, 
previous proponents of multi-pillar reforms reassessed the viability and desirability of 
such reforms. This shifted the focus of international organisations like the World Bank 
away from promoting private pension provision towards expanding public provision to 
those who had no provision at all. The thesis also demonstrates how international 
organisations must adapt to remain relevant in international agenda-setting. The lack of 
demand from middle-income countries for the World Bank’s pension expertise has 
meant it needed to shift towards assistance on public pension systems. In addition, the 
analysis shows the interaction between different types of authority. The World Bank has 
traditionally relied on its expertise as a source of authority. This authority has been 
damaged in the pension reform arena by a perceived failure of its flagship model. The 
ILO, on the other hand, relies on its moral suasion as a source of authority. This was 
enhanced during the global economic crisis, enabling it to reassert itself into the global 
debate.  
 
A final contribution of thesis in the application of the ASID model to a new area of global 
social policy. With the exception of Deacon (2013), who applied the model in the 
discussion of his research on policy making in the ILO, it has not been applied in any other 
global social policy analysis. This thesis applies the model much more comprehensively 
than Deacon, and in doing so, offers an insight into its usefulness in global social policy 
studies. The discussion in Chapter Nine reflects on its strengths and weaknesses in 
analysing global pension policy.  
 
The specific contributions of the thesis enable the research to position itself in a number 
of academic fields and debates. It makes an important contribution to global social policy 
by analysing a field that has been characterised by significant transnational influence 
only for that influence to wane dramatically. To date, there are no other examples in the 
field of global social policy whereby a transnational campaign has initially been 
successful with a significant number of countries enacting its reforms, only for them to 
be abandoned a few years later. In addition, it enables the thesis to position itself in 
debates within the international political economy literature, in particular in debates 
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between realists and constructivists, and powerful states and those on the periphery. 
The thesis captures in-real-time the state of flux as the World Bank’s influence in the 
world diminishes. The thesis also positions itself in the new institutionalism literature. It 
offers an important case study of the interaction between global policy ideas and the 
institutions they seek to reform. It offers a chance to analyse the relationship between 
material reality and the constructed reality of policy framing. It also offers a case study 
in institutional development, institutional change and institutional stability. Finally, the 
analysis is useful for pension scholars. The rise and demise of multi-pillar pension reform 
is an important case study in the balance between the state and the market in pension 
provision. The whole episode offers insights into what is desirable and what is achievable 
in altering the balance between the public and private provision.  
 
A Note on Terminology 
 
The thesis offers a description of the global policy process whilst also engaging with the 
debates about the desirability of different pension systems from the perspective of 
different actors. Its purpose is not to advocate one system over the other, but rather to 
describe the processes that have shaped global pension debates and organisational 
positions. With this in mind, the thesis uses terms that may be value-loaded and uses 
them interchangeably. For example, the term ‘pension privatisation’ is used by Orenstein 
to describe a pension system that either entails a full privatisation, as in Chile, or a 
proportion of public pension contributions diverted to individually fully funded accounts. 
This is not the favoured term of the World Bank. It prefers to use the term ‘multi-pillar 
pension reform’, whereby the first pillar is the public system and a mandatory second 
pillar is the proportion of the pension diverted into an individual account. Given a large 
proportion remains in public provision, the Bank disputes this is a privatisation. The term 
‘second pillar’ is also used in the pensions literature, particularly in the case of Central 
and Eastern Europe. Each of these terms will be used throughout the thesis, each time 
they are used, it refers to the mandatory contribution to an individual private account 
that has been diverted from the public account. Likewise, the term ‘counter-reform’ 
might be interpreted as negative, whereas ‘reversal’ could be interpreted more 
positively. Throughout the thesis both of these terms will also be used interchangeably.  
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Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter Two outlines the different pension system 
designs and the values and philosophies that underpin them. In addition, it sets out the 
theoretical foundations of the thesis describing the different theoretical approaches of 
the “new institutionalism”, the international political economy of international 
organisations, and the theoretical approaches of global social policy. Chapter Three 
reviews the literature on multi-pillar pension reform and the reversals to the system. It 
outlines the existing literature on pension reform and global pension policy. It shows 
how the thesis addresses the gap in the literature by analysing the perspective of the 
international organisations involved in global pension policy. Chapter Four sets out the 
methods deployed in the research and how they interact with the theoretical 
foundations which are discussed in the methodology. It also sets out the analytical 
structure of the thesis. Chapter Five is the first of four empirical chapters. It focuses on 
the global political economy of pension reform. It outlines the context in which 
international organisations operate and influence. Chapter Six focuses on Central and 
Eastern Europe, elucidating the institutional analysis of global pension reform. Chapter 
Seven analyses the different pension policy positions of the ILO and World Bank and how 
these have evolved over time, through internal analysis and evaluation. Chapter Eight 
focuses on the internal politics of the World Bank and ILO, showing how these have 
interacted with the global political economy in order to shape global pension policy. 
Chapter Nine draws all of these together in a discussion, leading onto the final conclusion 
in Chapter Ten.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Approaching Global Pension Policy: Pension System Designs and 
the Theoretical Foundations of the Thesis 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical foundations and key concepts that underpin the 
thesis. The chapter begins by setting out the approaches adopted within the field of 
global social policy. It outlines the main concepts and theories within this sub-discipline. 
Global social policy is concerned with the transnational aspects of social policy. It argues 
that traditional approaches to social policy have been characterised by methodological 
nationalism. The analysis here sets out what a methodological transnationalism entails 
and how this underpins the thesis. It details the main approaches to global social policy 
studies, namely complex multilateralism, a politics of scale and global advocacy 
coalitions.  
 
Next, the chapter positions itself within an academic debate on the nature of 
institutional development and institutional change. This is an emerging literature on the 
role of institutions within society. It analyses how and why they are designed and in what 
way change of the institutions is enacted. Hall & Taylor (1996) identified three distinct 
approaches within the “New Institutionalism”: rational choice, and historical and 
sociological institutionalism. Later another approach has been added: constructivist or 
discursive institutionalism (Hay, 2011; Schmidt, 2008). Each of these approaches will be 
outlined and analysed. A synthesis of historical and constructivist institutionalism will be 
central to the approach of the thesis. In particular, it will be argued that not only can 
ideas lead to institutional change, but also the stickiness of institutions can lead to 
ideational change.  
 
This leads on to the next theoretical analysis of this chapter: the role of international 
organisations in the policy making process and their interaction with domestic policy 
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makers. This is a debate that has taken place within the academic field of International 
Political Economy (IPE). The literature points to three distinct approaches towards the 
role of international organisations: realist, liberal and constructivist (Abdelal, Blyth, & 
Parsons, 2010; Barkin, 2013). Each of these will be outlined and analysed in this chapter. 
The approach of IPE scholars overlaps with the approaches in the new institutionalism, 
some of the ontological and epistemological foundations set out in the new 
institutionalism will be applied in the IPE framework. It will be argued that the 
constructivist approach best explains the role of the international organisations within 
the global pension arena, although there are also realist aspects to the current 
developments global pension policy.  
 
Finally, the chapter outlines the different types of pension arrangements that are 
possible. The design of a pension system will be shown to have a significant impact on 
the type of welfare system and the macro economy. Different systems are underpinned 
by different values and reforms can have redistributive consequences between 
socioeconomic groups and can also enhance or diminish gendered inequalities (Foster, 
2012; Foster et al, 2016; 2019; Foster and Heneghan, 2018; Ginn & Arber, 1996). 
 
Global Social Policy 
 
Global social policy as a distinct subfield of social policy emerged with the contribution 
of Deacon, et al. (1997), analysing the role of transnational actors shaping social policy 
in Central and Eastern Europe. It builds on many of the positions outlined in the section 
above. The journal Global Social Policy was launched in 2001 and an update from Deacon 
in 2007. Student textbooks on global social policy appeared in 2008 (Yeates, 2008). 
Deacon (2007) contends that global social policy consists of two things: first, it is the 
social policy prescriptions for national social policy being articulated by global actors, 
such as international organisations; second it is the emerging supranational social 
policies and mechanisms of global redistribution, global regulatory supervision and 
global social rights (2007, p. 1). The thesis is primarily concerned with the former 
preoccupation of global social policy. Like its parent field, social policy, global social 
policy draws eclectically from other fields and disciplines. In particular, it draws from: 
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development studies, international political economy, international relations, global 
sociology and the policy transfer and diffusion literature. The use of these disciplines can 
be collapsed into three overarching approaches: ‘complex multilateralism’ (O’Brien, et 
al., 2000), ‘global advocacy coalitions’ (Orenstein, 2008) and the ‘politics of scale’ (Clarke, 
2004; Stubbs 2005). Each of these will now be discussed in more detail.  
 
Complex Multilateralism 
 
This concept positions itself in the middle-ground between the state-centrist positions 
in international relations, like those adopted by realists and the global cosmopolitan or 
world society theories that completely ignore nation states. As will be argued in the 
section on international political economy later in the chapter, the former stresses that 
international organisations are primarily conditioned by nation states (Gilpin & Gilpin, 
2001), whereas the latter argues that the global system is characterised by the 
emergence of global actors and processes (Held at al., 2000). Global social policy 
developed at a time when global governance processes were in flux and positioned itself 
between these two extremes. It emerged as part of the social sciences preoccupation 
with globalisation that characterised the end of the last century with the aim of 
contributing to the definition and composition of globalisation (Deacon, 1997 p. 8).  
 
In absence of a formal rule-bound system of global governance, the vacuum is filled by 
nation states, international organisations, transnational corporations, epistemic 
communities, global social movements, the Catholic Church, international consultancies 
and NGOs and a multitude of transnational actors, which all compete to shape the social 
policy of national governments in a complex process that cannot be captured by the 
extreme positions at both ends of the spectrum. Complex multilateralism recognises 
how some of these actors seek to not only influence the conduct of nation states but to 
also influence the conduct of international organisations. O’Brien et al. (2000) analysed 
how global social movements influenced the policies of the World Trade Organisation 
and World Bank. In the pension reform arena, it will be shown in later chapters that the 
pensions industry had significant influence over the World Bank’s campaign for pension 
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privatisation. Conversely, the ILO was influenced by the development community when 
it designed its national social protection floor policy.  
 
Global Advocacy Coalitions 
 
A predominant way that global social policy has been conceptualised is through what are 
referred to as ‘global advocacy coalitions’ (Orenstein, 2008). International organisations 
with no formal veto power in domestic politics (Tsebelis, 2002), seek to influence 
national governments through the power of persuasion. This approach draws on the 
work of Haas (1992) to show how ‘epistemic communities’ defined as a network of 
knowledge-based actors, seek to articulate cause and effect relationships of complex 
problems to state actors. In doing so, they help states define their interests and frame 
collective debates in order to promote specific policies.  
 
As will be shown in detail in later chapters, the World Bank’s campaign for pension 
privatisation is a perfect example of an epistemic community. It formed a coalition with 
like-minded actors in the pensions industry, think-tanks and domestic politicians with 
neoliberal instincts, usually finance ministers. The coalition was able to shape the 
interests of domestic governments by framing pension provision as an oncoming crisis 
and their solutions as a policy with multiple benefits.  
 
This strand of global social policy studies has opened up a significant research agenda. 
Global social policy has predominantly been portrayed as an arena in which international 
organisations and transnational actors compete to influence the welfare reform 
trajectories of national governments (Deacon et al., 1997; Charlton and McKinnon 2002; 
Fergusson and Yeates, 2014; Orenstein, 2008). It was outlined in the introduction how 
Deacon described this contestation as “something of a ‘war of position’ between those 
agencies and actors within them who have argued for a more selective, residual role for 
the state with a larger role for private actors in health, social protection and education 
provision and those who take the opposite view” (Deacon, 2007, p. 171). Central and 
Eastern Europe was an important site for this analysis, which is why it is the focus of the 
thesis. This ‘war of position’ was predominantly conducted in the battle to shape the 
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region’s transition from socialism to market-based capitalism. In the early years of 
transition, the use of social policy to mitigate the costs of transition was permitted by 
IFIs as a way to keep momentum for reforms that would initially be unpopular. However, 
after the early phase of transition a battle ensued to reduce the cost of social policy and 
to bring market reforms into its provision. Yet, as will be outlined in the next section on 
institutional development and change, policies have a path dependency, which can 
constrain options for reform later on. Chpater Six outlines how the pension policies 
during transition constrained the options for privatisation later on and eventually led to 
their undoing. Chapter One noted how Kaasch (2013) has challenged this approach of 
global social policy, as an arena solely characterized by contestation. It explained how in 
the field of health policy, there is not one dominant model for international organizations 
to promote as a beacon for others to aspire to. In addition, international organisations 
are pressured to justify their own activities in the field. The thesis will also challenge the 
‘global advocacy coalitions’ characterisation of global social policy arena that solely 
consists of contestation. It will be shown that cooperation also exists in the field of 
pensions and social protection.  
 
The Politics of Scale 
 
A politics of scale refers to the idea that the complexity of social policy making in a 
globalised world cannot be captured by thinking in terms of tiers of government: local, 
national, supranational etc. For example, Hudson (2012) contended that global cities are 
a missing dimension of comparative social policy studies. He posits that for global cities, 
globalisation is not something that is “out there” sitting a few tiers above local 
governance, but rather is very much within and a part of the local. By thinking in terms 
of subnational, national, regional and global an important aspect of modern policy 
making is completely lost. Scale is socially and politically constructed; policymakers 
transcend these levels at any one moment, “the local is the global and the global is the 
local” (Yeates, 2008). Policy-making is multi-layered and multi-sited. Individuals act in 
the spaces between different tiers of government.  
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Some of the participants in this thesis perfectly demonstrate the politics of scale. For 
example, Michal Rutkowski was dispatched from the World Bank in 1996 to lead the 
Polish Plenipotentiary on pension reform. He was therefore at one time both an 
international civil servant and a domestic policymaker. Likewise, Agnieszka Chlon-
Dominczak has worked for the World Bank and also been a Labour Minister in the Polish 
government, before returning to academia. Other participants have moved horizontally 
across different organisations. For instance, Monika Queisser was at the World Bank 
before taking up the position as Director of Social Policy at the OECD – the position she 
held during her participation in this research. Both Robert Holzmann and Nicholas Barr 
have held positions at the IMF and World Bank. Both have been advisers for various 
national governments reforming their pension systems. 
 
It is this transnational nature of policy-making that is captured within global social policy 
studies. It calls for a breaking down of taken-for-granted notions of levels of 
governments and the “methodological nationalism’ that is inherent within it. In an 
evolution of the concepts and analytical tools of global social policy, Deacon and Stubbs 
(2013) have called for the ASID (Agency, Structure, Institutions and Discourse) 
framework, developed by Moulaert & Jessop (2006), to deployed by global social policy 
scholars. This particular approach will structure the empirical chapters of the thesis and 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four - the methods chapter.  
 
Institutional Development and Global Pension Reform 
  
The dominant approaches of global social policy outlined in the previous section 
completely overlook institutional analysis. This is argued in this thesis to be an oversight. 
It is argued that global social policy studies will be strengthened by analysing what 
happens to global policy ideas once they are implemented and how they interact with 
domestic institutions. With this in mind, the next section shows how pension systems 
have been embedded within national institutions. It will be shown how once they have 
become embedded reforming pension systems can be very difficult. It outlines the 
various schools within an approach in political science called the “new institutionalism” 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996). This is a framework that positions itself at the meso level of 
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analysis, in particular with regards to the process of institutional development and 
change. Pension expenditure across the OECD currently averages 8.6% of GDP (OECD, 
2017). Therefore, any significant reform to the pension system represents a significant 
institutional change. The institutional approaches developed within political science seek 
to explain institutional stability and change. Each of these will now be outlined and their 
usefulness for the thesis will be explored.  
 
Rational Institutionalism 
 
Rational institutionalism is premised on actor-centred functionalism. Institutions are 
argued to exist because actors instrumentally design the institution. Actors preferences 
are fixed and exogenous. This approach looks at the functioning of the institution and 
works backwards assuming this was the intentional design (Pierson, 2004). It assumes 
total rationality on the part of the designers. The functioning of the institution is thought 
to be the sole design of its creators. It relies heavily on insights from institutional 
economics such as Williamson’s (1975) work on the alleviation of transactional costs. 
From this perspective it is believed that institutions can coordinate the behaviour of 
actors and facilitate bargaining (Keohane, 2005). Scholars from a rationalist perspective 
stress stability in institutions, arguing that they represent a pareto-optimal equilibrium. 
Any change is therefore dependent on an exogenous change to the environment that 
alters the incentive structure for actors (Hall, 2010). From this perspective, institutions 
are largely viewed as voluntaristic and quasi-contractual. Power amongst actors is 
thought to be relatively equally balanced.  
 
One of the critiques of this approach is that working backwards from the design of an 
institution may be highly misleading (Pierson, 2004). This type of analysis reduces a 
dynamic process to a static snapshot which may lose a lot of the detail of the process. By 
describing the world how it is once the dust settles, there is a risk of losing much of the 
detail: it may not even settle (Blyth, 2011). Furthermore, simply reflecting on the choice 
of actors does not allow for unintended consequences of the design of an institution, 
changes in the social environment or gradual change over time through learning. 
Assuming that an institution exists in a current format because it was designed that way, 
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fails to capture institutional development that was designed by actors with diverse goals. 
Assuming instrumental goals by actors also fails to capture whether their actions were 
driven by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ rather than a ‘logic of calculus’. For example, the 
electoral systems designed in Latin America were done along proportional 
representation lines, despite a First-Past-The-Post system being more beneficial to 
designers. This is argued to be a logic of appropriateness on the part of the actors who 
were following the norms of new democratic systems being designed at the time 
(Lijphart, 2018).  
 
Scholars who explain the design of public PAYG pension institutions from this perspective 
argue that it was a process of mobilisation by political parties representing the interests 
of labour. A pension system mitigates some of the harsher consequences of free market 
capitalism; by mobilising within the state apparatus and building cross-class coalitions, 
representatives of labour were able to extract concessions from capital in the form of 
statutory pension benefits. Political elites also calculated that providing a minimum level 
of protection was optimal to stave off revolution (Baldwin, 1990; Korpi, 2001). However, 
whilst the reasoning for this analysis seems plausible for the early Bismarckian and 
Beveridgean pension systems designed a century earlier, it is found wanting as an 
explanatory variable in the later pension privatisation process.  As it will be shown in 
Chapter Six, there was no mass mobilisation of interests campaigning for pension 
privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe. Other material factors do not explain why 
some countries adopted pension privatisation and others never. The demographics of 
countries enacting privatisation varied considerably. So too did the level of public 
expenditure, particularly between regions such as Latin America and Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
 
Material factors, on the other hand, may have more credence in explaining the more 
recent pension reforms that have renationalised private pension pillars. The high costs 
of transition due to the ‘double payment problem’ (see the next section) led to fiscal 
deficits in Central and Eastern Europe. The running of fiscal deficits became more 
problematic upon joining the EU where membership required adherence to the Stability 
and Growth Pact, which stipulates that countries cannot run a deficit above 3% of GDP. 
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The downturn in economic growth following the global economic crisis exacerbated the 
fiscal position of countries in CEE (Casey, 2014). As will be discussed in Chapter Five, 
many of them also had export-led growth models that left them highly exposed to the 
downturn in demand across the EU. (IMF, 2008). Furthermore, the global economic crisis 
had an adverse effect on the on the asset prices pension funds had invested in (Financial 
Times, 2013). This reduced the returns on investments just as the first wave of 
pensioners, who had joined the private pension pillar, were about to retire, significantly 
reducing their income in retirement. 
 
Historical Institutionalism 
 
At its broadest, historical institutionalism seeks to illuminate how political struggles are 
mediated by the institutional setting in which they take place (Thelen, Longstreth, & 
Steinmo, 1992). In comparative politics, it can explain the different outcomes between 
countries facing similar external constraints and challenges. An interest in institutions re-
emerged within political science and political economy around the time of the oil shocks 
in the 1970s, as it became clear that divergence and cross-national differences to this 
external shock were prevalent (Katzenstein, 1978). It can also explain why some factors 
are magnified or mitigated in different contexts. A macro theory, like Marxism, ignores 
how class mobilisation varies between different countries. A mid-level or meso theory 
like historical institution can explain the varying degrees of success of the mobilisation 
of groups representing the interests of labour in different OECD countries (Thelen, 1993). 
It is an instructive approach to analyse why countries have not converged more closely 
in pension provision when many in the developed world face a similar demographic 
transition.  
 
Historical institutionalism works within a general definition of institutions that formal 
organisations and informal rules and procedures that structure political conduct (Blyth, 
2002). It is prefaced on institutions as mutually related rights and obligations that 
distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate action, right and wrong, possible and 
impossible. It therefore makes political behaviour predictable. It is primarily concerned 
with institutions that govern political behaviour. Therefore, the precise nature of the 
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political system is a formal rule that will structure conduct. For instance, in the electoral 
system, the nature of party competition, whether it is a parliamentary or presidential 
system, and the number of chambers of parliament there are all structure the behaviour 
of actors (Thelen, Longstreth, & Steinmo, 1992).  
 
These factors have influenced the nature and speed of multi-pillar pension reforms in 
Central and Eastern Europe. In Hungary, the unicameral parliament was able to enact 
reforms much quicker than Poland whose parliamentary system, in contrast, stresses a 
separation of powers (Orenstein, 2000). The nature of political competition has also 
influenced the reform trajectories in both countries. The winner-takes-all system in 
Hungary has enabled a much more dramatic counter-reform than in Poland. The ruling 
Fidesz Party was never consulted on the pension privatisation in the late 1990s and has 
been in opposition to it since. Its impressive electoral performance in 2010 enabled it to 
completely renationalise the pension system with almost minimal resistance 
(Simonovitz, 2011; 2011b). Poland, on the other hand, has renationalised its pension 
system in a much more sequential manner. First, it reduced the contributions to the 
second pillar in the wake of the global financial crisis, before effectively renationalising 
the system three years after Hungary, despite having larger transitional costs 
(Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012; Financial Times, 2014).  
 
All of the above examples are agreed upon as definitions of institutions by historical 
institutionalists. More contentious are norms, mores and customs that may structure 
action, but are not agreed upon as being defined as institutions within in this branch of 
institutionalism. In pension policy conflicts, the nature of the pension system would be 
defined as a formal institution. For example, whether the pension system is a 
Bismarckian or Beveridgean system, its coverage and its level of maturity will all structure 
the behaviour of actors and constrain to different degrees how extensive a reform of the 
system can be achieved within the parameters of the institution. It is envisaged that 
Bismarckian systems will be more difficult to retrench than Beveridgean systems. This is 
because the retirement income is more generous in these systems; it draws in more 
people who rely exclusively on the state for their retirement income and therefore more 
people will mobilise to resist reforms (Myles & Pierson, 2001). 
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The specific organisation of institutions determines the power of different actors within 
the institution. It also influences what actors perceive their interests to be. In short, it 
can both constrain and shape behaviour (Thelen, Longstreth, & Steinmo, 1992). Hence it 
affects the degree of pressure and the direction of pressure. One of the key differences 
between rational choice and historical institutionalism is the nature of preference 
formation. For rational choice scholars, preferences are exogenously driven. On the 
other hand, historical institutionalism sees preferences as endogenous to the 
institutional context (Thelen, Longstreth, & Steinmo, 1992). From a historical 
institutionalism perspective, pension institutions can shape the recipients’ preferences 
for reform. The more generous a public pension system is, the more difficult any kind of 
reform to it can be as the preferences of the electorate are strongly aligned towards the 
status quo (Pierson, 1994; Myles and Pierson 2001). PAYG pension systems shape 
preferences in a path dependent manner. Whilst there are similarities in both schools 
adopting a preference maximising approach to politics, historical institutionalism also 
argues that actors are also rule followers rather than simply all-knowing rational 
maximisers. These rules may structure action in a way that is not necessarily rational or 
in the interests of the actors involved.  
 
The main contribution of historical institutionalism is its ability to explain both continuity 
in political institutions and also variations across countries. Yet, as this thesis shows, both 
of these appear to have been violated by the pension reform developments in Latin 
America and Central and Eastern Europe. Both regions have witnessed radical reforms 
in pension provision over the past two decades (Brooks, 2005; Mesa-Lago, 1996; Muller, 
2003; Orenstein, 2008). They have also had a degree of convergence in their pension 
provision despite varying institutional arrangements within and between both regions 
(Orenstein, 2008). However, scholars within this school may argue that the counter-
reforms that have taken place across the region suggest a degree of continuity in the 
pension provision as the incentive structure for continuity remained despite the radical 
reforms in the 1990s and this incentive structure may have rendered a reversal of the 
reforms inevitable (Datz & Dansci, 2013; Guardiancich, 2011; Simonovitz, 2011b).    
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Paul Pierson’s (1994, 2000) work on pension systems has become one of the most widely 
applied examples of historical institutionalism and path dependency. Pierson argued that 
PAYG pension systems represent a ‘locus classicus’ in path dependency (Pierson, 1994). 
The popular support of the welfare system, particularly its pension system, means that 
politicians seeking any form of retrench or a ‘path departure’ face electoral 
redistribution.  Pensions and other welfare benefits create a constituency of 
beneficiaries who will mobilise to resist change. Previous policy measures therefore 
affect future policy options in a path dependent manner. The short-term cost of 
retrenchment in pension spending is highly visible, concentrated and immediate. Any 
potential benefits, on the other hand, are more long term, contingent and diffused. Any 
reduction in state spending that is concentrated on pensioners is particularly 
problematic for politicians given the increasing share of pensioners as a proportion of 
the electorate and the higher propensity of pensioners to vote (Sanderson & Scherbov, 
2007). This gives them a disproportionate influence over the policy process. Thus, any 
reform to a pension system must exempt the current cohort of pensioners, and those 
close to retirement, from any reforms. Privatising a pension system is therefore a costly 
affair. Under a PAYG system, those contributing only finance the retirement income of 
the current generation. A path departure towards a private provision entails a ‘double 
payment problem’. Contributors must finance the current generation of pensioners as 
they do under a PAYG system but also set aside resources for their own income in 
retirement. The larger the share of a pension system that is privatised, the larger the 
transition costs.  These considerations predict a large amount of stability in pension 
institutions.  
 
Between 1994 and 2004, 28 countries privatised all or part of their pension system. 
These developments were at odds with the predictions of scholars from historical 
institutionalism. The rare occasions that institutional change takes place from an 
historical institutionalism perspective is argued to be exogenously driven. An event 
punctuates the equilibrium. In the case of pension privatisation across the globe it is 
difficult to find such an event that could be argued to explain 28 different countries, from 
different regions implementing a path departure in pension provision. In the specific case 
of Poland and Hungary, the transition from a state planned economy to a market 
 30 
 
 
economy could be argued to be such an event. Yet, it was argued above to be inadequate 
to describe the transition to a market economy as an exogenous event. Focusing on 
pension privatisation as a single event is therefore difficult to explain from a historical 
institutionalist perspective.  
 
In contrast to the deductive nature of rational choice theory and its parsimonious 
approach to research, historical institutionalism is more inductive in nature because it 
seeks to put the behaviour of actors into the context in which they operate. Historical 
institutionalism is not as deterministic as rational choice or Marxism. Institutions are 
argued to constrain and refract politics but are never the isolated caused of outcomes. 
They structure political interactions and, in this way, affect political outcomes.  
 
One of the main criticisms of historical institutionalism has been its reliance on a 
punctuated equilibrium to explain institutional change (Blyth, 2002; Mahoney & Thelen, 
2010; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). The insight of historical institutionalism has been that 
without emphasising the stickiness of institutions, since if they reflect only changes in 
the balance of power, then they are epiphenomenal to political science and the forces 
around them are only of interest. This has led to a reliance on exogenous factors to 
explain institutional change. However, this has the problem of institutions explaining 
everything until they explain nothing. At the moment of breakdown institutions stop 
structuring politics and politics structure institutions.  
 
Historical institutionalism holds institutions as ontologically prior to actors’ preferences 
structuring their interpretation of their interests. Rational choice scholars on the other 
hand, hold actors and their preferences as ontologically prior to institutions. Rothstein’s 
(1990) analysis of the involvement of trade unions in unemployment insurance schemes 
offer a historical institutionalist approach to explain the varying degrees of membership 
density of trade union membership within the European Union. Rothstein (1990) argues 
that the Ghent unemployment insurance scheme, whereby trade unions administer and 
provide unemployment benefits, is responsible for the high level of trade union 
membership of countries that operate this system.  
 
 31 
 
 
This analysis also offers an insight into the unintended consequences of institutions. 
Many on the left were initially hostile to this scheme of administering unemployment 
benefits. Rather than a trade union insurance scheme, they preferred a state 
administered unemployment benefit that could offer the twin aims of universality and 
uniformity in provision. However, within this institutional arrangement, actors are 
incentivised to join a trade union. The lasting consequence of the Ghent scheme is a high 
level of trade union membership enabling the interests of labour to be more forcefully 
advanced in these countries. At the threshold of rational choice theory and historical 
institution are analyses around the origins of institutions. From a rational choice 
perspective, actors in Sweden seeking to mobilise bias in the interests of labour, 
introduced the Ghent unemployment scheme (Rothstein, 1990). From this perspective, 
actors were ontologically prior to the institution and acted instrumentally to advance 
their interest.   
 
The central criticism of historical institutionalism is its reliance on exogenous shocks to 
explain institutional change and its preoccupation with stability that may fail to recognise 
significant change at the margin. From this perspective, structure is totally dominant 
most of the time until, at rare critical moments, agency triumphs over structure and is 
able to recast institutions (Katznelson, 2003). Streeck and Thelen (2005) sought to 
advance the study of institutions beyond this narrow recognition of institutional change. 
Analysing the end of the ‘golden age’ of capitalism they identified how the process of 
marketization has taken place to varying degrees across all advanced economies. 
Globalisation had witnessed different institutional endowments interacting with 
identical exogenous, and, in some ways, endogenous challenges. This type of change has 
been gradual and incremental rather than abrupt and sudden. It therefore contrasts 
greatly with the exogenous shock model traditionally associated with historical 
institutionalism. It is conditioned within the current institutional context. They contend 
that by making the demand that major change is always the result of an exogenous 
shock, and only minor changes are incremental, makes excessive demands for ‘real’ 
change to be recognised. Gradual, incremental change can add up to major historical 
discontinuities.  
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Whilst the actor-centred functionalism of rational choice views institutions as 
voluntaristic and functional, the focus on rules and enforcement of historical 
institutionalism, does not allow for a gap between institutional design and behaviour 
beneath it. Historical institutionalism ignores the contestation of rules that may occur on 
the ground that can recast how institutions behave and evolve (Mahoney & Thelen, 
2010; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). If institutions are defined as social regimes, then those 
who control the social institution are unlikely to have perfect control of how their 
institution works in reality. By its very nature an institution will be characterised by 
change through evolution if for no other reason than by its imperfect enactment on the 
ground. It is the subject of continuous interaction between rule makers and rule takers. 
Institutions are therefore not reduced to the space in which rational actors maximise 
utility but are continuously contested and recreated by divergent actors with different 
goals. No single set of actors controls the process.  
 
By recognising incremental change, agency and structure do not take prominence 
sequentially, where institutions mostly constrain agent behaviour until a rare critical 
juncture creates a moment for agency. Instead, political institutions are continually 
contested and are the object of permanent skirmishes as actors try to achieve advantage 
by interpreting or redirecting institutions in pursuit of their goals. Actors can cultivate 
change by working around the elements they cannot change.  
 
Streeck and Thelen (2005) outline five different approaches for agents wanting to enact 
incremental institutional change: displacement, layering, drift, conversion and 
exhaustion. Displacement involves the rising salience of a rival institution in relation to 
previous dominant one. This can involve institutional incoherence which opens up an 
opportunity for a rival institution, it may involve the active cultivation of a new logic 
inside an existing institution or the rediscovery of a dormant institution. Layering entails 
new institutional elements being attached to an existing institution. Institutional change 
is achieved by the new institutional layer outgrowing the current one or destabilising the 
old one by siphoning off support or changing the institutional logic. Drift involves the 
deliberate neglect of an institution whose survival depends upon reform due to changing 
external circumstances. Conversion involves the redeployment of an old institution for 
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new purposes. Exhaustion is the gradual breakdown of an institution over time. This can 
occur by the institution exhibiting decreasing returns over time or a change the cost-
benefit of the institution through overextension.  
 
These approaches depend on the level of mobilisation in opposition to change and the 
level of discretion in interpreting the rules of the institution. Given the high level of 
mobilisation against changes to the pension system and the low level of discretion in 
interpreting the rules, their model for change is one of institutional layering. This is 
where the original institution remains intact but is contested with a new institution that 
is added as a layer to the old institution. In the case of Central and Eastern European 
pension reform, the private pension pillar fits the model as a new institutional layer. The 
logic of layering is that the new institutional arrangements can gradually replace the old 
ones without the abrupt ending of the old one that will ignite protest and mobilisation. 
Indeed, it was believed at the time of the private pension reform that the private pillar 
would outgrow and replace the public pension pillar (Muller, 1999). The closing down of 
the private pillar and renationalisation of the pension funds refutes the prediction that 
layering will lead to institutional change. 
 
Mahoney & Thelen (2010) bring agency to the forefront in a further development of the 
approach mapped out by Streek & Thelen (2005). In a similar vein, rather than viewing 
institutions as largely static with actors as compliant rule followers, they see ambiguity 
as a permanent feature of institutions and matters of interpretation of rules and 
implementation opens a site for contestation. They elaborate how the political context 
can structure strategies that proponents of institutional change deploy. In an institution 
with little discretion and strong veto possibilities, like a pension system, Mahoney & 
Thelen (2010) argue that layering is the most likely strategy to be deployed. Moreover, 
in a further categorisation of different agents, subversives are actors who seek to 
displace the institution but, in pursuing this goal, do not break the rules of the institution 
(See figure 1). They look for strategic openings and are likely to use layering as a strategy 
for change. Opportunists, on the other hand, are much more ambivalent with their 
preferences and can be drawn in by subversives. These types of actors will be shown to 
be prevalent in Central and Eastern European pension politics. The subversives were 
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initially able to add a private layer to the public system with the hope of it permanently 
supplanting the public pillar as the main source of retirement income. Opportunists, by 
contrast, were able to take advantage of the weak defence of private systems in the 
midst of the global economic crisis to renationalise the second pillar pension assets.  
 
Figure 1. Contextual and Institutional Sources of Change Agents 
 
  Characteristics of the Targeted Institution 
  Low Level of 
Discretion in 
Interpretation/ 
Enforcement 
High Level of 
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Enforcement 
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(Drift) 
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(Displacement) 
 
Opportunists 
(Conversion) 
 
Taken from Mahoney & Thelen (2010: 28) 
 
 
The Temporal Dimension of Institutionalism 
 
Time is an important variable of analysis in institutionalism. However, most social science 
is analysed within a very small timeframe (Pierson, 2004). Widening the time frame for 
analysis may highlight mechanisms that appear invisible in small time frames, such as an 
analysis of the immediate actors of policy reform. For example, in Müller’s (1999) 
analysis of pension reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, the focus is on the immediate 
actors involved in the reform process like the World Bank, the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministries of Labour or Welfare. Such insights made important theoretical 
contributions, like the propensity of some ministries to favour certain reforms and how 
the level of indebtedness of a country determined the degree of leverage the World Bank 
had over reforms. However, analyses over such a short period, particularly at the 
moment of reform, can over-emphasise the significance of reforms. They may also 
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downplay earlier events and actors that may seem insignificant at the time of the 
reforms but come to the forefront later on.  
 
Arthur’s (1994) four features of technology in a social context that generate increasing 
returns are adapted by Pierson (2000; 2004) to demonstrate how this framework is 
applicable to political institutions. Briefly, these features are:  
 
1. Large set-up or fixed costs. Create a high pay off for continued expansion. 
2. Learning effects. Knowledge gained in the operation of a system lead to 
incentives for continued use.  
3. Coordination effects. Where the benefits an individual receives from an activity 
increase as others adopt the same option. 
4. Adaptive expectations. The self-fulfilling character of expectations can reinforce 
the status quo. 
 
Within pension systems, many of these features are relevant. The large set up or fixed 
costs are applicable in both the transition costs to a funded system and the cost of setting 
up private pension companies. Learning effects are appropriate to describe the 
administrative efficiency of public pension systems. These can be collected by one 
agency, benefit from national economies of scale and have the advantage of employers 
and employee’s familiarity with the system. Adaptive expectations are applicable from 
the perspective of political actors who become accustomed to pension provision funded 
cheaply on a PAYG scheme, whereby the number of contributors outnumbers the 
beneficiaries and difficult decisions about setting aside resources for retirement are 
deferred to future policy makers.  
 
Sociological Institutionalism 
 
Sociological institutionalism arose within the subfield of organisation theory. It focuses 
on norms rather than rules or utility maximisation in the structuring behaviour of 
institutions (Hall, 2010; Hall & Taylor, 1996). It emerged as a result of a dissatisfaction 
with the assumption of rationality in bureaucratic behaviour. Scholars in this tradition 
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argued that many of the actions of organisations are not as a result of rationality, but 
rather because of culturally specific practices. Sociological institutionalism defines 
institutions much more broadly than other branches in political science. They do not just 
include procedures, norms and rules, rather symbols, cognitive scripts and templates 
that frame meaning. It is a concept that collapses the separation between institutions 
and culture. An example of this in the pension reform arena is the number of firms in the 
UK that switched to a defined contribution system once it became the norm, despite 
their defined benefit systems being perfectly sustainable (Bridgen & Meyer, 2005) 
 
In addition, an important contribution from sociological institutionalism is the way in 
which institutions provide identity and meaning in social life which can shape 
preferences. Bismarckian pension systems fostered segregated identities through the 
different pension schemes related to occupational status. The origins of Bismarckian 
pension systems lies in motivations to divide the interests of labour into subgroups 
through pensions tied to occupational status. Beveridegan systems on the other hand, 
with their universal flat-rate system, divided the working class reliant on the state for 
income in retirement and the middle class reliant on the private sector to supplement 
their basic pension (Korpi, 2001). This meaning focused aspect of sociological 
institutionalism aligns it very closely with constructivist institutionalism outlined below. 
Its broad range renders it too broad for a focus on pension systems and therefore 
hereafter, sociological institutionalism will be collapsed into constructivist 
institutionalism.  
 
Constructivist Institutionalism 
 
Constructivist institutionalism or discursive institutionalism (constructivist hereafter) 
emphasises the role of ideas in developing and maintaining political institutions. Ideas 
are argued to shape how we understand and define political problems, give definitions 
to our goals and strategies and are the mechanism of communication in politics (Béland 
& Cox, 2010). They give definitions to our preferences and are responsible for making us 
see some issues as more important than others. Béland & Cox (2010) argue the rise of 
behaviourism had meant that ideas have had a beleaguered status within the social 
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sciences This is in part because they are both difficult to theoretically define and 
empirically explore. Constructivist scholars define ideas as causal beliefs (Emmerij, Jolly, 
& Weiss, 2005) which are products of cognition, produced in our minds and are the link 
between our minds and the material world through our subjective interpretation of our 
surroundings (Béland & Cox, 2010).  
 
They can be causal in two ways: formally, such as X caused Y, but also more informally 
by making connections between things we believe to be related. It can help to explain 
why actors adopt positions that appear to be in direct opposition to their material 
interests. Ideas can take several forms. They may come in the shape of high-profile public 
discourses, frames and ideologies such as described by Campbell (2002). Or more low-
profile assumptions in the background such as the paradigms elucidated by Hall (1993).  
Ideas are embedded in the design of institutions. It is ideas that provide institutional 
stability, however, they can also provide institutional change once the beliefs about a 
particular set of institutional arrangements change. Ideas can also act as a blueprint for 
the design of the new institution once the old one has been discredited (Blyth, 2002). In 
this way an ideational approach to institutions argues that they shape people’s identities, 
which in turn shape their interests and beliefs. This contrasts with rationalist/materialist 
approaches which, take interests as independent of actor’s minds.  
 
Constructivist institutionalism takes issue with a number of core assumptions in both the 
rational choice and historical institutionalisms. Unlike rational choice whose approach is 
rationalist/materialist, constructivist institutionalism emphasises the role of social 
construction in actors’ preferences. It therefore argues against the fixed interests which 
are characteristic of rational choice assumptions. Instead, interests are contended to be 
historical, social and political constructions rather than ‘objective facts’ which have an 
existence independent of actors (Hay, 2011). For constructivists, interests do not exist 
independently of actors’ minds. Therefore, politics is not a battle of actors with clear and 
stable interests. It is maintained to be discursive rather than mechanical. Opposing 
actors can compete through the articulation of their ideas. The development of an 
institution can therefore be a result of the dominance of one idea over another (Blyth, 
2002; Hay, 2011; Schmidt, 2008).  
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Yet, a discursive battle of ideas to shape political outcomes, enact institutional change 
or foster institutional stability may be the result of material factors rather than ideational 
ones. Actors with significant resources will certainly have an advantage in promoting 
their ideas. In the international pension reform arena, the substantial resources of the 
World Bank relative to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) is argued in the 
literature to have given it a significant advantage in promoting its normative position on 
pension reform (Appel & Orenstein, 2013). From this perspective, ideas are no more than 
a mechanism of material supremacy rather than an explanation in their own right.   
 
However, as Mehta (2010) argues, to assert that ideas do not matter would imply that 
shifting ideals on science, democracy, slavery, gender, race and sexuality have not 
affected people’s lives or shaped how they act. Alternatively, it would contend that these 
shifts were somehow the result of material forces. The enlightenment is an illustration 
of a fundamental shift that is not reducible to material forces. A more recent example is 
the dramatic change in the political landscape in United Kingdom after its decision to 
leave the European Union. In a very short period of time the political cleavage has 
changed from a traditional left/right spectrum, to a Remain/Leave divide. The dramatic 
success of the Leave campaign which mobilised ideas of sovereignty and control has the 
potential to upend many of the deep-rooted institutions which characterised economic 
activity, such as the integrated Just-In-Time supply chains in car manufacturing which 
rely on membership of the single market and customs union institutions (Schmidt, 2017).  
 
Similarly, the dramatic shifts in pension provision in Latin America and Central and 
Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s, are argued by Orenstein (2008) to not be 
reducible to material circumstances. Many of the countries that enacted pension 
privatisation were at different stages of the demographic transition; some had relatively 
younger populations compared to others. There was also a large variation in pension 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP and differing levels of maturity of the pension 
systems. Moreover, there was a large difference in the national debt levels of the 
countries involved. All of which are traditionally thought of as triggers for pension 
reform.  It is for this reason that the role of ideas has played a prominent part in the 
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literature on pension privatisation. The World Bank is argued to have engaged in a 
successful campaign of ‘norms teaching’ (see below) in order to persuade many 
countries to adopt their preference for reform. 
 
A constructivist explanation for the series of counter-reforms that have taken place since 
the global economic crisis is completely under-developed so far in the literature. Two 
explanations that the thesis will empirically explore are an ideological shift in the 
consensus on the benefits of pension privatisation and a shift in the understanding and 
interpretation of material surroundings by actors. The first ideational explanation was 
offered as a suggestion by Béland & Orenstein (2013). They argue that the global 
‘consensus’ on pension privatisation has been shifting for some time – before the onset 
of the global economic crisis. In particular, they argue that the World Bank position has 
altered due to internal debates about the costs of and benefits of three pillar pension 
reform.  An explanation of this manner would contrast with the exogenous shock models 
of other institutionalism models. It would offer an endogenous process of change and 
suggest explanations of why certain reform options were chosen over others.  
 
A second constructivist explanation is completely unexplored in the literature. To date, 
the subjective perspective on actors’ motivations for reforming the literature is 
completely absent. Pension privatisation entailed running large budget deficits to fund 
the transition. The perception of budget deficits has shifted since the global economic 
crisis. Whereas international organisations had previously encouraged reforming 
countries to borrow from international financial markets to fund the transition, this has 
been actively discouraged since the crisis as austerity has become the new zeitgeist 
(Papadopoulos & Roumpakis, 2018). The thesis will therefore seek to explore whether a 
change in material conditions motivated actors to enact pension counter-reforms, or 
whether it was simply a change in the ideas and understanding of similar material 
conditions motivated a reform. The latter is a constructivist explanation. If it can be 
found that there was no discernible change in the material conditions, then the crisis 
may have triggered reinterpretation of those conditions. However, this perspective still 
relies on an exogenous shock to explain change unless it is linked with the first 
perspective which explains the specific nature of the change that was enacted. 
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Institutional change from a constructivist perspective is substantially different from 
materialist accounts. Whereas a change in material circumstances is argued to break the 
equilibrium that nurtured stability in rationalist accounts, for constructivists it is the 
understanding that changes rather than the material condition. In sum, materialists 
believe interests change as circumstances change. Constructivists believe that interests 
change as understanding changes. Constructivist scholarship also focuses on proactive 
actors rather than passive ones reacting to changing circumstances. It is agency centred. 
Actors interpret the world around them and construct realities.  
 
The ontological approach is therefore clear: the world is socially constructed and 
therefore social entities do not have an objective existence independent of the mind. 
Epistemologically, ideas are more problematic, since they cannot be physically seen it is 
difficult to discern their influence. For this to happen it requires the utterance of an idea 
which is then used successfully to implement change. Yet there are even more 
problematic issues surrounding the epistemological stance of constructivist 
institutionalism. Concepts such as cognitive locks and zeitgeists are much more difficult 
to explore empirically. 
 
Combining institutional approaches  
 
In an attempt to synthesise the branches of the new institutionalism, Korpi (2001) 
outlines a rational-action approach. This approach is predicated on purposive, rational 
actors seeking to maximize their interests, but it also takes account of power 
asymmetries and distributional conflict. Korpi focuses on elites in the policy making 
process. He argues that welfare institutions are residues of conflict. In particular, 
institutions are argued to be strategies to reduce the costs of exercising power through 
conflict. Institutions can frame which issues make the political agenda and shape the 
preferences and political cleavages. Both are iterations of Lukes’ second and third faces 
of power1 (Lukes, 1974). A focus on the motivations and consequences of elite actions is 
                                                     
1 The first face of power is simply the ability of one individual to make another do something they 
otherwise would not do. The second face of power refers to the ability to set the agenda or keep policies 
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instructive in the study of welfare institutions. Lynch (2015) challenges the notion that 
pension systems emerged due to pressure from old age pressure groups. She argues 
that, at best, they were supporting players rather than pivotal actors. Indeed, the 
pension reforms of Central and Eastern Europe were conducted at an elite level with 
very little participation from civil society or consultation with the electorate.  
 
In an exploration of ideas and institutions, Hudson et al (2008) analysed so called ‘Third 
Way’ ideas and their interaction with the welfare institutions of the UK and Germany. 
They demonstrated ideological consistency between the two main actors enacting the 
reforms – Blair and Schröder – but demonstrated how the outcomes were mitigated by 
the institutions of each country, indicating how ideas interact with context. It also 
demonstrated the importance of selecting the correct dependent variable for analysis. 
Analyses focused heavily on outcomes, may have missed the nuance of the direction and 
convergence of the UK and German institutions.  
 
These insights offer a theoretical framework in which to analyse the pension reforms and 
counter reforms of Central and Eastern Europe. Historical institutionalism stresses 
stability and path dependency in institutions. This appears to have been violated by the 
radical reforms of the late 1990s. However, when one considers the counter-reforms 
from 2010 onwards, the model of stability and path dependency still seems apposite. 
The institutional logic and increasing returns inherent in the PAYG pension system may 
have rendered the newer private tier doomed to fail given the insurmountable obstacle 
of the transition costs involved in pension privatisation. This also adds a material 
explanation for the pension reforms of 2010 onwards. The transition costs of pension 
reform were a material object that may have been insurmountable, despite an apparent 
path of departure in pension provision. This analysis allows for an historical 
institutionalism approach to be aligned with a rational choice account  (See Hall, 2010).  
 
                                                     
off the agenda. It is the power of non-decision. The third face of power is the ability of actors to convince 
subjects to act against their own interests (Lukes, 1974; 2005)  
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In addition to the framework set out by Korpi, there is also a constructivist account of 
the radical reforms and counter reforms. The role of international organisations as ‘social 
constructivist actors’ will be outlined below. This process can influence how actors 
interpret their material surroundings. The campaign led by the World Bank to privatise 
pension systems persuaded countries to view the ‘implicit pension burden’ as a measure 
for deep concern (World Bank, 1994). This led to the process of partial privatisation as 
actors were willing to use public sector borrowing to finance the transition. This led to 
many countries in Central and Eastern Europe running large deficits that were not seen 
as problematic as the constructed social problem of the implicit pension burden was 
being tackled. However, in the event of the global economic crisis, budget deficits were 
reinterpreted as being highly problematic and something that should take priority from 
policy makers (Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012). This reconstruction of a material reality 
meant that the implicit pension burden changed and became a secondary priority to the 
budget deficit. 
 
Pierson (2004) argues that rather than focus on institutional change, a more superior 
descriptor is one of institutional development. This may have utility in analysing the 
evolution of pension reforms in Central and Eastern Europe.  Primarily, it enables an 
analysis that allows for earlier parts in the process that constrain later options. 
Identifying these constraining mechanisms can help to explain institutional stability and 
change. These are unlikely to be captured by a snapshot or by comparative statics which 
characterise some models of institutional change. The expansion of pension provision in 
Central and Eastern Europe throughout the communist period and during the transition 
was a constraining force on the options for pension reformers in the late 1990s. A focus 
on institutional development also allows for downstream aspects to be analysed, it 
allows for the role of losers and marginal groups to act as agents and catalysts for change. 
Moreover, it allows for an analysis of overlapping processes. Institutional change cannot 
be analysed in isolation, there may be change across an array of institutions.  
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The Political Economy of Global Social Policy 
 
This section outlines a complementary analytical framework of the thesis. The first 
section outlined the effort to shift the focus of global political economy towards non-
state actors by defining the nature of global governance as one of ‘complex 
multilateralism’ (O'Brien et al., 2000). This concept acknowledges that, alongside states, 
other actors have influence over national politics and the international agenda. These 
include international organisations, multinational corporations and global social 
movements.  This analysis focuses on the role of international organisations in the global 
policy process. Since the focus of this section is global, it positions itself within the 
International Political Economy (IPE) literature. It compares three different approaches 
to analysing international organisations within the IPE literature: realist, liberal and 
constructivist.  
 
This section contends that both the constructivist approach and realist approaches are 
important in explaining the global process of pension reform. It argues that international 
organisations are purposive actors in their own right which have a degree of autonomy 
from nation states. They exert a normative influence over domestic social policy through 
a process of ‘norms creation’. This literature does not seek to diminish the role of 
domestic actors in policy formulation but rather focuses on the ideational inspiration and 
normative influence that international organisations have in the ‘policy development’ 
and ‘agenda setting stage’ of the policy process. However, alongside this, nation states 
also exert influence over the international organisations they have created and continue 
to finance. Chapter Eight, for example, shows how Germany sought to influence the 
promotion of certain personnel as a quid pro quo for the resources it invests in the ILO.  
 
Using the insights of Barnett and Finnemore (2004), it will be argued that international 
organisations are ‘constructivist social actors’ which use their rational-legal, delegated, 
expert and moral authority to create social reality. Through their power of classification 
and ability to provide meaning to the material conditions of nation states, international 
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organisations can have a powerful influence over how domestic actors interpret their 
material conditions; and the course of action they perceive to be desirable. Furthermore, 
this pervasive ability to construct meaning can have self-fulfilling consequences. For 
example, market-oriented reforms might be argued by some international organisations 
to increase inward investment. A country that adopts these reforms will signal to 
markets that they are a market-friendly place to do business and the reforms become 
self-fulfilling through construction not necessarily a change in material conditions.  
 
The Realist Approach to International Organisations 
 
International organisations have until recently been largely neglected in the IPE 
literature. This was because of the dominance of the realist perspective in IPE’s parent 
discipline - International Relations (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). Realists have an 
ontology that is state centric. For realists, states are the only actors in the international 
economy with power and therefore states are the focus of realists (Gilpin & Gilpin, 2001; 
Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1990). Realists subscribe to the idea that international 
organisations are puppets of their masters - nation states (Hawkins, et al., 2006; Wade, 
2002). Since international organisations are financed by nation states, realists believe it 
is logical to assume that they exist only to serve the states that finance them; otherwise 
why would states continue to finance them?  
 
Realists have a rationalist approach to their analytical models. They deploy a utility 
maximising framework borrowed from economics to explain the behaviour of states 
(Kirschner, 2009). They believe that the world is characterised by anarchy and that 
conflict is an inevitable outcome of international economic relations. Given the anarchic 
conditions of the world, states are believed to prioritise security over all other 
considerations. For example, according to realists, a state maximises its utility by 
choosing a course of action that guarantees security even if another option had greater 
economic benefits (Kirschner, 2009). 
 
For realists, international organisations can play a role in exerting a state’s hegemonic 
influence over other states. In the case of the World Bank, the US is the main financial 
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contributor to the financing of the Bank’s resources. In return, the US is granted 
privileged voting rights in the executive branch of the Bank and is able to veto the 
appointment of the Bank’s president – who by convention is American. Wade (2002) 
offers a compelling account of how the US was able to exert influence over the content 
of the World Bank’s annual World Development Report in 2000. Furthermore, he argues 
that the firing of one of the Bank’s most notorious and influential internal critics – Joseph 
Stiglitz – was the result of pressure it exerted on the Bank’s president Larry Summers 
(2002, pp. 221-223).    
 
However, this perspective is at odds with the Bank’s position on pension privatisation 
following the publication of ‘Averting’. In 2005, the US Congress rejected Bush’s plan to 
privatise part of the US Social Security System through the use of individual savings 
accounts (Galston, 2007). Given the Bank’s prominence in advocating pension 
privatisation across the globe, how can it be that its policy proposals are dictated by the 
United States when its congress forcibly rejected the World Bank’s prescribed model? 
 
Furthermore, there are countless examples where international organisations deviate 
from the wishes of powerful states. Realists may contend that this deviation from the 
wishes of the state which finances it can be explained by a ‘principal-agent problem’ 
(Hawkins, et al., 2006). This is where the agent is given a certain degree of discretion in 
order to operate and may be acting at the edge of that zone of discretion. However, the 
number of instances of international organisations acting in opposition to powerful 
western backers stretches this perspective to its limits and suggests that further 
explanation is required. 
 
The Liberal Approach to International Organisations 
 
In contrast with realists, liberals tend to downplay the inevitability of conflict in 
international relations and suggest that states are likely to cooperate in order to 
establish mutually beneficial outcomes (Keohane, 2005). Where realists see a world 
characterised by anarchy, liberals view a world that is characterised by interdependence 
and cooperation (Abdelal, et al., 2010; Cooley, 2009). Liberals contend that international 
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organisations exist to correct market failure in the international economy (Williamson, 
1975). It is common for liberals to argue that international organisations make the 
international economy more efficient. They argue that international organisations create 
public goods that are beneficial to the international economy and help regulate mutually 
beneficial systems. International impediments to the market such as incomplete 
information, transaction costs, and other barriers to ‘pareto-improving’ welfare 
conditions can be alleviated by international organisations (Barkin, 2013). For example, 
the World Trade Organisation regulates a system of free trade where incomplete 
information may lead to countries cheating on their trade agreements. In the case of the 
World Bank, its huge research resources are thought by liberals to produce information 
and knowledge that is beneficial to the international economy. Indeed, it has been 
argued that the entire role for the World Bank has been recast as a knowledge bank 
(Stone, 2003). In the pension reform arena, the World Bank conducts research on 
pension systems and produces advice on desirable reforms. For some, it has become a 
knowledge bank. It also provides technical assistance and loans for countries seeking to 
reform their pension systems. From a liberal perspective this would conform to their 
interpretation of international organisations providing information to alleviate 
information asymmetries. The technical assistance and loans are an example of a 
material influence mentioned in above, which may incentivise countries to undertake 
the reforms the World Bank perceives as desirable. 
 
However, there are numerous instances of international organisations creating 
inefficiencies which contradict the liberal stance. For example, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) was set up to alleviate countries in the midst of a balance of 
payments problem, providing liquidity to stabilise their respective currencies Yet, the 
East Asian financial crisis witnessed the IMF exacerbate the economic crisis and prescribe 
solutions at odds with standard economic theory (see Stiglitz, 2002 pp. 89-132). 
Moreover, liberals tend to adopt a ‘black box’ approach to International organisations. 
There is an input from states, such as realising that an organisation needs to be created 
to alleviate some market impediment, and then an output where it solves this problem, 
but no study of the internal dynamics of the international organisation (Barkin, 2013).  
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Despite their differences in ontology – realists believing in an anarchic world and liberals 
in an interdependent world – there are a number of similarities in the liberal and realist 
epistemology. Both approaches are positivist and rationalist using conceptual tools 
borrowed from microeconomics, such as utility maximisation and rational choice 
theories.  Both realists and liberals are ‘materialist’ believing in being able to ‘objectively’ 
describe what the world consists of and contains (Cooley, 2009; Kirschner, 2009). This 
materialism is the basis on what state actors view around them and informs their 
preferences. As a result of this, both realist and liberal scholarship tends to be 
parsimonious, utilising algebra and calculus to explain the world and predict the actions 
of actors in a given circumstance. These similarities have parallels with rational 
institutionalism outlined in section one.  
 
Constructivist Political Economy 
 
Constructivist IPE distinguishes itself from the rationalist-materialist scholarship of 
realist and liberal approaches. It is critical of the perceived incentives that realist and 
liberals believe are derived from the material structure of the economy (Abdelal, 2009). 
Furthermore, it is critical of the parsimonious models these approaches construct, which 
are presumed to correspond to ‘reality’, instead of representing stylised heuristics that 
illustrate a form of decision making for actors. In contrast, constructivism adopts a more 
interpretive approach to IPE. Its foundation is the premise that preferences vary and are 
not fixed like in a rationalist-material perspective (Abdelal, 2009). What causes 
preferences to vary are the norms, identities and meanings that actors prescribe to 
interpret the material world around them. Rather than focus on ‘material facts’, 
constructivists stress the importance of ‘social facts’. Social facts are collectively shared 
ideas which do not necessarily correspond to the material world. For example, the global 
economic crisis led to deterioration in the fiscal position of many of the developed 
world’s economies. This could be described as a ‘material fact’. However, how actors in 
these countries interpreted their increased borrowing and increasing debt to GDP ratio 
was a ‘social fact’. For some countries this deterioration in public finances meant that 
austerity was a necessary policy prescription to avoid increased costs to public sector 
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borrowing. Others with even higher debt to GDP ratio interpreted the weakened fiscal 
position differently and did not see the need to substantially curtail public expenditure.  
 
Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons (2010) propose four different pathways to constructivist IPE: 
meaning, cognition, uncertainty and subjectivity. The first of these pathways is meaning. 
It draws on sociological insights to explain the behaviour of actors. Weber first 
articulated the human dependence on prescribing meaning to the world around them 
(Weber, 1922). A strong version of meaning-oriented constructivism suggests that actors 
rarely, if ever, interpret the world around them purely in material terms. Instead, the 
economy is endowed with social purposes which are derived from shared norms, ideas 
and meanings. Applying this to global pension policy, the World Bank was able to 
prescribe a specific meaning to the pension systems of those economies which enacted 
pension privatisation. The demographic transition of declining fertility rates and an 
ageing population was endowed with a specific meaning, a demographic crisis that 
required action. The opening paragraph in the forward of Averting encapsulates this: 
 
“Systems providing financial security for the old are under increasing strain 
throughout the world. Rapid demographic transitions caused by rising life 
expectancy and declining fertility mean that the proportion of old people in the 
general population is growing rapidly. Extended families and other traditional 
ways of supporting the old are weakening. Meanwhile, formal systems, such as 
government-backed pensions, have proved both unsustainable and very difficult 
to reform. In some developing countries, these systems are nearing collapse” 
(World Bank, 2004 p. xiii) 
 
There was considerable variation in the pension systems of the thirty countries that 
enacted pension privatisation; some had large coverage rates and had reached 
maturation whilst others had low rates of coverage and had not yet reached maturation. 
This difference in material factors gives credence to a constructivist meaning-orientated 
explanation for the reforms. From a meaning-orientated perspective, the aim of this 
thesis is to ascertain whether the interpretation of the material surroundings was 
reinterpreted by actors in the series of counter-reforms. 
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The second pathway of constructivism – cognition – draws on insights from psychology, 
cultural sociology and behavioural economics to explain how human beings have long 
relied on shortcuts and heuristics to make decisions (Duina, 2010). Rather than searching 
for meaning, actors are unable to process the large amounts of information available to 
them and instead use heuristics and shortcuts to make decisions (Kahneman, 2012). This 
contrasts with the liberal approach to International organisations which argues they 
perform a public good in providing information to make markets work better. This 
argument posits that too much information is the problem. In the pension reform arena, 
framing the pension advice as a ‘demographic crisis’ acted as a heuristic device to actors. 
Furthermore, as more and more countries privatised their pension systems, cognitive 
frames for actors became more powerful and this acted as a shortcut making 
privatisation the ‘common sense’ reform for pension system reformers. Reforming 
countries simply followed the cognitive script that had been laid out by their peers. For 
instance, Slovakia followed the lead of Hungary and Poland in introducing a private 
pension pillar despite much more favourable conditions of its PAYG pension system 
(Muller, 2001). This also provides a useful framework to analyse the pension counter-
reforms after the global economic crisis. In the same manner that pension privatisation 
diffused rapidly across Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, the same process 
was evident in the series of counter-reforms. Countries in both regions appeared to 
follow lead-peers in enacting the reforms.  
 
The third pathway – uncertainty – describes a situation in which past events offer no 
solution for actors who must make decisions without the heuristics described above. In 
contrast to cognitive constructivists who view the world as complex, constructivists in 
this pathway view it as potentially unknowable (Widmaier, 2010). The transitions from 
planned economies to market economies presented such a scenario. Social policy was 
used as a tool to mitigate the consequences of large unemployment in Central and 
Eastern Europe as large sectors of the economy became redundant (Deacon, 1997, p. 
94). Pensions were used as a strategic tool to avoid social unrest. Millions of workers 
were permanently taken out of workforce by being enabled to retire early through 
disability pensions (Vanhuysse, 2006). This neutralised the threat of civil disorder. 
However, in Hungary and Poland it led to extremely high rates of expenditure on 
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pensions. Between 1989 and 1996, the number of pensioners increased by 20 per cent 
in Hungary and by 46 per cent in Poland (Vanhuysee, 2009, p. 57). Pension expenditure 
peaked at 11.5 per cent in Hungary and 14.5 per cent in Poland (Muller, 1999 p. 98). This 
led actors to explore radical options as there was no precedent to the high level of 
pension expenditure.   
 
Under these circumstances, the ‘path-departing’ process of pension privatisation was 
made possible. Uncertainty is argued to lead to radical steps whereby actors can use 
ideas to create a blueprint for reform. Blyth (2002) outlines the process of the two great 
economic transformations of the twentieth century: The Keynesian economic consensus 
of the post-war economic order and the shift to neoliberalism during the 1980s. He 
argues that a crisis enables actors to provide an ideational narrative to attack the existing 
institutional order. It also enables actors to use ideas as blueprints for a new institutional 
order. The global economic crisis also created an environment with a large degree of 
uncertainty. As market volatility swept the globe in a completely unforeseen manner, 
the crisis allowed opponents of market-based pension systems to create a narrative that 
undermined them and an alternative proposal to replace them. 
 
The final path to constructivism –subjectivity – focuses on ‘subjects’ rather than pre-
existing ‘agents’. Whereas agents endow material facts with meaning or deploy cognitive 
devices or manage uncertainty, subjects are positioned within a particular discourse 
which defines their identity. The discourse in which subjects are positioned shapes what 
is possible and impossible. Rather than seeing norms as regulative and constitutive this 
branch of constructivism sees them as expressions of power. In the context of pension 
reform, it is situated within a discourse of neoliberal economics. The dominance of 
neoliberalism influences the language and ideas that shape debates on the pros and cons 
of reform. Equally, the series of counter-reforms were initiated by two populist leaders 
of Argentina and Hungary. Their actions were presented as a narrative against 
imperialistic international financial institutions which seek to constrain the actions of 
domestic policy makers to the detriment of national citizens (Arza, 2012).  
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International Organisations as ‘Social Constructivist Actors’ 
 
Barnett and Finnemore (1999; 2004) adopt a constructivist approach to explain the 
power international organisations exhibit in shaping the behaviour of domestic policy 
actors. Their analysis opens the ‘black box’ of international organisations which was 
argued above to be a key criticism of the liberal approach. International organisations 
have power in their ability to classify the world. The classification process involves 
ordering information so that it is known and interpreted in a certain way. For instance, 
the World Bank publishes data on the sustainability of the pension systems of countries 
and compares them with others. This form of classification is done to orient action from 
countries who find themselves in a less desirable category. International organisations 
also have the power to fix meanings. For example, the World Bank was able to attach a 
macroeconomic element to pension reform. Instead of pension systems primarily being 
about income security in old age, they also became a tool of capital market development. 
International organisations also have power in the ability to diffuse norms. When they 
turn information into knowledge they do so with the intent to spread this knowledge as 
widely as possible. Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 2004) argue that through rational-
legal, delegated, expert and moral authority, international organisations regulate, and 
furthermore, construct social reality. Each source of power will now be discussed.  
 
Rational-legal Authority 
 
International organisations are bureaucracies that have a distinctive form of social 
authority. Weber (1922) first identified the characteristics of bureaucracies which set 
them aside from other forms of administration and rendered them more efficient. 
Bureaucracies exercise power through impersonal rules; these rules not only regulate 
but also construct the social world. Bureaucracies are characterised by hierarchy, 
meritocracy and a division of labour. It is the impartial and impersonal nature of applying 
rules that gives bureaucracies.  Barnett and Finnemore (2004) argue that whilst 
bureaucracies are by their very nature competent at completing complex tasks, they can 
also exhibit pathological behaviour which can lead to them failing to meet the objectives 
they were set up  to meet. This pathological behaviour stems from an insular culture of 
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bureaucracy and an adherence to rules. In the case of the World Bank, it has been 
criticised by Wade for hiring staff from a narrow pool of expertise. The World Bank tends 
to hire staff that were educated in American universities and also in the discipline of 
economics (Wade, 2002). This tendency to hire candidates with identical academic 
credentials narrows the world view of its staff. It leads to staff adopting similar outlooks 
and prescribing similar policy solutions. 
 
Delegated Authority 
 
International organisations are created with specific tasks and given power from states 
to undertake these tasks. At first sight, this form of authority might appear to concur 
with the realist interpretation on international organisations. However, states tend to 
delegate tasks to international organisations with broad mandates and little prescriptive 
guidance how to undertake these tasks (Hawkins et al., 2006). For example, as 
mentioned earlier the IMF was given the mandate to alleviate currency crises. In seeking 
to fulfil this task, it has broadened its mandate away from regulating balance of 
payments problems by focusing on imports and exports towards more and more 
domestic conditionality (Stone, 2008). This, it believes, is the root causes of external 
imbalances such as large fiscal deficits. In the case of the World Bank, it broadened its 
mandate away from reconstruction to development under the presidency of Robert 
McNamara (Finnemore, 1997). It was the broadening of this mandate which brought the 
World Bank into pension reform debates as it took the normative position that pension 
privatisation could aid capital market and hence economic development (World Bank, 
1994). The empirical investigation will analyse whether the Bank still prescribes pension 
reform as a key tool of development. If not, it will be possible to make a hypothesis that 
given its mandate the World Bank will retreat from the pension reform arena if it no 
longer believes it to be a useful tool for development. 
 
Moral Authority 
 
The missions that international organisations are given can make them a moral authority 
if they are deemed to be progressive or socially desirable. This is a source of power (Hall, 
 53 
 
 
1997). Whereas states are perceived to represent their own narrow interests, if 
international organisations are perceived to be representing the interests of the 
international community, they can exert authority through their moral standing (Hurd, 
1999). The maintenance of moral authority is at odds with the realist perspective of 
international organisations. They must make every effort to present themselves as 
autonomous and not doing the bidding of powerful states (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). 
A perception of an international organisation representing the interests of its financial 
backers will impede the exercising of moral authority.  
 
In the case of the World Bank, its mission of promoting development and alleviating 
poverty, is a socially desirable goal. However, its role in the structural adjustment 
programmes led by the IMF has damaged the moral authority of the World Bank (Stiglitz, 
2002). The consequence of this is that it has lost some authority in some of the poorer 
nations. In the pension reform arena, Kpessa & Béland (2012) argue that the World Bank 
has had very limited leverage in Africa on pension reform due its poor legacy in the region 
following the social consequences of its structural reforms. On the other hand, the ILO 
has been able to gain a leverage in Africa with its proposal for a global social protection 
floor (Kpessa & Béland, 2012). However, the market orientated approach enhanced the 
moral authority of the Bank in Central and Eastern Europe following the region’s 
transition to a market economy away from a planned economy.  
 
On the specifics of the pension advice to be investigated empirically, alongside 
advocating privatisation on the grounds of capital market development, the World Bank 
was also keen to present its proposals as characterised by a high degree of equity. It 
argued that public pension systems were inequitable because the beneficiaries were civil 
servants and other public sector workers whose income in retirement was financed by 
poorer private sector workers or informal workers through consumption taxes. How the 
World Bank has continued to present a moral argument in its reform advice will be 
investigated. 
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Expert Authority 
 
Expertise is a source of authority for international organisations (Barnett & Finnemore, 
1999). They can often be the sole source of certain forms of knowledge. For example, 
with countries that have low administrative capabilities, the IMF can be the only source 
of economic data in that country (Miller, 2007). Expertise not only makes international 
organisations an authority, it also shapes how they behave. The professional training and 
norms within the organisation are derived from expertise. In the case of the World Bank, 
this expertise tends to be focused on economics (Chwieroth, 2007). An influential role 
for economists will shape the kind of knowledge that is generated by the World Bank. It 
has a tendency for quantification, presenting a technocratic, impersonal, depoliticised 
knowledge which has a façade of objectivity. This objective, impartial façade is a source 
of authority. By relying on quantitative measures, the World Bank is able to present some 
distance between its subjective staff and the data. It can simply claim the numbers speak 
for themselves. They were out there just waiting to be collected.  
 
However, it is not simply the case that the data was out there waiting to be collected. 
The World Bank chooses which data to collect, and how it is to be measured and 
presented. Furthermore, the World Bank does more than simply present information. It 
endows the information with meaning, creating knowledge. For example, in the pension 
reform arena, a large justification for reforming pension systems lay in the creation of a 
measure of the implicit pension burden (World Bank, 1994). This particular measure 
rearticulated how countries should measure the sustainability of their pension systems. 
It classified seemingly balanced pension systems as highly imbalanced by adding future 
liabilities onto the current pension expenditure and extrapolating the burden using 
demographic data.  
 
This section has shown that international organisations have the ability to construct 
social reality through their sources of power. It has argued that this process of 
construction can transcend material conditions and orient action. This ability to 
construct social reality through meaning, cognition, uncertainty and social action has 
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been argued to be most conducive at the agenda setting and policy formulation stage of 
the policy process. The next section now moves onto define the specific pension system 
designs that international organisations have fought over, and the values that underpin 
them. 
 
Concepts and Principles in the Design of Pension Systems 
 
Many individuals across the globe expect to spend a proportion of the life course in 
‘retirement’. This is a period, after a sustained participation in the workforce, during 
which individuals withdraw themselves from the labour market in order to pursue other 
activities instead of paid work. This is a relatively recent phenomenon. Historically, 
individuals would work right up until death or incapacity forced them to stop (McKay, 
2009). Despite the positive associations with retirement, it is not universally viewed as a 
benign process. It has been argued to have been used as a mechanism to actively exclude 
older workers from the labour force in order to create a reserve army of labour to be 
tapped into when labour is in short supply and discarded once demand for labour falls 
(Walker, 1986).  
 
In order to spend a period of life in retirement it is necessary to have access to financial 
resources to have income security once withdrawing from the formal labour market. The 
provision of these financial resources, the duration of  the period of retirement should 
be and the question as to whether society or the individual should provide the resources 
for their retirement are the key debates within pension policy. Different systems stress 
different responsibilities for providing an adequate income in retirement. There are a 
broad range of pension systems across the developed world (Bonoli, 2000; Disney & 
Johnson, 2001; Ebbinghaus, 2011; Holzmann, 2005; 2012). Each of these has different 
implications for the economy and society and will either reduce or increase inequalities 
in old age income.   
 
The main divisions involve choices between publicly or privately provided schemes. 
There are decisions to be made as to whether schemes should be fully funded or whether 
they should be provided on a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) basis (which will be explained 
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below). Some systems will seek to smooth income over the life cycle, focusing on the 
insurance aspect of the system. Meanwhile others will seek to provide adequate incomes 
for all old age citizens and are therefore relatively more redistributive in nature. A 
decision must be made by the designers of the system as to whether participation in the 
scheme should be voluntary or mandatory. Some schemes have a defined benefit 
arrangement, whereby a proportion of income is guaranteed, whereas others are based 
on the defined contribution principle, whereby the income in retirement is dependent 
upon the level of contributions and the return a fund manager can make upon investing 
the contributions. Crucially, this system does not guarantee a specific amount in 
retirement. As a consequence, this type of system is often seen as less desirable and 
resisted by groups who represent beneficiaries (Myles & Pierson, 2001). Each of these 
design considerations will now be discussed in more detail as it necessary to understand 
the implications of each policy choice to understand global pension policy.  
 
Beveridgean versus Bismarckian Pension Systems 
 
In 1889, Otto von Bismarck created a social insurance system in Germany. In an effort to 
appease the growing socialist movement, health insurance and accident insurance were 
supplemented by old age and disability pensions to form the bedrock of the German 
welfare settlement (Korpi, 2001). These arrangements would later spread across much 
of Europe (Bonoli, 2000). The key component of this system which differentiates it from 
its Beveridgean counterpart is that under a Bismarckian system the pension system seeks 
to maintain income in retirement. It is financed by contributions from the state, the 
employer and the individual.  A Bismarckian pension system maintains status 
differentials generated by employment throughout retirement. Due to the larger 
contributions made by higher earners, it produces a pension that is more generous to 
higher earners. In conjunction with unemployment protection and insurance-based 
healthcare, the Bismarckian pension system is a core component of Bismarckian welfare 
states. These are characterised by a high degree of earnings-related benefits such as 
more generous unemployment benefits for higher earners due to their larger 
contributions. In Esping Andersen’s (1990) welfare regime typology, this type of benefit 
is characteristic of the conservative welfare regime. The governance of Bismarckian 
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pension systems tends to be tripartite in nature, with representatives from the state, 
capital and labour determining pension arrangements through bargaining (Bonoli & 
Palier, 2007).  
 
In contrast, the pension system advocated by William Beveridge in the UK in the 1942 
Beveridge Report was a universal flat rate pension entitlement. This was to alleviate 
‘want’ – something Beveridge argued was one of the ‘five giant evils’ (Beveridge, 1942). 
It was adopted by the post-war Labour government as part of a wide-ranging package of 
reforms enacted to create the welfare state (Glennerster, 2009). Instead of seeking to 
replace income like the Bismarckian system, a Beveridgean pension system is concerned 
with poverty alleviation. It is funded through the tax system. A pension system that seeks 
to provide a universal minimum leaves space for supplementary income in retirement to 
be provided by the private sector. It is for this reason that the UK has a much more 
established private pension industry than many of its European counterparts (Bridgen & 
Meyer, 2011). The state pension never crowded out private insurance in the same way 
that more generous Bismarckian systems have not allowed a significant private pension 
industry to flourish (Ebbinghaus, 2011). This is due to the lower demand for 
supplementary pensions as a result of significant income replacement by the public 
pension system.  
 
The governance of Beveridgean pension systems tend to be solely the responsibility of 
the state and they exclusively operate on a PAYG (to be explained below) basis, which is 
not necessarily the case with Bismarckian systems. A Beveridgean pension system can 
be part of the liberal or social democratic welfare regime depending on the generosity 
of the flat rate pension. An entitlement that only seeks to alleviate poverty will result in 
individuals relying on the market to supplement their retirement income. It is therefore 
characteristic of the liberal welfare regime. On the other hand, a more generous flat rate 
pension will reduce the need to use the market for income in retirement and this, 
alongside the universal nature of Beveridgean systems, makes it more aligned to the 
ideals of the social-democratic welfare regime. A generous universal minimum is also a 
redistributive pension system. Despite the differences between these two ‘ideal types’ 
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of pension provision, most European pension systems have elements of both with a flat 
rate element combined with some form of income replacement (Bonoli, 2000).  
 
Voluntary versus Mandatory Participation  
One of the principal rationales for the state to involve itself in pension provision is the 
inability of individuals to make rational decisions about setting aside resources for 
retirement and the market failures inherent in a private insurance system (Barr, 2001). 
Significant microeconomic behavioural research has shown that individuals prioritise 
current consumption of future consumption and have difficulty in predicting what they 
will need to maximise utility in the future (Foster & Heneghan, 2018; Laibson, 1997; 
Loewenstein, O'Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003; Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). Individuals are 
rational for the future, but not the present. When the future arrives, it becomes the 
present and is therefore acted upon irrationally. For example, on a dieting plan to lose 
weight that allows for an unhealthy snack over the course of the diet, individuals will opt 
for the unhealthy snack earlier and the more healthy one to be consumed at a later date 
(Just, Mancino, & Wansink, 2007). The same principle applies to individuals stating a 
desire to quit smoking; the date for quitting is often some point in the future rather than 
the present (see Barr, 2010).  
These principles also apply to pension saving. Often when individuals become aware of 
the need to save for retirement it is already too late to set aside resources for an 
adequate income in retirement (Cremer & Pestieau, 2011; Foster, 2012). Although some 
individuals with a low income may not have any resources to set aside. Myopia or short-
sightedness is often offered as a rationale for mandatory public pensions. As Kotlikoff 
(1987) puts it, “there seems to be an unstated belief that, left to their own devices, a 
sizeable fraction of households would inadequately save and insure” (1987, p. 675). 
Therefore, making contributions mandatory enables a pooling of resources that would 
not be available without classic insurance market failures, like adverse selection (Barr, 
2001). For example, without compulsion, only those who are certain to live a significant 
number of years past retirement would have the incentive to insure themselves 
(Friedman & Warshawsky, 1987; Gustman, Mitchell, & Steinmeier, 1994). This raises the 
cost of providing insurance and hence the cost of contributions. In addition, there would 
 59 
 
 
be an incentive for insurance providers to try and exclude those who were at risk of early 
retirement due to ill health. Compulsion, on the other hand, reduces the cost of provision 
by pooling the resources of those who will live a long way past retirement with those 
who contribute but do not retire or those who only live a short number of years past 
retirement.  
 
However, whilst these considerations render a mandatory element of pension provision 
desirable, the specific size of the mandatory element will determine the space for 
voluntary aspects of pension provision. In all developed societies, the mandatory 
pension scheme is not the only source of income in retirement (OECD, 2015; Queisser et 
al, 2007). Policy makers must decide whether to make a compulsory pension scheme 
generous enough so that individuals do not feel the need to also have a second pension, 
or to have the mandatory scheme only large enough to meet basic needs, with any 
additional income in retirement coming from a supplementary pension scheme.  
 
State versus Market Provision 
 
Pension systems have both primary and secondary objectives. The primary objective of 
a pension system is to provide an adequate income in retirement. However, a pension 
system also has a macroeconomic impact. It may stimulate private investment and 
enhance capital market development (Holzmann, 1997; Lefort & Walker, 2002) or it can 
act as an automatic stabiliser in the economy in the result of an economic downturn, as 
pensioners maintain a base level of expenditure in the economy (Darby & Melitz, 2008; 
Natali, 2011). State run pension schemes may be funded through the tax system, which 
also has economic implications in its interaction with the labour market (Hinrichs & 
Jessoula, 2012). For these reasons, choices around the precise role of the state and the 
market in pension provision are contentious. There is no consensus on whether pension 
systems should be used as a tool for macroeconomic policy or what the impact of 
different pension systems on the economy are. Whilst some extol the virtue of privately-
run pension schemes (Iglesias & Palacios, 2001; World Bank, 1994) others are much more 
critical (Barr, 2000; Orszag & Stiglitz, 1999).  
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Proponents of state provision emphasise intergenerational solidarity, redistribution and 
income security that underpin the system (Ervik, 2005). This type of solidarity is premised 
on the working-age population financing the income of the old-age population with an 
understanding they will be beneficiaries when they retire. It is also distinguished in 
providing a ‘defined benefit’ form of pension payment (to be discussed in more detail 
below), whereby an individual is guaranteed a specific amount that is not dependent on 
their contributions meeting this amount. Samuelson, (1958) and Aaron (1966) were able 
to show that so long as wage growth exceeds population growth then recipients of PAYG 
pensions are able to receive a larger pension than the amount they contribute, and the 
scheme still remains sustainable. Proponents of this system also argue that it has 
macroeconomic benefits in providing an automatic stabiliser to the economy during an 
economic shock. A collapse in aggregate demand in the economy after a shock can be 
mitigated by the counter-cyclical spending of pensioners which can maintain a base level 
of consumption in the economy (Darby & Melitz, 2008).  
 
Proponents of private pension provision stress the principles of individualism, choice and 
responsibility that underpin a private pension system. They believe that private pension 
funds will yield a greater income in retirement for the individual because the returns on 
equity are greater than the rate of wage growth (Iglesias & Palacios, 2001). By its very 
nature, a funded pension system is believed to be sustainable because it is financed 
entirely from contributors who fund their own retirement (World Bank, 1994; James, 
1996). Supporters of private pension provision maintain that it has a number of 
economic benefits. First, it is argued that it does not distort labour markets in the same 
way tax financed pension systems do (Lindbeck & Persson, 2003). This is because they 
believe individuals are hostile to paying a tax in which they feel they receive no benefit 
and so supply less labour to the market than they would otherwise. On the other hand, 
a private pension more directly links the contributions to the benefits. Second, at the 
macroeconomic level, an influential paper from Feldman in the 1950s, argued that the 
social security system in the United States had reduced savings in the economy by more 
than half. This is due to the ‘moral hazard’ of the insurance provided by social security 
(cited in Barr, 2001, p. 101). A principal reason for reform is therefore to increase savings 
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and hence investment in the economy. Finally, the increase in domestic savings is also 
argued to assist in the development of capital markets (World Bank, 1994 p. 208).  
 
Opponents of privatisation argue that it transfers risk from the collective to the 
individual. There are no guarantees on the income an individual will have in retirement. 
A volatile stock market, as seen during the global financial crisis, can render an annuity2 
much smaller than envisaged (Glennester, 2009). The risk of inflation necessitates some 
kind of public intervention in pension provision as the private market cannot insure 
against the risk of inflation. At the very least, the state guarantees against pension 
benefits being eroded by inflation are necessary. By tightening the link between 
contributions and benefits, those who take time out of the labour market are penalised. 
This is particularly unfair to women who take time out of the labour market for child 
birth and are more likely to engage in caring responsibilities (Foster & Heneghan, 2018; 
Ginn & Arber, 1996; Warren, Rowlingson, & Whyley, 2001). The administration costs of 
running a private pension system are much more substantial than public pension 
systems. Public pension systems can be run from a central bureaucracy with payments 
calculated from a simple formula. Conversely, private pension systems require an 
individual fund manager to manage each private pension plan, making investments and 
securing a return on contributions. They therefore require much more administrative 
resources than their publicly provided counterparts.  High administration fees can 
reduce the income in retirement substantially (Gill, Packard, & Yermo, 2005). 
 
At the macroeconomic level, Barr is critical of the claims made by proponents of 
privatisation that it will lead to higher growth rates. He argues that higher savings will 
not necessarily lead to a higher level of investment and that a higher level of investment 
will not necessarily lead to higher growth rates (2001, p. 104). On the issue of 
sustainability, Barr argues that the key determinant of pension adequacy is 
macroeconomic output regardless of the system in use. In a PAYG pension system this is 
explicit as the current level of macroeconomic output will determine how easy it is for 
                                                     
2 An annuity is a fixed sum paid each year. This will be usually be calculated by insurance firms using the 
value of the final accumulated pension fund and life expectancy tables to calculate the amount. It offers 
the certainty of income in retirement.  
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the current workforce to make provisions for the retired workforce. However, in a 
funded system, the current level of macroeconomic output is also the key determinant 
of pension adequacy. Individuals set aside resources throughout their working lives, yet 
the value of these resources is determined during retirement by the current level of 
macroeconomic output. This is not only the case because of the value of equities upon 
retirement, but also because the level of economic output will determine the price of 
goods in the economy (Beattie & McGillivray, 1995). For this reason, funded pensions 
are not a solution to the issue of population ageing because all pension systems involve 
the retired generation consuming the production of the working age population.  
 
The case for mandatory participation was outlined above. However, mandatory 
participation does not necessarily mean it will be the state providing the income in 
retirement. It is possible for the state to simply mandate that individuals must contribute 
to a privately-run pension system. This is the type of system that is the focus of this 
thesis. It will be discussed in much more detail below; the dominant form of privatisation 
to emerge as a global trend was one in which the state mandates that individuals must 
contribute a proportion of their income into a private pension. This constituted a partial-
privatisation, as only in Chile did this arrangement completely eradicate state pension 
provision.  
 
Insurance versus Redistribution 
 
There are variations in pension provision between systems which are essentially 
insurance based and ones which are more redistributive in nature. The former can be 
provided by both the state and the market. For insurance-based systems to avoid market 
failure there needs to be perfect information on both the demand and supply side of the 
market (Barr, 2001). The information required on the supply side of the market is clear 
and accurate, it is relatively easy to design a system since data on life expectancy and 
retirement is consistent and accurate. Insurers can therefore attach an actuarial risk to 
insurance premiums. However, information on the demand side is often incomplete. As 
mentioned, individuals often miscalculate the amount they need to save for retirement, 
and it comes onto their personal financial agenda far too late to set aside adequate 
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resources. It was therefore argued earlier that the state needs a minimum role in at least 
mandating some form of compulsory pension saving. Furthermore, pension information 
is complex, which renders individuals at risk of pension exploitation (Foster & Heneghan, 
2018). There is therefore a role for the state in regulating private insurance.  
 
Insurance-based systems seek to smooth income over the life cycle. An old-age system 
is said to be actuarially fair when there are no net gains from participating in the scheme, 
so the present total value of pay-outs equals the present total value of contributions 
(Muller, 1999 p. 10). In an insurance-based system, the income an individual receives in 
retirement is more likely to be closely linked to their contribution record and therefore 
is more likely to pay a higher pension to higher earners. For some, this form of pension 
provision is viewed to be unjust as it favours the wealthiest. If tax breaks are used to 
fund this type of pension arrangement, it is also regressive because the wealthiest will 
receive the largest tax breaks (Sinfield, 2000).  
 
Alternatively, the pension system can be designed to integrate redistributive elements 
into the system. This entails transferring resources from the highest earners to the rest 
of society. If the state provides a similar income in retirement to all individuals, this will 
redistribute resources from the wealthiest who have contributed more to the least 
wealthy whose contributions will be smaller. In any pension system, the larger the 
universal element of the system, the more redistributive it is, since more generous 
pension entitlements will need to be financed by higher earning tax payers (Krieger & 
Traub, 2008). In addition, further redistributive elements can be added to a pension 
system by transferring resources from those in work to those out of work either due to 
unemployment, undertaking caring responsibilities, being in full-time education or being 
unable to participate in the labour market through illness or disability. This is done by 
the state continuing to make pension contributions to an individual who is presently out 
of work. There are also subtler forms of redistribution, such as from men to women. 
Equal pension payments to men and women in the pension system entail a redistribution 
of resources from men to women as female life expectancy is higher. In Central and 
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Eastern Europe, women traditionally had a much earlier retirement age than men3, 
although these have been equalised in recent years. In PAYG systems (to be described in 
more detail below), there is also a transferring of resources from young to old, when the 
latter receive a pension that is larger than the contributions they have made.  
 
When income is redistributed through the pension system from higher earners to lower 
earners, this type of redistribution is known as ‘vertical redistribution’. Social insurance 
systems, on the other hand, are a form of ‘horizontal redistribution’. They can interact 
with other systems such as the student loan system to redistribute an individual’s income 
over the life cycle. The so called ‘productive middle years’ finance the other periods of 
the life course when income is substantially lower such as during higher education or in 
retirement (Barr, 2001). 
 
Pay-As-You-Go versus Funded Financing of Pensions 
 
One of the main debates in provision is with regards to whether pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
pension systems are more desirable than fully funded systems. The sustainability of 
PAYG pension systems has been questioned by policy makers in the light of the 
demographic transition of an ageing population (World Bank, 1994). Declining fertility 
rates and an increase in longevity lead to an increase in the proportion of the population 
that is over 65 (United Nations, 2017). With life expectancy considerably longer than 
before, the age at which individuals retire has been drawn into question. Furthermore, 
how retirement is financed has also been the subject of increased debate. The debate 
interacts with debates on whether pensions should be provided by the state or by the 
market. However, there are differences because fully funded pension systems can be 
both publicly and privately provided.  
                                                     
3 However, the construct of retirement only accounts for withdrawal from the formal labour market, it 
does not consider household labour and informal labour. The gendered division of household labour 
means that women’s experience of retirement is much different to men. Whilst there may be a transferral 
of resources from men to women, this is not to suggest that women have a superior experience of 
retirement.   
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In a PAYG system, contributions and benefits are distributed through the tax system. 
Retirement income is financed by the current generation of taxpayers. It is a system built 
upon the principle of intergenerational solidarity. Individuals contribute towards the 
current generation of pensioner incomes with the understanding that their retirement 
income will be provided by the future generation of taxpayers. When PAYG pension 
systems were first introduced in Europe, they were highly sustainable (World Bank, 
1994). Only a small proportion of the population was at retirement age and therefore 
pension spending as a proportion of government expenditure was relatively small. 
Furthermore, life expectancy beyond the statutory retirement age was very short and 
therefore pension spending was not viewed as a considerable strain on public finances 
(Esping-Andersen, 1996; Myles & Pierson, 2001). Successive political parties were able 
to garner support from the electorate by offering generous pension benefits. This was 
not costly in the early era of pension systems as the number of retirees was very small 
compared to the number of contributors into the system (Myles & Pierson, 2001). 
However, upon reaching maturation the problem has become much more acute. Most 
developed countries experienced a population boom in the early post-war period. This 
bolstered the number of contributors to the system. For example, in the US, before the 
boom 2.86 million babies were born in 1945. By 1957 this reached a peak of 4.3 million 
babies with a trough of 3.14 million babies in 1973 (Mankiw & Weil, 1989). Now that the 
so called ‘baby boomers’ have reached retirement, the old age dependency ratio, which 
measures the ratio retired population to the working age population, has increased. This 
has drawn into question the sustainability of PAYG pension provision, most notable by 
the World Bank in 1994. 
 
Fully funded pension systems can be provided by the state or the market. Unlike the 
PAYG system, a fully funded pension system by design should always be sustainable. The 
level of benefits is directly determined by the level of contributions. In an individual fully-
funded pension scheme an individual accumulates a pension fund over the working life. 
The overall value of this fund is usually maximised by a fund manager who invests the 
contributions in order to make a greater return than the cash amount invested in the 
fund. Upon retirement, the fund is turned into an annuity to provide a stable income in 
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retirement. Fully-funded schemes do not have to be run by the market at an individual 
level. Sovereign wealth funds are state savings that can be used to finance pension 
expenditure. For example, Norway’s sovereign wealth fund uses oil revenues to 
accumulate funds for its pension system (NBIM, 2015). However, this type of pension 
system differs from others because it is not financed by contributions. The United States 
Social Security system is an example of a state financed pension system that is fully-
funded. Many European pension systems paid contributions into a separate fund from 
the general budget. However, many of these pension funds were destroyed during the 
Second World War which necessitated a switch to PAYG systems in order to honour the 
contributions made before the war (Muller, 1999).  
 
Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution 
 
One of the major changes in pension provision over the past few decades has been the 
demise of defined benefit pension systems and the rise of defined contribution systems 
as their replacement (Bridgen & Meyer, 2005). This is particularly the case with 
occupational pensions and is a consequence of the growing concern with the 
sustainability of pension systems in light of an ageing population. Defined Benefit 
pension systems offer their recipients a guaranteed income in retirement. They are 
usually based on a pre-prescribed formula whereby the number of years paying into the 
system and the final salary determine the level of pension entitlements. Bismarckian 
pension systems with their income replacement component operate on a defined 
benefit basis. The risk of defined benefit schemes is carried by the employer in an 
occupational scheme and by the state in the public pension system. 
 
Defined Contribution systems, on the other hand, do not guarantee a specific income in 
retirement. Instead it is determined by the size of the accumulated pension assets and 
the returns the investments have yielded upon retirement. It places the risk of poverty 
in old age on the individual (Bridgen & Meyer, 2008). Alongside increased longevity, one 
of the causes of the demise of defined benefit schemes has been their obstruction to 
labour mobility (Barr, 2001). In a defined-benefit scheme, individuals have a disincentive 
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to change employer as their pension entitlements are adversely affected by changing 
pension schemes, even if the same formula is used (Barr, 2001).   
 
The tensions around defined benefit and defined contribution schemes are linked to the 
economic system. The varieties of capitalism literature outline two different equilibriums 
in the political economy: liberal market economies and coordinated market economies 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001). These different systems are linked to the pension system in a 
number of ways. Liberal market economies consist of firms dependent on capital 
markets to finance investment. Capital markets use formal accounting procedures to 
guide investment options. Firms in liberal market economies tend to favour radical 
innovation as venture capital seeks a generous return. Firm behaviour in a liberal market 
economy also favours a flexible labour force that it can shed easily. There is an incentive 
for firms to prefer a workforce with general, transferable skills as workers are less likely 
to remain employed in the same firm for a substantial period of time. For these reasons, 
defined contribution pension schemes are likely to flourish in an environment where 
workers can take their pension plans with them to retire and where capital markets are 
well developed.  
 
Conversely, in coordinated market economies, firms rely on informal knowledge to guide 
investment decisions, which is garnered through close relationships between firms at 
the industry level. They are less dependent on capital market for investment capital. In 
contrast to the general skillset favoured by firms in liberal market economies, firms in 
coordinated market economies prefer specific skill sets at either the firm or industry 
level. It is therefore important for firms to encourage long term employment in order for 
individuals to invest in specific skills that are not transferable to other firms. A defined 
benefit pension system is one way in which individuals are encouraged to remain with a 
firm because defined benefit formulas usually penalise moving between firms. 
Bismarckian welfare systems that replace income during unemployment and retirement 
are much more likely to be the preference of firms seeking to foster a long-term 
workforce.  
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Summary 
 
This section has outlined the different choices available to policymakers when designing 
a pension system. The choices are underpinned by different values. More market-
oriented approaches stress the principles of choice, flexibility and responsibility. A more 
substantial role for the state stresses redistribution, income security and 
intergenerational solidarity. The pension system has been shown to interact with the 
economy in a number of different ways. It can provide a buffer during a downturn as 
pension spending stops demand completely collapsing. However, it is argued by some to 
distort the economy through labour market disincentives. Defined benefit schemes have 
been shown to be favoured by firms in coordinated market economies as they are given 
an incentive to remain with the same employer. Defined contribution schemes have 
been shown to favour firms which prefer a flexible labour force, more frequently found 
in liberal market economies.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has set out the main theories that underpin the thesis. It began with 
outlining the main global social policy approaches to studies of the welfare state. Each 
of three main viewpoints outlined here guide the perspective of the thesis in how a 
transnational politics of pension reform has played out in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The chapter next outlined the institutionalist literature. This literature gives insights on 
the processes of continuity and change in institutions, it shows how pension systems 
create an institutional structure with a set of beneficiaries who will be resistant to 
reforms. These dynamics shape the extent to which transnational actors can influence 
the reform trajectories. The interaction between ideas and institutions is a key part of 
the thesis. Chapter Six, in particular, draws on the interaction of ideas and institutions. 
The chapter broadened then broadened this form of analysis to the global level by 
drawing on theories on international organisations from the international political 
economy literature. Of particular importance is the debate of how much influence 
international organisations have to set the agenda and orientate action from domestic 
actors. These are themes that will be revisited in the empirical chapters of the thesis. 
Finally, the chapter set the different choices and designs of pension systems and the 
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philosophies and values that underpin them. These are implicit within pension debates 
and steer the approach of the international organisations that promote their specific 
model. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
A Review of the Multi-pillar Pension Reform and Reversal 
Literature 
 
Introduction  
 
The previous chapter engaged with the pensions literature to outline the different 
pension systems and the philosophies and values that underpin them. It also utilised the 
literature on pension reform to outline the theoretical foundations of the thesis. This 
chapter offers a much more concentrated analysis of the literature. It is specifically 
focused on the multi-pillar reforms that were promoted by the World Bank and taken up 
by more than thirty countries, before being abandoned by more than half of them. The 
purpose of this chapter is to review the literature on these reforms and counter-reforms 
in order to establish what is known and what gaps in the literature still exists on this 
series of reforms and reversals. The review finds that the literature to date has primarily 
analysed the proximate causes of the pension reform reversals, largely arguing these 
were a combination of the fiscal costs of the reforms and the poor performance of the 
funded pillars. What has not been conducted yet is an analysis of how these events have 
shaped global pension policy, in particular from the perspective of the organisations that 
competed to persuade countries to privatise their pension systems and those that tried 
to prevent this. This enables the thesis to make a timely contribution to the global 
pensions policy literature.  
 
A significant gap in the literature, that is highlighted by this review, is the perspective of 
policy actors who operate at a global level. For example, the literature has not tried to 
gauge the position of actors in the World Bank or ILO – two organisations that have been 
prominent in shaping pension policies at a global level. This thesis will therefore seek to 
obtain the views of policy makers at the global level. It is not clear in the literature what 
the current position of the World Bank is on pension provision and whether it will 
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continue to play active role in the pension reform arena. These views also offer a way to 
empirically explore the reform reversals from an ideational perspective. To date there is 
no empirical exploration of the global consensus on pension privatisation, whether it has 
shifted within international policy circles, and if so, when? 
 
The Pension Privatisation Process 
 
In the decade following the publication of Averting the Old Age Crisis (World Bank, 1994), 
More than thirty countries enacted some form of pension privatisation (Naczyk & 
Domonkos, 2016). Whilst a large number of countries have enacted privatisation, many 
have not. The literature therefore suggests that external economic pressures on 
domestic actors, such as globalisation are not responsible for pension privatisations. 
Neither are demographic factors, since some countries with demographic pressures have 
reformed, whilst others have not (Brooks, 2005; Muller, 1999; Orenstein, 2008; 
Weyland, 2005). In particular, the countries of Western Europe and North America have 
been resistant to mandatory privatisation (Bonoli & Palier, 2007). This is because of the 
maturity of their pension system which exacerbates the cost of transition. Where 
privatisation has occurred in these countries, it has usually been through the restriction 
of the generosity of public system. This may ‘nudge’ individuals into voluntary private 
provision to supplement their retirement income. It has been described as “privatisation 
through the back door” (Bonoli, 2003; Bonoli & Palier, 2007; Ebbinghaus, 2011; Myles & 
Pierson, 2001; Orenstein, 2011). International capital mobility can act as facilitator for 
market-based reorganisation in many areas such as labour market reforms. However, it 
can also constrain the options for policy makers seeking to privatise social security given 
the transition costs and fiscal resources needed in the short term for the reform (Brooks, 
2005).  
 
Whilst high-income countries have been slow to initiate pension privatisation, middle 
income countries on the other hand, were particularly receptive to privatisation and to 
the message of its proponents. This was particularly the case in Latin America and Central 
and Eastern Europe. Orenstein builds upon the work of scholars who have identified the 
growing trend for social policy to be conducted at a global level by transnational actors 
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seeking to influence the reform trajectory of domestic governments (Deacon, 2007; 
Deacon et al., 1997; Yeates, 2008). His central thesis is that this was done through a 
transnational campaign spearheaded by the World Bank in a coalition with other 
transnational actors. In contrast to those who focus on the power of conditionality of the 
World Bank, where reforms are carried out through coercion (Stiglitz, 2002), Orenstein 
(2005, 2008), argues that pension privatisation has been encouraged through 
persuasion. Building upon what Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 2004) have coined “norms 
creation”, he argues that the World Bank was able to influence the reform preferences 
of domestic actors within countries that enacted the reforms. This was done through 
publications, seminars and conferences promoting the virtues of pension privatisation, 
citing the strong performance of the Chilean economy after it privatised its pension 
system as inspiration for potential reformers (Orenstein, 2008, p. 75).  
 
Orenstein’s work develops a model for global pension policy making. He sets out a three-
stage process where transnational actors can have influence over the domestic reform 
agenda. The first places the transnational actors at the policy development and ‘agenda-
setting’ phase of the policy process (Kingdon, 1997). This is where international 
organisations and other groups can use their “expert authority” (see Chapter Two) to 
place their favoured reforms on the agenda through the framing of problems in a specific 
way to orient action. Transnational actors can also be influential in “policy transfer” 
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000), where policies are taken from one location and put onto the 
policy agenda somewhere else. This was the case with pension privatisation, which 
sought to transfer Chilean pension reform to other locations. Finally, transnational actors 
can have influence in the implementation stage by offering expertise and technical 
support or loans to initiate the policies. For example, the World Bank offered resources 
to Poland to update its computer systems to make them suitable for individual pension 
accounts (Orenstein, 2008).  
 
The literature points to the leverage that International Financial Institutions (IFIs) hold 
over developing and middle-income countries as an explanation for their influence. In a 
structural-institutional analysis, Müller, (1999) argues that the World Bank was able to 
gain ideational influence in countries that were heavily indebted. She argues that where 
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pension systems were running deficits, the finance ministry took an active interest in the 
pension system. The specific constellation of actors would then determine the reform 
trajectory. She contends that finance ministries are more likely to be staffed with 
economists with neoliberal policy preferences. This enabled the World Bank to gain 
leverage in setting the agenda in pension reform in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, which were heavily indebted in the transition from socialism to market-based 
capitalism.  
 
It was Deacon (1997) who first articulated a war of position in social policy between the 
World Bank and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). He stated that the World 
Bank was trying to shift countries in a neoliberal direction while the ILO was trying to 
lead them in a more social-democratic direction. Orenstein (2008) argues that the World 
Bank, through its superior resources supplanted the ILO as the major player in pension 
policy at a global level. Appel and Orenstein (2013) build upon the solely ideational 
influence of the World Bank as an explanation for the reforms, arguing that its material 
resources were also a factor in the privatisations. They contend that the Bank’s superior 
resources enabled it to develop more sophisticated models and arguments than 
opponents of pension reform. Furthermore, the Bank was able to offer loans to countries 
interested in privatising their pension system and even went as far as to dispatch 
personnel to assist in the development of a Polish private pension pillar. The interaction 
of both material and ideational influences is argued to be critical in determining the 
success of the World Bank in the pension reform arena. 
 
However, whilst not denying the pivotal influence of the World Bank in the series of 
pension privatisations, other scholars have focused on other aspects than the ‘norms 
creation’ of the World Bank. In analysing the spread of privatisations in Latin America, 
Brooks (2007) focuses on domestic actors’ motivations for reforms and argues that the 
structural conditions of the countries were a major factor in whether a country 
privatised. In contrast to the constructivist approach of Barnett and Finnemore (1999; 
2004) used by Orenstein, Brooks adopts a rationalist-materialist approach to explain the 
reforms. It is rationalist, as she believes actors assessed the merits of the policy and 
weighed it against the costs and concluded that it was the best policy to pursue. It is 
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materialist in that it was a policy born out of the material conditions of the countries 
instead of how these conditions were interpreted by actors. Rather than view pension 
privatisation as a normative symbol of legitimacy to international markets, she argues 
that the soft power of the World Bank alone cannot overcome material conditions.  
 
In Brooks’ view, pension privatisation was adopted in Latin America as a way to 
overcome the region’s low domestic savings rate; this concurs with others who have also 
argued that the low saving rate in Latin America was a factor in the process (Madrid, 
2003; Meso-Lago & Muller, 2002). This rendered the region reliant on volatile 
international finance for investment. In contrast to those who argue that pension 
privatisation acted as a signal to international finance of market-orientated intent (such 
as Appel & Orenstein, 2018), she argues that international finance places a double bind 
on privatisation. On the one hand, markets act favourably as it signals a long-term fiscal 
retrenchment. However, given the transition costs of privatisation, she argues that 
markets respond negatively as it raises the risk indices of key variables on sovereign debt 
such as the budget deficit and debt to GDP ratio. For Brooks, a country’s macroeconomic 
condition at the time pension reform reaches the political agenda is critical in explaining 
when a country privatises. Whilst the transition costs will increase budget deficits, 
Mosley (2003) argues that a key indicator is the current account deficit, which will signal 
to investors the overall health of the economy. Brooks compares Argentina with Brazil. 
When privatisation reached the political agenda in Argentina conditions were more 
favourable to privatise. Argentina had a relatively lower current account deficit at the 
time of reform and international finance was liquid during this period. In contrast in 
1998, when pension reform came on to the Brazilian political agenda, its current account 
deficit had weakened substantially and international finance was scarcer.   
 
In a refutation of Orenstein’s thesis and the approach of Brooks, Weyland (2005) argues 
that the cognitive heuristics of policy makers is the most important determinant of 
pension privatisation. He cites the regional diffusion of pension privatisation as a counter 
to the persuasive influence of the World Bank. He argues that if norms creation was 
instrumental in bringing about reform, the global reach of the World Bank would mean 
the reforms would be globally spread rather than clustered in regions - primarily Latin 
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America and Central and Eastern Europe (2005, p. 275). Furthermore, he argues that the 
material constraints on pension privatisation and its distributive consequences for 
winners and losers outweigh the legitimacy gained from adopting the norms spread by 
the bank. He also rejects the notion that the policy was pursued from rational policy 
learning. He points to the heterogeneous material conditions of the countries that 
privatised and questions why it was only regional in character. A rational approach to 
policy making would mean actors assessing pension options across the globe for 
solutions. 
 
He posits that policy actors have a ‘bounded rationality’ in assessing the character of 
reforms. Actors have insuperable limitations on their processing capacity for the 
abundance of information available to them. They have limited memory capacity and 
scarce time and resources for a comprehensive development of policy proposals. In 
order to function, actors rely on inferential shortcuts to process the information and 
reach a conclusion. It is these heuristics that enable policy makers to decide. In a rational 
choice model, deviations from the norm cancel each other out as they are normally 
distributed. This does not happen with heuristics since different people apply the same 
heuristics. There are three interrelated processes of heuristics. The first is the availability 
of information. Information that is directly available is overrated in comparison to other 
information. For example, the information of pension reforms in neighbouring countries 
in Latin America was the most readily available and therefore given a precedence over 
other information. Second, actors derive inferences from a very small sample, assuming 
it is representative. They give undue weight to the short-term success or failure of a 
policy. In the case of pension reform, the initial success of the Chilean economy was 
given an undue weight in factoring the likely benefits of privatising a pension system. 
Finally, individuals are susceptible to anchoring. Policy makers are reluctant to diverge 
too far from a starting point. In Latin America, Chile became the anchor and so policy 
makers reformed their pension systems around this example.  
 
In the case of Latin America, pension privatisation was domestically generated. This is 
unanimous within the literature on pension reform in the region (Brooks, 2005; Madrid, 
2003; Mesa-Lago & Müller, 2002; Weyland, 2005) and was also confirmed by 
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interviewees from the World Bank (see Chapter Six). Central and Eastern Europe on the 
other hand, had much more direct involvement from transnational actors seeking to 
persuade privatisation, such as the World Bank, and from those who opposed it like the 
ILO. It is therefore the region where pension privatisation became a global policy. 
Chapter Six will demonstrate how it also became the region where pension privatisation 
ended as a global policy prescription.   
 
In summary, the literature points to three explanations for the spread of pension 
privatisation: norms creation, rational learning and cognitive heuristics. However, to 
date there has only been a limited synthesis of the reversals in order to offer a theoretical 
explanation.  
 
Pension Reform in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
The literature on pension reform in Central and Eastern Europe is primarily framed in the 
region’s twinned transition from one party rule to democracy and from state planned 
socialism to free market capitalism. Many scholars note the region’s propensity to 
embrace neoliberal reforms that went further than Western Europe in many areas of 
social policy – particularly in pension policy. The active role of the World Bank in the 
region is a prominent feature in the literature (Deacon et al., 1997; Drahokoupil & 
Domonkos, 2012; Muller, 1999; Orenstein, 2008). Like the literature on global pension 
policy, both rationalist and idealist approaches to pension reform are prevalent. 
 
There is also a smaller literature on the role of the EU in the pension reform process, a 
role that is ambiguous and contested. Whilst not overtly promoting pension privatisation 
in the region, the EU did not oppose it, which is interpreted by some scholars as a tacit 
approval (Ferge & Juhász, 2004). More recently, the impact of the Maastricht criteria for 
accession and the Stability and Growth Pact’s influence on a country’s ability to run a 
budget deficit has entered the literature as part of an explanation for the region either 
scaling down the private pension pillar or completely abandoning it. This literature 
adopts a realist approach, stressing the power of conditionality available to the EU. 
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The transition process in Central and Eastern Europe had two distinct phases. The first 
phase focused on democratisation and marketisation. The literature notes how during 
this phase, international organisations encouraged transition economies to increase 
social spending to mitigate the costs of transition (Deacon et al., 1997; Muller, 1999). 
Cerami (2011) and Orenstein (2009) note that the transition to a market economy has 
endowed Central and Eastern Europe with a set of unique challenges, that renders its 
demographic transition different to that of Western Europe. The hidden social cost of 
transition included not only the loss of a guaranteed job, but also the related changes in 
the quality of life that come with it. These include as increases in alcohol consumption, 
increasing number of divorces and the psychological problems associated with job loss 
and a lack of partaking in social activities (Izyumov, 2010). These factors have adversely 
impacted on the region’s fertility rate. This means that the median age of the region is 
increasing faster than elsewhere.  
 
Korpi’s (2001) rational-action approach to welfare state development in Western Europe 
contends that elites use their resources to shape subordinate actor’s definitions of their 
interests and identities in order to maintain power. This is in line with Lukes second and 
third faces of power (1974, 2005). Bismarckian pension systems were therefore a way 
for the elite to gain the acquiescence from the working class whose power resources 
were in the ascendancy. In a similar vein, Vanhuysse (2006; 2009) builds upon this 
approach in Central and Eastern Europe during the transition. His thesis is on the use of 
pension policy as a tool of protest avoidance. He argues that the large numbers of 
unemployed workers during the transition ripened the conditions for social disorder. 
This was particularly acute since the ending of the planned economy meant that entire 
sectors were made redundant at once. These members with similar material interests 
would find it easy to organise and threaten the position of the elites in government. He 
therefore argues the use of disability pensions was therefore a strategy to divide the 
unemployed into groups with different material interests. Millions of workers were 
permanently removed from the unemployed list by being granted an early pension. This 
divided them from younger unemployed workers and separated them into distinct 
subgroups with differing material interests. In particular, the newly retired pensioners 
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had interests aligned with the elite as both benefitted from the status quo of power 
relations.  
 
Vanhuysse’s analysis dovetails with Inglot (2009), who argues that welfare states in 
Central and Eastern Europe are ‘emergency welfare states’. This is a term given to the 
way in which he argues the expansion of the welfare state in the region has been 
undertaken. For Inglot, each crisis in the region has led to an expansion of the welfare 
state to assuage popular resistance to the ruling regime. During each crisis, a new layer 
is added to the existing institutional order, in what is believed at the time to be a 
temporary arrangement. Over time this arrangement becomes a permanent fixture of 
the welfare state. This explains why scholars have found it so difficult to categorise 
Central and Eastern European welfare states in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) worlds of 
welfare regime typology. Instead many have called them hybrids (Kovács, 2002). 
However, since each layer remains in place and only added upon, it can later be 
reactivated. Many early post-communist reformers tried to re-establish the Bismarckian 
traditions of the pre-communist era. The tendency to use the welfare state for 
emergency measures would put the reborn Bismarckian institutions under strain. 
 
The use of early retirement as a tool of protest avoidance dramatically increased pension 
expenditure in the region (Muller, 2002). Once marketization and democratisation had 
been secured the second phase of the transition focused on welfare state reform 
(Deacon, 1997; Muller, 1999). Pension systems were to come under increased attention 
as a means to decrease budget deficits. Furthermore, privatisation offered a chance to 
develop capital markets and further embed market institutions in the region. The 
literature stresses the ideational influence of the World Bank in persuading countries in 
the region to adopt pension privatisation; it is therefore constructivist in its approach. 
No scholar argues that the region was subject to conditionality, or that the Bank 
approached countries first with the proposal to privatise. Instead, countries decided to 
privatise their pension system and approached the World Bank for technical and financial 
assistance.  
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Muller (1999, 2002, 2003) and Orenstein (2000, 2005, 2008) are amongst the most cited 
authors in the pension reform literature in Central and Eastern Europe. They stress the 
paradigmatic nature of pension reform in the region. They argue that it represents a 
significant redrawing of the social contract from the state to the market and from the 
collective to the individual. Muller’s analysis of the political economy of pension reform 
in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, takes a structural-institutionalist approach. 
The significant increase in pension expenditure in Hungary and Poland (mentioned 
above) brought the ministry of finance into the policy agenda of pension provision; which 
had traditionally been the domain of the labour ministry. In contrast, pension 
expenditure had not increased significantly in the Czech Republic meaning the finance 
ministry was not active in the pension reform agenda. It is the finance ministry that is 
argued by Muller to give the World Bank leverage given that it is more likely to be staffed 
with actors with a neoliberal outlook.  
 
Orenstein (2000) focuses on the reforms of Hungary, Poland and Kazakhstan. His main 
contribution in this area is to analyse the speed of the reforms and the political 
consensus around them. This work focuses on the specific institutions in the countries 
such as the number of veto points and the coalition of parties involved in the reforms. 
Hungary and Kazakhstan both had a strong executive, which could force through radical 
pension reform more easily. Poland, on the other hand had more veto points and the 
reforms were more consensual. This led to a correct hypothesis by Orenstein that the 
reforms were more likely to be reversed in Hungary when the opposition came back to 
power.  
 
Guardiancich (2011) challenges the notion that pension privatisation represented a 
significant institutional change. His paper develops Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) 
undeveloped concept of institutional ‘survival and return’. He defines the survival of an 
institution where new change does not overhaul the institution. The new institutional 
arrangement does not change the incentive structure or the ‘logic of action’ but rather 
performs identical functions to the old institution. Return is defined as a process 
whereby the old incentive structure is brought back as a consequence of demands for its 
reintroduction. This is likely to happen with an unconstrained executive that has 
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concentrated power and does not need to compensate the losers in the reform process. 
This then motivates them to mobilise for change. In Hungary and Croatia the funded 
pillar continued the same logic as before given the propensity for fund managers to 
purchase government bonds. It therefore continued to function as a PAYG pillar. 
Moreover, the governance structure of the second pillar in Hungary was unreformed 
which led to it functioning in the same way as the third pillar had previously done: 
characterised by a lack of transparency, no competition and no downward pressure on 
fees.  
 
The role of the EU is ambiguous within the pension reform literature. Ferge and Juhász, 
(2004) contend that the passive role played by the EU in the pension privatisations 
undertaken in Central and Eastern Europe amounted to tacit support. They argue that 
the EU deliberately avoided a confrontation with the World Bank and found 
commonalities with the growing focus on sustainability for pension systems that the EU 
was adopting. However, the EU has adopted a more hard-line stance on pension reform 
in more recent years through both the Stability and Growth Pact and the hard 
conditionality of the Troika4 (Angelaki & Carerra, 2015). 
 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has fiscal conditions for all members of the European 
Monetary Union. It stipulates that countries cannot run budget deficits larger than 3% of 
GDP and must keep the debt to GDP ratio below 60% (European Commission, 2015). 
These stipulations must also be adhered to by the accession states. This pact has had 
implications for pension privatisation in the region. The transition costs for those that 
have enacted a partial privatisation were as high as 1.8% of GDP in Poland (Fultz, 2012). 
This is a significant proportion of the SGP’s requirement. Initially, allowances were made 
for countries that had undergone privatisation. For the first year the entire cost of 
transition could be excluded from the EU’s budget deficit accounting, with the amount 
that could be excluded reducing each year by 20%. At the end of the fifth year this meant 
that no further allowance could be made. This was protested by member states that had 
                                                     
4 The Troika refers to the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the European 
Central Bank 
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enacted the World Bank’s multi-pillar reform and also Sweden as it had a different 
version of multi-pillar reform (Woolfe, 2010). However, the Commission took a dim view 
to the public expenditure of some of the accession countries, in particular Hungary, and 
therefore declined the request for additional accounting allowances to be given in 
meeting the SGP criteria (Orenstein, 2011). The rigid conditions of the SGP are noted in 
the literature as being incongruent with pension privatisation (Angelaki & Carerra, 2015; 
Datz & Dansci, 2013; Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012; Orenstein, 2011; Stepan & 
Anderson, 2014). For this reason it is not only heavily indebted nations that have 
renationalised second pillars but also ones with a moderately healthy fiscal balance, like 
Poland. At the stroke of a pen, Poland was able to reduce its debt to GDP ratio by 8 
percentage points (Atkins, 2014). 
 
Alongside the SGP, the EU has also been active in the pension reform arena of member 
states through the hard conditionality of the Troika (International Monetary Fund, 
European Central Bank and European Commission). Countries that have been reliant 
upon loans to finance current expenditure have been granted them on the condition that 
pension expenditure is reduced. In the case of Greece this has meant reforms to the first 
pillar (Angelaki & Carerra, 2015). In Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary required EC 
financial assistance in November 2008 as the global economic crisis took hold. This was 
granted on the condition that pension expenditure was reduced. Specifically, the 
conditions were that Hungary changes the rules on indexation, abolished the 13-month 
pension pay out for new beneficiaries and increased the mandatory retirement age by 
three years (Stepan & Anderson, 2014, p. 326). However, in fashioning this 
conditionality, the EU indirectly influenced the fate of the second pension pillar. Whilst 
insisting on first pillar reforms that are visible and politically unpopular, it has made 
second pillar reforms that are not costly - and in the wake of the global economic crisis, 
popular – much more likely.  
 
In summarising the literature to date on pension reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, 
there are many similarities with the global literature particularly on the pension 
privatisation process. However, the literature on the counter reforms is less theoretically 
developed than at the global level. There are rationalist and ideational accounts of the 
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pension privatisation process. The work of Vanhuysee (2006, 2009) also gives a path 
dependent explanation to the fiscal burden of pension systems during the transition 
process. Whilst his approach is a rationalist one it created a logic of stability and path 
dependency in the pension systems of Central and Eastern Europe aligning it with the 
approach of historical institutionalism. However, the literature to date in the region on 
the counter-reforms is strictly rationalist. It has largely focused on the strategic approach 
of political actors responding to material constraints such as the cost of transition. 
Moreover, the focus on the coercive role of the EU in the pension reform arena is also 
within both the rationalist and realist academic approaches on international 
organisations. 
 
Pension Reform Reversals  
 
Early contributions to the literature on this emerging trend were country specific and 
could not have foreseen that it was a trend that would spread. Datz and Dansci (2013) 
argue that scholars underestimated the effects of the short-term pension transitional 
costs. The nationalisations were therefore unforeseen. Their paper focuses on the first 
countries to completely nationalise their second pension pillars: Argentina and Hungary. 
Their contention is that a nationalisation of the second pension pillar is explained by both 
countries’ restricted access to international finance; which concurs with the country 
studies or comparative studies (Arza, 2012; Angelaki & Carerra, 2015; Fultz, 2012; 
Simonovits, 2011).  
 
In addition, they argue the concentrated political power of the executive enabled the 
actors to undertake radical pension. Following Argentina’s default after the economic 
crisis in 2001, it had struggled to raise finance for infrastructure investment. The 
renationalisation of the pension system enabled the state to gain access to the 
accumulated pension funds and rid itself of the transition costs. In Hungary, a loose fiscal 
environment had led it to rely on loans from the EC and IMF to fund current expenditure 
- this was granted with conditions. The renationalisation of the second pillar enabled 
Hungary a temporary reprieve from its reliance on international finance. Both countries 
had populist leaders who had campaigned on platforms of domestic autonomy and both 
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had a strong parliamentary majority. This is argued to have enabled the nationalisations 
to take place with minimal opposition. 
 
However, these factors fail to explain the wider spread of nationalisations. For example, 
Poland was in a stronger position than Hungary following the crisis. It had managed to 
avoid a recession and had a much healthier fiscal balance (Orłowski, 2012). Its political 
institutions also have more veto points and a separation of powers compared to 
Hungary. An important contribution from the article is that it highlights an understudied 
aspect of the functioning of the private pillars. Namely, that many funds invested 
primarily in government bonds which meant they behaved more like PAYG pension 
systems than previously recognised. This had previously been highlighted by 
Guardiancich (2011) and Simonovits (2011).  
 
In keeping in line with the global focus of his earlier work Orenstein (2013), claims that 
the recent reversals do not represent a complete rejection of pension privatisation. He 
argues that whilst pension pillars have either been scaled down or renationalised it 
coincided with a retrenchment of the first pillar in many instances. With public pensions 
now less generous after the crisis, individuals will be ‘nudged’ into private pensions as a 
way to ensure an adequate income in retirement. This argument is in a similar vein to 
Bonoli and Palier (2007) who argue that through a process of sequencing, private sector 
pensions have been able to emerge in continental Europe despite the difficulties in 
retrenching the public pillar of Bismarckian pension systems. Orenstein also points 
towards the UK and New Zealand that have developed a model of auto-enrolment into 
a private pension. This system differs from the World Bank model in that it is not 
mandatory to contribute to a private pension. Instead, using insights from behavioural 
economics it relies on individuals being unlikely to opt out of a pension if they are 
automatically enrolled (Sunstein & Thaler, 2008).  
 
However, Orenstein’s arguments contradict previous scholarship on the significance of 
paradigmatic pension reform. What had set Latin America and Central and Eastern 
Europe apart from Western Europe and North America was that the regions had enacted 
a significant retrenchment of the public pension pillar. It was believed it would continue 
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to diminish with the growth of the private pillar (Muller, 1999). The mandatory nature 
of private pension contributions was what set it apart from other systems; reframing the 
definition of pension privatisation suggests that the reforms were not as significant as 
the early scholarship had implied. 
 
In Global Pension Systems: Reforms, Drivers and Trends, Holzmann (2012) surveys the 
pension landscape including all of the reform reversals that had taken place up to the 
point of publication. He argues that since the global economic crisis the enabling 
environment for private pension systems has changed significantly. Poor returns on 
pension assets have given opponents of multi-pillar pension reform ammunition. More 
significantly he suggests that the new lower returns might be a new normal for pension 
funds. Given that one of the justifications for multi-pillar pension reform is that it offers 
better returns than a public pension system, a lower return jeopardises that claim. 
Indeed, in Chile wage growth might be higher than asset returns, which is an indicator of 
public pension superiority.  
 
In addition, Holzmann cites several other flaws and weaknesses with many three pillar 
pension systems. He argues that coverage has been disappointing, particularly in the 
informal labour market where pension privatisation offered promise. Next, the tightened 
link between benefits and contributions has constrained the ability for pension systems 
to offer redistribution. This has had a negative effect on pension systems’ ability to 
deliver a basic income for all citizens. This is an issue that has come to the fore with the 
resurgence of the ILO on the global pension reform arena (see below). Moreover, three 
experimental flaws with the system are cited. First, the high administration fees have 
had a significant impact on the generosity of pension income. Secondly, the draconian 
regulations put in place on pension fund investment has meant that many have invested 
in government bonds. Finally, the focus in most countries has been on the accumulation 
phase of pension assets. There have not been adequate systems put in place for the pay-
out phase.  
 
The literature on the first wave of pension reforms was theoretically diverse, with 
explanations from rationalist, historical and constructivist institutionalism. In contrast, 
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the literature to date on the reform reversals is very much in the rationalist tradition. 
Actors are argued to respond to their short-term material conditions, specifically the 
budget deficit exacerbated by global economic crisis (Casey, 2014; Datz & Dansci, 2013; 
Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012; Price & Rudolph, 2013). Renationalising the pension 
assets, scaling down on the size of the private pillar or temporarily suspending payments 
to the second pillar is argued to have been carried out by these authors primarily for 
short-term fiscal reasons.  
 
Sohkey (2017) has analysed the counter-reforms across the globe to develop a theory of 
reform reversal. She argues that countries which had a moderate degree of privatisation, 
were the most likely to reverse the reforms. The argument being that countries which 
had only undertaken a very limited privatisation had no incentive to reverse the reforms 
as the fiscal rewards were very limited. Conversely, countries that have undertaken a 
significant privatisation on the other hand, are, she argues, also unlikely to reverse 
because the citizens and the pensions industry will oppose reforms. This is despite 
significant fiscal incentives to do so. However, for a country that has undertaken a 
moderate privatisation there are argued to be fiscal incentives without significant 
opposition to the reversal from citizens or the industry.  
 
Naczyk & Domonkos (2016) focus on the domestic political-economic dynamics of 
pension privatisations and reversals. They explicitly reject a global explanation offered 
by Orenstein (2013) and Béland & Orenstein (2013), i.e. where the World Bank’s shift 
has led to the series of counter-reforms. Instead, they emphasise the failure of 
privatisation to realise the benefits it promised and the fiscal cost of moving towards a 
funded system. This weakened the support of previous proponents of the reforms, such 
as the finance ministry, and strengthened the hands of its long-time opponents. Their 
analysis focuses on the type of reversal taking place, arguing that where pension assets 
were largely held in government bonds, then countries were more likely to nationalise 
the funded pillars, as this made it much easier than when pension assets consisted of 
equities or foreign securities. This would explain the way Hungary and Poland 
nationalised their pension assets, which were predominantly held in governments 
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bonds, whilst the Baltic countries only suspended payments to their private pillars, since 
a larger proportion were invested in equities.  
 
Altiparmakov (2018) refutes the idea that the counter-reforms are primarily about the 
short-term fiscal benefits.  Instead, he argues that the initial privatisations were never 
implemented in a manner that made them sustainable. The central contention is that for 
a mandatory private pillar –  carved out of the public pillar – to be sustainable in the long-
term, it needs to be financed through increased taxes or spending reductions elsewhere. 
In addition, the net returns need to be tangibly higher than the gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth. He argues that neither of these preconditions were met in any country in 
Central and Eastern Europe. He therefore echoes the argument of Fultz (2012) to 
contend that the crisis was simply a trigger of pension reform reversal, and not a 
fundamental cause.  
 
What all of the above analyses of the pension reform reversals have in common, is they 
all adopt a rationalist/materialist explanation for the reform reversals. None focus on 
the role that ideas have played, despite ideas being prominent in explanations for the 
initial privatisations. An exception to the rationalist approach to date is Béland & 
Orenstein (2013). This article positions itself in a debate on the nature of international 
organisations in the policy process. As Chapter Two explained, realists believe that they 
are puppets of the state and will seek to maximise the interests of their benefactors. 
Moreover, some organisations such as the World Bank are associated with a neoliberal 
approach whereas others, such as the ILO, a more left-leaning approach (Deacon et al., 
1997). Constructivists on the other hand, stress the autonomy of international 
organisations and argue that they are open systems that do not have fixed policy 
preferences. The World Bank’s position on pension privatisation is used to illustrate a 
constructivist case. The authors argue that the position of the World Bank on pension 
reform has been shifting for some time before the global economic crisis. A number of 
critical reports on the merits of pension privatisation are cited as evidence that the World 
Bank has withdrawn its wholehearted support for pension privatisation. This poses a 
challenge to the rationalist-materialist accounts above. Instead it offers an ideational 
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explanation for the reform reversals. Namely that the global consensus on the benefits 
of privatisation has broken down.  
 
However, a synthesis between the two positions is where this thesis positions itself. 
Historical institutionalism has both sociological and rationalist approaches. The legacies 
of past policies can either constrain future policy options through the norms and 
expectations created or through the materialist incentives structured by the institution. 
The approach of Pierson (1994, 2001) has been a rationalist one. The constituency of 
supporters that a PAYG pension system creates and therefore the obstacles to reform or 
the price of it, through transition costs, is framed in rationalist terms. This approach is 
challenged by Hay (2011); he argues that actors do not have fixed ‘objective’ preferences 
that are derived from their material surroundings. Rather than fixed, preferences are 
dynamic and constructed. In the pension reform arena this dovetails with Barnett and 
Finnermore’s (1999, 2004) work on the social constructivist power of international 
organisations that are argued to create social reality. The publication of Averting enabled 
actors to reinterpret the transition costs of pension reform. New metrics such as the 
implicit pension burden were devised that made actors view their material conditions 
differently. It meant that the increase in borrowing to fund the transition was not viewed 
as negatively as increases in a budget deficit might otherwise have been.  
 
A reinterpretation/reconstruction of these material surroundings may have taken hold 
before the global economic crisis and then accelerated afterwards. As Beland and 
Orenstein (2013) argue, the key proponent of pension privatisation, the World Bank, had 
been shifting its position for some time. Moreover, another actor, the European 
Commission, has emerged on the scene following the accession to the EU of Eastern 
European countries. This led to a reinterpretation of budget deficits that once might have 
been condoned as a price worth paying for privatisation, to something much more 
problematic – particularly as international finance became scarcer after the crisis. This is 
an ideational reconstruction of material surroundings that will lead to maximising-actors 
pursuing a different strategy after the change.  
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Finally, Kpessa & Béland (2012) argue the standing of the ILO as a global player has been 
enhanced since the global economic crisis. Many of its warnings about the shortcomings 
of pension privatisation have been realised. Moreover, they argue that the poor 
reputation of the World Bank in Africa following its Structural Adjustment Programmes, 
has meant that lacks influence in policy development and agenda setting in Africa. As a 
consequence, the ILOs prescribed pension model of a social protection floor has gained 
ground in Africa and in international policy circles (see Deacon 2013). In line with Barnett 
and Finnemore’s (2004) contention that moral legitimacy is one of the sources of 
international organisations’ social constructivist power, the ILO construction of reality 
may have more leverage given its enhanced reputation. Whilst the focus of global 
pension policy in the 1990s was the second pillar, the rise to prominence of the ILO, the 
problems with second pillar reforms and the continuing fiscal constraints has meant that 
extension of the public pillar has taken centre stage, as the following chapters in this 
thesis show.  
 
Individual Country Studies of Pension Reforms and Counter-Reforms 
 
Hungary has acted as a lead peer in the region for other reforming countries. For this 
reason, the accounts of the policy transfer from South to East in pension privatisation 
(Muller, 2003; Orenstein, 2008) or regional accounts of pension reform (Cerami, 2011; 
Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012; Guardiancich, 2011; Muller, 1999; Orenstein, 2000) 
have devoted sections to Hungary given its role as a first mover. Hungary was also the 
first country in the region to renationalise its pension system and so was again ahead of 
the trend in the region. It is for these reasons that it is given a prominent place in the 
more recent studies of pension counter-reform such as Datz and Dansci’s (2012) 
comparative study of pension reform reversal in Argentina and Hungary. However, whilst 
Hungary has primarily featured in literature that is globally or regionally focused, there 
are characteristics specific to Hungary. These characteristics are argued in the literature, 
which focuses solely on Hungary, to have rendered its pension system in a ‘permanent’ 
state of reform (Augusztinovics, 1999; Czúcz & intér, 2002; Guardiancich, 2008; Holtzer, 
2010; Palacios & Rocha, 1998; Rocha & Vittas, 2002; Simonovits, 2000; 2011). 
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The process of democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe has been a heterogeneous 
one. Some countries have adopted institutions that foster a separation of powers, such 
as Poland, whereas Hungary’s institutions encourage a concentration of power (Enyedi, 
2017). Furthermore, political competition in Hungary closely resembles a two-party 
system with the socialist party as the main party on the left and Fidesz emerging as the 
main party on the right. This contrasts again with Poland, which has a fragmented party 
system whereby parties have struggled to establish themselves as permanent parties of 
government or opposition (Szczerbiak, 2017). 
 
Simonovits (2011) offers an extensive analysis of pension reform and counter-reform in 
Hungary. In 2010, Fidesz gained a substantial majority in the general election resulting in 
it controlling 68 per cent of the parliamentary seats. In opposition it had opposed the 
elimination of the 13th month pension entitlement. These manifesto promises ran 
counter to the austere fiscal environment which the government inherited. After failed 
attempts to lobby the European Commission to relax the Maastricht constraints on 
budget deficits, an even looser fiscal policy was proposed with the proposed introduction 
of a lower flat tax rate of 16 per cent of income. Simonovits argues these promises 
contributed to Hungary’s decision to renationalise the second pension pillar in late 2010. 
The nationalisation reduced the reported budget deficit by 1.4% as it diverted 
contributions to the private pillar back into the general budget, Moreover, the 
accumulated capital was transferred back into the public purse, enabling further 
expenditure options for the government. The renationalisation of the pension system in 
Hungary was carried out with minimal domestic opposition. International newspapers 
such as The Economist and Financial Times have voiced opposition that it sets a worrying 
precedent but domestically the small opposition had no mechanism through which to 
oppose the move. Prior to the nationalisation, Orbán stripped the constitutional court of 
veto powers over fiscal matters. Given that the second pension pillar falls within the 
fiscal remit it had no legislative power over the outcome rendering opponents to the 
move, powerless. In 2014 Fidesz retained its substantial majority in parliament. This 
indicates that the reversal of the 1998 pension privatisation has not had a detrimental 
political impact to the ruling party. Whilst, the privatisation had initially been a popular 
move, its reversal has also been an accepted reform. 
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In an analysis of the Polish pension reforms and counter-reforms, Inglot (2016) stresses 
the path dependency inherent in the Polish pension system. Where scholarly attention 
had been focused on the partial-privatisation of the pension system through the setting 
up of individually funded accounts, it failed to recognise the continued expansion of the 
public pillar. He ultimately rejects the notion that the partial-privatisation of the system 
represented a paradigm shift in Polish pension provision. The closing down of the private 
pillar is argued to be merely a tinkering of the system that has been a characteristic of 
pension reforms for a long period of time in Poland. This analysis builds on the central 
thesis of Inglot (2008), that the welfare states of Central and Eastern Europe represent 
‘emergency welfare states’, characterised by institutional layering that takes place 
during crisis and often becomes semi-permanent.  
 
Adascalitei & Domonkos (2015) analyse the late reforms of the Czech Republic and 
Romania. Müller (1999) argued that the relatively smooth transition of the Czech 
Republic meant that pension reform never made the political agenda in the same way it 
did in Poland and Hungary. The Czech Republic, alongside Romania, never reformed its 
system prior to the crisis, in the same way that most other countries in the region did. 
Whilst many of those were reversing their reforms, the Czech Republic and Romania 
were undergoing a moderate privatisation. The authors argue this was the result of 
Conservative politicians with market-orientated preferences governing both countries. 
Unlike, previous reforms in the region these are more modest and therefore argued to 
be more sustainable. However, by the time of publication, events had overtaken the 
argument and the Czech Republic came into line with the rest of the region when it 
closed its second pillar (Krzyzak, 2014). Romania has also legislated to dramatically 
reduce the size of its second pillar amidst debate over closing it completely (Ottawa, 
2019).  
 
Upon declaring independence from the Soviet Union, the Baltic States inherited the 
Soviet pension system. They were Bismarckian in nature but funded entirely from the 
general taxation as opposed to contributions like Bismarckian systems, including the 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary (Leppik & Võrk, 2006). Immediate reforms entailed 
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establishing a separate financing mechanism from the Soviet one and extending 
coverage. Attempts were made to enhance the earnings-related component of the 
system. However, the deep economic crisis of the transition scaled down the ambitions 
of pension reformers due to scarce revenues (Leppik & Võrk, 2006). Instead, a flat 
universal pension was introduced. This pension was less generous than the Czech, 
Hungarian and Polish pension systems (Casey, 2004). During the transition period, the 
number of old age pensioners fell in the Baltic states due to an increase in the retirement 
age. This crucial difference rendered multi-pillar reform much easier than in the Baltics 
than the Visegrad countries. For example, Estonia’s transition costs stand in marked 
contrast to Hungary and Poland. It used a ‘carve-out and top-up’ approach to 
establishing the second pillar (Fultz, 2006). The balanced-budget fiscal stance of 
successive governments gave Estonia greater fiscal space at the onset of the global 
economic crisis. In 2008, when the crisis began, Estonia’s debt-to-GDP ratio was only 
4.5%, compared to 71.6% of GDP in Hungary (Eurostat, 2016). There was therefore not 
the same incentive or urgency to dismantle the second pillar. Instead, to avert fiscal 
problems, second pillar funds were temporarily diverted back to the public pillar for a 
time-limited period (Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012). Once this period of time was over, 
the second pillar was strengthened with increased revenues to make up for the previous 
reduction.  
 
It has been argued that the Baltic states have embraced marketisation and neoliberalism 
more wholeheartedly than any other region in the world (Bohle & Greskovits, 2009; 
Casey, 2004; Sommers & Woolfson, 2014). As will be shown in the later chapters, this 
reason was offered by the OECD and ILO as an explanation for why the region never 
completely abandoned the multi-pillar pension system when others did. To date the 
literature has not adequately analysed the Baltic exceptionalism of the multi-pillar 
pension model.  
 
Conclusion and contribution of the thesis to the literature 
 
This review has focused exclusively on multi-pillar pension reforms and counter-reforms. 
It finds that the literature on pension privatisation at the global level is the most 
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theoretically developed from the different perspectives of institutional change. There 
are rationalist, historical and constructivist approaches to explaining the process of 
pension privatisation. The literature on the counter reforms on the other hand is much 
less developed. This is not surprising given how recent the reversals have taken place.  
 
The literature on pension privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe at the regional level 
is primarily situated within the transition from state led socialism to market-based 
economies. In a similar vein to the literature at the global level there is also a 
theoretically rich literature on the process of pension privatisation with contributions 
from rationalist, historical institutionalist and constructivist perspectives, with the latter 
primarily coming from global social policy scholars. Again, the literature on the reform 
reversals is somewhat under-developed. Rationalist interpretations of the reform 
reversals are the dominant interpretation in the literature with the added dimension of 
the emergence of the EU as a veto actor in the domestic politics of Central and Eastern 
Europe. This is enacted through the Maastricht Criteria of EU membership and the hard 
conditionality attached to loans from European institutions. To date, the perspectives of 
actors who carried out the reform reversals are not present in the literature. It is unclear 
whether the Maastricht criteria were a prominent reason for the reforms or whether it 
was a wider disillusionment with pension privatisation. The literature offers no 
perspective on how much actors were influenced by neighbouring countries. It also is 
unable to answer whether actors feared retribution from financial markets or from 
international organisations like the World Bank.  
 
This review has identified significant gaps in the literature on pension reforms across the 
globe since the global economic crisis. In particular, at a global, regional and local level 
the view of transnational pension reform actors is missing. These views are an important 
epistemological component of the interaction between ideas and public policy. They will 
help to position the thesis at the nexus of the literature on institutional change and global 
pension policy. The role of ideas allows for an interaction between historical and 
constructivist institutionalism. The view of actors will also allow for a deducing of the 
rationalist intentions of actors. In conclusion, there is still a lot unknown about the recent 
pension reforms, elaboration could lead to a deeper understanding into the causes of 
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ideational shifts and institutional change making a significant contribution to the global 
social policy literature. The next chapter will outline the methodological approach in 
meeting these empirical and theoretical gaps in the literature. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Methodology 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter outlines the methods that were deployed to collect the data in order to 
answer the research questions set out in Chapter Three. The thesis employed two 
methods of data collection: elite interviews with policy actors and a document analysis 
of policy documents. Both of these methods will be analysed here and their usefulness 
evaluated for the thesis. The chapter then sets out the analytical framework which 
structures the thesis and the methods of data collection deployed to answer the research 
questions. It builds on the theoretical foundations set out in Chapter Two; in particular, 
the final section on global social policy. The analytical framework deployed is the Agency, 
Structure, Institutions, Discourse (ASID) framework developed by Moulaert & Jessop 
(2006) and proposed by Deacon and Stubbs (2013) as an approach to global social policy 
studies. It outlines the rationale for this approach; specifically, its usefulness in capturing 
the multi-faceted nature of global social policy. 
 
Ontological Considerations 
 
Ontological considerations question the nature of social entities and whether they have 
an existence external to the mind of actors or whether actors construct the entities in 
their minds (Benton & Craib, 2011). Bryman has argued there are two distinct ontological 
positions that determine the epistemological approach of research (Bryman, 2008). The 
first is objectivism. This infers that social entities exist independently of our minds and 
are not influenced by our own subjective interpretations. Conversely, the second 
position, constructionism, questions the notion that social entities have an existence 
independent of individual minds (Burr, 2015). This position argues that social entities are 
produced through social interaction which leaves them in a permanent state of revision. 
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A hard-interpretation of the constructionist position would imply there are no definitive 
versions of reality. Instead, an infinite number of realities would exist upon interaction 
with the world.  
 
Chapter Two outlined the utility of the constructivist approach to international relations, 
in particular for global social policy studies. By adopting this approach, the thesis aligns 
itself more closely with a constructionist ontology. However, it does not seek to reject 
the idea that an objective social reality does exist, independent of the mind of actors 
(Danermark et al., 2005). Rather, it prioritises the socially constructed aspects of the 
social world for empirical exploration.  
 
The thesis adopts a number of ontological stances which orient the investigation into 
global pension policy. First, international organisations are believed to exist as purposive 
actors in their own right. This implies they have an ontological status that is separate to 
nation states which finance them and create them (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). 
International relations scholars from the constructivist tradition have stressed the 
autonomy –  from nation states – international organisations such as the World Bank 
have; alongside the freedom they have to pursue their own policies (Barnett & 
Finnemore, 2004; Béland & Orenstein, 2013). Second, global pension policy is not 
something that is ‘out there’ acting above the heads of everyone. It is a transnational 
process that operates at every level of governance (Stubbs, 2005). This position was 
outlined in the politics of scale section in Chapter Two. Finally, one of the tools that 
international organisations use to set the agenda is the publication of documents. 
Atkinson and Coffey (2004) have argued these documents should not be viewed as 
‘windows into reality’. Rather, they should be thought of as entities with a distinct 
ontological status: a ‘document reality’ (2004, p. 87). This necessitates an inquiry that 
contains a contextual analysis of a document cognisant of who wrote it and what was 
the intended audience. The analysis of documents in Chapter Seven dovetails the 
analysis of Chapter Eight which focuses on the internal politics of the ILO and World 
Bank. It outlines the context of the documents that were produced and the politics of 
how they came into existence.  
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The analysis is therefore concerned with the constructed aspects of global pension 
policy. It analyses the meanings and cognitive frames which are implicit within 
publications and within the utterances of elite actors. It does not assume that ‘objective’ 
data is a window into reality. Establishing the full context of a document or the 
positionality of an actor will inform the analysis. The meanings that may be implicit will 
be elucidated in order to establish the action they orientate. For instance, it will be 
shown in Chapter Seven that Averting was written in such a way as to persuade countries 
to partially privatise their public pension systems through a multi-pillar pension system. 
 
Epistemological considerations 
 
Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. It is essentially the theory of how humans have 
knowledge of the world around them or ‘how do we know what we know?’. It provides 
a philosophical grounding for all knowledge claims. Within the social sciences there are 
two main approaches to epistemology: positivism and interpretivism (Benton and Craib, 
2011). Positivism views scientific knowledge as superior to rival knowledge claims. It 
prioritises the scientific method and principles (Benton and Craib, 2011). It seeks to 
produce objective knowledge through measurement and testing. Drawing on a tradition 
that dates back to Comte, it seeks to separate factual statements, which are testable, 
from value judgements, which are not scientific (Scharff, 2002). Thus, according to 
positivists, the role of the researcher is present the world as it is, not how they believe it 
ought to be. The personal beliefs of the researcher should not influence the findings. The 
evaluation of all knowledge claims should be undertaken with universal methods that 
are reliable and transparent (Bryman, 2008).  
 
Researchers from an interpretivist tradition have been highly critical of the central tenets 
of positivism (Schutz, 1954). In an attempt to advance the utility of social science, Weber 
argued that it should study meaningful action (Johnson et al., 1984). He proposed that 
researchers should study the interaction of individuals. For Weber, there were two types 
of knowledge: observation and explanation (Johnson et al., 1984). Observation simply 
entailed the identification of what a person was doing. However, explanation was a more 
thorough and deeper level of knowledge that sought to understand why they were doing 
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it. Weber called this understanding verstehen which loosely translates to the English 
word empathy (Bryman, 2008 p. 45). Weber’s verstehen was influential for 
phenomenologists, another tradition within the broader school of interpretivism. 
Phenomenology is an attempt to link consciousness to an external reality. It seeks to 
understand how human consciousness converts sense perceptions into what we believe 
to exist. A key distinction for phenomenologists is this perception is not limited to what 
we can physically observe, but also our imagination. Phenomenologists capture the 
principal difference between positivists and interpretivists, they argue that the social 
world is inherently different from the natural world, which renders the scientific 
methods of inquiry ineffective for understanding the social world. This dilemma is neatly 
captured by a widely cited quote from Schutz:  
 
“the world of nature as explored by the natural scientist does not ‘mean’ anything 
to molecules, atoms and electrons. But the observational field of the social 
scientist – social reality – has a specific meaning and relevance for the beings, 
living, acting and thinking within it. By a series of common-sense constructs that 
have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world which they experience as the 
reality of their daily lives. It is these thought objects of theirs which determine 
their behaviour by motivating it. The thought objects constructed by the social 
scientist, in order to grasp this social reality, have to be founded upon the thought 
objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men [and women!], living 
their daily life within the social world.” (Schutz, 1954, pp. 266-267). 
 
The thesis aligns itself most closely with an interpretivist epistemology. It will seek to 
interpret the meaning and cognitive processes of actors – both those who are 
interviewed and also those of policymakers who are the intended audiences of World 
Bank and ILO publications. For the publications, it is unlikely both organisations will 
always be explicit in publications in outlining the action they seek to orient from actors. 
A level of interpretation will therefore be necessary. At no point is it possible to observe 
the reader of documents and empirically investigate their understanding in the moment. 
Instead this must be interpreted from the text. For example, Chapter Seven argues that 
Averting the Old Age Crisis was framed in such a way, systematically attacking public 
provision whilst simultaneously championing the benefits of private provision, that it 
oriented a specific form of action. With the interviews an interpretivist stance will be 
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deployed in order to draw out the meanings implicit within the responses from the elites 
who are interviewed.  
 
Data 
 
The thesis utilised two methods of data collection to explore the research questions: 
elite interviews and document analysis. It therefore benefitted from the methodological 
principle of triangulation. This is a research principle that seeks to install checks on 
assumptions that may be derived from documents, by testing them in interviews. In 
addition, the elite interviews enabled data to be generated on the story behind the 
documents such as why did they come to exist in the first place, and what was omitted 
from the documents? It can be impossible to derive information from the documents 
alone on the latter question and can only be possible to know if the answer is explicitly 
stated in the former. Atkinson and Coffey (2004) have argued that documents cannot be 
thought to offer some kind of ‘window into reality’. They must not be treated as neutral 
documents, but rather have an ontological existence of their own, a ‘document reality’. 
 
As Chapter Eight shows, the data generated from the interviews gave insights into the 
documents that could never have been known from the document alone. For example, 
the World Bank’s evaluations into the pension reforms it supported, appears from just 
reading the document, to be a rational exercise in reviewing the outcomes of its flagship 
programme. However, the interviews revealed the evaluations were initiated by political 
opponents of the multi-pillar reforms as a way to shift the debate in a direction that 
questioned the utility of the reforms. An example of omissions from documents is the 
revelation that a report into pension privatisation in Latin America was never translated 
into Spanish. This meant that a core audience of the report would never be reached. The 
interviews revealed this was a consequence of internal politics that tried to suppress the 
publication of the report. These types of internal battles can never be known from a 
simple reading and interpretation of a document. It requires information from those 
present. The content of the documents of international organisations can be heavily 
contested given the reach of the publications. As Wade (2002) shows, the messages 
contained in them can be hotly disputed given their role in global hegemony. The battle 
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over pension documents was a front in the battle over neoliberal ideas and their 
counterparts in the pension debate. Equally, the information given in an interview must 
be treated with caution. Actors may knowingly or unknowingly give false information. 
Where possible this should be verified from other sources.  
 
A Comparative Research Design  
 
Research design is a logical exercise that seeks to structure the inquiry in an appropriate 
way to answer the research questions. It acts as a framework to generate and analyse 
data. For the research questions developed in Chapter Three, a comparative research 
design is best suited to analyse the data in a way that will test the hypotheses. 
Comparative designs entail an analysis of the difference and similarities between cases. 
The nature of the comparison involves comparing the pension and social protection 
positions of both the ILO and World Bank. It also involves a dynamic aspect, comparing 
the change over time in the positions of the two organisations and their influence over 
the global policy process during different time periods.  
 
The advantages of the comparative research design are fourfold: it allows for the 
contextualisation of knowledge, it enables classifications to be improved, it allows for 
the formulation and testing of hypotheses and it allows for predictions to be made 
(Hague & Harrop, 2007). In the case of the thesis, the comparative design allows for the 
contextualisation of a number of concerns of thesis. For example, the thesis shows that 
the authority of the World Bank has diminished in global pension policy. However, 
without comparing this observation to the authority of the ILO, it is impossible to know 
if the World Banks authority has diminished or whether the authority of all international 
organisations has diminished. In the case of classifications, the comparative element 
enables the analysis to recognise how pensions policy has evolved into debates around 
social protection and its coverage, with pensions forming part of a larger social 
protection debate. The comparative design also allows the process of pension reform 
and counter-reform to be analysed by comparing the impact of the global economic crisis 
and pension reform reversals on the nature of global pension policy and how things have 
changed between pre- and post-crisis time periods. 
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Comparative designs have a number of drawbacks. From an experimental design 
perspective, the condition known as “too many variables, not enough cases” will always 
be a problem for comparative designs in the social sciences. This is because the social 
world is so rich and complicated there are far too many variables to ever isolate with the 
same number of cases. In the case of this study, there are only a finite number of 
international organisations, trying to isolate every variable with the addition of new 
organisation would be futile. It would also dilute the research findings. The whole 
purpose of a qualitative approach is to generate rich, nuanced and in-depth data. This 
can only be achieved with a smaller number of cases. This is one of the reasons the ILO 
and World Bank were selected for the thesis.  
 
However, the inclusion of two more international organisations in the study would have 
traded the depth of analysis as a way to include more breadth. The World Bank and ILO 
were selected because they are the two organisations that are involved at every stage of 
the global social policy model proposed by Orenstein (2008). At the policy development 
and agenda setting stage, the World Bank, ILO, OECD and EU all contribute to debates 
on pension provision on issues such as sustainability, coverage and adequacy. This will 
often be through the publication of reports and sponsored conferences with the aim of 
influencing national agendas. However, at the other two stages of the global social policy 
process, the role of the EU and OECD is diminished (Orenstein, 2008). On policy transfer, 
the EU may seek to guide best practice through the Open Method of Coordination. 
However, this is a soft compulsion which simply nudges member states in certain 
directions. The OECD through its Pensions Outlook seeks to steer pension reforms softly 
by comparing each the systems of member countries. However, given the diversity of 
the pension systems of the members in both organisations, they are both reluctant to 
promote one specific pension model, policy transfer is not on the agenda of these 
organisations.  
 
The ILO and World Bank are not constrained by these considerations, both have 
promoted specific policy models from different countries. Most notably, the World Bank 
promoted the Chilean pension system across the globe. A further consideration is that 
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the OECD and EU related only to a limited number of countries, the EU is regional and 
the OECD is focused solely on developed nations. The ILO and the World Bank on the 
other hand, have a global reach and are therefore more qualified to be considered the 
leading actors in global pension policy. Finally, at the implementation stage of the global 
social policy process, both these organisations offer technical support to reforming 
countries and are therefore much more active in policy implementation than the OECD 
and EU. It is for this reasons that these cases were selected.  
 
A second drawback of comparative studies is referred to as the travelling problem. This 
problem is conceptual. How does the meaning of the concept travel across time and 
space? This is an important consideration for this study. How can it be certain that the 
dynamics of the global pension debate that took place between the ILO and World Bank 
in the 1990s, be certain to travel across time. This was overcome by the triangulation of 
the research methods. In particular, the elite interviews gave context and insight to the 
publications produced by each organisation. It was these interviews that enabled the 
study to establish that the pensions debate had shifted terrain into a wider debate on 
social protection. This might not have been clear from an analysis of the documents 
alone.  
 
Content Analysis of Documents 
 
Content analysis is an empirically grounded research technique which seeks to make 
replicable and valid inferences from text-based sources (Krippendorf, 2004). The nature 
of content analysis is exploratory in nature and predictive or seeks to draw inferences in 
its intent. It involves the systematic analysis of texts and is a technique that aims to be 
learnable and divorceable from the researcher (Krippendorf, 2004). Content analysis can 
be both quantitative and qualitative in nature, drawing on both positivist and 
interpretivist traditions. Each of these approaches will now be outlined before providing 
a justification for a qualitative approach to analysing documents.  
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Quantitative Content Analysis 
 
Early proponents of content analysis as a research method envisaged it to be a 
quantitative research tool. They argued it should involve the “objective, systematic and 
quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Berelson, 1952 p. 
18). Despite its use dating back to the sixteenth century; in particular, in order to quantify 
the content of religious texts, it came into popular use as a method to quantitatively 
analyse the content of newspapers. It was primarily used to quantify trends in the print 
media over time. One of the central findings from these inquiries was that news was 
becoming trivialised and divorced from political life over time (Sparks, 1988) .  A trend 
that recent content analyses have shown to have continued with the market-driven news 
agenda (Beam, 2003). These findings for example, were deduced by the decline in the 
frequency of the word of democracy in the press. The strength of this method lies in its 
transparency and replicability. It is less likely to be influenced by the bias of the 
researcher.  
 
However, the validity of the findings is questionable. A simple counting of words ignores 
the context in which they are used. In addition, even when the context is known the 
inferences that can be drawn from this type of analysis are limited. For example, an 
increase in the prevalence of crime stories in the media, may not be a result of an 
increase in crime but rather an increase in the triviality of the media. Inferences that go 
beyond the textual matter are therefore difficult to draw. Krippendorf (2004) cites an 
example of the limitations of quantification. A student of his analysed a book written on 
US presidents by a colleague. He asked the author to rank the presidents in author of 
importance. The correlation between this order and the quantification were remarkably 
low. Early content analysis implicitly assumed hat the text contained a message which 
could be extrapolated. However, this type of analysis does not factor in omissions, which 
may be more important than the contents of the message. Despite this, however, some 
form of classification is still necessary, this may entail some forms of quantification 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
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Qualitative Content Analysis 
 
Social constructionists have used content analysis in a very different way to the 
positivists’ notions within quantitative content analysis (Krippendorf, 2004). They have 
instead used content analysis in attempt to understand how reality comes to be 
constituted in language and through human interactions with a written text. It is more 
closely aligned with thematic analysis (Bowen, 2009). A text needs to therefore be 
analysed within a particular context. In contrast to quantitative approaches, a single text 
can have multiple interpretations according to the context in which it is situated. It 
therefore requires a close reading of a smaller number of texts.  
 
An interpretivist reading will seek to draw out the meanings which may not necessarily 
be inherent in the physicality of the written text. There is a recognition that texts do not 
have single meanings. For example, a researcher on gender will draw different inferences 
from a political speech than an economist seeking to deduce macroeconomic policy 
signals. However, whilst multiple inferences can be drawn from the text read in different 
context, systematic inquiry from the same context should draw the same inferences. It 
is important therefore that the process for how conclusions were drawn is made 
transparent.  
 
The Sampling of Documents 
 
The policy discourse of the ILO and World Bank is represented in range of different types 
of documents. These include: official reports, working papers, thematic or special issue 
reports, press releases, briefings, technical notes, recommendations, conventions and 
guides for policy makers. The documents analysed in this thesis excluded any documents 
that were prepared by outside consultants, including only those within the organisation 
who have some claim to represent the voice of the organisation in some form. All of the 
documents included in the analysis are publicly available. All documents with a 
significant pensions component from both organisations published after 1994 were read 
as part of the analysis. This amounted to a reading of 104 pension documents from both 
organisations. The full list of the documents selected for analysis is available in the 
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appendix. The analysis then used information from 25 elite interviews and the global 
pension policy literature to assess which documents required a closer analysis. The 
documents analysed in Chapter Seven were all cited by numerous interviewees as having 
a significant impact on the development of pension policies within both organisations.  
In total, 26 documents were comprehensively analysed  in Chapter Seven for their 
development of each organisation’s pension policies.  
 
Setting the Contours of the Document Analysis 
 
The closer reading of the of the significant documents had a number of aims. It sought 
to examine the framing of pension problems and the policies promoted to tackle them. 
It also sought to discern degrees of alignment between the two organisations. A 
consultation of the wider sample and the information from the elite interviews also 
helped determine which lines of contestation between the two organisations was 
present and where the field was developing away from contestation.  The content 
analysis therefore picked out the key framing of the problem and whether solutions 
offered lay on an imagined axis between state and market provision. As will be shown in 
detail in Chapter Seven, this analysis found the dominant framing for the World Bank in 
the early 1990s to be around sustainability, with market solutions offered as the solution. 
For the ILO, the framing of the problem was around adequacy and risk, this favoured 
publicly provided solutions. Over time, coverage became the key issue framed by both 
organisations, which has led to the promotion of the state and public pensions as the 
solution. 
 
Elite Interviews 
 
The thesis draws on the data generated in elite interviews to trace the process of global 
pension policy. Process tracing has become a growing qualitative approach in political 
science (Collier, 2011). Its advantages lie in its ability to explore causal mechanisms and 
to analyse complex decision-making. This analysis that follows in this thesis traces the 
complex pension policy-making processes of the World Bank, the ILO and the 
governments of Central and Eastern Europe. Elite interviews belong to the “family of 
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qualitative interviews” (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). Qualitative interviews are often described 
as a “conversation with a purpose” Berg (2011, p. 89). However, unlike other qualitative 
interviews, the balance of knowledge, expertise and power usually rests with the 
respondent rather than the interviewer. This can be overcome with a thorough 
preparation endowing the interviewer with their own authority through expertise or 
knowledge of the policy area (Mikecz, 2012). 
 
Tansey (2007) outlines four uses for elite interviews:  
 
1. To Corroborate what has been established from other sources 
2. Establish what a set of people think 
3. Make inferences about larger population’s characteristics 
4. Reconstruct an event or set of events 
 
The Corroboration of Findings from Other Sources 
 
As was argued above, the principle of triangulation was deployed in the thesis as a way 
to corroborate the findings from different data sources. Before the interviews had been 
undertaken, a full reading of all the pension documents by international organisations  
was undertaken to inform the interview schedule. When interviewing regional experts 
and actors, preparation involved a reading of the pension reform process in the specific 
country in which they were situated. Where initial findings were gleaned from the 
documents these could then be tested through interviews with key actors. For example, 
an evaluation of the World Bank’s pension reforms was undertaken in 2006. This 
appeared to signal a shift in the stance of the World Bank in its pension stance. An 
interview with Robert Holzmann, the Director of Social Protection and Labor at the World 
Bank could thus assess whether a shift had taken place at that point and also add depth 
to the finding by ascertaining what had precipitated the shift.  
 
In addition, the thorough preparation, ahead of the interviews, was deemed necessary 
to conduct the interview in an appropriate manner. As Leech (2002) argues, “in an 
interview what you already know is just as important as what you want to know” (2002 
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p. 665). As what you know determines the questions you will ask and how you will ask 
them. In the case of elite interviewing this is crucial. The recruitment of elites for 
interview is notoriously difficult, and any interview may be subject to stringent time 
constraints (Goldstein, 2002). It is therefore crucial to ensure that maximum leverage is 
gained from the time-constrained interview. Thus, the interview should not seek to 
generate findings that can be established elsewhere. For example, actors within 
international organisations usually publish peer-reviewed papers, reports and other 
publications in their specific field. It was important these were read in preparation of the 
interview to ensure it augmented what it published in the documents rather than simply 
generated findings that could be found elsewhere.  
 
To Establish What a Set of People Think 
 
This was an important component of the elite interviewing as one of the principal 
research questions is to establish the perspective of international organisations on the 
series of pension reform reversals, and what this means for pension policy going forward. 
The elite interviews allowed for a deeper analysis of the meanings within policy 
documents. It also allowed for the tentative findings to be checked with the key authors 
of texts. The analysis of documents had analysed a growing convergence between the 
two main organisations in question. It was therefore important to question whether this 
was the case and what the nature of cooperation between the two organisations 
entailed. The interviews will be shown to reveal this is the case but important differences 
between the two organisations remain. This enabled an iterative relationship between 
the documents and the interviews as they could be re-read and interpreted in new ways.  
 
Reconstructing an Event or Set of Events 
 
This is one of the central aims of the elite interviews conducted for the thesis. It would 
not have been possible to reconstruct events in the way that this analysis does through 
a document analysis alone (Collier, 2011; Bowen, 2009). Using direct and focused 
questioning the interviews enabled a reconstructing of political events within 
organisations. It brought together various accounts from different actors and pieced 
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them together to trace the underlying process. It enabled the first-hand interviewing of 
the participants at the centre of global pensions policy including domestic actors who 
enacted the reforms. It allowed for a probing that went deeper than official accounts. 
For example, when questioning the Polish Finance Minister on the nationalisation of the 
Polish pension system, the interview enabled me to ask him why he did not nationalise 
in 2011 instead of simply cutting the contributions to the private system. I was also able 
to ask whether he feared the reaction of the pensions industry before conducting the 
reforms. These insights are simply not available from other sources.  
 
Make Inferences About a Larger Population’s Characteristics 
 
This was not one of the outcomes that was sought form the elite interviews. The number 
of policy actors in the field of pensions in both organisations is small and so the aim was 
to speak to as many people as possible that work in the field. The non-random, 
convenience and snowball sampling methods would not have been conducive to a 
meaningful generalisation to groups beyond the core pensions policy teams of the 
organisations and the domestic experts in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
Sampling and Recruitment 
 
The interviews were selected by a non-random sampling method (Tansey, 2007). The 
aim was not to draw a sample from a larger population of actors and to generalise the 
findings to that larger population. Instead, the aim of the interviews was to speak to the 
key actors in the field who had participated in pension reform at the domestic level, 
global level or in many cases transnational actors that traversed both the national and 
the global. In most research methods, the aim is to homogenise variables and treat all 
respondents equally. However, in elite interviewing, not all respondents can be treated 
equally and therefore standardisation is not a priority like in other techniques (Tansey, 
2007). More senior respondents have more knowledge of the decision-making process 
and therefore can offer insights that less senior ones can. However, elites may also be 
dishonest for political reasons or seek to embellish their role in a process (Berry, 2002). 
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In order to alleviate this threat to validity all claims were corroborated with other 
sources.  
 
An initial stakeholder analysis was undertaken to establish key respondents for the 
interview. It led to the successful recruitment of the present and former directors of the 
Social Protection and Labor Department at the World Bank, the present and former 
directors of social security at the ILO, the director of social policy at the OECD, who has 
also worked at the World Bank, and other members of the respective departments at 
the ILO and World Bank. Interviews were also undertaken with the ILO and World Bank 
Directors of the regional offices in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, interviews 
were sought from domestic actors and experts to establish their perspective on global 
pension policy and whether international organisations had any bearing on their pension 
decisions.  
 
Once the list of potential participants was drawn up, written contact was made to each 
prospective respondent. An example of the written contact is available in the appendix. 
Invites were individualised to maximise the chances of a successful response. The 
response rate for interviews was around 40% and out of that around 35% of those 
contacted were interviewed. Further interviews were also obtained through snowball 
sampling and through the use of participants as gatekeepers to other interviewees, 
However, clearly not all the respondents who were sought for interview responded, 
which is not ideal for balance and avoiding systematic bias in the findings. For example, 
the current director of Social Protection at the World Bank, Michal Rutowski, was 
interviewed and so was the director who promoted Averting in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, Robert Holzmann. But Arup Banerji, the director who led the department in 
between these two, was not interviewed. This was alleviated by securing an interview 
with a senior economist from the department who had worked there under all three 
directors. In addition, the former branch director of Social Security Policy and 
Development was interviewed but not his counterpart and rival, the director of Social 
Security, Financial, Actuarial and Statistical Services, Michael Cichon. This was offset by 
interviewing his long-term deputy Krzysztof Hagemejer. The former Deputy Prime 
Minister and Finance Minister of Poland, Jacek Rostowski, who authorised the re-
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nationalisation of the Polish pension system, was interviewed in Warsaw. However, an 
interview with Leszek Balcerowicz, his rival who campaigned against the reversal, was 
not obtained. In this particular instance, the data obtained from Rostowski was used to 
glean the leverage the World Bank still had over the pension reform process, the thinking 
behind the reversals and how the World Bank’s leverage compared with the EU’s 
authority. The interview provided insights that could be corroborated later and used in 
a global social policy analysis.  
 
The Interviews 
 
The length of the interviews ranged from a minimum of 40 minutes to one that lasted 2 
hours and 30 minutes. Out of the 25 interviews conducted, 16 were done via video chat 
through the telecommunications software, Skype. Two interviews took place in person 
in Warsaw, over lunch and another over coffee, another two were conducted at the 
headquarters of the World Bank in Washington, DC and one was conducted in person in 
Philadelphia, PA in the United States5. The interviews that were conducted in person 
were done so at the request of the participants who stipulated this as a condition for 
interview. Finally, one interview with a senior Hungarian civil servant, who wished to 
remain anonymous, was conducted via email. With the exception of the latter, there did 
not appear to be a discernible difference from the data generated in person as to that 
by Skype (for a discussion on mediums of communication see Opdenakker, 2007). The 
literature on qualitative interviewing often cites it to be more of an art form than a 
science (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). Getting participants to open up and building trust is done 
by empathetic body language and thinking on one’s feet when the interview moves in a 
specific direction. This could be accomplished through the medium of a video call, to a 
large extent. One notable difference however, was the soft compulsion of participants 
allowing the interviewer more time if they had travelled some distance to be there. For 
this reason, the interview with the Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister in 
Warsaw was the longest in length, lasting over two hours.  
                                                     
5 The face-to-face interviews were generously funded by the ESRC’s Overseas Institutional Visit Scheme 
which paid for me to be based in the United States for 9 weeks and by the ESRC’s Overseas Fieldwork 
Fund, which paid for two visits to Poland. 
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Furthermore, as two interviews were conducted at the World Bank headquarters as part 
of a research visit, those interviews also enabled a very short ethnography of the World 
Bank. Whilst a one-day visit could never provide incontrovertible data, it did allow for 
insights that were not readily apparent beforehand, and which could later be 
corroborated with other sources. For example, international organisations can 
sometimes be presented as behemoths and monolithic blocs. The introductory chapters 
cited Deacon’s (1997; 2007) analysis of the World Bank and IMF as neoliberal institutions 
whilst the ILO and UN were argued to be more socialist. However, upon visiting the Bank, 
it became clear just how small some department offices are and therefore how 
influential individuals could influence the conduct and policies of the department.  
 
Participants were given the choice from the outset whether the interview would be 
anonymised or whether they would be named. It was explained that for some of the 
participants, anonymity may not be categorically guaranteed if their answers revealed 
insights that only they could know (Lancaster, 2017). They were also given the choice as 
to whether the interview was recorded on a recording device, or not. In total, 19 
interviews were conducted on the record, with a further six conducted off the record 
and anonymised. Three participants did not allow the interview to be recorded. 
Interviews that were not recorded inevitably generated less data than the recorded ones 
(Harvey, 2011). Detailed notes were taken immediately after the interviews, but this 
method relies on the memory of the interviewer. In addition, the recollection after the 
interview inevitably focuses on the salient issues on the mind of the interviewer at the 
time of the interview being conducted. Other insights from an interviewee, that are not 
deemed important at the time, but later become key parts of the analysis are completely 
lost. This is important as re-analysis of interview transcripts at a later time can highlight 
insights that become important but were not deemed important immediately after the 
interview. Furthermore, some of the details from an interview might not be initially clear 
at the time and would therefore be lost in the writing up of notes, yet later on, it might 
be absolutely clear what the interviewee was referring to. This type of insight or data can 
only be captured with a transcript that allows for analysis of the full interview at a period 
of time in the future.  
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The literature cautions against the use of elite interviews as a sole research method in 
any project (Lilleker, 2003; Mikecz, 2012; Morris, 2009; Tansey, 2007). Elite respondents 
may not tell the truth. More innocently, their recollection of events may not be entirely 
accurate, particularly if it was a long time ago. Elites may embellish their role in events 
or have incentives to conceal other important information (Berry, 2002). In addition, the 
difficult process of recruiting elites can lead to an asymmetric sample, which could build 
systematic bias into the findings. However, despite these drawbacks, the method had 
significant utility for thesis. Without the use of elite interviews, the processes of policy 
making at the global level could never have been derived from other sources alone. The 
interviews generated data that would never have been obtainable from the documents. 
As was argued above, the neutral, objective and dispassionate language of a policy 
document conceals the deep divisions and debates that take place in their production. 
For these reasons, despite the extensive drawbacks of elite interviewing that have been 
outlined in this chapter, the benefits of the additional data and context they provide, 
added significant utility to the project.  
 
The Analytical Framework of the Thesis 
 
In 2004, the European Commission funded the DEMOLOGOS project which was tasked 
specifically with developing a methodology suitable for analysing socioeconomic 
development at different spatial scales (Moulaert, Jessop, & Mehmood, 2016). Their 
fourfold ASID model aims to address the limitations of previous scholarship that focuses 
exclusively on structure and agency. The authors note that:  
 
“For an adequate account of socio-economic development, one must refer to the 
actions that steer or interfere with the development processes, the structures 
that both constrain and enable action, the institutions that guide or hamper 
action and mediate the relation between structures and action, and the 
discourses and discursive practices that are part of these interactions.” 
(Moulaert, Jessop, & Mehmood, 2016, pp. 168-169). 
 
They also note that their four concepts have disputed definitions so offer their own 
interpretation of the concepts. They define them as follows:  
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Agency is meaningful human behaviour, individual or collective, that makes a 
significant difference in the natural and/or social worlds, either by direct, 
unmediated action or through the mediation of tools, machines, dispositifs, 
institutions, or other affordances. The differences made by agency include the 
appropriation and transformation of nature; the creation or variation of 
identities, subjectivities, or social standing; the design, building, re-arrangement, 
creative destruction, or dismantling of institutions; and the re-articulation of 
discourses. These and other effects occur in many and varied combinations. 
 
Structure comprises those moments of natural and/or social realities that, in the 
short- to medium-run and in a definite spatial context (typically wider than the 
‘localissimo’), cannot be changed by a given individual or collective agency. The 
necessarily relative, relational, and temporary nature of structure in this sense 
means that the emergent properties of interaction among social agents vary with 
the potentially constrained agents’ spatio-temporal location and relative control 
over resources, affordances, and capacities that are relevant to modifying a given 
structure. Thus, for our purposes, the structure of natural and/or social realities 
must always be defined relative to the differential transformative power of social 
forces that are potentially subject to their constraining or facilitating powers. 
 
Institution: depending on the theory, this category can complement or rival that 
of ‘structure’. The ASID model views institutions as ‘socialized structure’, that is, 
a relatively enduring ensemble of structural constraints and opportunities. 
Institutions comprise a more or less coherent, interconnected set of routines, 
organizational practices, conventions, rules, sanctioning mechanisms, and 
practices that govern more or less specific domains of action. Some have global 
significance (e.g. the balance of power principle in international relations), others 
are more local (e.g. family rules about domestic turn-taking). 
 
Discourse is the production of intersubjective sense- and meaning-making. It is an 
essential moment of action (as meaningful behaviour), of structural constraints 
and conjunctural opportunities (which typically vary with agents’ identities, 
values, interests, spatio-temporal horizons, strategies, and tactics) and, a fortiori, 
of institutions (understood as ‘socialized structure’). (Moulaert, Jessop, & 
Mehmood, 2016, p. 169) 
 
Deacon and Stubbs (2013) have argued this framework has utility in global social policy 
studies. It allows for a more all-encompassing approach to the various strands of global 
social policy research that were outlined in Chapter Two. Complex multilateralism and 
the messy process of global governance, global advocacy coalitions and a politics of scale 
can all be captured by the multi-faceted analysis of Structure, Agency, Institutions and 
Discourse. For example, the concept of global advocacy coalitions involves the 
(re)production of particular kinds of global hegemonies. In Orenstein’s (2008) application 
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of this, it entailed a coalition of transnational actors promoting a specific neoliberal 
pension model. It was disseminated and placed on the agenda by a network of like-
minded policy entrepreneurs. Applying the ASID framework as a heuristic to analyse this 
process is straightforward: the agency aspect focuses on the transnational actors 
involved in the coalition campaigning for pension privatisation, alongside those who 
opposed it. Structure would consider the global political economy  within which the 
actors were operating in. Institutions would consider the welfare institutions that the 
World Bank coalition was seeking to reform. For example, the World Bank’s multi-pillar 
pension model enabled the size and composition of its various pillars to be adapted to 
meet the needs of the reforming country. Finally, discourse would be concerned with 
the publications and discursive practices of the World Bank-led campaign. The 
publication of Averting the Old Age Crisis had a discursive function in reframing the 
priorities and purpose of pension systems. The priority was shifted to sustainability from 
adequacy, whilst the purpose was broadened from one solely to concerned with income 
security in old age, to one that had secondary macroeconomic objectives of developing 
capital markets.  
 
The four components of the ASID framework are used to structure the empirical 
component of the thesis. The following four chapters each comprise of one of the facets 
of the model. Each of these draws on the data to different extents and is outlined below. 
 
Chapter Five is the structure element of the ASID framework. It is concerned with the 
global political economy of global pension policy. It describes how the global political 
and economic environment structured the development of pension policy over the past 
century and at the beginning of this one. It engages with the complex multilateralism 
(O'Brien et al., 2000) of pension policy and shows how international organisations came 
to be involved in the development of pensions and social security policies. The chapter 
shows that the prevailing global paradigm has influenced the nature of pension reforms.  
 
Chapter Six is the institutional aspect of the ASID framework. This interpretation of 
institutions is a refinement of how they were interpreted by Deacon and Stubbs (2013) 
who simply referred to the practices and rules of international organisations. This 
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chapter instead focuses on the welfare institutions of Central and Eastern Europe. This 
is the traditional use of institutions within comparative social policy studies (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Hudson, Gyu-Jin & Kühner, 2008). It deploys the ‘new institutionalism’ 
literature (Hall & Taylor, 1996) to analyse the pension reforms and counter-reforms of 
Central and Eastern Europe. It shows how path dependency has shaped the development 
of pensions institutions in the region and shows how this has influenced global pension 
reform. The chapter also engages with the politics of scale aspects of global social policy 
studies 
 
Chapter Seven is the discourse element of ASID. It focuses on the content and 
development of pensions policy and the evaluations of pension systems conducted by 
the World Bank and ILO. The chapter analyses how reports have been framed and how 
this has shaped the pensions debate both between the organisations and the wider 
global debate. It traces early global pensions documents from the ILO and then the entry 
of the World Bank into the global pension reform arena and how this affected the ILO’s 
policies. From a global social policy studies perspective, this chapter is concerned with 
the global advocacy coalitions aspect of global social policy.  
 
Chapter Eight is the agency component of ASID. It analyses the internal politics of the ILO 
and World Bank, showing how internal political battles and debates have been decisive 
in shifting the global pension policy. It shows that the promotion of certain individuals 
can be instrumental in shaping the global political agenda in certain directions. From a 
global social policy studies perspective, this chapter aligns itself closely with the global 
advocacy coalitions approach and also the complex multilateralism approach by 
demonstrating how actors within international organisations have a role in global 
governance.  
 
Chapter Nine draws all of these chapters together to offer a multi-faceted analysis of 
global pension and social protection policy. It shows how each of the four components 
interact with each other in a variety of ways. For example, it will be shown that the global 
structural environment shapes actors within international organisations, but also how 
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these actors can shape the global structural environment. It therefore proposes an 
iterative relationship between the two.  
 
One of the major drawbacks of the ASID model is each component is not neatly separable 
from the others. For example, what may be considered structure, might equally be 
considered institutional under some conditions. Likewise, agency cannot always be 
neatly separated from discourse. However, whilst there may be some overlap between 
the various facets they still each offer something distinctive. It is the distinctive 
component that is most important for the analysis of global of pension policy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has set out the data sources, methods and analytical structure that have 
guided the inquiry into global pension policy. It outlined the strengths and drawbacks of 
each method, highlighting the principle of triangulation as a fundamental check on the 
over-reliance of one method. It has also stressed the iterations between each method, 
as both sources of data informed the other. The initial reading of documents informed 
the interviews. However, the interviews offered data that could not be elucidated from 
documents and also formed the reading and more detailed analysis of the documents. 
This chapter has also outlined the analytical framework deployed to structure and guide 
the analysis. ASID’s strengths have been argued to be the comprehensive account of 
global pension policy that it enables. It draws on internal politics, global structural 
dynamics, the evaluation and evolution of policy positions and how the institutions in 
which policy ideas are implemented, shape those policy ideas. The thesis now turns to 
its empirical components beginning with setting the scene with the global political 
economy. 
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Chapter Five 
 
 
The Global Political Economy of Pension Reform 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter informs the structure component of the ASID framework that was outlined 
in the previous chapter. It gives a broad outline of the major political and economic 
events that have shaped pension developments at the global level. It serves as a context 
for the chapters that follow. For the following chapter on Central and Eastern Europe 
(Chapter Six), the global context will be shown to have influenced the ideas motivating 
transnational change agents, such as those at the World Bank, attempts at institutional 
change in the region. The global political and economic environment has also fashioned 
the creation of international organisations, which have been so influential in the global 
pension policy process (Garcia, 2007; Skidelsky, 2005). On the development of the 
content of global pension policy (Chapter Seven), this chapter develops the context to 
explore how global political economy has shaped the policy prescriptions offered by 
international organisations. It has also influenced the activity and focus of these 
organizations. In the chapter on agents and international organisations (Chapter Eight), 
the context will explore how actors within these organisations interpret the policy 
environment and how the prevailing paradigm influences the agendas of international 
organisations. This chapter also demonstrates how international organisation 
themselves can influence the agenda within the broader global political economy.  
 
The chapter begins by giving a brief outline of the global political economy in the 
interwar period. Immediately after the First World War, the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) was created. However, no other institutions were created to foster 
international cooperation and international economic stability broke down (Ruggie, 
1982). This period is important, as its shortcomings were partially responsible for the 
outbreak of the Second World War. The subsequent post-war consensus that emerged 
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in its wake, fostered the conditions for what would be coined the ‘golden age’ of 
prosperity (Marglin, 1990). One of the hallmarks of this golden age was the expansion of 
the welfare state and a commitment by western governments to full employment. The 
institutions created during this period were politically important in fostering liberal 
democracy, acting as a bulwark against fascism and Bolshevism (Esping-Andersen, 1996). 
It was during this period that we see an early example of global social policy. The ILO 
seized the emerging consensus on welfare provision to promote the welfare state as a 
tool for social stability (ILO, 1944), and a significant element of this entailed the 
expansion of worldwide pension provision (Orenstein, 2003). The chapter will show, at 
the global level, how the system created at Bretton Woods in 1944 established the rules 
for the international economy. Two new international financial institutions (IFIs) were 
created at Bretton Woods, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – which would form part of the World 
Bank Group. The golden age lasted until the mid 1970s, when the oil shocks precipitated 
a decline in the dominance of Keynesian economic ideas (Hall, 1993).  
 
The chapter then turns to the breakdown of the post-war consensus and the ascendancy 
of neoliberalism. Globally, this new paradigm would take hold of the two major IFIs 
(Williamson, 1990). The chapter gives an outline of this ‘Washington Consensus’ and its 
impact on social policy in developing countries. The Washington Consensus would have 
a devastating impact on Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa (Stiglitz, 2002). It would 
exacerbate the East Asian Financial Crisis, leading to a new approach from IFIs in their 
approach to development and crisis management (Pender, 2001). Next, the chapter 
analyses the end of the Cold War and the race to integrate the economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe into the global economy. It was during this period that global social policy 
as a distinct academic field was created as international organisations competed to 
influence the trajectory of welfare state development in the region (Deacon et al., 1997).  
Global pension policy would become particularly active during this period as the World 
Bank launched a campaign to reform public pension systems (Orenstein, 2008). 
 
The outline of the global structural context concludes with a section on the global 
economic crisis. The crisis challenged the dominance of the neoliberal paradigm and 
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influenced the actions of global policy actors in social protection policy (Deacon, 2013; 
Farnsworth & Irving, 2011). The crisis would have a significant impact on global pension 
policy. First, it created conditions for the large-scale reversal of the World Bank’s multi-
pillar pension model (Datz & Dansci, 2013; Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012). Second, it 
momentarily amplified the positive role of the state in social protection vision, 
particularly during an economic downturn (Deacon, 2011; Natali, 2009; Orenstein, 2011). 
It was in this context that the ILO was able to pass Recommendation 202 on National 
Social Protection Floors, which will be shown to be a significant event. The global 
economic crisis served as a structural influence on international organisations to expand 
the coverage of social protection - including pensions - across the globe.  
 
The analysis for this chapter predominantly draws on secondary sources to present the 
global political and economic context, but also utilises the elite interviews and document 
analysis. In particular, when the focus is brought onto global pension policy, and where 
reference was made by the interviewees to the global structural environment in which 
they were operating. The main aim of this chapter is to present the distinct paradigms 
that have been so influential in the development of global pension policy. The first is the 
Keynesian post-war consensus, which took hold from 1945 and came to an end in the 
mid-to-late 1970s. This paradigm influenced the spread of public pension systems across 
the globe. The second is the neoliberal paradigm, which was ushered in with the 
elections of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in 1979 and 1980 respectively. Both 
paradigms were global in nature, shaping all areas of social policy, in particular the 
approach to pension policy. The neoliberal paradigm was hugely influential over the 
World Bank’s promotion of pension privatisation (Orenstein, 2008). In order to present 
the two distinct paradigms, it is necessary to give an account of the conditions that led 
to their establishment. The chapter then presents the ongoing challenge to the 
neoliberal paradigm presented by the global economic crisis and its responses. It 
demonstrates how global pension policy has mirrored the dominant economic order. 
The current trend towards expanding pension coverage, is a result of the responses to 
the global economic crisis and the coordination bodies set up in the immediate 
aftermath.   
 119 
 
 
 
 
The post-war consensus had its origins in the interwar years, as it was a deliberate 
attempt to foster conditions that would prevent a repeat of the events that led to the 
complete breakdown of the international economy and the conflict that followed. It to 
these events where the analysis now turns.  
 
The Political Economy of the Interwar Period 
 
The First World War represented a devastating blow to the cosmopolitan liberalism of 
the nineteenth century. The idea that economic interdependence was sufficient to foster 
a peaceful coexistence between nations was shattered by the conflict. The War brought 
an end to an unprecedented level of economic activity between nations. The level of 
trade and capital flows would not reach a similar level until the 1970s (Ravenhill, 2017, 
p. 13). This was in part a consequence of the inability of national governments to create 
the conditions for a viable international economic system. The insistence that Germany 
pay for war reparations compounded political and economic instability in Europe and 
thwarted efforts at reconstruction. In 1923, French and Belgian soldiers invaded the Ruhr 
to secure reparations from Germany, which was experiencing dire economic conditions. 
Germany subsequently resorted to printing money to pay for reparations, resulting in 
hyperinflation. A series of loans from the United States to Germany through the Dawes 
and Young Plans stabilised the international economy in the 1920s, enabling Germany to 
pay its reparations and allowing for a return to a more benign economic climate. 
 
The Wall Street Crash in 1929 ended this system of loans and plunged the global 
economy into a depression. The major industrial countries responded to the crisis with 
a series of ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ economic policies that compounded the problems in 
the global economy. The value of world trade declined by two thirds between 1929 and 
1934 as weak demand was exacerbated by a series of tariffs raised to protect local 
industries from international competition (Ravenhill, 2017, p. 14). The effects of the 
depression were also aggravated by a preoccupation with maintaining the international 
gold standard - the system of fixing a country’s currency value to the price of gold 
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(Polanyi, 1944). In Britain, pressure for the pound to depreciate against the price of gold 
saw the Bank of England lose most of its gold reserves in an attempt to service the 
balance of payments. Interest rates were also raised to stimulate demand for sterling. A 
commitment to the gold standard dampened demand in the domestic economy, further 
exacerbating the problem of high unemployment (Keynes, 1936).  
 
The Great Depression of the 1930s caused high unemployment throughout the 
industrialised world. This was a recipe for social disorder and hastened the breakdown 
of liberal democracy across continental Europe. In the United States, the election of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, in 1933, would have significant consequences in understanding 
how the domestic economy functions. His ‘New Deal’ put people back to work through 
government fiscal activity. In a break with economic orthodoxy, he stimulated demand 
in the domestic economy during an economic contraction. This, and the growing 
international demand for American armaments exports in the approach to War, rescued 
the US economy on the eve of the Second World War. The performance of the US 
economy would serve as important empirical contribution to John Maynard Keynes’ 
(1936) seminal macroeconomic publication in 1936 the General Theory Employment, 
Interest and Money (Keynes, 1936). 
 
It is important to note that international institutions had no significant role in the 
governance of international economic affairs throughout the interwar period. The 
League of Nations had coordinated a loan to Austria to aid with its reconstruction and 
held conferences with the aim of facilitating trade by promoting common standards. 
However, the political and economic turmoil of the period overwhelmed the fledgling 
institution and it was dissolved during the Second World War. One exception was the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), which was created in 1919 as part of the Treaty 
of Versailles6. It would outlive the League of Nations despite is origins as one of its 
agencies. It was founded as an agency to promote the interests of workers at the 
international level and became a significant actor in global pension policy as explored 
below. Against a backdrop of huge exploitation of workers in the industrialised world, 
                                                     
6 More detail on the ILO, its mandate and its governing structure are provided in Chapter Eight. 
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the ILO sought to compensate them for their efforts in the First World War and to secure 
a permanent peace through the promotion of social justice.  
 
The ILO would begin its activities with considerable zeal. In its first two years, nine 
International Conventions and 10 Recommendations were adopted. This unnerved some 
governments who felt the ILO was over-stepping its remit. This halted the early period 
of activity (ILO, 2018). In 1926, a supervisory system to monitor the application of ILO 
standards was created, which exists to this day. In 1934, the ILO was given a boost when 
the United States became a member at the behest of President Roosevelt, who realised 
that managing labour issues required international cooperation (ILO, 2018).  
 
On May 10, 1944, whilst the war was still ongoing, the ILO’s 26th International Labour 
Conference (ILC) in Philadelphia, formally established the rights of every human being to 
social security. The Declaration of Philadelphia requires the ILO to promote the 
achievement of social security among the nations of the world. There was a huge feeling 
of urgency and responsibility at the ILC in 1944 (ILO, 1944; Orenstein, 2003). The 
Conference was part of an emerging international consensus on the nature and 
principles of the political, economic and social reconstruction after the war; with the ILO 
part of a of a growing movement to foster peace and stability through the use of social 
policy (Esping-Andersen, 1996). Speeches delivered by the Prime Ministers of Australia 
and New Zealand at the Conference encapsulate the importance social security was 
granted in the emerging post war consensus, each of these is shown below respectively:  
 
“ … that we would go back again to social insecurity and unemployment, then the 
war that is to be won would be lost”.  
 
“Democracy can never again afford a depression … It must be made clear that 
security depends not primarily where borders are and international armed 
forces, but upon economic security for all people” (cited in Reynaud, 2005).  
 
The significance of the Declaration was neatly captured by President Roosevelt in 
welcoming the delegates to the White House:  
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“Your Declaration sums up the aspirations of an epoch which has known two 
World Wars. I confidently believe that future generations will look back upon it 
as a landmark in world thinking. I am glad to have this opportunity of endorsing 
its specific terms on behalf of the United States. I trust, also, that within a short 
time its specific terms will be whole-heartedly endorsed by all of the United 
Nations” (ILR, 1944). 
 
Concretely, the ILC adopted Convention 102 on Minimum Standards of social security in 
order to ensure that the agenda for social security agreed at the Conference would be 
put into practice and become legally enforceable. Importantly, the Declaration of 
Philadelphia made explicit reference to old age pensions: it called for the creation of 
unified, national pension insurance systems under a central social security 
administration, to provide a specified set of benefits including disability and old age 
pensions (ILO, 1944).  
 
The activism of the ILO in promoting old age pensions is an early example of global social 
policy (Orenstein, 2003). It entailed transnational actors, such as world leaders and the 
international civil servants of the ILO, seeking to influence the policy trajectory of other 
national governments. The Declaration of Philadelphia was the first in a number of 
international legal instruments that have sought to install social security as a right to 
every human being. In 1948, The United Nations General Assembly included social 
security among the rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(United Nations, 1948). In 1966, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, also recognised the rights of everyone to social security (ICESCR, 1966). 
This right to social security formed a central component to the post war consensus to 
foster peace and stability. In addition, a commitment by national governments to 
maintain full employment in the economy became the dominant economic objective in 
what would later be looked back on as the ‘Golden Age of Prosperity’. 
 
Global Political Economy post-1945: Fostering the Golden Age 
 
The global liberal order that was formed in the aftermath of the Second World War was 
different to anything that existed previously. The commitment to international 
cooperation, and the installation of a new economic orthodoxy, was fostered by the 
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creation of a set of international institutions and international organisations. These were 
given mandates designed to prevent the conditions that had led to international conflict. 
At Bretton Woods, in 1944, the Western Allies created two new major international 
financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – now part of the World Bank Group. The 
IMF was given the role of assisting countries experiencing a balance of payments 
problem. It would lend to a given government to prevent the issues that had previously 
arisen in trying to maintain the gold standard. A new system of fixed exchange rates was 
also installed, this time pegged to the dollar, with convertibility between currencies to 
encourage world trade. The IBRD was given the task of lending to governments to 
stimulate the process of reconstruction after the war. There was also an attempt to 
create an International Trade Organisation - however, this was not ratified by the US 
Congress, due to its protectionist instincts, so it never came into existence (Drache, 
2000). A looser General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was initiated, which would later 
become the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  
 
According to Ruggie (1982; 1992), the post-war liberal economic order was underpinned 
by two fundamental principles: embedded liberalism and multilateralism. Embedded 
liberalism was the compromise Western governments made between encouraging an 
increase in international trade and investment with their domestic commitment to full 
employment. The commitment to liberal economics was ‘embedded’ within domestic 
objectives that would maintain domestic political consensus. This consensus was not 
only fostered by government intervention in the economy, but also through a 
comprehensive welfare state. In the early post-war years, western governments 
deepened their existing commitment to social security and the provision of public 
services. As Figure 5.1 shows, public social spending increased dramatically across the 
developed world in the post-war period.  
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Figure 1. Public Social Spending as a Share of GDP Social spending includes, among others, the 
following areas: health, old age, incapacity-related benefits, family, active labour market programmes, 
unemployment, and housing. 
 
 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database 
 
As Chapter Two demonstrated, the dominant explanation for the development of 
welfare states comes from the burgeoning literature on historical institutionalism 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Pierson, 2004; Skocpol, 1992; Weir and Skocpol, 1985). 
However, there is also an international aspect to the development of pension system 
through the process of emulation and diffusion. In the years that followed the 
Declaration of Philadelphia, the ILO set about promoting social security through 
conferences, the creation of reform templates and the dispatching of consultants. The 
activities of the ILO were instrumental in the spreading of pension ideas across the globe. 
As Table 5.1 shows, in the immediate years after the Declaration, most Latin American 
countries adopted a pension system by the end of the 1940s. Caribbean countries 
followed suit in the 1950s and 1960s, with the majority of African countries following 
later in the 1960s and 1970s (Orenstein, 2003). The table shows a prominent diffusion 
pattern of pension provision after the declaration.  
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Table 5.1 Global Spread of Pension System Adoption, 1889–1994 
  
 
  Europe/ Antipodes/ 
United States/ Central 
America  
Latin America/ 
Caribbean  
Africa/Middle 
East/Asia  
1880s DE   
1890s DK, NZ   
1900s AU, AT, BE, IS, UK, CS, 
IE    
1910s FR, IT, NL, SE, ES, RO, 
LU    
1920s CA, BG, EE, HU, LV, 
LT, PL, RU, YU, GC 
CL, EC  ZA  
1930s FI, NO, US, GR, PT  BR, PE, TT, UY, BB  
1940s AL, CH, TR, MC  AR, CO, CR, DO, GY, 
MX, PA, PY, VE 
DZ, GQ, JP  
1950s CY, JE, LI, MT, SM  BO, HN, JM, NI, SV, 
BS  
BI, EG, IQ, GN, IR, IL, 
LY, MU, MA, RW, SY, 
ZR, CV, CN, ID, IN, 
MY, PH, SG, LK, TW 
1960s AD  CU, HT, GT, BM, GD  
BF, CM, CF, CG, CI, 
ET, GA, GH, KE, LB, 
MG, ML, MR, NE, NG, 
SA, TG, TN, TZ, UG, 
ZM, NP, VN, FJ, FM, 
MH, PW  
1970s  AG, BZ, DM, LC, VC, 
VG  BJ, TD, JO, KW, LR, 
OM, SD, SN, SZ, BH, 
SC, ST, HK, KR, PK, 
KI, SB, WS  
1980s   GM, YE, PG, VU  
1990s   ZW, BW, TH  
 
 
Notes: Bold type indicates a country with  a population of more than 1 million people in 2000.  Italic type indicates a high -income OECD country.  
Countries are listed alphabetically by geographic category.  
ISO 3166 Economy Codes: AD = Andorra, AG = Antigua, AL = Albania, AR = Argentina, AT = Austria, AU = Australia, BB = Barbados , BE = 
Belgium, BF = Burkina Faso, BG = Bulgaria, BH = Bahrain, BI = Bu rundi, BJ = Benin, BM = Bermuda, BO = Bolivia, BR = Brazil, BS = The 
Bahamas, BW = Botswana, BZ = Belize , CA = Canada, CF = Central African Republic, CG = Democratic Republic of Congo, CH = Switzerland, 
CI = Ivory Coast, CL = Chile , CM = Cameroon, CN = China, CO = Colombia, CR = Costa Rica, CS = Czechoslovakia, CU = Cuba, CV = Cape 
Verde , CY = Cyprus, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, DM = Dominica, DO = Dominican Republic, DZ = Algeria, EC = Ecuador, EE = Esto nia, 
EG = Arab Republic of Egypt, ES = Spain, ET = Ethiopia, FI = Finland, FJ = Fiji, FM = Micronesia, FR = France , GA = Gabon , GC = Guernsey 
(author’s abbreviation), GD = Grenada, GH = Ghana, GM = The Gambia, GN = Guinea, GR = Greece , GT = Guatemala, GQ = Equatorial  
Guinea, GY = Guyana, HK = Hong Kong (China), HN = Honduras, HT = Haiti, HU = Hungary, ID = Indonesia, IE = Ireland, IL = Israel, IN 
= India, IQ = Iraq, IR = Islamic Republic of Iran, IS = Iceland, IT = Italy, JE = Jersey (author’s abbreviation), JM = Jamaic a, JO = Jordan, JP = 
Japan, KE = Kenya, KI = Kiribati, KR = Republic of Korea, KW = Kuwait, LB = Lebanon, LC = St.  Lucia, LI = Liechtenstein, LK = Sri Lanka, 
LR = Liberia, LT = Lithuania, LU = Luxembourg, LV = Latvia, LY = Libya, MA = Morocco, MC = Monaco, MG = Madagascar, MH = Mars hall 
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Islands, ML = Mali, MR = Mauritania, MT = Malta, MU = Mauritius, MX = Mexico, MY = Malaysia, NE = Niger, NG = Nigeria, NI = 
Nicaragua, NL = Netherlands, NO = Norway, NP = Nepal, NZ = New Zealand, OM = Oman, PA = Panama, PE = Peru , PG = Papua New 
Guinea, PH = Philippines, PK = Pakistan , PL = Poland, PT = Portugal, PW = Palau , PY = Paraguay, RO = Romania, RU = Russia, RW = 
Rwanda, SA = Saudi Arabia, SB = Solomon Islands, SC = Seychelles, SD = Sudan, SE = Sweden, SG = Singapore , SM = San Marino, SN = 
Senegal, ST = St.  Tome and Principe , SV = El Salvador, SY = Syrian Arab Republic, SZ = Swaziland, TD = Chad, TG = Togo, TH = Thailand, 
TN = Tunisia, TR = Turkey, TT = Trinidad and Tobago, TW = Taiwan (China), TZ = Tanzania, UG = Uganda, UK = United Kingdom, US = 
United States, UY = Uruguay, VC = St.  Vincent, VE = República Bolivariana de Venezuela, VG = Virgin Islands, VN = Vietnam, VU = Vanuatu , 
WS = Samoa, YE = Republic of Yemen , YU = the former Yugoslavia, ZA = South Africa, ZM = Zambia, ZR = Zaire , ZW = Zimbabwe .   
Source: Orenstein (2003)  
 
It should also be noted that a bi-polar world emerged in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. This chapter predominantly focuses on the west and the global economy 
forged under the leadership of the United States. However, the Soviet Union also created 
its own sphere of influence during the Cold War that would last until 1989. At the end of 
the war, the Red Army of the Soviet Union was stationed across the whole of Eastern 
Europe. Motivated by the historical precedent of German invasions, the Soviet Union 
sought to create a buffer between itself and Western Europe by installing friendly 
regimes across Central and Eastern Europe (Applebaum, 2012). These countries were 
bound by the Warsaw Pact, a collective treaty between the Soviet Union and its satellite 
states in Central and Eastern Europe. It fostered close economic ties with the Soviet 
Union. Whilst the region varied in its proximity to Moscow and in the communist welfare 
structures that were installed, there were some commonalities throughout (Cerami & 
Vanhuysse, 2009).  
 
Most of the countries in the region had Bismarckian style pension systems that pre-dated 
the communist regime. The fund’s reserves were largely destroyed during the war and 
so the countries in the region switched to PAYG pension funding (Müller, 1999). The 
communist system brought many more people into the welfare system through the 
nationalisation of industries. Political crises that emerged during the period, that 
threatened the Warsaw Pact, were often followed by an expansion of the pension 
system (Inglot, 2008). The importance of this will be explored in Chapter Six, but at this 
point it is important to highlight the similarities between the strategic use of social policy 
by the communist authorities and the concept of embedded liberalism throughout the 
Western sphere of influence.  
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The post-war liberal order was also underpinned by the concept of multilateralism 
(Ruggie, 1992). This was a qualitatively different approach to the international economy 
than had existed previously. It involved a substantial increase in the degree of 
international cooperation between nation states and entailed the creation of rules and 
systems to govern economic behaviour, such as the international rules for trade. It also 
involved the creation of international organisations, which would proliferate after the 
war. The result was that states enmeshed themselves in a dense web of multilateral and 
regional institutions. In 1957, six countries signed the Treaty of Rome, creating the 
European Economic Community. This regional formation would grow to 28 countries as 
part of the European Union (EU). The EU is one of many regional formations that were 
created in the post-war era to promote economic cooperation (Ravenhill, 2017, pp. 141-
173).  
 
Multilateral economic cooperation would bring about unprecedented rates of economic 
growth during the Golden Age. Global GDP grew at an average annual rate of 4.8% 
between 1950 and 1973 (Marglin, 1990). Global exports grew even faster at an average 
rate of 8% per annum from 1950-1973. Embedded liberalism was also responsible for a 
dramatic redistribution of income and wealth, with societies across the Western world 
becoming more equal as the gap between rich and poor closed (Esping-Andersen, 1996). 
However, whilst inequalities closed within nations, the gap between the rich and poor 
between nations grew substantially. The economies of sub-Saharan African barely 
registered any economic growth during this period (Collier & Gunning, 1999). However, 
in contrast, the region of East Asia experienced rapid economic growth through the 
export-led growth strategies of what would be coined the East Asian Tiger Economies 
(Birdsall et al., 1993).  
 
Crisis and Stagnation in the Global Economy 1973-1979 
 
The international regimes and policy stances that had been established at the end of the 
war and had created the conditions for a long period of economic growth, would enter 
a period of turbulence during the 1970s. Cracks first appeared in the global economic 
architecture with the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates constraining the 
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options of the United States to tackle inflation resulting from high levels of government 
expenditure financing the war effort in Vietnam. In 1971, President Nixon sent 
shockwaves through the system by unilaterally devaluing the dollar (Edwin & Dale, 
1971). This would signal the end of the fixed exchange rate regime and undermine the 
predictability that had formed part of the preceding successful economic era. Further 
structural problems in the global economy emerged through the increase in the price of 
raw materials. Analysts in the United States feared its reliance on imported oil from the 
Middle East (Atkins, 1973). This was dramatically exacerbated by the oil price shocks in 
1973 as the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries drastically reduced the 
supply of oil in protest against the Arab-Israeli conflict (BBC, 1974). These events brought 
into sharp focus the power of the United States in the global economy. Hegemonic 
stability theory proposes that stability in the global economy requires a dominant 
hegemon to provide public goods and promote cooperation. The perceived waning 
influence of the United States therefore represented a threat to its role as the global 
hegemon (Cox, 2001).  
 
Alongside the political upheavals of the oil price shocks and a perceived diminishment of 
the United States, there were also a growing number of challenges to the economic 
orthodoxy that had characterised the post-war golden age. Keynesian economic policy 
had dictated the responses of national authorities to economics shocks. A collapse in 
demand necessitated an intervention of the authorities through active fiscal and 
monetary policy to stimulate economic activity - such as increasing government 
expenditure and cutting taxes to stimulate demand. Conversely, if the economy was 
overheating, threatening inflation, it required intervention by the state to dampen 
demand. Throughout the early period of the golden age there appeared to be a trade-
off between unemployment and inflation (Friedman, 1975; Phillips, 1958)- that is, full 
employment could be achieved with some minor inflationary tendencies.  
 
Over time, inflationary pressures crept into the system, and at the same time as 
unemployment started to rise. In 1965, in the UK, the Wilson government set up the 
National Board for Prices and Incomes as an attempt to manage inflation. In the 1970s, 
Nixon also enacted price controls to tackle US inflation at the same time that the dollar 
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was devalued (Edwin & Dale, 1971). The oil price shocks in 1973 completely 
overwhelmed the capabilities of the authorities and challenged the notional trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment. At this time, the term stagflation was coined to 
describe the high unemployment and high inflation that characterised global economies. 
In the UK, the Labour government was forced to borrow from the IMF, which came with 
conditions to cut expenditure (Burk & Cairncross, 1992). Attempts to control inflation 
through wage restraint, triggered a wave of industrial activity in the UK. Opponents of 
the welfare state and Keynesian economics proved particularly adept at narrating the 
crisis and presenting their ideas as viable solutions (Hay, 2010).  
 
The Keynesian economic model appeared broken and incapable of meeting the 
economic challenges of the 1970s. The dramatic conditions of the 1970s would have 
lasting consequences for the period of embedded liberalism that had fostered the golden 
age. In the decades that followed, attempts to ‘roll back the tides of the state’, would be 
carried out with attempts to dismantle the welfare states across the developed world 
(Pierson, 1994; 1996). This would have consequences for national and global pension 
policy - as the largest items of welfare expenditure, pensions would necessarily need to 
form part of any attempts to retrench expenditure. In addition, new ideas about how 
economies function and the primacy of the private sector would also begin to influence 
global ideas on pension reform.  
 
The Neoliberal Economic Order 
 
The elections of Margaret Thatcher in the UK in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the US in 
1980 helped usher in a new economic paradigm. Inspired by Friedrich Hayek (1976) and 
Milton Friedman (1977), a challenge was mounted against the principles that had 
underpinned the global economy. The commitment to full employment was abandoned 
in favour of fighting inflation. Price control became the number one macroeconomic 
objective (Blyth & Matthijs, 2017). In addition, marketisation, privatisation, deregulation 
and individual responsibility became the fundamental approach to most aspects of the 
economy and society. Resources were believed to be allocated much more efficiently by 
the market. Rather than manage the demand side of the macro economy, it was 
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therefore deemed more efficient for the government to manage the supply side by 
reducing burdens on private enterprise. The ‘Reagan-Thatcher decade' was thus defined 
by commitments to reducing taxes and regulation on enterprise. Table 5.2 outlines the 
main differences between the economic paradigm of the early post-war period and the 
regime that Thatcher and Reagan established. 
 
Table 5.2  
The macroeconomic regimes of the 1970s and today compared. 
Macro-Regime I:  
Institutional configuration 
Macro-Regime II:  
Institutional configuration 
Policy target: Policy target: 
Full employment (or low unemployment) Price stability (or low inflation) 
Policy outcomes: Policy outcomes: 
Positive inflation Secular disinflation 
Labour’s share of GDP at historic highs Capital’s share of GDP at historic highs 
Corporate profits low or stagnant Wages low or stagnant 
Inequality low Inequality high 
Markets mostly national Markets globalized 
Trade unions strong Trade unions weak 
Finance weak and immobile Finance strong and highly mobile 
Central banks weak and politicized Central banks strong and independent 
Legislatures strong Legislatures weak 
 
Source: (Blyth & Matthijs, 2017) 
 
These new principles would axiomatically have consequences for the welfare state. 
Moreover, these changes would transform the politics of pensions in the UK, which 
would later have an impact on the approach of the World Bank in its pension advocacy. 
One of the first actions of the Conservative Government (1979-83), in its attempt to 
control government expenditure, was to change the indexing of pensions from average 
wage growth to prices. Over time, this new indexing significantly reduced the generosity 
of the public pension system (Land, 2004), which would not be reversed until the 
introduction of the triple lock on pension indexing in 2011. It was during this time that 
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the portrayal of pension expenditure first emerged as a burden on the economy and a 
threat to the nation’s future (Walker, 1990). Retrenchment of pension spending was 
justified through the argument that it was not compatible with the commitment to fight 
inflation through reduced government expenditure. The principal pension policy 
objective of the Conservative Government was to shift the responsibility of income in 
retirement from the state to the individual (Walker & Foster, 2006). 
 
The generosity of the UK public pension system had previously been enhanced by the 
Wilson government in 1975. A second earnings-related pension scheme (SERPS) was 
added to the basic Beveridgean flat-rate entitlement. Opponents of SERPS argued that it 
was unsustainable in the long run, claiming it would require substantial increases in 
National Insurance Contributions (Myles & Pierson, 2001). The Social Security Act of 1986 
undermined the generosity of SERPS by changing the formula which the earnings 
component was calculated. It changed from the best 20 years of employment to earnings 
over 44 years for women and 49 years for men (Walker & Foster, 2006). The Act also 
changed the pensions landscape by creating personal pension plans. Individuals were 
given generous incentives to opt-out of SERPS to pay into a private pension plan. The 
move towards personal pension plans coincided with a shift from defined benefit (DB) 
pension plans, to defined contribution (DC). The UK government perceived DB plans as 
unsuited to the modern labour market: they inhibited flexibility, which would 
characterise the new post-industrial labour market that the Thatcher government was 
seeking to establish (Bonoli, 2003). The new pensions landscape was also being 
established alongside a deregulation of the financial sector. The ‘big bang’ liberalisation 
in 1986 reduced restrictions on capital markets, stimulating a new era of mobile capital 
and financial power.  
 
The Neoliberalism of International Financial Institutions: The Washington Consensus  
 
The new economic orthodoxy emanating from the US and UK took hold of international 
institutions. Neoliberal economics had been born in university economics departments 
in the US, such as the Universities of Chicago, Stanford and Columbia. These same 
institutions were also the alma mater of large numbers of staff and experts employed by 
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the World Bank and IMF (Chwieroth, 2010). This  new orthodoxy would have a 
substantial impact on their approach to economic crises and the prescriptions they 
offered to countries seeking financial assistance. The strong performance of the Anglo-
American economies, in contrast to other developed economies with a statist 
orientation, influenced the development agenda. More specifically, the neoliberal 
orientation of the IFIs was underpinned by a deep suspicion and cynicism of politics and 
the state, that traced its roots back to neoclassical economics. States were therefore 
assumed to create distortions in the economy, which damage development (Williamson, 
1990). 
 
The neoliberal critique of Keynesian economics and hostility to trade union militancy in 
the developed world, was extended to a critique of the import-substitution policies of 
the developing world (Birdsall et al., 1993). These were argued to have created 
inefficiencies in the economy, encouraged corruption and inflation. Traditional 
dependency theories of development that characterised the global economy as a ‘core’ 
of developed countries, the First World, and a ‘periphery’ of developing countries, the 
Third World, were challenged by the rapid growth of the High Performing East Asian 
Economies. Neoliberals claimed ownership of the so called ‘East Asian Miracle’ through 
the region’s openness to the global economy (Birdsall et al., 1993). However, another 
school emphasised the state-led aspects of the development and how infant industries 
in the region had initially been protected from competition through restrictive trade 
measures (Wade, 1990). 
 
Latin America and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa had pursued an ‘import-substitution’ 
development model in an attempt to industrialise (Sachs & Williamson, 1985). These 
policies prioritised foreign capital over trade as a way to accumulate investment capital. 
It was characterised by state-led investment to encourage industrialisation and a social 
policy directed towards the new urban proletariat. The expansion of international 
liquidity during the Golden Age had sustained the development model. However, the oil 
price shocks abruptly halted the availability of international credit. In addition, the rise 
in the price of oil, increased the dependency of the region on foreign capital to pay for 
it. The scarcity of foreign capital increased the interest rates on borrowing (Sachs & 
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Williamson, 1985). This meant that the countries of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa 
had an increased dependency on foreign capital, to pay for the increase in the price of 
commodities, at a time that borrowing was becoming more expensive. Eventually a 
number of countries defaulted on their debts. Locked out of international capital 
markets, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa had only the IFIs as a source of lending. This 
dependency on the IFIs for finance increased understandably increased the latter's 
leverage, not least because such loans came with very strict conditions (Walton & Ragin, 
1990).  
 
It was during the 1980s that the Washington Consensus emerged as a prescriptive 
neoliberal approach to development. It was promoted as a ‘common sense’ set of 
policies of good economic governance in response to the growing hegemonic power of 
global capital. It was disseminated primarily by the World Bank and IMF and 
implemented through a process of ‘conditionality’. This was the set of conditions that 
came with loans or Structural Adjustment Programs. The accelerating process of 
globalisation manifested in a new structure of rewards and punishments. Capital was 
argued to respond ‘objectively’ and dispassionately to key macroeconomic indicators. 
The policies of the Washington Consensus were ostensibly installing positive economic 
indicators. The Washington Consensus was coined by Williamson (1990) who identified 
a set of common policy prescriptions attached to World Bank and IMF loans. These 
included: fiscal discipline, budget deficits were not to exceed 2% of GDP; a reorientation 
of public expenditure away from subsidies, towards expenditure on health, education 
and infrastructure; a broadening of the tax base, reducing high marginal taxes; a 
maintenance of positive interest to discourage capital flight; trade liberalisation; 
privatisation of state enterprises; a maintenance of competitive exchange rates; 
elimination of barriers to foreign direct investment; deregulation of the economy and an 
enforcement of property rights (Williamson, 1990).  
 
Notably, this neoliberal set of policy prescriptions were advocated on a one-size-fits-all 
basis, with minimal effort made to assess the implications for the recipient countries 
(Stiglitz, 2002). The Washington-based IFIs had significant leverage given they were the 
sole sources of finance for many developing countries. The social costs of the policies 
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were particularly damaging - many countries were forced to retrench social assistance 
to reduce their government spending and borrowing requirement (Stiglitz, 2002). For 
example, Costa Rica retrenched its social spending at the behest of the IMF (Wilson, 
1994). In addition, the liberalising of their economies exposed them to international 
competition, threatening their infant industries. The liberalisation of capital markets 
exposed them to the volatile whims of the market and left them vulnerable to capital 
flight caused by decisions beyond their control, such as an increase the US base rate.  
 
By the end of the 1980s, the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were perceived to 
have largely failed (Stiglitz, 2002). The economies of sub-Saharan Africa had stagnated 
for the entire decade. The economic performance of Latin America had also been poor, 
with its economies  continually fighting inflation. By the end of the decade, SAPs were 
dropped by the IFIs who began to use a softer forms of conditionality around the ‘good 
governance’ agenda. However, the 1990s and early 2000s would further damage the 
reputation of both the World Bank and particularly the IMF: their responses to the 
Mexico Peso Crisis, the East Asian Financial Crisis and the Russian Financial Crisis all were 
argued to have exacerbated the economic misery (Calomiris, 1998; Higgott, 1998; 
Stiglitz, 2002). For example, in the East Asian Financial Crisis, many of the countries in 
the region were advised to significantly increase interest rates to stave off capital flight. 
Such a dramatic increase considerably dampened demand in the domestic economy, 
prolonging the recession. In addition, many of the earlier policy prescription were argued 
to have intensified the crisis. The liberalisation of capital markets in particular, exposed 
countries to capital flight. However, the IFIs would not countenance capital controls as a 
valid response to capital flight and instead the insistence was placed on raising interest 
rates (Stiglitz, 2002). The entire episode of Strucural Adjustment Programmes shaped 
the behaviour of the World Bank in its activities in Central and Eastern Europe. It 
abandoned conditionality in favour of norms creation and persuasion.  
 
The Battle for Ideas and Influence in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Importantly for global pension policy, the end of the Cold War preoccupied the global 
social policy environment in the 1990s as it was dominated by debates around the 
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transition of post-socialist economies. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe were 
undergoing the twin transformation from one-party authoritarianism to democracy, and 
from state planned socialism to market-based capitalism. This entailed integrating their 
economies into the global economy. Nothing on the scale of the twin transition had been 
undertaken before, making the region dependent on the expertise and finance of 
international financial institutions (Roaf et al., 2014). The post-socialist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe were uniquely susceptible to neoliberal policy advice, given 
their recent experience of socialism (Deacon et al., 1997). In addition, these regions were 
starved of capital for much needed investment making them keen to attract 
international investment. Appel and Orenstein (2018) contend that many countries in 
the region engaged in a process of ‘competitive signalling’ for international capital, which 
entailed the adoption of radical neoliberal policies, such as flat tax regimes and pension 
privatisation, to signal to international investors they were friendly places to do business.  
 
The World Bank had learned from the experiences of the SAPs (Pender, 2001), and so its 
approach to influencing the reforms in Central and Eastern Europe was to use its expert 
authority for inspiration, rather than the coercive methods of conditionality (Orenstein, 
2008). As will be shown, during this period Central and Eastern Europe had some of the 
highest pension spending in the world - much higher than the traditional client base of 
the Bank (World Bank, 1994: 263). In addition, the region also had a high incidence of 
pensioner poverty due to a history of inadequate indexing of pension benefits (Müller, 
1999). Their systems required large employer contributions, which encouraged evasion 
and undermined the stability and robustness of the system. Moreover, the region had a 
rapidly ageing population and traditionally had a low retirement age. In many countries 
in the region, men could retire at 60 and women at 55 (Fultz & Ruck, 2001). To add to 
the burden of the pension system, during the early period of the transformation, the 
pension system was used as a de facto unemployment benefit to ease the burden on 
those made unemployed (Müller, 1999). The difficulties caused by the confluence of 
these factors made the region even more susceptible to external expertise. 
 
The collapse of the communist system represented favourable conditions for the World 
Bank. It was a time when neoliberal policy prescriptions were at their zenith. It was also 
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active in a region keen to signal its neoliberal fervour and sympathetic to the arguments 
of its policy advocates. As noted above, the constituent countries engaged in a process 
of ‘competitive signalling’ in order to attract foreign investment, enacting what Appel 
and Orenstein (2018) have coined as ‘avant-garde’ neoliberal policies. These are policies 
that are more neoliberal than those implemented across the developed world (e.g. flat 
tax systems and pension privatisation). The World Bank therefore entered the pension 
reform arena as a response to the needs of the transition economies: 
 
“I think it’s very clear to me the reason the World Bank became active in pensions 
in the 1990s, because we had to have answers and good policy advice to the new 
countries who were coming to us from Eastern Europe, because for the first time, 
and still today, we were dealing with countries that were spending 5-10+% and 
more on pensions. We’ve never had that experience prior. If you are lending to a 
country and the country is running deficits on the pension system of several 
percentage points of GDP, you can’t ignore it you have to become knowledgeable 
about the subject, so that was why it started, why it got moving in that way.” 
(Interview with Robert Polacios. Global Lead Economist in Social Protection and 
Labor, World Bank, January 2017). 
 
These new clients for the Bank, had very different needs to its traditional client base of 
developing countries. As a result, the Bank found itself making recommendations for 
industrial countries in mainland Europe whose expenditure on pension provision was 
substantially higher than the developing countries who traditionally used Bank 
assistance. For this reason, the Bank concluded it needed to formally document its 
position on pension policy. The publication of Averting (1994) represented the Bank’s 
formal response to the new post-socialist landscape within which it was now operating: 
 
“In Eastern Europe which is more heterogeneous now. But in the 1990s there was 
a common problem. I was in all of these countries because at this time I worked 
at the IMF and that’s the reason I came back to pensions, because I opened the 
budget book and I could see a big problem. So, at this time all the countries had 
a problem, for this reason Averting was written” (Interview with Robert 
Holzmann, Former Director of Social Protection and Labor at the World Bank, 
December 2016). 
 
The World Bank also had a separate middle-income region that represented test cases 
for the pension reforms it would advocate in Central and Eastern Europe. At around the 
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time of Averting being published, Latin America was pursuing multi-pillar pension 
reform, which, whilst largely domestically generated, had some World Bank input 
(Weyland, 2005).  
 
“I think what you have is a confluence of a few things, you’ve got a whole new 
bunch of clients who were spending a lot of money on pensions, you’ve got these 
things happening in Latin America, and I think one of the misunderstandings is 
how little the World Bank had to do with what happened in Latin America, we 
had Chile there already for a decade, but the countries, Argentina, Peru, even in 
Mexico where we had a little bit more of an involvement, but these countries 
were going in that direction anyway, so we had almost nothing to do with that 
wave, but it was something very unnerving to people in the field that this was 
happening.” (Interview with Robert Palacios. Global Lead Economist in Social 
Protection and Labor, World Bank, January 2017). 
 
The shining example of Chile, which privatized its pension system in 1981, represented 
a beacon for the espoused benefits of fully funded pension systems. The reforms were 
argued to have helped Chile develop its capital market and led to its impressive economic 
performance (World Bank, 1994). Given the nascent capital markets in Central and 
Eastern Europe, this promise was an added potential benefit to pursuing the World 
Bank’s pension reform prescriptions. The success of the World Bank’s campaign for 
pension reform is shown in Figure 5.2 below; with a clear diffusion of multi-pillar pension 
reform after the publication of Averting the Old Age Crisis in 1994.  
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Figure 5.2 The Diffusion Pattern of Pension Privatisation 
 
 
Note : Countries listed alphabetically by International Organization for Standardization 3166 country codes.  AR  =  Argentina, BO  =  Bolivia, 
BU  =  Bulgaria, CL  =  Chile , CO  =  Colombia, CR  =  Costa Rica, CZ  =  Czech Republic, DE  =  Germany, DK  =  Denmark, 
DO  =  Dominican Republic, EE  =  Estonia, HU  =  Hungary, HV  =  Croatia, KV  =  Kosovo, KZ  =  Kazakhstan , LT  =  Lithuania, 
LV  =  Latvia, MI  =  Malawi, MK  =  Macedonia, MX  =  Mexico, NG  =  Nigeria, NI  =  Nicaragua, PE  =  Peru , PL  =  Poland, 
RO  =  Romania, RU  =  Russia, SE  =  Sweden, SK  =  Slovakia, SV  =  El Salvador, TW  =  Taiwan, UK  =  United Kingdom, 
UY  =  Uruguay, UZ  =  Uzbekistan .  
Source: Orenstein (2013) 
 
However, the World Bank-led campaign had been met with substantial opposition. A 
rival coalition led by the ILO had opposed the retrenchment of public pension systems 
(Beattie & McGillivray, 1995). Yet, despite global pensions policy traditionally being the 
domain of the ILO, as shown above, it was unable to use its authority to stem the tide of 
successive countries adopting the World Bank’s proposed pension model. Consequently, 
in the years that followed the entry of the World Bank into the pension reform arena, 
the ILO found itself in a subordinate position in global pension debates. The ILO had 
opened up a Budapest Office in 1992, specifically tasked to offer technical assistance and 
to have influence on the transition process. However, on pensions, it found itself in an 
unaccommodating policy environment when the World Bank launched its campaign for 
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pension privatization. Central and Eastern Europe represented an ideal-type of the 
World Bank’s critique of public pension systems (World Bank, 1994). The ILO was 
therefore trying to defend a pension system demonstrably failing in terms of costs and 
coverage, in a region with politicians unsympathetic to the public sector and a public 
suspicious of the government’s commitment to honour pension promises (Fultz, 2012). 
 
In trying to defend monolithic public pension provision, the ILO was therefore fighting a 
losing battle. In addition, the campaign for pension diversification, led by the World 
Bank, was able to attract other powerful allies. The pension and insurance industry also 
had an active interest in developing new markets in Central and Eastern Europe and it 
added significant resources to the already superior stock of the World Bank.  
 
“You know the whole thing, let’s come back to the origins of the whole thing. It 
was not just a battle between the ILO and the World Bank or Washington 
Consensus versus the ILO. It’s not the full picture of this pension debate. In my 
view, the World Bank was coming with the template and theoretical backgrounds 
starting with Averting, but it was much deeper. The movement to introduce this 
direction and it was actually what was important in my view was really the 
interests of the financial services sector, which had very strong support, 
especially of mandatory funded pillars. I was in Hungary in the ILO office in 
Budapest when it was the final years of the Hungarian debate and I saw how 
many discussions and debates took place in conferences on the pension reform 
they were actually organised and fully funded by international banks, insurance 
companies and other finance companies.” (Interview with Krzysztof Hagemejer, 
former Chief of Policy Development and Research, ILO Social Security 
Department August 2017). 
 
The ILO was therefore subordinated by the superior resources of the World Bank-led 
campaign and out-manoeuvred, given the policy environment in Central and Eastern 
Europe in the mid to late 90s. Its initial response to the World Bank campaign was low-
key, coming in the form of a journal article published in International Social Security 
Review. This is a journal primarily read by experts in the field to debate and propose 
ideas in social security. The paper discussed in more detail  in Chapter Seven, argued that 
many of the shortcomings of pension systems could be addressed by parametric reforms 
– i.e. changes to the current system such as increasing contributions or the retirement 
age – and that systemic reform was no panacea for population ageing (Beattie & 
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McGillivray, 1995). A more extensive response came in the form of a book more than 
five years later. However, by this point the ILO accepted the main architecture of the 
World Bank model. It accepted diversification of provision through its pension tiers, 
which mimicked the World Bank’s pension pillars in many areas: this would mark the 
beginning of a convergence between the two organisations.  
 
Globalisation and its Malcontents 
 
Around the turn of the millennium, a growing discontent with globalisation began to 
surface. This was expressed through protest by activists, global social movements and 
international organisations opposed to the neoliberal orthodoxy of the two Washington-
based organisations (Stiglitz, 2002). The growing activism of global social movements had 
implications for the system of global governance - the multilateralism of the post-war 
age was argued by some to have been replaced by a ‘complex multilateralism’ (O'Brien 
et al., 2000). It was in this context that the move for a global social floor first emerged 
within development circles and UN agencies (Deacon, 2013). A social protection floor is 
a minimum level of health provision and income security, including an old age pension, 
to which every person in the world is entitled. The campaign for social protection floors 
was both an internal one within the ILO, and a wider global campaign. Further detail on 
the internal campaign is set out in Chapter Eight. 
 
The external campaign began before the social floor was official ILO policy. In 2007, 
Michael Cichon, the Director of Social Policy at the ILO convened a meeting with 
representatives from United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs  
(UNDESA ) United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and Help Age International. The 
meeting formalised the Coalition for a Global Social Floor (2007), it sought to be a 
steering committee to bring together a movement for social protection floors under the 
UN umbrella. It was established in the context of debates around a fairer globalisation 
and global inequalities. In addition, these debates were taking place in parallel with the 
positive experiences of modern forms of universal social policy in the global South, such 
as the Conditional Cash Transfer programs being rolled out in Latin America (Huyse, et 
al., 2017). As will be shown below, the campaign would be given further impetus in the 
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response to the global economic crisis, with the ILO’s role in policy debates substantially 
enhanced and formalised.  
 
The Global Economic Crisis 
 
In 2008, Lehman Brothers Bank, the United States’ fourth largest bank, filed for 
bankruptcy. It represented the largest bankruptcy in history and signalled a chain of 
events that would lead to a global recession in 2009. At the onset of the downturn it 
represented a crisis of the global economic structure, justifying a large-scale intervention 
of the state in the management of the economy. In an effort to offset the impact of the 
downturn, governments around the world used an active fiscal policy to stimulate 
aggregate demand or to rescue insolvent banks. Much of this action was coordinated at 
the global level through the G20, but it was also supported by the IMF (IMF, 2008). In 
addition, the role of social security was recast. The dominant message from the World 
Bank on the sustainability of pension systems, and the virtues of private provision, were 
drowned out in a context of market volatility and economic contraction. In the 
immediate crisis era, the role of social security as an automatic stabilizer in the economy 
was emphasised (IILS, 2011; Natali, 2009). In light of this, the ILO found itself invited to 
the top table of global governance to report how social security could be deepened to 
embed its role as an automatic stabilizer in the global economy (Deacon, 2013).  
 
The role of international cooperation during the crisis would have a significant impact 
upon the embedding of the social protection floor in global policy discourse. The crisis 
prompted the UN to develop a series of coordinated responses to foster a recovery and 
better protect the world’s population against future economic downturns. The UN Chief 
Executives Board (UNCEB) established the Social Protection Floor Initiative (SPF-I) to 
coordinate development efforts and improve its assistance to countries wishing to 
expand social protection. This was to be chaired by the ILO and World Health 
Organization (WHO). In effect, this meant that social protection floors went from being 
a campaign of disparate groups - as seen above - to official UN policy. The SPF-I would 
have a significant impact in August 2010 by inviting the former President of Chile, 
Michelle Bachelet to chair an advisory group on social protection floors. Her publication 
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in 2011, coincided with the French Presidency of the G20, whereby fortuitously for the 
ILO, the French President Nicolas Sarkozy, was sympathetic to the idea of a social 
protection floor (Deacon, 2013). The Bachelet Report called for more inter-agency 
collaboration on social protection: it argued that coordination was often lacking between 
ministries, UN agencies and IFIs. It also advocated the establishment of a mechanism for 
collaboration and coordination of experts from all the relevant experts from UN 
agencies, program funds, regional commissions and IFIs (Bachelet & ILO, 2012).  
 
This recommendation from the report Bachelet Report was acted upon when the G20 
Development Working Group set up the Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation 
Board (SPIAC-B). In calling for the SPIAC-B, the Bachelet Report recommended that the 
“World Bank and ILO, in consultation with other relevant international organizations, 
develop a mechanism to improve inter-agency coordination” (G20 DWP, 2011). The 
mandate of the SPIAC-B is to complement existing collaborations, such as the SPF-I. It is 
chaired by the World Bank and ILO and meets bi-annually. The board is attended by all 
relevant international organisations, bilateral donors and relevant NGOs. The initial 
division of labour between the two global governance mechanisms was determined at 
the second meeting of the SPIAC-B: it concluded that SPF-I would focus its efforts on the 
horizontal dimension of social protection coverage, whilst the SPIAC-B would provide a 
broader and more inclusive mechanism for sharing information and coordination 
between partners, addressing the system as a whole, the vertical dimension.  
 
The crisis therefore provided the momentum for the social protection floor campaign 
and formalized the role of the ILO in inter-agency boards. The ILO emerged from the 
crisis with a strengthened reputation and an enhanced role in global social protection 
policy (Deacon, 2013). The crisis would also be an important backdrop in the passing of 
Recommendation 202 at the ILC in 2012. 
 
 
Meanwhile, the enabling environment had become adverse for the World Bank’s multi-
pillar pension model. Farnsworth and Irving (2011) argue that the global economic crisis 
is not one, but a series of separate, interrelated crises. Beginning with the credit crunch 
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in 2007, the first crisis was one of financial markets starved of liquidity. This then led to 
a crisis in the real economy, as the growth rate for the world economy turned negative 
in 2009. The impact on pension funds was almost immediate as stock markets recorded 
huge losses. The OECD estimates $5 trillion dollars was wiped off pension assets during 
the crisis (Keeley & Love, 2010). The returns on pension fund investments in Central and 
Eastern Europe were also dramatic. For example, in Lithuania, the returns over the entire 
funded period were negative (Bielawska et al., 2016). The contributions would have been 
better placed in a PAYG system. Next came a fiscal crisis, which threatened the stability 
of the Eurozone, as markets turned on the debt levels of Southern Europe. The state 
activism of the early crisis period was replaced by an era of austerity, and balanced 
budgets became an important signal of economic stability. The poor performance of 
pension funds served as ammunition for the opponents of multi-pillar pension reform:  
 
“Success on the reform was predicated on a good performance of financial 
markets, which should be measured in the long term, but nonetheless 
performance after the crisis and in general financial markets, made enemies of 
the reform, having a good time in criticising the structure of the reforms” 
(Interview with Michal Rutkowski, Director of Social Protection and Labor, World 
Bank, December 2016).  
 
Central and Eastern Europe was acutely exposed to the crisis. For example, Hungary's 
export-led economic model rendered it vulnerable during the global downturn, as global 
demand for its exports weakened (European Commission, 2014). In addition, its loose 
fiscal policy, before and after the crisis, resulted in it becoming the second country, after 
Iceland, to seek financial assistance from the IMF. The subsequent loan came with 
conditions to cut government spending (IMF, 2008). Where the previous decade had 
witnessed competitive signalling to attract international capital, markets now were 
preoccupied with the budget deficit and the level of national debt. This made reversing 
the World Bank-inspired pension reforms an attractive option.  
 
As was noted in the introduction, the World Bank inspired most of the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe to divert a proportion of the contributions from the public 
pension system into individually funded accounts. However, contributions to the public 
system were used to finance the pensions of those already retired. This created a 
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shortfall in pension revenues needed to finance the payment of pensions. When 
countries enacted the reforms, they had a number of options to finance the transition to 
a partially funded system. Essentially, these consisted of cutting current expenditure and 
raising taxes to finance the transition, or use government borrowing to finance the 
transition. The Baltic states were less inclined to borrow to finance the transition. In 
contrast, other countries in the region financed their transition through borrowing. This 
borrowing cost as much as 1.9% of GDP each year (Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012). In 
addition to the fiscal burden of financing the pension transition, accession to the EU 
entailed abiding by Maastricht Criteria on the budget deficit and national debt. This 
stipulates that member states cannot run a budget deficit larger than 3% of GDP and that 
national debt must remain below 60% of GDP. Consequently, suspending, scaling down, 
or completely reversing the multi-pillar pension model was a tempting option for all 
countries in the region.  
 
A suspension of the multi-pillar model meant that contributions diverted into funded 
accounts could be redirected temporarily into the state coffers to ease a budgetary crisis. 
This option was undertaken by the Baltic states in the immediate crisis period 
(Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012). Scaling down followed similar lines, to a smaller 
degree, but on a permanent basis, as enacted by Slovakia for example (ibid). Completely 
abandoning the multi-pillar system permanently diverted the contribution back into 
general tax revenues. It also gave the state access to the accumulated pension funds that 
had built up during the funded period. This option was undertaken by Kazakhstan, 
Hungary and Poland (Naczyk & Domonkos, 2016). As Table 5.3 outlines, alongside the 
reform reversals in Central and Eastern Europe, there were also reversals in Latin 
America as Argentina and Bolivia renationalized their funded pension pillars (Naczyk & 
Domonkos, 2016). 
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Table 5.3 
Pension Reform Reversals Since the Global Economic Crisis 
Scaling down of Individual Accounts  Dismantling of Individual Accounts 
Romania (2009)  Argentina (2008)  
Estonia (2009)  Hungary (2011)  
Latvia (2009)  Kazakhstan (2013) 
Lithuania (2009)  Poland (2014)  
Poland (2011)  Czech Republic (2014)  
Bolivia (2011)   
Slovakia (2012)   
Russia (2013)   
 
Source: Kay (2014) and author’s own coding 
 
In addition to the message that such a large number of reversals to the World Bank’s 
pension model sent to the global policy community, the Bank had also lost its leverage 
in Central and Eastern Europe. In the early transition period, the Bank had used its 
lending capacity to influence finance ministers across the region (Müller, 1999; Appel & 
Orenstein, 2018), however, as the region became more integrated into the global 
economy and the EU, it had other sources of finances. For example, the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) became a much more important source of 
finance, this significantly diminished the influence of the Bank in the region: 
 
“I attended one presentation in 2009, advocating some ludicrous scheme to 
continue investing funds once the pay-out phase had begun. I dismissed it. That 
was my only dealing with the World Bank. The World Bank is far less important 
than it used to be. The EBRD is much more important. The World Bank was keen 
to lend us money, we were encouraged to borrow some for a particular scheme 
and the rate was below market rates, so we took advantage of that, but it was 
only a small amount.” (Interview with Jacek Rostowski, Deputy Prime Minister 
and Finance Minister of Poland 2007-2013, July 2017). 
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In concluding the impact of the crisis on the global pension and social protection debate, 
it had the dual impact of propelling the ILO back into the forefront of policy making in 
social protection, whilst at the same time creating the conditions for many countries to 
abandon their World Bank-inspired multi-pillar pension models. The reputation of the 
World Bank in pension expertise was damaged at the same time its influence in the 
region of Central and Eastern Europe was diminishing (Birdsall, 2014). As Chapter Eight 
outlines, the internal developments within both organisations would crystalise these 
positions. The World Bank’s expert authority has been damaged by the reform 
experiences of countries which enacted its multi-pillar model as many of the espoused 
benefits failed to materialise. Proponents of pension funding argued that the returns on 
investments would exceed the returns in PAYG pension system7. Moreover, the cost of 
transition to a funded system was thought to be partially paid for by the enhanced 
economic growth brought about by the development of the capital market, stimulated 
by pension funding. These conditions had not held by the time many countries decided 
to reverse the pension reforms advocated by the Bank. In addition, alongside transition 
costs and poor investment performance, funded systems had come under attack for 
exorbitant fees and for failing to extend pension coverage beyond previous levels.  
 
The World Bank’s moral authority had also been in long-term decline as a consequence 
of the legacy of Structural Adjustment. Its reputation in Sub-Saharan Africa, where much 
of the more recent international organization activity on pension reform has taken place, 
had been damaged by the imposed austerity in the 1980s. As a consequence, the World 
Bank is more timid than in the past - as expressed by Mamta Murthi: 
 
 
 “I think the World Bank became too timid and inward looking. It is not confident 
enough to express itself or defend its stance.” (Interview with Mamta Murthi, 
Former Director for Central Europe and the Baltic Countries, June 2017).  
 
                                                     
7 For funded pension systems to have superior returns to unfunded ones, the market interest (r) must 
exceed wage growth (g). Proponents of funded systems argued that, ceteris paribus, r > g.  
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On the other hand, the ILO was not damaged by the SAPs and therefore had a 
sympathetic ear to pension reform in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kpessa & Béland, 2012) and in 
the wider development community (Deacon, 2013). This enabled the ILO to further its 
agenda on national social protection floors, as their need came to be recognised.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has outlined the global and political context within which global pension 
policy is constructed and enacted. The global political economy has led to the creation 
of international organisations, which have been the key actors in global pension policy. 
These organisations, and the actors within them, have operated within discrete 
paradigms. It has argued that the Keynesian post-war consensus and the neoliberal 
consensus that replaced it, were instrumental in shaping the types of pension reforms 
that spread globally. The global economic crisis was shown to challenge the orthodoxies 
of the neoliberal paradigm, with its consequences shaping the future of global pension 
policy through the social protection floor initiative. The response of IFIs to economic 
crises have also influenced the manner in which they engage with countries seeking 
financial assistance. The controversy over SAPs had lasting influence on both the 
perception of the IMF and World Bank from the outside and the internal workings of the 
organisations internally. Chapter Eight will outline in greater detail the internal workings 
of international organisations and the impact this has on pension policy, which will be 
linked to how these actors were shaped by the global events outlined above. This chapter 
has also demonstrated the link between national social policy and global pension policy. 
The relationship between global ideas and institutions will now be discussed in the 
following chapter.  
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Chapter Six 
 
 
Global Pension Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: The 
Interaction Between Global Policy Ideas and Domestic Interests 
and Institutions 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter narrows the focus from the global context seen in Chapter Five, to the 
region most associated with global pension policy, namely Central and Eastern Europe. 
It analyses the interaction between global pension policy ideas and the welfare 
institutions particular to the region. It therefore forms the institutional component of 
the ASID framework. The analysis builds on the theoretical foundations that were 
outlined in Chapter Two. It also draws on the emerging literature on incremental changes 
to institutions, which can lead to substantial transformation over time (Hacker, 2004; 
2005; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Furthermore, it engages with 
the literature on ideas and institutions (Béland, 2005; Béland & Cox, 2011; Blyth, 2002; 
Hall, 1993; Hay, 2008; Schmidt, 2011) and utilises these literatures to advance a greater 
understanding of global social policy. 
 
The central argument of this chapter is that global social policy can be shaped and refined 
through its interaction with national social policies and their institutions. The analysis 
utilises data from the elite interviews and analysis of key pension documents from 
international organisations, alongside the literature on the pension reforms and counter-
reforms of Central and Eastern Europe. It does so to demonstrate how the advocacy of 
mandatory second pension pillars, carved out of the public first pillars, was effectively 
ended by its interaction with national pension institutions and the interests of domestic 
policy actors in Central and Eastern Europe. This was largely a result of the path 
dependency inherent in the pension systems of Central and Eastern Europe, which 
derived from the policy legacies of over a century of pension provision in the region.  
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Actors from various international organisations offered an almost uniform interpretation 
of pension reform reversals in the region. In addition, as will be shown in Chapter Seven, 
pensions advice coming from the World Bank no longer advocates that countries carry 
out this reform. Meanwhile, the recent World Social Protection Report (ILO, 2017) offers 
a critical interpretation of the reform experience. The analysis shows that the Central 
and Eastern European experience of multi-pillar pension reform has reduced the 
optimism and enthusiasm of those who believed it to be an optimal policy reform to 
improve the sustainability, adequacy and coverage of pension systems, alongside 
enhancing the prospects for economic growth. The large transition costs involved in 
reform and the ease with which pension assets were renationalised has led to a collective 
rethink on the viability of mandatory second pillars in mature pension systems. However, 
the analysis also shows that both the transnational advocates for multi-pillar pension 
reform and its opponents, were highly critical of the reform reversals after the global 
economic crisis. For its proponents, it represented a step backwards in achieving a 
sustainable pension system. Whilst for the original opponents of multi-pillar reform, it 
was feared that the renationalisation of pension funds would further erode trust in 
pension systems in a region where trust was already low.  
 
This chapter is divided into three parts: the first outlines the various ideational and 
material influences over pension privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe; the second 
does the same for the reform reversals after the global economic crisis; and the final part 
outlines how these processes have influenced global pension policy ideas.  
 
Ideas, Interests and Institutions 
 
Scholars who propose an ideational approach to institutional change, have argued that 
after a once beleaguered status in the social sciences, ideas have risen to prominence as 
key explanatory variables, particularly in explaining institutional change (Béland & Cox, 
2011; Blyth, 2002). However, they are often advanced as independent variables in the 
process of institutional development and change, shaping actor preferences and offering 
blueprints for the design of new institutions. This chapter offers a more dynamic and 
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iterative relationship between global social policy ideas and domestic institutions and 
interests. Drawing specifically on insights from the historical institutionalist branch of the 
new institutionalism, it shows that path dependency was a strong feature of the post-
socialist pension reforms. This path dependency and the mechanisms released by multi-
pillar pension reform, have in turn shaped global pension policy ideas.  
 
The reform of pension systems in Central and Eastern Europe are part of broader 
changes in the region’s transformation from state planned socialism to market based 
capitalism. The series of reforms have been argued in the literature by some to represent 
radical path departures (Bohle & Greskovits, 2009) and by others to be characterised by 
path dependency (Cerami, 2009; Inglot, 2008). In drawing on ideas, institutions and 
interests, Cerami (2009) illustrates each of these as different mechanisms of institutional 
change. This chapter utilises each of these to show how they have all been part of the 
pension reform and counter-reform process. It also demonstrates that pension reforms 
in the region have exhibited both elements of path departure and path dependency. It 
is not the purpose of this chapter to argue which of these has been the most significant, 
nor is its purpose to argue whether the reforms represent a path departure or path 
dependency, as it will be shown they have elements of each of these. Rather the purpose 
of the chapter is to elucidate the reform process through the various mechanisms of 
institutional change. The aim is to show how global policy actors have interpreted this 
process and how this  then influences global pension policy.  
 
The next section begins by showing how policy ideas were a mechanism of institutional 
change. The World Bank’s campaign for pension reform was highly influential as a source 
of inspiration for reformers. Through the use of conferences, workshops and seminars 
the World Bank - in conjunction with USAID and the pensions industry - was able to 
persuade most countries in the region to create mandatory second pension pillars. Table 
6.1 below shows the countries and year that multi-pillar pension reforms with a 
mandatory second pension pillar were enacted. The chapter then moves onto the 
adaptive mechanisms as a source of institutional change. Here the policy legacies of the 
pre-communist era, the communist period and the immediate post-transformation years 
will be shown to have constrained the pension reforms that were undertaken as 
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reformers opted for layering of new institutions on top of the old ones, rather than a 
wholesale transformation. The constrained nature of the reforms resulted in sub-optimal 
elements built into the system, which made their reversal more likely. Next the chapter 
moves onto interests as a source of institutional change. The World Bank not only used 
persuasion to bring about change but also used material resources through its loan 
facilities to incentivise actors to undertake reforms. Interests were also an important 
mechanism in the reform reversals that took hold after the crisis. Domestic politicians 
responded to material incentives to renationalise private pillars or to scale them down. 
Finally, the chapter returns to policy ideas. It draws on the elite interviews and an 
analysis of key pension documents from international organisations to show a large 
degree of coherency between actors of different institutions in their interpretation of 
the counter reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. This coherency suggests a growing 
consensus on the problems associated with carving out a mandatory second private 
pillar from a fully mature first pillar.  
 
The chapter contributes to a greater understanding of global social policy making. There 
have been surprisingly few analyses in the global social policy literature that have 
integrated institutional theory to global social policy ideas (Béland, 2009; Orenstein, 
2008). Institutions do not only mediate social policy ideas by refracting the types of 
reforms that are undertaken, they also shape and create policy ideas. Mandatory second 
pillars as a global pension policy were developed domestically in Latin America and 
transferred by transnational actors within international institutions to Central and 
Eastern Europe in an example of a global policy process. Central and Eastern Europe 
became the region where mandatory second pillars became a global social policy. 
However, mandatory second pension pillars are no longer promoted by the World Bank 
as a desirable pension reform idea - and so this chapter demonstrates how the region 
also became the site where the policy idea lost its appeal to its former proponents and 
subsequently changed global pension policy. This chapter therefore explores pension 
reforms and counter-reforms in the region and actors’ perspectives to demonstrate the 
iterative nature of global social policy. 
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Part One: Pension Privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
This section analyses the discursive, institutional and material influences over the 
privatisation process. It was discussed in Chapter Five how pension privatisation spread 
across Central and Eastern Europe in a very short time period. As Table 6.1 shows, 
between 1998 and 2002, nine countries had either fully or partially privatised their 
system, with five more countries following soon after. This rapid spread of the trend 
suggests ideational or discursive influence over the process. However, the table also 
shows that no country attempted a full privatisation and that there was a large degree 
of variation in the second pillars, indicating a constraining influence over the process. 
The chapter also highlights the material incentives that also swayed the decision to enact 
a privatisation of the system.   
 
Table 6.1 Pension Privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Country  
Year of 
Privatisation  
Size of 
Second 
Pillar 
Who Participates  
Hungary 1998 6% > 8% Mandatory for new entrants 
Kazakhstan  1998 10% Mandatory for all 
Poland  1999 7.3% 
Mandatory for new and young workers, voluntary 30-50 
Estonia  2001 6% Mandatory for new entrants 
Latvia  2001 2% > 5.5% 
Mandatory for new and young workers, voluntary 30-50 
Kosovo  2002 10% Mandatory for all below 55 
Bulgaria  2002 2% > 5% Mandatory for all workers 42 
Croatia 2002 5% 
Mandatory for new and young workers, voluntary 40-50 
Russia 2002 3% > 6% Mandatory for all born after 1966 
Lithuania  2004 
2.5% > 
5.5% 
Voluntary for new and current workers 
Slovakia  2005 9% Mandatory for those born after 1983 
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Macedonia  2006 7% Mandatory for new entrants 
Romania  2008 2% > 3% 
Mandatory for new and young workers, voluntary 36-45 
Czech Republic  2011 2% 
Voluntary for new and current workers 
 
Sources: Price & Rudolph (2013), Tuck, (2014) 
 
Ideas and the Partial-Privatisation of Pension Systems in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
In Blyth’s (2002) analysis of the ‘great transformations’ that took place in the twentieth 
century that were discussed in Chapter Five – namely the transition to embedded 
liberalism and later to neoliberalism – ideas acted as the blueprints for reform. In what 
is described as ‘Knightian uncertainty’, ideas offer stability to actors facing unknowable 
consequences. The transformations in Central and Eastern Europe represented a high 
period of uncertainty. A twin economic and political transformation had not been 
undertaken before. Market reforms acted as blueprints for welfare institutions facing 
considerable strain under economic transition.  
 
Transnational actors had significant influence in the decision of most countries in the 
region to enact multi-pillar pension reforms (Orenstein, 2008). This was largely a result 
of the ideational influence of these actors. Chapter Five explained how neoliberal ideas 
had risen to prominence across the globe throughout the 1980s. The end of the Cold War 
further emphasised the perceived superiority of the market in the organisation of the 
economy and society. A global network of actors was keen for Central and Eastern 
Europe to reform its socialist institutions to benefit from the promises of marketisation 
(Bockman & Eyal, 2002). Pension reforms were an extension of these ideas into a specific 
policy domain, with Chile’s pension privatisation the beacon for all advocates of this 
reform (Holzmann, 1997; James, 1999; Vittas, 1999). The architect of Chile’s pension 
reform, one of the so called ‘Chicago Boys’, José Piñera, was a particularly influential 
advocate of pension reform. In the same year that Averting was published, Piñera set up 
the ‘International Centre for Pension Reform’ in an effort to promote the Chilean pension 
system across the world. A year later he became the co-chair of the Cato Institute’s 
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project to promote pensions choice. These institutions were joined by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and led by the World Bank as part of a 
coalition with the pensions industry to campaign for multi-pillar pension reform 
(Orenstein, 2008). Piñera was particularly hostile to communism and saw pension 
privatisation as a bulwark against it. He argued that ‘[b]y converting all workers into 
owners, the reform commits them actively to a responsible management of the 
economy, as well as to political stability and social peace’ (Piñera, 1991 cited in Müller, 
2003 p. 12). 
 
One of the central ways these actors inspired domestic reformers in Central and Eastern 
Europe was through the disseminations of reform ideas within seminars and 
conferences. For example, the Head of the Central Bank in Kazakhstan cites his 
attendance at a World Bank-sponsored pensions conference as the inspiration for him 
to push for pension privatisation in Kazakhstan (Orenstein, 2008). In the case of Croatia, 
a pension conference in 1995 organised by the World Bank, the East-West Institute and 
the Croatian government was inspiration for the Prime Minister to declare his intentions 
for multi-pillar reform immediately after attending (Anusic, et al, 2003). In addition to 
the benefits promoted by the coalition for pension reform, the World Bank led team also 
offered a considerable resource through its expertise and technical assistance. Uncertain 
reformers in the region had both the promise of increased economic growth through the 
multi-pillar idea, alongside the reduction in uncertainty proffered by the technical 
assistance and advice offered by international organisations. For example, Poland 
benefitted from the World Bank dispatching a staff member to lead the Polish 
Plenipotentiary for the pension reform (Orenstein, 2008).  
 
A further method of ideational influence of transnational actors, was to form coalitions 
with like-minded domestic actors. This was often the finance minister, who was usually 
more neoliberal minded than the labour minister (Müller, 1999), and it enabled them to 
convince opponents of multi-pillar reform. The former Chilean finance minister, Hernán 
Büchi, acted as an adviser to the Croatian government and was an inspiration for reform 
(Anusic, O'Keefe, & Madzarevic-Sujster, 2003). In the case of Poland, a senior member 
of the Social Protection and Labor Department, Michal Rutkowski was seconded from 
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the Bank to lead the Plenipotentiary for Pension Reform (Müller, 1999). Similarly, the 
World Bank dispatched the former Croatian finance minister to assist the reform team 
there when he left Croatian politics to join the Bank’s staff. In this way a multi-national 
network of elite actors was formed around the idea of privatised pension reform. 
 
The campaign to win over opponents involved numerous approaches across the region. 
It entailed ‘coordinative’ discourses (Schmidt, 2008) through expert debates. In both 
Hungary and Poland, there were protracted debates between reform minded ministries 
of finance, and reform opponents in the ministries of labour and social security (Müller, 
1999; Orenstein, 2000). The World Bank funded fact-finding trips to Chile for pension 
officials, displaying the benefits of the reforms in the country where they had been most 
successful. World Bank assistance also included ‘communicative’ discourses (Schmidt, 
2008) targeted at the wider public to win over support from the general population. For 
instance, in Poland the reforms were promoted through a publicity campaign, funded by 
the pensions industry, promising superior returns. This aggressive campaigning by 
competing pension funds included TV advertising which promised luxury holidays, 
retirement villas and a decadent life in retirement, was partially responsible for the 
public support for multi-pillar pension reform. It was also these unfulfilled promises 
which caused later disillusionment with pension reforms when the returns failed to 
materialise: 
 
“I think they were oversold, not with regards to projections, but the image of the 
private pensions. With one year of decision, with regard to whether people 
joined or not, there was a huge PR campaign, there were large numbers of agents 
convincing people to join the funds, there were TV commercials selling the image 
that it will allow you to spend your holidays in the Caribbean, to drive luxury cars, 
really spend without any worries and this kind of an image is something that was 
one not only by the pension funds, but also with the government, it was selling 
the reform as one that will give you better pensions which obviously wasn’t case, 
but I think it sort of blurred that people believed private pensions were superior.” 
(interview with and Agnieszka Chlon-Dominizak. World Bank and former Labour 
Minister, Poland, January, 2017).  
 
Adaptive Mechanisms and the Partial-Privatisation of Pension Systems in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
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A strong campaign for pension privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe was mitigated 
by the policy legacies in the region, which constrained the options for a full privatisation. 
The pension systems had Bismarckian origins, with earnings related components in their 
pension formulas (Müller, 1999). The state had played the prominent role in providing 
an income in retirement with no private pension provision. The socialist authorities had 
switched to Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) financing after the war as pension reserves in the 
funded Bismarckian systems had been destroyed. The earnings-related elements of the 
schemes were gradually reduced through a combination of flat rate components making 
up the bulk of the pension formula and benefit ceilings, both enhancing the redistributive 
nature of the pension system. However, a particular characteristic of the socialist welfare 
state were so-called branch privileges. These were additional benefits to those in 
occupations strategically important to the state such as miners and railway workers. 
These privileges included early retirement or more generous benefits. Pension 
contributions were financed by state-owned enterprises, direct contributions from 
workers were rare. A hallmark of the socialist welfare state was a retirement age lower 
than those in the OECD. Across the region, men could retire at 60 with 25 years 
employment and women at 55, with further entitlements depending on the number of 
children they had, often entailing lower retirement ages and enhanced benefits (Fultz & 
Ruck, 2001). All the pension systems in the region had reached maturation before the 
beginning of the transition, with almost full coverage across the population.  
 
Inglot (2008) coined the welfare states of Central and Eastern Europe as ‘emergency 
welfare states’. This type of welfare state entailed a familiar cycle of policy making, 
whereby following a political crisis, an elite-driven expansion of welfare took place. This 
would then be followed by attempts at retrenchment, until the next crisis brought about 
another round of expansion. For example, following the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, 
it adopted a more universalistic approach to welfare in its social contract to compensate 
for a lack of civil and political rights. Similar expansions were undertaken in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, following the Prague Spring, and in Poland where the pension 
system was expanded to include agricultural workers. Later, attempts were made to 
retrench the pension system through inadequate indexing, which in an environment of 
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high inflation, cut the real value of pension entitlements significantly. However, pension 
spending as a proportion of GDP remained stubbornly high throughout the twilight years 
of the communist period. Table 6.2 gives further detail on the expansion of the pension 
system in Hungary and Poland to illustrate the emergency welfare state prevalent across 
the region.  
 
Table 6.2 The Expansion of the Hungarian and Polish Pension Systems 
  Hungary  Poland 
The Bismarckian 
origins of the 
pension systems 
Origins in mandatory health insurance for 
workers in 1891. The first pension system 
was set up for civil servants in 1912 and 
financed from the state budget.  
 
 
 
Later in 1928, legislation was passed for a 
fully funded mandatory pension scheme for 
blue and white-collar workers. Coverage at 
this point only amounted to 31 per cent of 
the population. The entire rural workforce 
was excluded.  
 
The former German territories had a 
Bismarckian system implemented by 
Chancellor Bismarck in 1889.  The Austrian 
region had a pension system for salaried 
workers from 1906. Whilst the region that 
had been part of Tsarist Russia, had no 
pension provision at all.  
 
By 1927, a unified pension system was 
established for white-collar workers. A similar 
arrangement for blue-collar workers was 
established in 1933. Both schemes were fully 
funded and administered by the state Social 
Insurance Institute (ZUS).  
 
A separate scheme for railwaymen, miners 
and public sector workers was introduced on 
an unfunded basis. Farmers had no 
protection at all. 
The Communist 
Period 
In 1949 new communist regime recognises 
pension rights and operates them on PAYG 
basis. 
 
In response to the Hungarian revolution of 
1956, pension coverage was extended to 
agricultural co-operatives more than 
doubling the coverage of the pension 
system.   
 
 
A more generous system emerged in the 
mid-1970s with replacement rates peaking 
at 66 per cent before falling back again.  
Communist regime established a PAYG 
pension system after reserves destroyed 
during the war.  
 
 
Between 1950 and 1954 coverage was 
extended to include agricultural workers. 
Branch privileges remained for particular 
groups such as policemen and soldiers. 
Moving to a two-tier scheme in 1954 with 
teachers, railway workers and miners 
receiving more generous benefits. 
 
In the 1960s more expansion was undertaken 
to include craftsmen, artisans and writers.  
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Attempts at 
Retrenchment 
by Communist 
Governments 
As the economy deteriorated in the 1980s, 
attempts to control the pension system by 
the communist party were made by 
inadequately indexing pensions to inflation. 
Around one-fifth of pensioners were forced 
to enter the labour market to supplement 
their income.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, 40 per cent of 
pensioners remained in employment due to 
the low pension entitlements. The issue of 
poor indexing rose up the party agenda in the 
1980s, after pressure from the Solidarity 
movement for a fairer pension. 
The 
Transformation   
During the transformation, millions of 
workers removed from the unemployment 
register by granting them early retirement. 
Between 1989 and 1996 the number of 
employed Hungarians falls by 22 per cent 
and the number of pensioners rises by 25 
per cent including a 45 per cent increase in 
disability pensions. Pension expenditure 
reached 11.5 per cent of GDP in 1994. 
The economic crisis that ensued during the 
transformation had a major impact on the 
Polish pension system. The number of 
employed people fell by 14.4 per cent, whilst 
the number of pensioners rose by 22.1 per 
cent, suggesting the pension system was used 
a de facto unemployment benefit.  
Sources: Inglot (2008); Müller (1999); Vanhuysse (2006) 
 
In addition to the socialist legacies of the pension system, the transformation also placed 
further constraints on those campaigning for pension privatisation as it led to a 
significant increase in pension expenditure and coverage. The collapse in output, as a 
consequence of the transformation, had significant adverse consequences for the 
dependency ratio of the pension systems of Central and Eastern Europe. During the early 
stages, production dropped between 20 and 50 per cent across the region (Fultz & Ruck, 
2001). Many countries did not recover to their pre-transformation levels until the mid to 
late 1990s. Employment also dropped sharply, for instance, in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, 5 million jobs were lost between 1989 and 1996 
(Augusztinovics, 1999 p. 91). This caused a huge fall in pension contributions and 
necessitated a steep increase in the contribution rate. This increase encouraged evasion, 
by firms under-declaring wages for their workers to avoid employee contributions, 
further exacerbating the dependency ratio problem (Müller, 2003).   
 
In addition to the sharp decline in pension contributions, the transformation from 
socialism to capitalism brought about a huge expansion in pension coverage. In Hungary 
and Poland, Vanhuysee (2006) has argued that elites turned to a familiar tool of protest 
avoidance. The move from a centrally planned economy to a market-orientated one 
would inevitably entail huge sectors of the economy redundant. The large increase in 
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unemployment of people with identical interests ripened the conditions for social 
disorder (Piven & Cloward, 1977; 1993). Early retirement in Poland and disability 
pensions in Hungary were used as a strategy to divide the interests of the workforce. 
Senior members, who were more likely to be embedded in trade union networks, were 
permanently removed from the labour force through early retirement. In Hungary, 
between 1989 and 1996, the number of employed Hungarians fell by 22 per cent, whilst 
the number of pensioners rose by 25 per cent, including a 45 per cent increase in 
disability pensions. In Poland, the number of employed people fell by 14.4 per cent, 
whilst the number of pensioners rose by 22.1 per cent. This was despite stable 
demographics, suggesting the pension system was used a de facto unemployment 
benefit (Müller, 1999). This strategy was also deployed in other countries across the 
region. In Bulgaria, a temporary early retirement scheme was introduced for men aged 
57 and women aged 52 who were made redundant and had 25 years insurance years if 
they were men or 20 if they were women (Müller, 2003). In Croatia, in 1990 there were 
1.97 million contributors for 656,000 retirees, yet by 1999 this had fallen to 1.4 million 
contributors for 1 million beneficiaries. The ratio of contributors to retirees therefore 
dropped from 3.0 in 1990 to 1.4 in 1999 (Anusic, O'Keefe, & Madzarevic-Sujster, 2003). 
Figure 6.1 shows the growth in the number of pensioners during the early transition 
period.  
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Figure 6.1 Percentage Growth in the Number of Pensioners (pre-1992 = 100) 
 
Source: Fultz & Ruck (2001) 
 
The sharp increase in the dependency ratio had contradictory implications for pension 
reform. It placed reform high on the agenda, as pension expenditure as a proportion of 
GDP in some of the region’s constituent counties was some of the highest in the world 
(World Bank, 1994). There was a consensus that the systems were unsustainable and 
early parametric reforms to the pension systems across the region were undisputed 
amongst social security experts (Müller, 2003). Such reforms included: the raising of the 
retirement age; the introduction of an employee contribution; the abolition of branch 
privileges; restricting early retirement; the tightening of eligibility for disability pensions; 
and indexing to protect against the risk of inflation. These parametric reforms proved to 
be publicly unpopular, some were resisted by constitutional courts, whilst in other places 
the intensity of reforms was significantly decreased. For example, in Poland, the reform 
to miners’ pensions was delayed due to the ability of miners to mobilise opposition to 
the proposed reforms (Armeanu, 2010). In Croatia in May 1998, the Constitutional Court 
ruled the wage-based indexing of pensions illegal. In contrast, the move towards a multi-
pillar framework for pension provision was not controversial in the first instance. This 
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was because it was done on a voluntary basis in most countries as part of reform 
packages to stimulate domestic capital market innovation (Müller, 2003).  
 
However, at the same time as pushing pension reform high on the agenda, the 
dependency ratio constrained the options for privatisation of the public pillars given the 
huge transition costs that would be involved for a full privatisation. For this reason, a full 
privatisation was never on the political agenda in most of the 14 reforming countries, 
even from the most ardent supporters of pension privatisation (Orenstein, 2000). In 
Hungary, the neoliberal finance minister Bokros, floated the idea of a full privatisation 
when he was appointed in 1995, but this was quickly dismissed as unachievable, due to 
the huge transition costs it would entail (Ferge, 1999). Similarly, in Poland, an original 
proposal in 1991 advocated a mixed system with half with half of all earnings above 120 
per cent of average earnings to be diverted to a private pillar (Topinski & Wisniewski, 
1991). A Ministry of Finance proposal went even further, arguing for three-quarters of 
pension contributions to be diverted to a private pillar with only one-quarter remaining 
in the PAYG pillar. The transition costs of such a proposal were seen as too big an obstacle 
to overcome, estimated at 5 per cent of GDP (Golinowska, 1999). Only in Kazakhstan, 
was a full privatisation of the pension system carried out in the same manner as Chile’s. 
This was also carried out against the advice of the World Bank, as advisers there believed 
the preconditions – such as the regulatory framework and functioning capital market – 
for a pension privatisation were not present in Kazakhstan at the time of reform: 
 
EA: “You know I worked on the Kazakhstan reform and there were a group of 
people who wanted me to work on it there because they knew I wasn’t dogmatic 
about it.  
 
INT: “So basically, the initial conditions were not right in Kazakhstan so they 
thought to send you there because you were not dogmatic?”  
 
EA: “Exactly. And it was interesting because Kazakhstan wanted the Chilean 
approach and what we did there was to try and ensure that it had half a chance 
of working. By providing a lot of technical assistance and trying to ensure there 
was a reasonable regulatory structure. And now I think Kazakhstan is one of the 
countries where the governments reversed the reforms.” (Interview with Emily 
Andrews, World Bank, August 2017) 
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Reformers across the region settled on a partial-privatisation as the most viable systemic 
reform to embed the principles of funding and marketisation into pension systems. The 
strategy was akin to layering described by Hacker (2004) and Streeck &Thelen (2005). 
Since a full privatisation of the system was not possible due to the considerable transition 
costs, the layering of a private element on top of the public element could see the private 
pillar supplant the public pillar over time as the most important pillar for pension 
provision and eventually completely replace it. This type of institutional change is 
described by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) as the strategy of ‘subversives’ (see Chapter 
Two) whom wish to close down an institution but must do so over time because of the 
huge upfront costs involved in a full scale closing down. The World Bank often advocated 
sequencing of reforms in the switch to a funded model. It was aware that a full 
privatisation of the pension system would effectively double the cost of pension 
provision in the short run, destabilising the reforms. It therefore advocated a sequencing 
process entailing the tightening of benefits from the PAYG pillar to create fiscal space, 
alongside regulatory reforms to prepare for the capitalisation of retirement income 
(World Bank, 1994).  
 
The Path Dependency Inherent in the Partial Privatisation of Central and Eastern 
European Pension Systems 
 
The pension reforms across the region entailed two separate reforms. The introduction 
of a mandatory second pension pillar was accompanied by parametric reforms to the 
public pillar, such as raising the retirement age, or in the case of Latvia and Poland, 
introducing a notionally defined contribution (NDC) scheme8. It also included the 
elimination of branch privileges, removing the more generous benefits for certain 
occupations. For political expediency, tactical sequencing was deployed in many 
countries, introducing the less contentious second pension pillars first, before 
undertaking more unpopular reforms to the public system (Müller, 1999). However, 
reforming the first pillar proved to be much more difficult than introducing a mandatory 
                                                     
8 NDC schemes function as PAYG schemes in terms of contributions – the working-age population 
finance the incomes of the retired population. However, the benefits behave like a defined contribution 
scheme, by accumulating a notional fund with a rate of return. The parameters of the scheme can 
automatically adjust to mean it is always sustainable.  
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second pillar. In Pierson’s (2000) terms, the restriction of public pension benefits induced 
a negative feedback loop. For example, in Poland the elimination of branch privileges 
(special pension privileges for specific industries) was not attempted until 2005, six years 
after the introduction of mandatory second pillars, despite branch privileges constituting 
one-third of the total public expenditure on pensions (Armeanu, 2010). These attempts 
encountered fierce resistance. Reforms to miners’ pensions were met with 8,000 miners 
assembling outside parliament while the debate was going on, deterring MPs from 
voting in favour of the reforms. Aleksandrowicz (2007) estimates that in total, 100 
occupations benefitted from the privileges and successive governments have been 
unable to retrench this socialist legacy, it is argued that it systematically undermines the 
principles of the pension system. Special privileges in Bulgaria were also not reformed 
alongside the introduction of the mandatory second pension pillar. In addition, at time 
of multi-pillar reform, the original planned retirement age of 65 was reduced to 63 for 
men if they have 37 years of insurance contributions and 60 for women if they have 34 
years of insurance contributions (Müller, 2003). It was not until 2015 that the retirement 
age was finally legislated to increase to 65 years.  
 
Despite the necessity to reform public pension pillars in order to enhance sustainability 
and reduce costs, a trend to increase the generosity of the public pillar continued in some 
countries across the region. This logic is rational for political actors who are able to claim 
credit for immediately raising the retirement income of pensioners, whilst the costs are 
borne by future taxpayers (Pierson, 2000). However, it violates the logic of a funded 
pension scheme, crowding out the fiscal space for a funded pillar and in the case of some 
countries exacerbated their fiscal position just before the onset of the global economic 
crisis. For example, in Hungary in 2002, the Socialist Party introduced a 13th month 
pension entitlement to compensate for past inadequate indexing (Simonovits, 2011). 
This increase in spending was not matched by an increase in contributions. As a 
consequence, by the time the financial crisis hit the global economy, Hungary was 
running a budget deficit of 9% of GDP. In Poland, in 2015, the populist Law and Justice 
Party (PiS) ran on a platform to reverse the planned increase in the retirement age to 67 
down to a retirement of age of 60 for women and 65 for men. This demonstrates the 
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temptation for governments to prioritise the short-term in pension provision, over long-
term sustainability.  
 
Interests and the Partial-Privatisation of Pension Systems 
 
Material interests have also been a part of the process of pension reforms and counter-
reforms. The decision to introduce a mandatory private pillar to the pension systems of 
Central and Eastern Europe had the material incentive of World Bank technical 
assistance and loans to assist with the implantation of reforms. These loans did not come 
with the explicit condition to part-privatise the pension system (Orenstein, 2008); it was 
therefore not an example of the hard conditionality synonymous with international 
financial institutions in the 1980s. Rather, a country which had decided to implement a 
multi-pillar pension reform, did so in the knowledge that World Bank support and loans 
were available to assist the process – a softer material incentive than the conditionality 
of the past (Appel & Orenstein, 2013). Figure 6.3 shows an analysis of World Bank loans 
for pension reform - it shows that the region was one of the most popular recipients for 
World Bank technical loans, alongside Latin American and the Caribbean, the other 
region where multi-pillar reforms have been prominent.  
 
Table 6.3 World Bank Lending Operations in Support of Pension Reform 1984 - 2005 
 
Region 
Countries 
(Number) 
Projects 
(number)  
Commitments 
($ bn) 
Size of 
pension 
component 
($ bn)  
Africa 14 26 1.5 0.1 
East Asia and Pacific 4 7 7.4 0.5 
Europe and Central Asia 25 93 10.8 1.5 
Latin America and Caribbean 15 57 10.7 3.1 
Middle East and North Africa 6 9 1.1 0.1 
South Asia 4 12 2.7 0.1 
Total  68 204 34.2 5.4 
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Source: Independent Evaluation Group (2006, p. 12) 
 
The data above includes loans for all types of pension reforms, a closer analysis shows 
that most loans were for pension reforms that entailed a multi-pillar reform as shown 
below in table 6.4. This financing from the World Bank was used to set up the new 
systems and regulatory frameworks required for multi-pillar reform, alongside assisting 
some of the transition costs in the switch to a funded system.  
 
Table 6.4 Pension Lending by Pillar 
 
 
Source: Independent Evaluation Group (2006, p. 14) 
 
Material resources for pension privatisation were also provided by sources other than 
the World Bank. The IMF tacitly supported pension reforms by not including pension 
debt to form part of the calculation for country debt levels (Appel & Orenstein, 2013). 
USAID provided technical assistance to reforming and even managed the creation of the 
pensions regulator in Hungary. In addition, it created a system of social security numbers 
in Croatia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Macedonia, Slovakia, Romania and the Baltic States 
(Orenstein, 2008). A further incentive for reformers was the prospect of being employed 
by the World Bank as a consultant to advise other reforming countries or to be serve as 
a specialist in Washington, D.C. (Appel & Orenstein, 2013).  
 
A further material incentive to pursue pension privatisation came from the promise of 
increased international investment when reforms were pursued. Chapter Five noted that 
the region pursued avant-garde neoliberal policies as a signalling device to attract 
international investment, this included pension privatisation and also implementing a 
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flat tax structure. This was to commit them to creating an exceptionally liberal 
investment climate (O’Dwyer & Kovalcik, 2007). Whilst both of these policies had initial 
fiscal implications - transition costs for pension privatisation and lost revenue for flat tax 
policies - reformers believed these reforms would attract considerable international 
investment. Data on investment appears to support this assumption. IMF data on 
international investment shows that in the years preceding the global economic crisis, 
Central and Eastern European states had the highest in net financial inflows per GDP in 
the world (Becker et al., 2010, p. 5; IMF, 2008, p. 283). Moreover, a study on the adoption 
of pension privatisation is correlated with a 57.4 per cent increase in the rate of foreign 
direct investment (Reece & Sam, 2011).  
 
Part Two: Pension Reform Reversals in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
The wave of reform reversals in Central and Eastern Europe was even more rapid than 
the earlier spread of privatisation. There were also variations in the reform reversals, as 
shown in Table 6.5. Some countries went for a full nationalisation of the funded pillar, 
which represents a complete and permanent reversal of pension privatisation. This 
option was chosen by Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland and Czech Republic, which chose to 
close down its second pillar after only three years of it being in operation. Other 
countries opted to scale down the size of the second pillar, permanently reducing its size. 
This was the reform option of Slovakia, Russia, Romania, Lithuania and Bulgaria. Estonia 
and Latvia showed more commitment to their funded pillars with payments to the 
second pillar suspended to ease the fiscal crisis, but then continued again three years 
later. In the case of Estonia, the private pillar contributions were increased to make up 
for the shortfall in the years they were reduced. In Kosovo and Croatia, the second pillars 
have remained intact without any temporary or permanent reversals. The analysis of this 
section also draws on ideational, institutional and material explanations for the reform 
reversals.  
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Table 6.5 Pension Reform Reversals in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Country  
Year of 
Reversal 
Type of 
Reversal  
Permanent or Temporary 
Estonia  2009 Partial Temporary 
Latvia  2009 Partial Temporary 
Lithuania  2009 Partial Permanent 
Hungary 2010 Complete Permanent 
Russia 2012 Partial  Permanent 
Kazakhstan  2013 Complete Permanent 
Poland  2013 Complete Permanent 
Slovakia  2013 Partial  Permanent 
Bulgaria  2015 Partial Permanent 
Czech Republic  2016 Complete Permanent 
Romania  2017 Partial  Permanent 
Kosovo  - 
No 
Reversal 
- 
Croatia - No reversal - 
Macedonia  - 
No 
Reversal 
- 
 
Sources: Appel & Orenstein (2013), Drahokoupil & Domonkos (2012), Krzyzak (2014; 2017) 
Price & Rudolph (2013) 
                                                                                                                                     
Ideas as a Source of Pension Reform Reversal  
 
Ideas were also a mechanism of institutional change in the counter-reforms that were 
carried out across the region. Chapter Five explained how Central and Eastern Europe 
was acutely exposed to the global financial crisis. Through its integration in global capital 
markets and exposure to declining export markets, the region was dramatically hit at the 
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onset of the crisis. Table 6.6 shows the dramatic impact of the crisis on the growth rates 
of countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it was the worst affected region in the world.  
 
Table 6.6: GDP Growth in Selected Countries 2007-2013 
 
Country Name 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Lithuania 11.09 2.63 -14.81 1.64 6.04 3.83 3.50 
Estonia 7.75 -5.42 -14.72 2.26 7.60 4.31 1.94 
Latvia 9.98 -3.55 -14.40 -3.94 6.38 4.03 2.43 
Russian Federation 8.54 5.25 -7.82 4.50 5.28 3.66 1.79 
Slovenia 6.94 3.30 -7.80 1.24 0.65 -2.67 -1.13 
Croatia 5.15 2.05 -7.38 -1.42 -0.33 -2.24 -0.65 
Hungary 0.43 0.86 -6.60 0.68 1.66 -1.64 2.10 
Romania 6.86 8.26 -5.91 -2.81 2.03 1.24 3.53 
Slovak Republic 10.80 5.63 -5.42 5.04 2.82 1.66 1.49 
Czech Republic 5.60 2.68 -4.80 2.27 1.78 -0.80 -0.48 
Bulgaria 7.34 6.02 -3.59 1.32 1.91 0.03 0.86 
Serbia 5.89 5.37 -3.12 0.58 1.40 -1.02 2.57 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 5.73 5.58 -2.99 0.87 0.96 -0.82 2.35 
Macedonia, FYR 6.47 5.47 -0.36 3.36 2.34 -0.46 2.93 
Kazakhstan 8.90 3.30 1.20 7.30 7.40 4.80 6.00 
Poland 7.03 4.25 2.82 3.61 5.02 1.61 1.39 
Kosovo 7.29 2.64 3.34 3.31 4.81 2.90 3.43 
        
OECD members 2.50 0.18 -3.54 2.87 1.80 1.25 1.42 
 
Source: World Bank Database 
 
The crisis crystallised the negativity towards market transition across the region. Even 
before the crisis had hit, surveys revealed a stark scepticism towards free markets and 
neoliberal institutions. A poll conducted in Central and Eastern Europe in 2009 by the 
Pew Research Centre found a decline in the support for market-based capitalism in 
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comparison to the beginning of the transition period. As Figure 6.2 shows, the decline in 
support in some countries was dramatic. For example, in Hungary, capitalism had a net 
approval rating of 70 in the spring of 1991. By the fall of 2009, this had dropped to just 
4. In the Ukraine, the net approval rating for capitalism was negative, with more people 
disapproving than approving of market-based institutions.  
 
A closer reading of the surveys shows a consensus forming in the region, at the time of 
the crisis, that the transition to market-based capitalism had been good for business 
owners, but bad for ordinary people (Pew Research Center, 2009). This was echoed by 
findings in surveys by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 
In the ‘Life in Transition’ surveys conducted before and after the crisis (shown in Figure 
6.3), in a relatively short period of just four years, support for free market capitalism had 
declined in most countries across the area. For example, belief that the market economy 
was superior to any other economic system declined by 10 percent in Poland, the leading 
reform country, from 40 to 30 percent.  Fewer than one-third of the population in 
Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Russia, Croatia, and Serbia believed 
in the supremacy of the market economy in 2010, compared to approximately 65 
percent in Sweden and Germany. It should be noted however, that this trend is not 
unique to the post-communist region, countries across the developed world grew more 
hostile to the idea of free markets following the global economic crisis. 
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Figure 6.2 Net Approval Rating for Market-Based Capitalism Spring 1991 and Fall 2009 
Compared 
 
 
Source: Pew Research Centre, 2009 
Adapted from Pew Research Centre (2009), Q13. Approval rating is equal to the difference between 
Strongly Agree/Agree and Disagree/Strongly disagree, excluding don’t knows.  
 
Figure 6.3 Share of Population that Strongly Supports the Idea of Free Market 
Capitalism 
 
  
Source: EBRD (2013) 
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For opponents of pension privatisation, the extent of the crash laid the ground for a swift 
reversal. As Chapter Seven will outline in more detail, many of the design flaws of the 
system had been brought into focus before the crisis. The exorbitant fees charged by 
fund managers threatened to have a dramatic adverse effect on the retirement incomes 
of those drawing a proportion of their pension from the second pillar. Nominal 
administration charges that sound small, grow exponentially over the life course of the 
portfolio significantly reducing retirement income. For example, a 1% administration 
charge reduces the final pension by over 20 per cent (Barr, 2001). In addition, the poor 
performance of the portfolios (discussed below) and the large transition costs, all 
provided ammunition for ideational attacks on the second pension pillar from the 
opponents of the reforms, or from opportunists seeking to ease the fiscal burden of the 
second pillar. In sum, the early crisis environment was conducive to a reversal of market-
based reforms in favour of statist welfare reforms.  
 
Path Dependency and Pension Reform Reversal  
 
The obstacles to a full privatisation outlined above also incentivised the reversal of the 
system. The shift to a funded system was argued by its proponents to improve the 
sustainability of pension systems in the face of an ageing population (World Bank, 1994). 
Its core philosophy entails the setting aside of additional resources to finance pensions 
in older age, alongside the funding of the current generations. By investing in equities as 
resources for income in retirement, it was also believed the system would aid the 
development of capital markets of countries in transition from state planned socialism 
to capitalism (World Bank, 1994). However, the insistence by some governments that 
pension providers invest large proportions of the portfolio in government bonds, 
violated these principles. It ensured the funded system operated as a PAYG system in all 
but name. An exception was the Baltic States where there was a shift to portfolios with 
a significant proportion of equities.  
 
Policy makers had several options to finance the transition to a partially-funded pension 
system (Fultz, 2012). Government expenditure could be retrenched in other areas to 
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ensure the move to a funded system was revenue neutral. Taxes could have been raised 
to finance the transition costs (Fultz, 2012). A further option was to use the revenue 
generated from the sale of state-owned enterprises to finance the transition. Instead, 
most governments in the region chose to finance the transition costs primarily through 
borrowing. By doing so they failed to fundamentally change the institutional logic of the 
PAYG pension system. In the past, contributions to the public pension system were paid 
in to the public scheme and used to finance current expenditure. Now, the only 
difference entailed some new intermediaries, but essentially contributions to the funded 
system were still being used to finance current pension expenditure on the unfunded 
system (Guardiancich, 2011). 
 
As a result of this continued institutional logic, governments seeking re-election still had 
the same incentives to expand the first pension pillar since the costs were met primarily 
by future tax payers, whilst credit for expansion or lack of retrenchment was immediate. 
In Hungary these incentives led to the introduction of the 13th month pension 
entitlement in 2006 (Simonovits, 2011). In Poland, this manifested itself in the continued 
provision of branch privileges to certain classes of employees (Armeanu, 2010). In 
marked contrast, the Estonian government did not issue government bonds during the 
transition period (Bloomberg, 2015). Estonian second pillar portfolios instead consisted 
primarily of foreign government securities (Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012). This strict 
adherence to a balanced budget has meant the that the institutional logic underpinning 
the pension system in Estonia is different to others in the region. In Estonia resources 
are truly set aside for retirement.  
 
Interests as a Mechanism of Pension Reform Reversal 
 
Many of the mechanisms described here are related to the cost of transition in shifting 
to a funded pension system. In summary, this cost acted as a constant thorn in the side 
in the fledgling private pillars. It raised the budget deficit, forcing the governments of the 
region to borrow to finance transition (Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012; Fultz, 2012). It 
also incentivised them to encourage pension funds to hold a significant share of 
government bonds as a proportion of the total portfolio (Datz & Dansci, 2013; 
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Guardiancich, 2011). Moreover, the transition costs constrained the size of the private 
pillar and therefore limited the efficient functioning of the pillar by restricting the gains 
from economies-of-scale in reducing the cost of administration of managing individually 
funded accounts (Broeders, et al., 2015).  
 
Yet, alongside these costs of pension reform, there was a substantial parallel benefit, 
which could be realised by closing down the private pillar – accumulated pension funds. 
As the debt-to-GDP ratio grew year-by-year, so too did the size of the accumulated 
pension fund as a growing incentive to reverse the reforms. The ease with which the 
governments in the region have seized the accumulated pension assets has violated 
many of the propositions that proponents of multi-pillar pension had posited (World 
Bank, 1994).  
 
One of the principles that supposedly underpinned the rationale for multi-pillar pension 
reforms was one of individual property rights. Individual accounts were considered the 
private property of contributors. It was believed this rendered them free from 
government manipulation (World Bank, 1994). Indeed, the justification for multi-pillar 
reform was to diversify risk. The use of the private sector in pension provision was 
thought to mitigate against the risk of government interference in the private element 
of the pension system (Holzmann, 2000). This was proved incorrect.  
 
This issue highlights the difference in time horizons between politicians seeking re-
election and policy entrepreneurs advocating their view of an optimal pension system. 
The proposed benefits of multi-pillar pension reform take decades to materialise yet 
politicians are motivated by the electoral cycle. Their incentives are therefore much 
more focused on the short-term. Locked within the fiscal parameters of financing the 
transition costs, there is built-in a double incentive to renationalize the pension system. 
The first is the elimination of transition costs, the second is the appropriation of the 
accumulated pension assets. For example, in the case of Poland, which seized only the 
government bonds, this reduced the national debt by 8 per cent of GDP (Atkins, 2014). 
In Hungary, where all accumulated assets were seized, the size of the accumulated fund 
was about 9 per cent of GDP (Simonovits, 2011). Although, unlike Poland, this was not 
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all used to play down the national debt (Simonovits, 2011). For office-seeking politicians 
this incentive structure proved hard to resist. In the case of Hungary, this act was carried 
out by a long-term opponent of the multi-pillar pension system. However, in Poland the 
reform was conducted by the economically liberal Civic Platform (PO), previous 
supporters of the pension reform. This suggests this action is not limited to long-term 
opponents of pension privatization. 
 
The nationalisation of pension assets is not limited to the governments of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Whilst the closing down of the second-pension pillars demonstrated an 
overt nationalisation, it is a propensity that has also been carried out in Western Europe 
as well, to alleviate fiscal pressures in the wake of global economic crisis. In Ireland, 
€4.4bn of the country’s national pension reserves were used to finance the bank bailout 
(Altman, 2013). Meanwhile, France and Spain also used pension reserve funds to finance 
current expenditure (Casey, 2014). In the UK, the Coalition Government nationalised the 
pension assets of the Royal Mail (Williams, 2012). The privatisation of the Royal Mail had 
been a long-term goal of the Conservative Party. However, an obstacle to the process lay 
in the pension liabilities the private sector would have obligations for once it took 
ownership. As a way to circumvent this obstacle, the Coalition Government agreed to 
honour the pension liabilities of Royal Mail, freeing the private sector from these 
obligations. Whilst this entailed long-term obligations for the state, in the short-term, 
£28 billion of pension assets was subsumed by the state. In a similar fashion, Portugal 
nationalised the pension assets of Portugal Telecom (Altman, 2013). This series of 
nationalisations of private assets points to a growing trend of government action in both 
mandatory and voluntary pension pillars (Casey, 2014). It is a mechanism that reinforces 
PAYG pension funding in both cases. 
 
Part Three: Global Pension Policy Ideas After the Reversals  
 
The first two parts of this chapter have offered an institutional analysis for the pension 
reforms and counter-reforms of Central and Eastern Europe. By drawing on the different 
strands of the institutional literature it has demonstrated the various mechanisms for 
the pension reform and counter-reform process. The purpose of this section is to 
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demonstrate how this process has shaped the global pension policy discourse. 
Transnational actors different organisations, with different values and preoccupations 
have all drawn similar lessons from the region’s experimentation with privatisation. The 
overarching conclusions are: that the transition costs involved in the switch to a multi-
pillar system may be too difficult to overcome; that politicians with short time horizons 
may find the accumulating pension funds too tempting to avoid raiding; and that the 
actions of those who renationalised their private pillars were undesirable as they further 
eroded trust in a pension system with historically low levels of trust. The original 
proponents of pension privatisation also acknowledged there may have been too much 
optimism for the potential that private pension pillars offered. However, there was also 
some variation in the interpretation of the pension reform experience in the region. For 
the proponents of pension privatisation, the EU might have been more accommodating 
with its insistence on adhering to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). In addition, the 
original proponents have also argued that the timing of the global economic crisis was a 
critical factor in the scaling down or abandoning of the second pension pillars. Here the 
argument was that if the crisis had come later, and the second pillars were more 
established, the returns on investments would have been much more pleasing than they 
were at the time of the crisis. This might have stabilised a path departure and created a 
new path dependency. However, at the onset of the crisis, Hungary had just begun to 
diversify its second pillar portfolios, this meant a larger proportion of the portfolios were 
invested in equities just as the markets were about to make dramatic losses.  
 
Fiscal Explanations for the Counter-Reforms 
 
Transnational and domestic actors all cited the transition costs for the reform reversals 
in Central and Eastern Europe. The fiscal implications of moving towards a multi-pillar 
pension system were offered as a key causal factor in the reform reversals by the full 
range of domestic and transnational actors, regardless of their stance on multi-pillar 
pension reform. For example, two key proponents of multi-pillar pension reform offered 
the following as one factor in explaining the pension reform reversals: 
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“First and foremost, it was because of the fiscal situation. Not all of the things 
that were planned during the reforms went as they were expected. So, for 
example, most of the transition costs came from raising the debt levels rather 
than savings in the pension systems or current tax revenue or privatisation 
revenues.” 
(Agnieszka Chlon-Dominczak, former Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Policy 
and World Bank Consultant, January 2017). 
 
“Transition costs were something which was underestimated and should have 
been given more attention than they have been given. Perhaps those who were 
negotiating on the ground were afraid, if you push too much with the transition 
costs, the country wouldn’t do the reform, or even within the government they 
had these kind of things, but also a lot of them didn’t want to emphasise, but also 
there was a lot more optimism from reforming countries policy-makers and one 
of the illusions there which I wasn’t able to diffuse, would offer a lot of resources 
to finance the transition costs.” 
(Robert Holzman, former Director of Social Protection and Labour, World Bank, 
December 2016). 
 
 
Likewise, prominent critics of multi-pillar also cited the fiscal problems of trying to move 
from a PAYG system to a funded one the explanations were almost identical regardless 
of the previous stance on the issue: 
 
“Any move from PAYG to funding has transition costs because if your 
contributions are paying for my pension, but then you’re told no, your 
contributions will pay Martin’s individual account. The question then is who pays 
my pension? The answer has to be the government one way or the other.” 
(Nicholas Barr, London School of Economics and former World Bank Consultant, 
December 2016). 
 
“There are differences from country to country, but generally, the main reason 
for the reversals or temporary reversals in some cases was the fiscal situation and 
fiscal concerns, so the transition costs of the reforms resulting in additional deficit 
in the public finances, the point during the crisis for many countries, the easiest 
way to ease the fiscal situation by either suspending contributions to the second 
pillar or limiting them or stopping them.”(Krzysztof Hagemejer, former Chief of 
Policy Development and Research, ILO Social Security Department, August 2017). 
 
However, whilst there was unanimity of this as a causal factor, there was some nuance 
in how this was interpreted. The EU’s Stability and Growth Pact was viewed as too 
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inflexible in accommodating the multi-pillar reforms and their associated transition costs 
by those who were initially supportive of the reforms:  
 
“Unfortunately, the EU Commission was slow and ineffectual in changing the 
rules to accommodate the pension reforms. What I have in mind is countries that 
introduced a funded pillar, they were reducing implicit debt, but because of the 
double burden increasing explicit debt. Measured by EU criteria the countries had 
problems. The commission did not help them, and recognise implicit debt was 
just as dangerous explicit. One could say implicit debt is an explicit debt with a 
lower probability, but it is not zero. So, in this sense there was no help, no 
movement. Maastricht should recognise structural reforms and importance of 
implicit debt. They use the assumption that explicit debt has a 100% probability 
of being paid back whereas implicit debt has zero. We all know one can default 
on explicit debt and one can actually take seriously for political economy reasons 
implicit debt. The EU had enough time to do analytical work and come up with 
reforms. That was an important reason” 
(Michal Rutkowski, Director of Social Protection and Labor, World Bank, 
December 2016). 
 
“Countries underestimated the difficultly of making savings for the transition 
costs. They thought we would have higher growth and this and that, so they did 
not make sufficient provisions. Linked with this the EU and also the IMF were not 
helpful in their budget calculation (Maastricht criteria), presentations you know 
the issues of the transition costs - the deficit. So as a result, they had to become 
more contractionary and here maybe the reforms were oversold, it needed to 
have a strong fiscal mechanism. This is one part and it is a major part, so it needed 
to be more fiscally tight.” 
(Robert Holzman, former Director of Social Protection and Labour, World Bank, 
December 2016). 
 
“For those countries that are a member of the EU this whole issue of whether the 
transition cost count as debt or not was a huge issue.” 
(Monika Queisser, Director of Social Policy, OECD, January 2017). 
 
This view sees the transition costs as ‘good debt’ and not an example of fiscal profligacy 
that the SGP seeks to eliminate. The proposition is that the EU did not understand the 
principles underpinning the reforms and that Central and Eastern Europe was enacting 
reforms that all countries would one day need to undertake in order to make pension 
systems sustainable. The issue strikes at the heart of one of the main debates between 
the ILO and World Bank, namely whether pension liabilities for future generations should 
be accounted in the same way as national debt.  
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“There was a lack of understanding that Central and Eastern Europe was 
leapfrogging the rest of Europe, and that means you don’t just copy, you try to 
find a faster way to develop the capital market, to contribute to growth as well 
to have a higher number of future pensions with higher diversity. There was an 
understanding with some individual researchers, but no understanding within 
the institution (The EU Commission) at large of the reforms in CEE.” (Michal 
Rutkowski, Director of Social Protection and Labor, World Bank, December 2016). 
 
“Well If we’re thinking colloquially, we can go beyond Maastricht, there are 
headline budget deficit and debt figures and they’re not taking into account what 
happens in the unfunded liabilities side, they are not systematically measured 
and reported. The EU context and the specific Maastricht criteria, the accounting 
is getting better, in the sense of 2017 there will be a requirement of international 
accounts to report unfunded pensions liabilities on an accrued basis for all EU, 
but that’s the first time it’s happened. It will take a long time for these to become 
recognised. We feel these are real liabilities that have macroeconomic impact 
that cannot be simply wished away.”(Robert Palacios, Global Lead Economist, 
Social Protection and Labor, World Bank, January 2017). 
 
However, not everyone supported the view that transition costs should have been kept 
off the balance sheet for EU Maastricht Criteria. The ILO’s former director of Russia, 
Central Europe and Central Asia argued that the initial accommodation from the EU, of 
allowing the transition countries and Sweden to keep transition costs off the balance 
sheet highly generous. She went to argue that it did not make sense for a continued 
exception for these countries in the treatment of their budget deficits.  
 
“The EU was more than generous with accommodating the transition costs. The 
case for exception didn’t stack up.”(Elaine Fultz, Former Director of Russia, 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, ILO, January 2017). 
 
In summary, transition costs were cited as the main causal factor in the counter-reforms 
across Central and Eastern Europe. The high cost of diverting funds from the first pillar 
to individually funded accounts was seen as the main difficulty in maintaining a 
mandatory funded pillar carved out of the first pillar. The nature of the debt meant that 
it was explicit and long-term, continually undermining support for funded pillars from 
politicians. For global pension policy this has significant implications for the advocacy of 
funded pillars. Where a country has a mature PAYG system in place, the prospect for a 
robust mandatory second pillar that is not closed during an economic downturn seem 
unlikely. The Holzman and Hinz (2005) update to Averting, which will be discussed in 
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more detail in Chapter Seven, developed ‘robustness’ as part of a set of criteria which 
pension systems should seek to fulfil. Robustness is the ability of a pension system to 
withstand major shocks. The experience of Central and Eastern Europe with mandatory 
second pillars has led to a reassessment of their robustness in the face of major shocks. 
The assumption that individual pension accounts were robust as they were protected by 
private property rights has proven to be a false one, to the surprise of the reformers: 
 
“When I did the reforms, I expected the pension funds and chamber to be far 
more effective at defending the second pillar. If you asked me in 2001/2002 
whether this could happen I would have said it’s impossible this could happen. 
This is a separate discussion, why the funds proved to be so ineffective.” (Michal 
Rutkowski, Director of Social Protection and Labor, World Bank, December 2016). 
 
 
This is a significant re-evaluation by the one-time proponents of multi-pillar reforms. It 
suggests that the assumptions that the establishment of a multi-pillar system would 
install actors into the political process that will protect financial interests has proven to 
be false. Despite the growing resources of the pensions industry in Central and Eastern 
Europe, it did not manage to use these resources to mobilise its interests or shape the 
political process in its favour.  
 
The Poor Performance of Second Pension Pillars 
 
Another common theme that runs through the responses from transnational actors was 
that the second pillar pensions had not performed as well as expected. This poor 
performance is the result of a combination of factors, which can be interpreted in various 
ways. For proponents of multi-pillar pension systems, it relates to poor implementation 
and the timing of the global economic crisis, for its opponents the system design flaws 
were inherent in the switch to a multi-pillar system with mandatory second pillars.  
 
“They never implemented it properly. It was poor. The whole system, the market 
oligopoly that was created by the system, the whole fee levels which by 2010, 
were not too bad in international comparison, but for most of the period were 
high and returns were not very good. So, in other words you had a system that a 
system that took money from the social security system and did not provide good 
returns. So, for an incoming government it was quite easy to discredit the system 
and say we didn’t need it. I think that’s basically the main issues why they 
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demolished it and it was done very easily. You know not many people revolted 
against it.”(Peter Holtzer, Former Chairman of the Hungarian Asset Managers' 
Association, Hungarian Pension Expert and consultant to the World Bank, January 
2017). 
 
A further criticism centred around unrealistic promises that were made by proponents, 
which coupled with poor implementation, weakened support for the multi-pillar system. 
However, there was no acknowledgement by these proponents of multi-pillar reform, 
that it was the World Bank which had been influential in overselling the benefits of multi-
pillar pension reform. As Chapter Seven will explore, Averting the Old Age Crisis was 
written in a particular way to hint this. Instead actors associated with Averting speak of 
these proposed benefits as though they were external to the entire World Bank 
campaign: 
 
“I do think the performance of some of the pension schemes was not up to 
expectations, some of the implementation of pension schemes was done pretty 
badly. I think that reduced credibility and public support for the reforms.”(Robert 
Palacios, Global Lead Economist, Social Protection and Labor, World Bank, 
January 2017). 
 
 “People thought if they did the second pillar reforms they’d get the effects on 
growth, financial markets, employment. And right up to the most recent crisis 
after some initial problems, some growth has taken place, it was not as strong as 
we would have hoped and certainly not as strong for some countries it needed a 
bit of the 1990s, with higher growth rates and then by 2007/8 everything was 
over and then you have the strong contraction taking place there and so this 
another part of it. The optimistic scenarios they had in mind aren’t really 
there.”(Robert Holzman, former Director of Social Protection and Labour, World 
Bank, December 2016). 
 
In drawing on the reform experiences of Latin America, Nicholas Barr, a principal critic 
of the multi-pillar reforms in both Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, argued 
that administration costs and poor compliance had damaged the reputation of 
mandatory pension pillars across the globe:  
 
“The second reason, which applies in Latin America (except for Chile), is that of 
administration charges, a lot returns end up disappearing in administration 
charges. Compliance in Latin America, as they lacked the institutional capacity, – 
including collusion with employers, such as declaring that you’re earning 
minimum wage when in fact you’re earning a lot more. Result: not a lot of 
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contributions went into your funded account. And of that did a lot of it 
disappeared because of high administration costs. So, they retreated because the 
original design exceeded the countries’ institutional capacity.” (interview with 
Nicholas Barr, December 2016). 
 
The poor performance of the second pillar has both ideational and path dependent 
influences on global pension policy. For the original proponents of multi-pillar reforms, 
the crisis provided ammunition to the opponents of mandatory pillars, giving them 
justification to make the counter-reforms through an ideational attack on the second 
pillars:  
 
“Success on the reform was predicated on a good performance of financial 
markets, which should be measured in the long term, but nonetheless 
performance after the crisis and in general financial markets meant enemies of 
the reform had a good time in criticising the structure of the reforms. And I think 
this is the first element, which is in a way objective element. Although they were 
not measured in the right timeframe.” 
(Michal Rutkowski, Director of Social Protection and Labor, World Bank, 
December 2016). 
 
However, there was also a path-dependent aspect to the poor performance of the 
second pillar. As was noted by Monika Queisser, the small size of the contributions to 
the second pillars meant that it was unlikely they would generate significant returns. 
Given the problem with transition costs, larger contributions to the second pillar to 
generate a greater return were not politically feasible. Therefore, the constraining 
nature of the mature public pillar meant that only a sub-optimal reform was possible, 
which rendered it vulnerable. In addition to the small contributions, the poor 
performance of the second pillar was also a product of the composition of the second 
pillar portfolios. Most countries stipulated that pension funds’ assets were held primarily 
in government bonds in the early phase of reform, as discussed above. For the 
proponents of multi-pillar pension reform in Central and Eastern Europe this was initially 
desirable as capital markets were in the early stages of development.  
 
“I think there were unrealistic promises made, people expected to get a lot of 
money out of the second pillar really quickly and of course that wasn’t possible 
because the contributions were too small to produce something big, the 
administration costs were enormous, we spent a lot of time talking to the Poles, 
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even the pension managers themselves saying you can’t really make a credible 
argument to continue doing this if we don’t get the administrative costs 
down.”(Monika Queisser, Director of Social Policy, OECD, January 2017). 
 
“When you start out with such a system, you as a pension fund starts, in the 
beginning there aren’t many investment products, the stock market is small, so 
if you invest there you drive the prices up, you don’t want to invest 
internationally as the money doesn’t’ flow back in the same way. It’s not a 
question of having government bonds, it’s a question of do you diversify over 
time. Maybe it could have happened faster but starting out wasn’t a bad idea. 
Because it is something which is a known quantity for the asset manager. 
Everything else is pretty unknown.”(Robert Holzman, former Director of Social 
Protection and Labour, World Bank, December 2016). 
 
However, for some the regulations were too stringent, stifling the ability of the second 
pillars to generate adequate returns. The initial regulations should have been relaxed 
much sooner in order to enable the pension funds to make viable returns, which may 
have bolstered support for them on  a more permanent basis: 
 
“Right now, looking form the historical perspective. It could have been better. 
The problem was the initial design was to have one type of portfolio, but by 2004 
starting from the implementation the law envisaged there would be different 
portfolio types. The idea was to get people acquainted with the system initially 
with relatively simple rules, where they don’t choose portfolios, but choose a 
fund and then they are more accustomed they could choose. The problem is, this 
was not implemented, the history of the implementation, so the multi-funds 
were removed from the legislation was removed in 2005, everyone thought it 
wouldn’t work, we tried to go back to this idea and that was part of the reforms 
we did for the prime minister’s office, but again in 2008 after the crisis, no one 
was listening to the argument that we should diversify portfolios.” (Agnieszka 
Chlon-Dominizak. World Bank and Labour Minister, July, 2017). 
 
 
Accumulated Assets as a Temptation for Governments 
 
A persistent theme that emerged from the interviews, on their perspective of the 
pension reform reversals, is the problem of accumulated assets and temptation they 
represent for national governments. Many proponents of pension privatisation had not 
foreseen the ease with which national governments could renationalise the second 
pension pillars. As discussed in the section on transition costs, this has implications for 
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how robust private pension pillars can be thought to be. It was also expressed has having 
grave consequences for social policy making: 
 
INT: “Were accumulated pension funds too big a temptation for governments to 
raid the funds?” 
 
MR: “This is a great question, Nick Barr thinks this is the case. I don’t know the 
answer. At the same time, you have assets accumulating at different times which 
would be much safer than pension funds. The mandatory contributions makes it 
possible. If this is true, then it bodes very poorly for social policy making in the 
years to come. Which is for social policy to be effective it needs to be for 
private/public partnership. This is inevitable in my view, given ageing and limited 
fiscal resources. I can’t see if Hungary is to do this again in 1996 who the takers 
will be given the assets were seized, so this is a fundamental blow to the 
participation of the private sector in social policy provision. In many social 
objectives we need the private sector, and for that to happen we need to 
predictable rules.”(Michal Rutkowski, Director of Social Protection and Labor, 
World Bank, December 2016). 
 
The confiscation of pension assets by the state violates one of the core assumptions that 
had been promoted by the World Bank as a justification for multi-pillar pension reform. 
The expectation that the government would be unable to intervene in pension provision 
once it was privatised was one of the key selling points of the reforms. Indeed, given the 
history of retrenchment and inadequate indexing of pensions in Central and Eastern 
Europe, this message was particularly relevant to the region (Fultz, 2012). Furthermore, 
the idea that pensions would be treated like private property was one of the main 
theories that underpinned the assumption that privatising pensions would have positive 
labour market effects. The idea being that taxes distort labour supply, but a funded 
pension would not as it would be considered private property. However, the entire 
experience of Central and Eastern Europe defies the expectations of property rights. The 
episode has taken the proponents of multi-pillar reforms by complete surprise.  
 
“Yeah, I have to say this is something frankly speaking why it didn’t come up, we 
didn’t think there would be political support behind such actions. Policy makers 
can always do stupid things, no country is immune, this happens, one really 
thought there would be more resistance, but perhaps you had this perfect storm 
coming together with the financial crisis, turned economic crisis, political crisis 
which come in parallel, there was not so much resistance. We had in our fantasy 
to imagine what would be needed to resist that. The belief was that these were 
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people’s property rights, there would be firm resistance to it, I guess do you think 
it was a conjuncture of all these factors coming together at once.”(Robert 
Holzman, former Director of Social Protection and Labor, World Bank, December 
2016). 
 
In summary, the interaction between the neoliberal pension ideas and the institutions 
of Central and Europe has violated many of the assumptions that underpinned the case 
for multi-pillar reform. In turn, this has reshaped the neoliberal ideas of those who had 
previously promoted this as a desirable reform for all countries. The whole experience 
of mandatory second pillars and its impact on global pension policy is best captured by 
the Director of Social Protection and Labor at the World Bank: 
 
“At this point in time I would say the Bank is in search of a paradigm for the future. 
Because a lot of things happened in parallel… We are much more concerned with 
coverage, social pensions and poverty relief, because we supported funding and 
it is blamed for things it shouldn’t be blamed, maybe because we neglected other 
things.” 
 
One final implication of the failure of the multi-pillar pension model in Central and 
Eastern Europe is the damage it has done to the authority of the World Bank. Chapter 
Two outlined the different sources of power that international organisations have. It was 
argued that they have power through their expert authority - this has been argued by 
Nicholas Barr to have been curtailed in the pensions field by the reversals to its model:  
 
“That’s because it has been seen to lose the argument by people who care about 
the argument. It has been shown the system works badly in Latin America and 
Central and Eastern Europe, so the model has been discredited as a dominant all-
purpose, everyone should do it model. Which I think is important. Have they 
changed their views? No not officially, they’ve changed what they do. Essentially, 
they’ve bowed out of pensions.”(Nicholas Barr, London School of Economics and 
former World Bank Consultant, December 2016) 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has elucidated the ideational, institutional and material influences over the 
pension reforms and counter-reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. It has then used 
this analysis to show how it has informed elite opinion of transnational actors in pension 
reform. The whole experience in Central and Eastern Europe, a region where 
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international organisations were most active in shaping pension reforms, has altered the 
global position on mandatory pension pillars. There had never been a consensus within 
and between international organisations, as discussed throughout the thesis. However, 
whilst there are varying interpretations of the experiences of Central and Eastern 
Europe, a consensus is emerging between transnational and domestic actors that this 
type of reform is replete with a number of issues that may be insurmountable. It has led 
to earlier proponents of mandatory pension pillars to reassess their desirability. In the 
process, as the following chapters will show, this has opened up the possibility for 
cooperation rather than conflict in global pension policy. For opponents, it has been seen 
to lose the argument on multi-pillar reforms, which has led to the World Bank reorient 
the role of the Social Protection and Labor Department away from pensions towards 
social protection.  
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Chapter Seven 
 
 
 
The Evolution of the ILO and World Bank’s Position on Pension 
Systems 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses global pension policy through the discourses component of the 
ASID framework. It focuses on the pensions positions of the World Bank and 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) as the key actors in a global debate on pension 
reform. The analysis shows a convergence of ideas between the main organisations 
around pension policy. Global pension policy has evolved from a heated debate in the 
1990s, to a more cooperative and consensual position from the main organisations in 
the field. The focus of this chapter is on the substantive elements of the pension 
positions of both organisations. Some of this development emerged from internal 
political battles, through the promotion of key personnel, which will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter Eight. The purpose of this chapter, is to analyse the content of the 
positions and to summarise the main issues in global pension policy.  
 
The analysis in this chapter draws mainly from an analysis of over 100 policy documents  
. However, at times, it also draws on important commentary on the pension positions 
was generated during the elite interviews. The policy documents selected in this chapter 
have been highlighted as developing, and changing, the policies of each organisation. 
Each of these documents were referred to both in the interviews and the literature as 
influential and indicative of policy developments (Béland & Orenstein, 2013; Deacon, 
2013; Ervik; 2005; Queisser, 2000; Orenstein, 2003; 2005; 2008; 2013). 
 
The main finding is that both the World Bank and ILO have moved away from their 
entrenched positions in the 1990s to a more cooperative stance. The shifting of the 
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pension debate away from public versus private and funding versus Pay-As-You-Go, has 
opened up space for dialogue and cooperation between the two main actors in global 
pension policy. During the heated debate, the main framing of positions was one of 
sustainability by the World Bank and adequacy by the ILO. Both organisations have 
moved towards a focus on extending the coverage of pension provision as the most 
important issue in pension advocacy.  
 
The analysis begins by tracing the origins of global pension policy by outlining the 
position of the ILO after its formation in 1919. A number of conventions were drawn up 
in the interwar period, however, it was not until the end of the Second World War that 
a global campaign for social security was established. The model promoted by the ILO 
was a unified public scheme that guaranteed a minimum income in retirement. The 
consensus on social security and the advocacy led by the ILO remain unchallenged at a 
global level of international organisations for several decades (Orenstein, 2003). This was 
despite the neoliberal critique of the welfare state in the 1970s that was outlined in 
Chapter Five. A new pensions model and a break in the global consensus finally emerged 
in 1994 with the publication of Averting the Old Age Crisis. This chapter outlines in detail 
the multi-pillar pension model promoted by the World Bank and it’s  immediate criticism 
from the ILO. In addition, the chapter will detail the new position of the ILO on pension 
provision that begins with its more detailed response to Averting, publishing in 2000: 
Social Security Pensions: Development and Reform. Here it will be shown that the ILO 
conceded substantial ground in its intellectual battle with the World Bank’s pension 
model. This led to a slow convergence on both organisations focusing on the coverage 
of pensions as the main focus rather than debates and competition around pension 
structures. The analysis ends with the ILO’s social protection floor as the dominant model 
in the pension reform arena, where the pensions policies of both organisations have 
been subsumed into their wider social protection agendas.  
 
The Social Insurance Era of the ILO 
 
There are two distinct periods for the ILO in its position on old age income security. In 
the interwar years the ILO adopted a social insurance position on pensions and other 
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forms of income security. After the Second World War, following the publication of the 
Beveridge Report in the UK, the position of the ILO evolved to a more comprehensive 
position in what was commonly coined the ‘social security era’ (Otting, 1993). The first 
ILO Conventions that dealt explicitly with old age social insurance were ILO Conventions 
35 and 36, concerned with old age insurance in industry and agriculture respectively (ILO, 
1933a; 1933b). These conventions called for social insurance of those in employment. 
For example, Convention 35 argued for a compulsory social insurance scheme for manual 
and non-manual workers:  
 
“The compulsory old-age insurance scheme shall apply to manual and non-
manual workers, including apprentices, employed in industrial or commercial 
undertakings or in the liberal professions, and to outworkers and domestic 
servants.” (ILO, 1933a Article 2). 
 
 
Article Seven, of both Conventions, specifies the amount the pensions should be. It calls 
for either a fixed sum or a percentage of the remuneration considered for insurance 
purposes. It also advocates a fixed portion not dependent on the time spent in insurance. 
In addition, where contribution rates are graduated according to the wage, the 
Convention argues that the level of remuneration should be considered for the purposes 
of calculating the pension – effectively a wage-related pension commonly associated 
with social insurance schemes.  
 
“1. The pension shall, whether or not dependent on the time spent in insurance, 
be a fixed sum or a percentage of the remuneration taken into account for 
insurance purposes or vary with the amount of the contributions paid. 
2. Where the pension varies with the time spent in insurance and its award is 
made conditional upon the completion by the insured person of a qualifying 
period, the pension shall, unless a minimum rate is guaranteed, include a fixed 
sum or fixed portion not dependent on the time spent in insurance; where the 
pension is awarded without any condition as to the completion of a qualifying 
period, provision may be made for a guaranteed minimum rate of pension. 
3. Where contributions are graduated according to remuneration, the 
remuneration taken into account for this purpose shall also be taken into account 
for the purpose of computing the pension, whether or not the pension varies with 
the time spent in insurance.” (ILO, 1933a Article 7). 
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The idea of compulsory social insurance was initially resisted by some constituents in the 
ILO (Otting, 1993). In the interwar period, with the exception of Germany and Austria, 
there were very few complete social insurance schemes in the world, which could act as 
blueprints or benchmarks. As a consequence, there were sceptical quarters within the 
organisation. For example, employers’ representatives refused to a support a full 
prescription from the ILO on social insurance when cnventions on compensation for 
injury were discussed in 1925 (Otting, 1993). However, over time, the idea of compulsory 
social insurance covering the main risks, including old age, gained leverage within the 
organisation. By the time of the First Conference of American States (1936), which 
worked closely with the ILO, social insurance was argued to have a significant advantage 
over social assistance schemes as:  
 
(a) it associates the workers concerned, from whom a contribution is required, 
both materially and morally in the protection of their health and their working 
capacity; 
(b) it implies the establishment of autonomous insurance institutions dedicated 
solely to the organization of prevention and of the service of medical and cash 
benefits; 
(c) it grants benefits in virtue of definite rights, and thus preserves the self-
respect of the beneficiary, who is secured against arbitrary decisions on the part 
of the body responsible for awarding benefits; 
(d) it guarantees the payment of benefits by the assignment of specific resources, 
and by distributing the cost over long periods in accordance with the rules of 
actuarial services. 
 
The growing acceptance of the principle of social insurance and the increasing activism 
of the ILO in promoting it on the global stage, would be given a further impetus in the 
next decade as the allied powers began to plan for the social settlement that would 
enhance global peace and stability.  
 
The Declaration of Philadelphia 
 
As Chapter Five noted, global pension policy was born in the immediate aftermath of the 
Second World War. It was at this time the ILO transformed from a standard-setting 
organisation to a technical assistance one. As Sinclair (2017) argues:  
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“The practices of technical assistance undertaken by the ILO were increasingly 
directed toward educating and assisting peripheral states in the adoption of 
technologies of government that aimed at both the reform of individual conduct 
and the regulation of society as a whole” (Sinclair, 2017, pp. 30-31) 
 
The publication of the Beveridge Report in the UK in 1942 recast the understanding of 
income security in old age, popularising the expression ‘social security’ (Parrott, 1992). 
The ILO had been actively involved in the discussion and articulation of the report. Its 
core message of “freedom from fear and want” chimed with the desire of the ILO to 
create a new social settlement that would prevent the conditions for international 
conflict. From a global perspective, the most important document in pension policy was 
the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944). This was incorporated into the ILO’s constitution 
and formed the cornerstone of its activities in the decades that followed. It recognises 
the: 
 
 “solemn obligation of the International Labour Organisation to further among 
the nations of the world programmes which will achieve”, among others, “the 
extension of social security measures to provide a basic income to all in need of 
such protection and comprehensive medical care” (ILO, 1944, Article III (f)) 
 
In order to achieve this aim, the Conference adopted two Recommendations, one on 
income security (Recommendation 67) and one on medical care (Recommendation 69). 
In the case of pensions, the recommendation calls for:  
 
“each of the main contingencies in which a person, ordinarily at work, finds 
themselves unable to work or to obtain it, or dies leaving a dependent family. 
These comprise: sickness, maternity, invalidity, old age, death of the 
breadwinner, and the disablement or death as a result of employment injuries” 
(ILR, 1944 p. 20).  
 
The Recommendation on income security consists of thirty general guiding principles 
alongside numerous suggestions for their application. It first advises that every country 
should build up a unified income security organisation under a single authority, working 
closely with medical and employment services (ILO, Income Security Recommendation, 
1944 (No. 67), 1944). This is similar to the configuration of the Department for Health 
and Social Security (DHSS) in the UK, which existed between 1968 and 1988. It is argued 
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that social assistance should be temporary or transitory, as eventually all citizens should 
be covered under the social security system (ILO, 1944). It also calls for all self-employed 
to be covered under the social system as soon as ways can be found to organise their 
contributions.  
 
The Recommendation has a number of Bismarckian features. It states that the 
distribution of costs of the benefit including the administration should be distributed 
among insured persons, employers and taxpayers. It also states that “[b]enefits should 
be related to the previous earnings of the insured person on the basis of which they have 
contributed”. The Recommendation advised that in the case of unemployment and 
sickness insurance the benefit level for unskilled workers should not be less than 40 per 
cent of the previous net earnings and 60% of net earnings if the worker had dependents.  
However, it was advised to be capped at certain level, essentially a ceiling above the 
average wage of skilled workers. The Recommendation also had Beveridgean elements; 
it suggested that: 
 
 “flat rates may be appropriate for countries where adequate and economic 
facilities exist for the population to procure additional protection by voluntary 
insurance” (ILO, Income Security Recommendation, 1944 (No. 67), 1944).  
 
Such benefits were advised to be commensurate with the earnings of unskilled workers 
so that changes in the cost of living could be reflected in the benefit payment. On the 
level of pensions, the Recommendation was also Beveridgean in nature, calling for 
benefits of “no less than 30 per cent of the average wage of unskilled workers or 45 per 
cent for those with dependents”, with additional benefits for young children. On state 
pensions it therefore advised a universal minimum, linked to average wages rather than 
a pension related to the individual contributors’ earnings.  
 
The Declaration of Philadelphia (1944) enshrined in the constitution of the ILO, a 
commitment to promote the extension of social security to all citizens. Furthermore, it 
recommended a unified administrative structure for the collection of contributions and 
the administering of benefits. The Declaration advocated that contributions should be 
made by the employer, the employee and through general taxation and it specified a 
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minimum level of benefits. Given the destruction of reserves during the war, this 
essentially made PAYG pension systems the de facto recommendation of the ILO.  
 
The Declaration influenced the activities of governments across the globe in the years 
that followed.  Advice was sought from the ILO in the designing of social security schemes 
in the immediate post-war years. For example, the Czechoslovakian social security 
system that was created in 1948 was done so under the guidance of ILO staff at the 
request of the Czechoslovakian government (Schoenbaum, 1945). The guidance advised 
that the state should main its role in pension insurance and that a:  
 
“larger part of the basic pension amounts should be borne by the state” 
(Schoenbaum, 1945, p. 165).  
 
The guidance also advised that the most important reform step for the Czechoslovakian 
government was a reform to the organisation of social security. It proposed an end to 
the large number of insurance providers arguing that the organisation of social insurance 
should be simplified by concentrating them in uniform territorial carriers of insurance (p. 
160).  
 
In Latin America, the Declaration of Philadelphia crystallised a growing movement within 
the region towards greater social security for workers that was noted above by the 
Labour Conference of the American States. In 1944, most countries in the Americas were 
enacting some form of social insurance legislation (Altmeyer, 1945). The Inter-American 
Conference on the Problems of War and Peace reaffirmed the commitment to the 
Declaration of Philadelphia it stated that: 
 
“American nations must develop their social policy, ratify international labour 
Conventions, and incorporate in their legislation and enforce the principles 
adopted at the various sessions of the International Labour Conference. They 
should draw up full plans for social security based on the principles approved by 
the International Labour Organisation” (Lopes, 1945) 
 
Recommendations 67 and 69 paved the way for Convention 102 on Social Security 
(Minimum Standards), that followed shortly after in 1952. The Convention marked a 
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step-change in global social security policy, since it introduced the idea of a minimum 
level of social security that could be attained anywhere in the world (Cichon & 
Hagemejer, 2007). It incorporated all the branches of social security, including old age 
security, that had previously been dealt with in separate conventions and 
recommendations. The Convention moved on from defining the classes of people that 
ought to be protected and instead argued that a specific percentage of the population 
be covered: 
 
The persons protected shall comprise-- 
 
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all 
employees; or 
(b) prescribed classes of the economically active population, constituting not less 
than 20 per cent. of all residents; or 
(c) all residents whose means during the contingency do not exceed limits 
prescribed in such a manner as to comply with the requirements of Article 67; or 
(d) where a declaration made in virtue of Article 3 is in force, prescribed classes 
of employees, constituting not less than 50 per cent. of all employees in industrial 
workplaces employing 20 persons or more. 
 
The above gave the ratifying states the flexibility to extend social security as it sees fit 
and to exempt certain occupations for expediency for its given circumstances. The 
Convention also had flexibility for ratifying countries in allowing them to adopt parts of 
the branches of social security without adopting all of them. It also refrained from 
prescribing how social security should be administered, viewing it as an outcome rather 
than a mechanism. Yet, whilst progressive in nature, the lack of specification made it 
blunt tool in compelling countries to offer meaningful social security.  
 
However, this interpretation of the Convention would be important in later years as will 
be shown in Chapter Eight, and in the discussion on Recommendation 202 on National 
Social Protection Floors below, as it allowed proponents of social protection floors to 
argue that they were in the tradition of the ILO; as Convention 102 was one of its 
treasured legal instruments (Deacon, 2013). The flexibility of 102 allowed a role for social 
protection beyond the developed economies and would therefore enhance the reach 
and significance of the ILO in the developing world.  
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The ILO remained the preeminent international organisation in social security policy for 
decades afterwards (Orenstein, 2003). Where pension system development involved the 
assistance of international organisations, the ILO was the main provider of expertise and 
technical assistance. In summary, global pension policy for five decades after the war, 
consisted of the promotion and support for state-financed, and state-provided support 
for old age income security. The role of the market and of individual responsibility was 
not yet part of the discourse of international organisations.  
 
Averting the Old Age Crisis: The World Bank Enters the Global Policy Debate 
 
It is difficult to overstate the influence of the World Bank in the pensions debate, once it 
entered the field in 1994 with its seminal publication Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies 
to Promote Growth and Development. The document is 400 pages in length and 
extensively covers a large number of issues in highly accessible language. Chapter Five 
outlined how the global structural environment facilitated its immediate impact. The role 
the World Bank played in facilitating the partial-privatisation of pension systems of 
Central and Eastern Europe and of pushing the sustainability of public pension systems 
onto the global agenda has been told many times in the literature (Deacon, et al., 1997; 
Ervik, 2005; Müller, 2003; Orenstein, 2008). However, interviews with World Bank staff 
revealed some disagreements with the popular interpretation of Averting (as a 
document promoting privatisations) and with the World Bank’s role in promoting multi-
pillar pension reform across the globe: 
 
“I would step back and take issue with the common perception that seems to 
sometimes be put forth by people that we as an institution are linked to a lot 
advising by countries to adopt these reforms. Even from the very beginning, I was 
one of the co-authors of Averting, if you read it carefully, even if you read the 
overview it was very clear that this not the type of reform that we would be 
advocating in a lot of countries that would not have the conditions to do it and 
it’s always been that way. So, with that in mind, I would say, no, the reversals 
have not had a significant impact on or changed the advice because we wouldn’t 
advice many places to do this in the first place.” (Interview with Robert Palacios, 
Global Lead Economist, World Bank, January 2017). 
 
The implications of this statement are that the World Bank feels it does not need to 
change its position on pension provision, in light of the reform reversals, because it was 
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the message that was misinterpreted, rather than the advice being misguided. 
Interviews with World Bank staff illuminated a number of interpretations beyond the 
dominant ones it is often associated with. For some, Averting has a much broader 
message than simply privatising social security.  Those who take issue with this 
interpretation argue that it is primarily about risk diversification: 
 
“The bank position is sometimes misunderstood, it was perceived by many to 
want to replace public systems. The emphasis was diversification. The perception 
of the bank being a force behind funding is stronger than the reality, even though 
the Bank supported funding. The perception now is the bank is more flexible with 
more diversity. The bank still supports it, but what was missing in the discussions 
is we were always very careful in establishing minimum conditions for a funded 
pillar. And many countries who didn’t have those conditions enacted the reforms 
and failed in a way predictably, if you look at the explicit debt no wonder in those 
countries the bank is not supportive of them now because it never was.” 
(interview with Michal Rutkowski, Director of Social Protection and Labour, 
World Bank, December 2016). 
 
In light of the number of reversals it is therefore useful and necessary to revisit the 
original text of Averting in order to analyse its contents and elicit its core messages. As it 
will be shown in detail below, Averting advocated that pension provision should be 
diversified to manage the risks inherent in public or private provision. Its central 
argument therefore was that monolithic public pension systems carries political risks, 
whereas private ones carry market risks and these need to be managed by a multi-pillar 
pension system. As was argued by one of its authors: 
 
“Well, there are three major messages from Averting and unfortunately two of 
them because they were controversial to begin with and people in the pensions 
world didn’t like them. Those two things: the role of the private sector in 
provision and the role of funding vs PAYG and because of those for many years it 
was really about that. But as you point out the third important message was 
separating redistribution and poverty relief from insurance and doing that in a 
clean and that message is extremely relevant today and we’re gravitating back to 
that rather than continuing a very stale debate on funding versus paygo, really 
focusing on achieving these objectives of the pension system – consumption 
smoothing and poverty relief. Achieving these with different instruments and 
very clear objectives of what does what. Unfortunately, that message got 
drowned out with the controversy of the private sector and its role.” (Interview 
with Robert Palacios, World Bank global lead economist, January 2017). 
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However, a close analysis of the framing of Averting reveals that it was written in such a 
way to orient significant action from policy makers. As Barnett and Finnemore (2004) 
have argued, the ability of international organisations to classify the world enables them 
to influence the cognitive frames of decision makers. Averting framed a crisis in pension 
provision that required urgent action. Its message is expressed with a semblance of 
balanced language, highlighting the positives of public provision and PAYG funding. This 
gives credibility to the statements from its authors and proponents noted above. 
Nevertheless, the balance is completely in favour of private provision and funding. A far 
greater proportion of the text is devoted to extolling the virtues of private provision and 
funding, alongside highlighting the drawbacks of public PAYG systems. This discussion is 
set against a backdrop of dramatic population ageing that is argued to require urgent 
action from policy makers.  
 
It is possible to distil the message of Averting into three different messages from those 
proposed by its authors. These are: the demographic crisis requires urgent action, public 
pension provision is laden with weaknesses, private provision is superior to public 
provision and offers significant economic benefits. With these messages in mind the 
World Bank promotes a multi-pillar model with the following features.  
Figure 7.1 The World Bank’s Three Pillar Model 
 
 
The Pillars of Old Age Income Security (World Bank, 1994 p. 15) 
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Averting calls for the following objectives for each pillar:  
 
 The public pillar would have the limited object of alleviating old age poverty 
and co-insuring against a multitude of risks. Backed by the government's 
power of taxation, this pillar has the unique ability to pay benefits to people 
growing old shortly after the plan is introduced, to redistribute income 
toward the poor, and to co-insure against long spells of low investment 
returns, recession, inflation, and private market failures. The public pillar 
could take three alternative forms. It could be part of a means-tested 
program for the poor of all ages. Alternatively, it could offer a minimum 
pension guarantee to a mandatory saving pillar. As still an- other alternative, 
it could provide a universal or employment-related flat benefit. But it should 
be modest in size, to allow ample room for other pillars, and pay-as- you-go, 
to avoid the problems frequently associated with public management of 
national provident funds.  
 
 A second mandatory pillar, one that is fully funded and privately managed, 
would link benefits actuarially to costs and carry out the income-smoothing 
or saving function for all income groups within the population. This link 
should avoid some of the economic and political distortions to which the 
public pillar is prone. Full funding should boost capital accumulation and 
financial market development. The economic growth this induces should 
make it easier to finance the public pillar. But a successful second pillar should 
reduce the demands on the first pillar. The second mandatory pillar could 
take two alternative forms: personal saving accounts or occupational plans. 
In either case, mandatory programs require careful regulation. 
 
 Voluntary, occupational or personal saving plans would be the third pillar; 
providing additional protection for people who want more income and 
insurance in their old age. 
 
 Although the redistribution and saving functions would be separated, the 
insurance function would be provided jointly by all three pillars. since broad 
diversification is the best way' to insure against a very uncertain world (World 
Bank, p. 16). 
 
The pension model promoted by the World Bank is set out on page 15. The following 400 
pages afterwards amount to a systematic argument to orient this action. A spotlight is 
shone on all of the proposed benefits and the weaknesses of alternatives. The risks with 
pursuing this strategy are significantly downplayed. There is a continued pattern 
throughout Averting: it superficially appears to have a balanced message of 
diversification given it offers strengths and weaknesses of public and private provision. 
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However, its critiques of public systems are much more detailed and forceful, whereas 
any drawbacks with private provision are often under-elaborated.  
 
Framing the Reform Environment: Population Ageing 
 
Concerns about population ageing and its impact upon public expenditure and economic 
growth predate the publication of Averting (Hagemann & Nicoletti, 1989; Thane, 1987; 
Walker, 1990). Averting advanced this debate by offering reform templates alongside 
the demographic transition narrative. It also moved the debate away from the previous 
focus on industrialised countries, and the neoliberal narratives about the welfare state 
being unsustainable, to orient action from developing countries with young populations 
and embryonic welfare states. The opening lines in foreword at the beginning of Averting 
captures the alarmism of the demographic transition facing the world and the call for 
reform from all countries no matter what their level of development or how advanced 
their welfare states are:  
 
“Systems providing financial security for the old are under increasing strain 
throughout the world. Rapid demographic transitions caused by rising life 
expectancy and declining fertility mean that the proportion of old people in the 
general population is growing rapidly. Extended families and other traditional 
ways of supporting the old are weakening. Meanwhile, formal systems, such as 
government-backed pensions, have proved both unsustainable and very difficult 
to reform. In some developing countries, these systems are nearing collapse. In 
others, governments preparing to establish formal systems risk repeating 
expensive mistakes. The result is a looming old age crisis that threatens not only 
the old but also their children and grandchildren, who must shoulder, directly or 
indirectly, much of the increasingly heavy burden of providing for the aged. For 
these reasons, many economists and policymakers are seeking information and 
advice about old age security arrangements. But there are still too few who are 
aware of the impact these arrangements have on such diverse concerns as 
poverty, employment, inflation, and growth. Averting the Old Age Crisis is the 
first comprehensive, global examination of this complex and pressing set of 
issues. The culmination of a two-year research project. it synthesizes what is 
known, analyses the policy alternatives, and provides a framework for identifying 
the policy mix most appropriate to a given country's needs.” (World Bank, 1994 
p. xiii). 
 
Averting moved the debate on from a focus on OECD countries by arguing that most of 
the growth in the world’s old age population would be in developing countries (World 
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Bank, 1994, p. 28). On page one it issues a stern warning to developing countries not to 
follow the lead of developed countries:  
 
‘At the same time, many developing countries are on the verge of adopting the same 
programs that have spun out of control in middle-income and high-income countries’ 
(World Bank, 1994 p. 1). 
 
In addition, the warning of population ageing was accompanied by an analysis of the 
breakdown of informal Old Age Support in developing countries as a result of increased 
urbanisation and mobilisation across the developing world. Moreover, it argued that 
famine, wars and AIDS were rapidly dismantling informal old age support in Africa. (Ibid, 
p. 33).  
 
Averting’s Critique of Public Pension Plans 
 
The section on public plans begins with highlighting their unique ability to redistribute 
income to the lifetime poor. This meets one of the main objectives of pension provision 
for the World Bank. This is argued to be their big advantage over other systems. 
However, it quickly points out the contradictions and failures of the public pillar: 
 
 Redistribute to the poor. But many rich people get back in pensions more than 
they contributed, while many poor people do not collect any benefits. 
 Augment the income of the old who can no longer work productively. But 
many recipients are middle-age and still capable of working.  
 Protect the old from risk by defining the benefits in advance. But these 
benefits are redefined frequently, so considerable risk remains. 
 Protect the old against inflation. But many governments have failed to index 
fully, using inflation to reduce their real costs. 
 Be a remedy for myopia among workers. But the program’s implementation 
often demonstrates the myopia of politicians, in some cases causing the old 
age system to collapse (World Bank, 1994 pp. 101-102) 
 
Averting argues that some of these problems can be fixed, such as early retirement and 
overly generous benefits. However, it maintains most of these problems stem from the 
separation of benefits and contributions, labour and capital market distortions and the 
wasteful use of pension reserves, alongside political pressures for poor design. 
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Importantly, this implies that many of the problems with PAYG pension systems cannot 
be repaired with parametric reforms. Rather, the implication is that systemic reform is 
the solution to the flaws in public provision.  
 
As the chapter traces the development of public pension provision, it uses Samuelson’s 
(1967) proposition that ‘a growing nation is the greatest ponzi game ever contrived’: 
 
“The beauty of social insurance is that it is actuarially unsound. Everyone who 
reaches retirement age is given benefit privileges that far exceed anything he has 
paid in.... How is this possible? It stems from the fact that the national product is 
growing at compound interest and can be expected to do so for as far ahead as 
the eye cannot see. Always there are more youths than old folks in a growing 
population. More important, with real incomes growing at some three percent a 
year, the taxable base upon which benefits rest in any period are much greater 
than the taxes paid historically by the generation now retired.... A growing nation 
is the greatest Ponzi game ever contrived.” (Samuelson, 1967 p. 88) 
 
 
The central proposition put forward is that the benign conditions which allowed this 
‘ponzi scheme (that actually worked)’ to flourish, no longer exist. It argues that is not 
clear whether any thought was given to the long-term sustainability of pension schemes 
in Europe once large earnings-related tiers were added to the existing means-tested tier 
(p. 110). Where the demographic transition is not as pressing – in developing countries 
– it is maintained that their pension systems began at a much earlier stage of 
development than industrial countries did historically. The case is made that the 
‘intragenerational transfers’ are unfair, as they transfer revenues from the poor to the 
rich. It also argues that the ‘intergenerational transfers’ are unfair, as earlier cohorts 
receive generous benefits funded by younger cohorts who will not receive the same 
generous benefits. A debate that is still propagated by those on the right in the UK 
(Willetts, 2010). 
 
The analysis is then enhanced through its impact on the labour market. High payroll taxes 
provide incentives for employers to avoid taxes. In a further targeting of the message to 
developing countries, the section in Averting argues that employers in developing 
countries are much more likely to escape to the informal sector to avoid taxes. It cites 
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the examples of Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay where more 
than half the population are in the informal sector (World Bank, 1994 p. 122).  
 
This analysis puts the World Bank at odds with those who hoped the embryonic welfare 
states in the developing world would help to form cross-class coalitions in order to 
sustain and expand the welfare state across the population (Deacon, 2007).  The analysis 
from the Bank was that this is misguided and developing countries should try to avoid 
what it sees as the mistakes of industrial countries in the past. It argues that Latin 
America and Eastern Europe can longer afford their pension systems – using 
inflammatory language that they are “on the verge of insolvency” (p. 138).  
 
The analysis draws on the worst-case scenarios to argue against public provision. For 
example, it deploys the examples of Hungary and Argentina to illustrate the difficulties 
public provision can run into. Hungary is held up by Averting as the country with the with 
one of the largest dependency rations in the world. Out of a population of 10.3 million, 
2.9 million are shown to be receiving a pension. However, as noted in Chapter Six of the 
thesis, Hungary’s pension system was used a de facto unemployment benefit during the 
economic upheaval of the transition and so is not illustrative of the average public 
system. Argentina is shown to have attempted to curtail pension spending by not 
uplifting benefits in line with inflation, which was subsequently overruled by the courts. 
The analysis fails to mention that Argentina at this point had recently suffered 
hyperinflation, which makes uplifting pension entitlements with inflation much more of 
an issue (Kamin & Ericsson, 1993).  
 
In summary, the section on public pension plans is the longest in Averting by a 
considerable length. Whilst engaging with some of the positives of public provision, 
there can be no doubt that it amounts to a systematic critique and attack of PAYG 
pension provision. Its selective use of worst-case examples and underlying assumptions 
leads the reader to draw the conclusion that only a modest public pillar is desirable, 
tasked with the limited role of poverty alleviation. Whilst Averting may have intended to 
have a more nuanced message of diversification, this is not apparent in the chapter on 
public plans, most of the detail only outlines the negative aspects.  
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The lack of a stronger message on the positives of public provision was highlighted by 
one of the authors of Averting below. Here it was noted that the role of social pensions 
in extending coverage of old age income security was underplayed in Averting. As will be 
discussed below, the focus of the Bank has moved on from a preoccupation with funding, 
(the primary focus of Averting), to one now more focused on poverty alleviation. 
 
“And I would even go as far as say that out of the 415 pages of Averting, with 
hindsight, I would like to have seen more on in retrospect is a detailed discussion 
of the options for non-contributory pensions. A pure first pillar in the old three-
pillar system and what’s sometimes referred to as the zero pillar in the five-pillar 
system. A good and better understanding of how to do that and integrate that 
with a system with a mandatory contributory element, and that’s something 
we’re working on now and we’re catching up with what’s going on.” (interview 
with Robert Palacios, World Bank, January 2017).” 
 
The Promotion of Personal Savings Pillars 
 
The section on personal savings plans contrasts greatly with the one on public plans. 
Where that section focused heavily on the negative impact of public plans, the savings 
section is primarily focused on the merits of personal savings plans. It draws extensively 
on the Chilean experience as that was the only country with a mandatory savings pillar 
at the time of publication. It compares Chile to the publicly managed provident funds in 
parts of Africa and East Asia to demonstrate how the latter create capital and labour 
market distortions alongside ‘capricious redistributions’ and political manipulation.  
 
Averting cautions that regulating privately managed funds requires considerable human 
capital and institutional capacity. But, in its characteristically breezy manner on the 
drawbacks of market provision, asserts these are likely to develop in response to the 
scheme. Assertions of this nature contradict claims by World Bank staff that it cautioned 
many countries not to pursue multi-pillar reforms too soon. The message from this is 
that personal savings plans are superior and that their implementation will stimulate the 
conditions they need to function and prosper.  
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The main benefit of savings plans is maintained to be their positive effect on capital 
accumulation. In a message tailored to developing economies, it is contended they can 
accelerate capital market development and enhance investment in productive capital. 
The analysis argues that personal savings plans do not impact on the functioning of the 
labour market, as individuals are argued to view these as savings, not a tax on income. 
Chapter Six demonstrated how this assumption has been reassessed by the proponents 
of mandatory second pension pillars. It is also argued that these schemes do not 
encourage political pressure for unsustainable benefits. 
 
There are a number of regulatory issues highlighted in the final section. It is expressed 
that extensive regulation is required to ensure fair charges and acceptable levels of risk 
with investments. It focuses on the challenges, since government protection of 
investments is a moral hazard that may encourage too risky behaviour. However, some 
risk is desirable as overly conservative funds will not make a decent return – something 
that was shown to undermine the pension systems of Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
The discussion on whether funds should allow overseas investment is short and does not 
offer guidance, rather it simply describes Chile’s system of only allowing 1% of overseas 
investment, which rose to 10% in 1995. This is problematic as it points to an inherent 
tension in the design of personal savings plans. Allowing overseas investments may 
generate superior returns. However, it directly impedes the development of domestic 
capital markets. This tension was highlighted in the interview with the Polish finance 
minister who argued: 
 
“Other options were not viable such as exporting to lower yield developed 
economies which made no sense or allowing the funds to invest in higher risk 
markets where the funds may have been nationalised.” (Interview with Jacek 
Rostowski, Warsaw, July 2017). 
 
There are also tensions with regard to fee levels that Averting did not adequately 
address. For instance, the concentration of funds enables companies to benefit from 
economies of scale, but also may mean they collude to charge more than they would in 
a voluntary competitive scheme. It also points to Chile’s flat fee per contribution, which 
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is acknowledged as regressive, but states it may be the real cost of managing the 
account. Fees in Chile later became highly controversial and were one of the focal points 
of those calling for a pension reform (Mander, 2016). 
 
The final section of Avertig, on the transition to a new system, states from the outset 
that the transition from one system to another is costly and likely to be met with strong 
resistance. However, to orient action, it reintroduces the notion of the implicit pension 
debt to encourage a sense of urgency and to justify taking up such large transition costs.  
“Although difficult to estimate, the total implicit debt is probably as much as 100 
to 250 percent of GDP for OECD and Eastern European countries” (World Bank, 
1994, p. 266). 
In addition, an optimistic scenario is presented on the efficiency gains that will result 
from systemic pension reform, which is argued to fund some of the pension transition 
costs.  
First and most important, efficiency gains should help to pay off the debt. Under 
some circumstances the shift of labour from the informal to the formal labour 
market could boost productivity and growth substantially (Corsetti and Schmidt-
Hebbel 1994). Raising the effective retirement age would increase the labour 
force and GDP by 10 to 30 percent in some cases (Cavalcanti 1993; Rashid 1993), 
resulting in an efficiency gain as long as the value of the increased output is 
greater than the value of leisure time lost. More output gains are achieved if the 
new system increases saving, international competitiveness, and inflow of 
foreign capital - although that is likely to be a very long-run effect. These 
efficiency gains together with the reduction in evasion generate increased tax 
revenues that can be used to pay off part of the debt. (World Bank, 1994 p. 279) 
 
This final section is, again, characteristic of Averting. It cannot be accused of ignoring the 
downsides to transitioning to a multi-pillar pension system as the costs are mentioned. 
However, it does fails to highlight what a multi-decade commitment this will be. 
Furthermore, whilst the costs are mentioned it also proposes its own metric – the implicit 
pension burden – to suggest that inaction also has the same costs. Moreover, the 
proposed benefits of reforming the system are suggested to offset many of the transition 
costs. Pension reformers in Central and Eastern Europe could be forgiven in believing 
that transition would be pain-free given the boost to the economy that Averting 
promised.  
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Summary of Averting 
 
This section has analysed Averting in considerable detail. An interpretive analysis of the 
document has enabled the less explicit messages of it to be elucidated by paying 
attention to the framing of the document. Averting is a powerfully written argument to 
orient action from pension reformers across the globe. The framing of the argument is 
around the sustainability of public pension systems given population ageing. This framing 
is explicit in the title – Old Age Crisis. The opening chapter of Averting is also concerned 
with population ageing, the next is on the collapse of informal care and then policy 
choices for reformers.  
 
The argument is substantially developed by the section on public pension plans which is 
largely critical of their impact on the macro economy through what Averting argues are 
the ‘distortionary taxes’ used to finance them. The focus on the downsides of public 
provision is mirrored by the emphasis on the positive potential of private mandatory 
savings schemes. Whilst Averting never calls for the complete privatisation of pension 
provision, the framing of the argument is clearly designed to encourage policy makers to 
plan for a drastically smaller public pillar than those of OECD countries, with the vast 
majority of pension income derived from mandatory savings pillars.  
 
The ILO Responds: A risky strategy: Reflections on the World Bank Report Averting 
the Old Age Crisis 
 
The immediate response from the ILO, regarding Averting, came in the low-key fashion 
of a journal article published in the International Social Security Review titled: A Risky 
Strategy: Reflections on the World Bank Report Averting the Old Age Crisis (Beattie & 
McGillivray, 1995). Despite coming in this format, it is often cited as the primary first 
response of the ILO (Brooks, 2005; Holzmann, 2000; Orenstein, 2008; Queisser, 2000). 
The response begins with recognition of the research effort of the Bank and argues that 
it is an important analysis of alternative policies for the provision of social security 
pensions. It asserts that anyone familiar with the activity of the Bank in the field of 
 206 
 
 
pensions should not be surprised by the content but notes that the fact this is now to be 
vigorously promoted is highly significant.  
 
The article takes a number of issues with Averting’s critique of existing public pension 
systems. Namely, that it maintains it encourages early retirement, payment of higher 
benefits to the rich than poor, have over-generous benefit formulas and high 
administrative costs. The authors counter that: 
 
“The report ignores the fact that many of the criticisms levelled at public schemes 
have been seen to apply just as forcibly, and in some cases more so, to private 
schemes. Furthermore, there are many examples of public pension systems, 
particularly in industrial countries, which have been effective in eliminating or 
greatly reducing poverty among the elderly, in providing workers with an 
adequate degree of income replacement in old age, in adjusting benefits in line 
with earnings or price and operating efficiently, indeed, with administrative costs 
far lower than those of any privately managed scheme” (Beattie & McGillivray, 
1995, p. 6). 
 
Next the article moves onto Averting’s critique of the impact of public pension schemes 
on the economy. It takes issue with its claim that public schemes have “major effects on 
labour and its productivity, on capital accumulation and its allocation, on the ability of 
governments to finance public goods and services – therefore on the growth of the 
economy” (World Bank, 1994 p. 120). Beattie & McGillivray (1995) counter that a recent 
review of social security and work incentives concluded that there are relatively few 
situations where a disincentive effect has been recorded (Atkinson & Mogensen, 1993). 
In addition, they highlight that report argues that social security can have positive 
benefits by encouraging people into the formal labour market in order to qualify for 
future benefits. Furthermore, they point to the US, where eligibility for early retirement 
is highly restricted in the public scheme and argue that it is private schemes that have 
enabled older workers to retire early (Beattie & McGillivray, 1995, p. 7).  
 
It was argued above that Averting used the best-case or worst-case scenario in places to 
strengthen its arguments. Beattie & McGillivray also highlight this in their critique when 
the United Kingdom is used as example to highlight that pension spending in the 
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developed world is higher than when industrialised countries were at a similar point in 
development. They go as far as to propose that: 
 
“One might cavil at the choice of the United Kingdom to represent industrial 
countries, as its public pensions are among the lowest in the OECD” (p. 8). 
 
Alongside highlighting the strategic use of pension spending examples, the critique is 
enhanced by asking the rhetorical question that “just because the United Kingdom 
allowed many of its older citizens to live in poverty, can other countries in more 
enlightened times not do better?” (p. 8). It states that there is no economic law that 
prevents societies from choosing to allocate more resources to social security. Finally, 
this section attacks the notion of the implicit public pension debt, arguing that countries 
would only find themselves in trouble if they tried to terminate their PAYG schemes.  
 
Moving onto Averting’s arguments about the political risks of the scheme, Beattie & 
McGillivray challenge the World Bank’s arguments that recent changes to public 
schemes in the US, UK, Japan and Sweden represent a changing of the rules of the game, 
rather they argue that it shows the system is functioning to make it more sustainable. 
They also argue it is cynical of the Bank to recommend that further reductions in state 
benefits are carried out to make the schemes easier to shut down.  
 
Next, the notion that public pension systems are unable to cope with the demographic 
transition is challenged by arguing that all pension systems are affected by demographics 
in the same way, a rise in the dependency ratio, which is the same in all systems. 
Furthermore, they argue that public systems are better able to manage the demographic 
transition by adjusting contributions over time, allowing reserves to be built up. On 
individual risks, the article argues that the investment risks of mandatory savings 
accounts far outweigh the political risks of public schemes. They also maintain that the 
uniform rates of return that are reported in Averting are not realistic, rather some will 
do very well out of private provision whilst others have very poor returns. The final 
riposte to the World Bank’s critique of PAYG takes issue with the idea of a war between 
generations, where the grandchildren always lose out. Beattie & McGillivray accept that 
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the first generation are always the winners in a PAYG as they receive a pension with very 
few contributions. However, they point out that the biggest losers in any PAYG scheme 
are the last generation to be covered as it would pay contributions with little or no 
pension at all. This is not factored into Averting’s representation of ‘fairness’.  
 
After responding to Averting’s critique of PAYG pension systems, the final part of the 
article offers a critique of the World Bank’s model. It is contended that the proposals 
represent a high degree of risk for all parties concerned. It maintains that mandatory 
private pillars have investment risk, inflation risk, regulatory risk, and a special risk for 
the low paid. It is pointed out that developing countries face a number of risks with 
defined-contribution schemes. Namely, that adequate domestic investment 
opportunities may not exist and that overseas investments may encourage capital flight. 
In addition, the real rate of return will be affected by an oversupply of capital. The impact 
of the increased supply of capital was pointed out by the Polish Finance Minister who 
argued that the Polish stock market was overvalued as a result of the mandatory second 
pillar (interview with Jacek Rostowski, Warsaw, July 2017).  
 
Interestingly, and presciently, Beattie and McGillivray point to the risk of governments 
absorbing the pension reserves by fiat or by default, the type of behaviour PAYG prevents 
governments from engaging in (1995 p. 15). Indeed, Peter Diamond has argued that 
under a PAYG scheme, governments only have one year’s worth of contributions to be 
frivolous with, in a funded system they have many years’ worth (interview with Nicholas 
Barr, December 2016).  
 
In addition, they Beattie and McGillivray note the high proportion of pension income 
that goes to administration costs and profits in the US and UK, arguing it is likely to be a 
much higher proportion in developing countries. Echoing the Richard Titmuss dictum, in 
his 1967 lecture on ‘Welfare and wellbeing’ to the British National Conference on Social 
Welfare that: “services for the poor become poor services” (cited in Alcock, et al., 2001), 
it is argued that if the public pension pillar is solely dedicated to poverty relief, whilst the 
main retirement income comes from private sources, the system will struggle to 
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maintain the support from those who finance it. This will put the lifetime poor at greater 
risk.  
 
They conclude that they do not wish to defend the status quo, rather it is, in their 
opinion, a shame that debate about necessary reforms has been mixed up with debates 
on privatisation and the role of government. They argue that despite the inception of 
lower growth rates that have characterised industrialised countries, the social fabric has 
remained intact as a result of social security measures, including pensions. It is 
maintained that none of the issues of the shortcomings of pension systems highlighted 
by Averting have anything to do with whether they are public or private, but rather are 
about governance. Finally, a radical restructuring will create uncertainty, and there is no 
guarantee from Averting that the new system will create adequate benefits.  
 
In summary, the critique from the ILO offered a robust defence of public pension 
systems; maintaining that where problems existed, they were better addressed through 
changes to the existing system rather than a radical reform. In addition, the reform 
proposals advocated by Averting were argued to increase the risk to individuals. 
 
Providing Better Protection and Promoting Growth: A Defence of Averting the Old 
Age Crisis 
 
The response by the ILO prompted the editors of the International Social Security Review 
to invite the lead author of Averting, Estelle James to write a reply. This was published 
in 1996. The reply acknowledges the controversy around its reform proposals and argues 
that, given this, a thorough public discussion is necessary. She begins with a defence of 
Averting asserting that at least some of the problems identified with PAYG systems were 
present in all the systems across the industrialised and developing world, leading to the 
conclusion that there are inherent political and economic consequences of PAYG 
funding. The defence of the multi-pillar framework begins with a focus on the second 
pillar as James rightly notes this as the most contentious aspect of the reform proposals 
(James, 1996). 
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She argues that funding makes costs clear, upfront, and discourages unaffordable 
promises to be made. She goes on to argue that it prevents inadvertently large 
intergenerational transfers and helps to increase long-term national savings. The 
proposition that funded pillars should be privately managed is defended on the grounds 
that the private sector will allocate capital more efficiently, making a better return. 
James maintains that Averting is not a blueprint for all countries arguing that variation 
can take place through the size of the different pillars.  
 
Four underlying reasons are offered by James as to why the ILO’s review comes up with 
different solutions for the same pension related problems: The review authors are not 
concerned with the impact of social security systems have on the broader economy, or, 
they believe the effects are negligible. The ILO authors defend the equity of the system 
with how it looks on paper, rather than the realities. They assume that parametric 
reforms will not be thwarted by citizens and finally she argues they do not acknowledge 
the benefits of risk diversification (James, 1996, p. 10). Each of these positions are 
expanded upon by reasserting the arguments made in Averting. It challenges the critique 
by Beattie and McGillivray by doubling down on the arguments set out in Averting. She 
argues that the ILO’s assertion that taxes do not alter economic behaviour in any 
meaningful way and that evasion can be eliminated by better enforcement, may hold 
true in some countries, but it is not the case in most countries (James, 1996 p. 12). The 
claim by the World Bank that PAYG schemes offers perverse redistribution is once again 
asserted, arguing that the facts on the ground are different from the theoretical ideal. 
The case for diversification is maintained by arguing that the system is insulated from 
political manipulation (p. 14). Here James fails to engage with the almost prophetic 
charge by Beattie and McGillivray that funded schemes offer incentives for political 
interference. The position of the Bank is neatly summed in the paragraph below.  
 
“In sum, if there were no distortionary effects stemming from high taxes, or 
evasion by workers and employers, or political pressure for attractive early 
retirement provisions, or fear of misallocated public resources, or need to 
increase long term national saving, or concern about the lack of redistribution 
from rich to poor, or lack of concern about intergenerational transfers, or need 
to diversify risks, old-style social security systems favoured by ISSA and the ILO 
would do just fine. But we believe these concerns are present, serious, and 
 211 
 
 
motivate a shift to the multi-pillar system described above and at greater length 
in the report.” (James, 1996 p. 140) 
 
This period would mark the high point in divisions between the positions of the two 
organisations. The focus on sustainability and risk diversification by the World Bank and 
adequacy by the ILO, fostered irreconcilable differences in the two positions. For the 
World Bank, the imperative for developing countries was not to repeat the pension 
policies of industrialised countries. In the view of the Bank, PAYG systems had political 
incentives to provide overly-generous pension benefits at the outset, given their low 
initial upfront cost and political rewards. Funding made the costs more transparent and 
therefore the system more sustainable. For the ILO, these problems of sustainability 
could be addressed within a public pension system; funding led to unnecessary risks 
placed on individuals. From its perspective, the best solution was parametric reforms to 
existing systems and for developing countries to build up reserves within their pension 
systems.  
 
Softening the Stance: Evolving Positions on Pension Provision  
 
Both organisations would soften their stance by the turn of the millennium. Some of this 
was a result of changing personnel and internal politics, which is discussed in Chapter 
Eight. The World Bank would begin to evaluate the reforms it had advocated and some 
of their underpinning assumptions. The ILO would tone down its opposition to 
privatisation; whilst shifting to focus on coverage rather than adequacy. The World Bank 
too would eventually shift to prioritise coverage over sustainability. This evolution of 
positions would later open up space for dialogue and cooperation.  
 
Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten Myths About Social Security Systems  
 
The appointment of Joseph Stiglitz as Chief Economist at the World Bank would prove 
controversial (Wade, 2002). He used his position to critique many areas of the 
institution’s activities; in particular, its role in the transition from socialism to market-
based capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe and the role of the Washington-based 
institutions in exacerbating financial crises (Stiglitz, 2002). In 1999, he entered the 
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pensions debate with a provocative presentation, alongside Peter Orzag, at the World 
Bank Conference, New Ideas About Old Age Security. The paper, Rethinking Pension 
Reform: Ten Myths About Social Security Systems, challenged many of the assumptions 
that underpinned Averting. The central claim is that Averting’s challenge of social 
security myths had produced a new set of dominant myths and that the pendulum had 
swung too far in a new direction. Orzag and Stiglitz highlight the nuances within Averting 
that allow for a more flexible interpretation than the one that was popularly 
characterised at the time. However, they note that the interpretation common among 
policy makers that it promoted a privately managed, defined contribution component, 
is the one that the Bank’s leading pension scholars such as Holzmann and James 
promoted (1999, p. 2).  
 
The analysis begins with some background points, some of which apply particularly to 
the countries that would later reverse their multi-pillar pension models. For example, a 
caution is noted on the initial conditions and political economy constraints of 
transforming the pension system from one model to another. The implication being, that 
Averting presents an idealised pension system without adequately focusing on 
transitioning from current systems to its model:  
 
“In evaluating the effect of pension reform, initial conditions are important. In 
particular, one must be careful not to confuse the issue of whether a shift to 
individual accounts would be socially beneficial with the separate issue of 
whether, in a tabula rasa sense, an individual account system would have been 
preferable to a public defined benefit system in the first place.” (p. 5). 
 
This point is developed further by arguing that Averting makes the opposite mistake to 
politicians. Namely, that politicians focus exclusively on the short-run. Averting is argued 
to focus too exclusively on the long run, with substantial costs to the intervening 
generations.  Next the paper turns to the myths it argues have been propagated by 
Averting, they are divided into three broad areas and offer a comprehensive critique to 
the Bank’s policy position on pensions: 
 
Macroeconomic myths 
• Myth #1: Individual accounts raise national saving 
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• Myth #2: Rates of return are higher under individual accounts 
• Myth #3: Declining rates of return on pay-as-you-go systems reflect 
fundamental 
problems 
• Myth #4: Investment of public trust funds in equities has no macroeconomic 
effects 
Microeconomic myths 
• Myth #5: Labor market incentives are better under individual accounts 
• Myth #6: Defined benefit plans necessarily provide more of an incentive to 
retire 
early 
• Myth #7: Competition ensures low administrative costs under individual 
accounts 
Political economy myths 
• Myth #8: Corrupt and inefficient governments provide a rationale for individual 
accounts 
• Myth #9: Bailout politics are worse under public defined benefit plans 
• Myth #10: Investment of public trust funds is always squandered and 
mismanaged 
 
The Macroeconomic Myths 
 
The paper takes issue with the assumption that prefunding pensions automatically 
increases national savings. It is claimed that if prefunding simply displaces other savings 
then the national accumulation of savings remains unchanged. The tabula rasa point is 
emphasised again that the discussion of whether social security lowered national 
savings, (i.e. whether funding is superior to PAYG) is not the same as the discussion of 
whether moving from PAYG to funding will raise saving. Switching is not the same as 
creating a pension system from scratch. Next, it challenges the assumption that rates of 
return will be higher with individual accounts. It argues that simple headline rates of 
return do not consider administration costs and transition costs (p. 13). On the cost of 
transition, it is pointed out that the higher returns from funding are offset by the cost of 
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borrowing to fund the transition. On the assertion that declining rates of return in PAYG 
systems reflect fundamental problems with the system, the paper simply notes that the 
first generation of retirees in a PAYG always receive a significant generous return relative 
to contributions, as they receive a pension having made no contributions. Switching to a 
funded system does not alter the inter-generational dynamics.  
 
Microeconomic Myths 
 
The idea that labour market incentives are better under individual funded accounts, as 
argued by the World Bank (1994) and James (1994), is challenged in the paper. It is firstly 
pointed out that the objective is enhancing welfare, not labour supply and that there 
exists a trade-off between redistribution and incentives. The paper notes that: 
“One of the most difficult questions in assessing any program is the appropriate 
counterfactual against which to judge it. For example, assume that workers who 
did not save for retirement -- or who invested their contributions poorly -- knew 
that they would be bailed out by the government. Funds for the bailouts would 
have to be raised through distortionary taxes, which would then affect labour 
supply” 
It therefore concludes that there is no dominance of one system of another in terms of 
labour supply (p. 26). Next, it challenges the assertion that defined benefit plans provide 
an incentive for early retirement by providing examples in the US and Sweden where 
incentives to retire early have been reformed in the public system. The next myth to be 
challenged is the ones surrounding transition costs. A distinction is made between rents 
and costs. The paper argues that competition can only reduce rents, not costs. These are 
reduced by the structure of the accounts with a centralised account benefitting from 
economies of scale. The paper cites examples from Chile and the UK where 
administration costs are high. 
 
Political Economy Myths 
 
The final set of ‘myths’ challenged in the paper are the political economy myths. Firstly, 
that inefficient governments provide a rationale for privately managed defined 
contribution plans. Orzag and Stiglitz point out some clear flaws in the logic of this 
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rationale. They highlight the need for significant government regulation of a privately 
managed funded system. They ask how an inefficient government can be expected to 
undertake such a complex operation. They use the ‘mis-selling’ controversy in the UK to 
illustrate the difficulties of regulating individual accounts, despite the UK being a 
reasonably safe place to invest. They conclude that:  
 
“The bottom line is that public malfeasance or incompetence can be just as 
dangerous under individual accounts as under public defined benefit systems.” 
(p. 34). 
 
One point to note at this point is how they underestimated the potential for 
governments to nationalise accumulated pension funds. The authors claim that: 
 
“For example, a rule-based system in which public funds are invested in 
government bonds or in broad market indexes is relatively easy to monitor and 
therefore seems to involve limited scope for abuse.” (p. 33) 
 
Here they refer to private abuse and do not comprehend that individual accounts, with 
investment by private actors into government bonds, may encourage malfeasance by 
the government in seizing the assets. A related myth they seek to counter is that bailout 
politics are worse under defined benefits plans than under defined contribution. They 
point to Chile which has large government guarantees with 100 per cent up to the 
minimum pension guarantee and 75 per cent above the minimum (p. 35). With the focus 
of Averting on developing economies, the authors argue that the volatility of those 
economies necessitates investing abroad. However, this fails to capture the social 
benefits of individual accounts. Finally, they challenge the proposition in Averting that 
public trust funds are always squandered and mismanaged. Like Beattie and McGillivray, 
Orzag and Stiglitz take issue with selective reporting in Averting, they argue that the data 
on returns to public funds did not compare with real interest rates, in doing so they show 
examples where public funds outperformed the return on market interest rates (p. 38). 
In addition, they argue that pubic funds are innovating to capture better returns, citing 
Canadas as an example. They conclude that:  
 
“One potential conclusion from this literature is that public pension funds with 
sound corporate governance protections -- independent boards and sources of 
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financing, along with a clear legal mandate to pursue competitive returns -- may 
avoid some of the pitfalls associated with pension fund investing.” (p. 39).  
 
Summary 
 
Orzag and Stiglitz, in a deliberately provocative manner, challenged many of the 
premises of Averting  in what they present as a set of myths. They contest the alleged 
supremacy of a privately managed fully funded second pillar. One of the important 
contributions of this paper was the distinction between tabula rasa pension systems, 
designed with no pension origins, and the reality of transitioning to a funded system 
from a PAYG one. This paper showed advanced thinking and  it foresaw many of the 
problems that would be encountered in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
 
Social Security Pensions: Development and Reform 
 
As the premises of Averting were beginning to be challenged internally at the World 
Bank, the ILO began to soften its own opposition to Averting. Social Security Pensions: 
Development and Reform was its long-awaited formal response to Averting (Gillion et al., 
2000). It was edited by Colin Gillion, the Social Security Department director of the ILO.  
Its softened stance was not fully supported within department. Gillion’s de facto 
successor Emmanual Reynaud noted that if he had come to the ILO sooner, he would 
have taken a different direction and offered continued robust opposition to Averting 
(interview with Emmanuel Reynaud, April 2018).  
 
It was written in the format of an encyclopaedic volume, placing itself alongside Averting 
as part of the sparse pensions literature that took a global focus. The volume was 
considerably extensive, it was written in a format that could serve as pensions primer for 
students and policy makers. The volume is divided into two main parts. The first part 
consists of fourteen chapters and is largely descriptive of different pension systems. It is 
this part that is intended to act as a reference book for policy analysts and a textbook for 
graduate students, or for final year undergraduates. It claims it:  
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“as far as possible avoids taking sides in what has become a controversial and 
sometimes heated policy debate” (p. 1). 
 
This section is largely uncontroversial. It offers a comprehensive guide to pension 
provision and all the different aspects of provision that policy makers would encounter. 
The intention of such a large volume must certainly have been motivated by the entry of 
the World Bank into the pensions field. Social Security Pensions: Development and 
Reform seems like a publication seeking to reassert the authority of the ILO in one of its 
traditional policy domains, with the volume acting as the ‘go-to’ source for pension 
knowledge. Given the largely descriptive nature of Part One of the ILO’s response, it is 
not useful in the policy debate between the Bank and the ILO. Part Two, on the other 
hand, sets out the normative basis for pension programmes “and because of this, may 
be more controversial” (p. 1). The following sections outline the main arguments set out 
in Part Two of the volume. 
 
The Normative Basis for Policy 
 
The section begins by stating that a number of considerations that affect the reform, 
existence, and development of pension systems, are normative ones, based on the 
values which society places on income security in old age (p. 395). These values include: 
who should receive a pension? how much? who should contribute?  how large should 
contributions be?  public or private? universal and compulsory? or voluntary and 
selective? In differentiating itself from the position of Averting, it states that:  
 
“Of course, all such issues also have their economic aspects, which interact 
strongly with the normative ones, but unless we are clear about the moral and 
social objectives, as well as the economic ones, we will not have a precise idea 
about the purpose of pension schemes and how they should be structured” (p. 
385). 
 
The section then moves on to outline the changing global conditions that may 
necessitate the need to re-examine the normative basis that underpins the development 
of old age pensions. Implicitly, it acknowledges many of the issues set out in Averting. It 
first recognises that, in the developed world, old age at one time almost inevitably 
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entailed living in poverty and that, since the 1950s old age pensions has diminished this 
in absolute and relative terms. However, the design of these systems did not foresee the 
increased female participation in the labour market, nor the impact that unemployment, 
particularly in Europe would have on the demand for early retirement. In addition, the 
late 1970s and early 1980s were characterised by high inflation which meant 
revaluations of pension benefits that had not been anticipated in their design. The 
pension designers also did not foresee the demographic transition. As a result of all of 
these, the chapter argues that the scale of pension programmes was not anticipated in 
their design, that expenditure of over 10% of GDP on pensions was never envisaged in 
the outset.  
 
On the other hand, in middle-income and developing countries, the impact of pension 
schemes on old age poverty was argued to have been much less: the levels of benefits 
and overall coverage much smaller, whilst the old were impacted by structural 
adjustment and transitions to a market economy. In light of this, the volume questions 
the importance of previous normative standards and asks if there are now two sets of 
normative criteria: one for countries which may be considering if pensions have 
developed a too generous system: one for where pension systems need to be expanded, 
not contracted (p. 398).  
 
Before outlining more specific guidance on pension models, the volume outlines the 
guiding principles for all pension systems: 
 
1. The extension of coverage to all members of the population. 
2. Protection against poverty in old age. 
3. Provision of an income, in replacement of earnings lost as a result of voluntary 
or involuntary retirement. 
4. Adjustment of this income to take into account of inflation and to some 
extent the general rise in living standards 
5. Creation of an environment for voluntary provisions for retirement income 
(Gillion et al., 2000 p. 399) 
 
The guiding principles above are not incompatible with the vision for pension systems 
outlined in Averting. Indeed, it becomes apparent as one reads through the volume that 
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the complete hostility to the idea of funding and private provision, which was expressed 
in the immediate reaction to Averting, has given way to a more measured and 
accommodating response from the ILO.  
 
However, there were still differences; the guiding principles above are supplemented 
with criteria which differentiate the approach of the ILO from the World Bank. The 
criteria consist of; coverage, compulsory affiliation, solidarity, equality of treatment, 
indexation, guaranteed and predictable benefits, and democratic management. It is the 
latter two criteria that the volume argues defined contribution schemes struggle to 
meet. By their very nature, defined contributions cannot offer guaranteed and 
predictable benefits as they are dependent on the performance of investments. For this 
reason, the pensions model proposed in the volume has a more limited role for defined 
contribution schemes. Democratic participation is also much more difficult in a defined 
contribution scheme. The volume suggests this can be enhanced by the option to switch 
funds depending on performance and more transparent information on fees, returns and 
governance. 
 
On the role of the state, which was part of the controversy in the heated debate with the 
World Bank, the volume concedes some significant ground. It argues that the state has 
a significant role to play in managing the framework of the system and its general 
efficiency, 
  
“but is does not necessarily imply that the state should be directly involved in the 
operation of the scheme itself. This may be left to other agencies such as quasi 
state bodies or even private institutions” (Gillion et al., 2000 p. 404).  
 
However, on the more controversial areas of the debate between the ILO and the World 
Bank, such as whether a scheme should be funded or unfunded, private or public, or 
defined contribution or defined benefit, the Gillion volume ceded even more ground to 
the World Bank. Whilst clearly stating the ILO’s main concerns with funded defined 
contribution schemes, such as the risk being borne by pensioners, there is also the 
acknowledgment that there are some economic advantages to a defined benefit scheme. 
Here it is acknowledged that they can stimulate capital market development, create 
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fewer distortions in the labour market and are not susceptible to over-promising from 
the government. As a result, the ILO’s own proposed pension model in this volume is not 
too dissimilar to the World Bank’s multi-pillar model. It accepts the need for 
diversification, using the language of tiers, rather than  pillars.  
 
 
Table 7.1 The ILO Pension model 
 
Tier  
number 
Target 
group 
 Characteristics  Nature of 
participation 
Financing 
Method 
0 The poor Social assistance 
scheme providing 
means-tested 
benefits 
means-tested 
Mandatory General 
revenues, PAYG 
1 Formal and 
to the 
extent 
possible, 
informal 
sector  
Public defined 
benefit scheme 
ensuring a 
replacement rate 
of between 40- 
50% of average 
lifetime income 
Mandatory Contributions, 
PAYG or partially 
funded 
2 Formal and 
informal 
sector 
Defined 
contribution 
scheme publicly 
or privately 
managed 
Mandatory or 
voluntary, 
including 
occupational 
plans 
Individual 
contributions, 
fully funded 
3 Formal and 
informal 
sector 
Saving, or non-
pension benefits 
(housing ) etc. 
Voluntary Individual 
Source: Gillion et al. (2000)  
 
Social Security: A New Consensus 
 
Chapter Eight outlines in detail, the internal politics of how the ILO shifted its focus away 
from competing with the World Bank, to defend Bismarckian pension systems and 
campaign for an extension of social security to all. This was partly a strategic change of 
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direction given the superiority of the World Bank in the pension reform arena. However, 
it was also a functional response to a growing global social problem. The ILO estimated 
that only 20% of the world’s population had adequate social protection (Reynaud, 2002). 
It therefore needed to develop a new policy to expand coverage to the informal sector. 
A campaign was initiated by the ILO as an attempt to place extending coverage onto the 
international agenda. The theme of its 2001 International Labour Conference was 
“Extending Social Security to all.” The main conclusion from the session was ‘highest 
priority should go to policies and initiatives to extend social security to those who have 
none’ (ILO, 2001: v). The campaign was launched formally by the ILO in 2003. It had the 
following objectives: 
 Universality of access to formal systems of social protection. In line with its rights-
based approach to social security, the ILO opted for aiming to make a minimum 
set of benefits available to all, priority being given to benefits with strong 
investment (i.e. human capital) character. These included child benefits, health 
care and income support.  
 -  Progressiveness, referring to the understanding that universal provision of a 
basic benefits package is to be regarded only as the first step in a continuing 
process of social security development in which, fiscal space permitting, benefit 
levels will be increased and more contingencies will be covered.  
 -  Pluralism, in acknowledgement of the body of experience and evidence 
showing that there is no single “right” model for provision of social protection, or 
single path towards achieving universal coverage.  
 -  Outcome focus, referring to the essentially pragmatic nature of all ILO 
interventions and activities. The aim should be to reach optimal social outcome 
rather than settle ideological and/or academic debates. (ILO, 2010). 
This signalled a move away from a contentious area of policy, to one where there was a 
broad consensus between the two organisations. It also allowed the ILO to move into a 
pensions policy area where the World Bank was not as preoccupied or in competition 
with the ILO. Both organisations agreed on the importance of the state’s role in providing 
an income in retirement for the poorest in society and for those not covered in other 
formal schemes. As van Ginneken (2003) notes: 
“Most analysts agree that a multi-tiered system characterized by diversification 
of financing and benefit mechanisms provides the greatest long-term income 
security. Usually there is no disagreement about a minimum guarantee for the 
poor (the first tier) and voluntary retirement saving (the third tier). It is generally 
also agreed that a closer contribution-benefit link, and proper incentives for 
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contributions and transparency are desirable in the intermediate, mandatory 
insurance scheme (the second tier). According to Augusztinovics (2002), the 
debate revolves around the institutional setting of the second tier: the method 
of financing (PAYG or funded) and the type of management (public or private)” 
(2003 p. 33). 
 
The insights from above demonstrate the nature of conflict, cooperation, and 
convergence between the ILO and the World Bank. There was never a dispute over so-
called ‘zero pension pillars’. Both organisations agree that the state should finance the 
income of the lifetime poor in retirement however, they argue about from where this 
should come from;  The World Bank claiming  this should come from a means-tested 
benefit, something which the ILO is ambivalent towards. There was also very little 
dispute on the first pillar, although each organisation had a preference over its size, with 
the World Bank preferring a modest first pillar and the ILO favouring a much more 
generous one, both organisations agreed it should be publicly provided and operated on 
a PAYG basis. Likewise, on the voluntary third pillar, both organisations approved the  
economic benefits and its role in a diversified pension system. The dispute was only ever 
the second pillar andonce the global debate moved away from the contentious second 
pillar, the space would open up for a more meaningful cooperation between the two 
organisations. 
The ILO therefore, was moving into a new campaign focused on developing countries, 
using its comparative advantage of social protection expertise that it still had over other 
organisations. In the beginning of the campaign, the main ILO activity was to 
demonstrate to all countries that social protection, including income security in old age, 
was affordable to all countries. It distinguished between horizontal and vertical benefit 
provision. Horizontal involving basic coverage for the whole population, whie vertical 
referred  a  deepening of the extent and generosity of coverage. By focusing on the 
horizontal dimension, the ILO was carving itself a policy area in social protection where 
it would not come into conflict with the World Bank and where it could have significant 
influence. It was during this time the seeds of the social protection floor were to be sewn.  
 
Old Age Income Support in the 21st Century 
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Chapter Eight outlines the details in which Old Age Income Support in the 21st Century 
(Holzmann & Hinz, 2005) came into being. It was billed as an update to Averting the Old 
Age Crisis to communicate to the rest of the organisation, and to the outside world, how 
the World Bank’s pensions stance had evolved since its seminal report. It did not undergo 
the same review as official publications from the Bank and therefore reflects the views 
of the authors, rather than the institution at large. However, given that the author was 
the current director of Social Protection and Labor at the Bank, it is widely regarded as 
an official statement of policy. For its critics, the volume never fundamentally changed 
its pensions stance and continued to support a private pension pillar. For example, Nick 
Barr argued: 
 
“The Holzmann and Hinz book was meant to do it, [change the position of the 
World Bank] but the thing was, it said individual accounts are a good thing, and 
all the individual reviewers said. ‘Ah, but what about transition costs?’, they 
would say ‘blah blah yes there’s transitional costs but IFAs are still the best way 
to go, yes there’s institutional factors, but IFAs are still the best way to go.’ That 
book never did it. In fact, I can remember a discussion I had (at a dinner in 
Warsaw) saying that this was a time when it would have been possible for 
pensions leadership in the Bank to say, ‘we’ve moved on, our position has 
evolved it is now more…’ essentially drawing a line under on the over-promotion 
of Chile’. The response I got was rather disappointing ‘I couldn’t get the troops to 
follow’ (interview with Nick Barr, World Bank, December 2016).  
 
However, this characterisation seems slightly unfair. Whilst not wholly moving on from 
the World Bank’s promotion of the second pillar, the volume shifted the focus towards 
the importance of the other pillars. As the above analysis of Averting shows, it mounted 
to a systematic attack on the public pension pillar. The Holzmann and Hinz volume on 
the other hand, recognises the importance of the state in income security in old age for 
the poor and begins to shift the stance of the World Bank away from viewing multi-pillar 
pension reform as a complete panacea. The analysis in this volume is much more 
nuanced than Averting and devotes sections outlining the limits to what can be achieved 
with mandatory second pillars. The introduction sets out the new contours: 
 
“The main changes to the Bank’s perspective concern the enhanced focus on 
basic income provision for all vulnerable elderly as well as the enhanced role for 
the market-based, consumption-smoothing instruments for individuals both 
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within and outside mandated pension schemes. The Bank increasingly recognises 
the importance of initial conditions and the extent to which conditions in a 
particular country necessitate a tailored or tactically sequenced implementation 
of the multi-pillar model”.  
 
In summing up this update to Averting, its most important contribution was to begin to 
shift the focus of the World Bank away from the second pillar towards income security 
for the poorest in society. It did not represent a radical redrawing of World Bank policy, 
rather a subtle shift in direction. It was also more focused on adequacy and coverage, 
instead of the preoccupation with sustainability in Averting. As it notes in the summary 
at the beginning the volume claims to offer:   
 
“A better understanding of reform needs and measures: assessing the need for 
reform beyond fiscal pressures and demographic challenges. Understanding the 
limits and other consequences of mandated pension systems. Reassessing the 
continued importance, but also the limitations of prefunding.”  
 
Whilst there were still sections devoted to the need for prefunding, there were also 
larger sections devoted to the need for the publicly funded poverty alleviation and 
extending coverage. This would foster increased cooperation with the ILO in its new 
focus on extending coverage.  
 
Keeping the Promise of Social Security in Latin America 
 
While the Social Protection and Labor Department was beginning to see the virtues of 
the other pension pillars in providing income security in old age, shifting its activities 
away from the promotion of the second pillar, other sections of the Bank began an attack 
on the virtues of a mandatory second pillar. Keeping the Promise of Social Security in 
Latin America (Gill, Packard, & Yermo, 2005) represented the first evaluation of the 
World Bank’s flagship pension model. The region was chosen as the focus as it had the 
longest experience with multi-pillar systems. At the time of its publication, the multi-
pillar systems of Central and Eastern Europe were still in their infancy. Latin America on 
the other hand, had over a decade’s experience in 12 countries, and in Chile, two 
decades. The report did not advocate the full-scale reversal of the policy but did highlight 
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some of the issues where the reforms had failed to fulfil their promise. In total, it argued 
there were five important lessons to be drawn from the Latin American experience: 
 
The first and most important lesson which is emphasised throughout the report is the 
disappointing growth in pension coverage in Latin America. It argued that more attention 
needed to be paid to poverty relief through the zero and first pillars. This lesson is not 
dissimilar from the Holzmann and Hinz volume. However, it went further and called for 
a separation of this pension provision from the savings pillar, which was a direct criticism 
of the Chilean pension system, signalling a change in tone from Averting. The second 
lesson was a defence of the second pension pillar. It argued that it was desirable that the 
link between benefits and contribution was tightened and that this pillar was best placed 
for income smoothing over the life course. The third lesson also supported some of the 
arguments of Averting by arguing that the first pillar could not be so large that it created 
incentives for informalisation in the labour market. The fourth lesson makes the same 
argument for the savings pillar arguing that it must also not be so large that it creates 
incentives for informalisation in the labour market. Finally, the report argues that more 
focus needed to be directed towards lowering the administration costs of the second 
pillars. The exorbitant fees were argued to be a huge problem for the sustainability and 
viability of the system. 
 
The Independent Evaluation Group 
 
Alongside Keeping the Promise of Latin American Social Security further critiques of the 
functioning of the second pension pillar came from inside the Bank a year later in 2006. 
Chapter Eight shows the internal politics that led to the evaluation taking place, it also 
shows how the Latin American volume was controversial and hotly disputed by 
proponents of the multi-pillar system. These criticisms of the second pension pillar were 
also being conducted at the same time as the George W Bush was attempting to 
implement a multi-pillar pension system in the US (Weaver, 2006). The proposed reforms 
failed to get through congress, adding to a growing chorus of critical voices about the 
desirability of mandatory private pension pillars. The Independent Evaluation Group was 
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an official report signed off and reviewed under the appropriate channels to be 
considered the voice of the World Bank: 
 
INT: Were your evaluations signed off as an official publication? 
 
EM: Yes, absolutely. Signed off and official. And in the comments, they had all 
the dissenting voices. But not everyone has to agree with it, but it goes through 
with the comments. (interview with Emily Andrews, World Bank, August 2017).  
 
The main contentions of the Independent Evaluation group were that greater attention 
needed to be paid to initial conditions before recommending a multi-pillar pension 
reform. It also argued that the Bank had been too preoccupied with fiscal sustainability 
at the expense of focusing on the core pensions objective of income security in old age. 
The focus on initial conditions aligned with the Holzmann and Hinz volume which also 
called for more attention to be paid to them before recommending reform. However, 
the evaluation argued that the Bank needed to take parametric reforms to the first pillar 
more seriously. The report highlights examples where the Bank did due diligence and 
only supported a first pillar reform in countries such as in India, Turkey and Brazil. On the 
other hand, it highlights Latin America and the Caribbean as regions where there was 
significant activity to implement multi-pillar reforms when the initial conditions were not 
right.  
 
“While the Bank did not advise the provision of funded pensions in many 
countries with unsuitable initial conditions, the Bank acted too quickly to support 
multi-pillar reforms in other countries without examining options for 
complementary safety net programs to protect informal sector workers from 
poverty in old age. The Bank also supported some reforms in which 
macroeconomic, financial sector, and institutional preconditions were not met. 
This put the reforms at risk from the start. While many, but not all, countries in 
Europe and Central Asia showed a readiness for reform, those in Latin America 
and the Caribbean were less likely to be appropriate candidates. The 
development outcome ratings of the Bank’s activities in IEG case study countries 
in which preconditions were not met were often rated unsatisfactory” (IEG, 2006 
p. 19). 
 
 
The report offers a number of preconditions that must be met before a multi-pillar 
reform should be enacted: these are appropriate safety nets in place, stable economic 
 227 
 
 
conditions (including low inflation and fiscal capacity), a sound financial sector. It argues 
that The World Bank had not paid enough attention to developing safety nets. It cites 
examples in Latin American and Central and Eastern Europe where there were 
weaknesses in the safety net programmes that were developed but the Bank was too 
focused on the second pillar. It cites several other countries that have low coverage but 
have received little assistance in extending coverage (2006 p. 20). 
 
The stable economic conditions that the report argues must be a prerequisite before 
multi-pillar reform takes place. The report notes a number of countries that enacted the 
reforms whilst experiencing high levels of inflation and  recognises that an adverse fiscal 
position may bring pension reform onto the political agenda. However, it argues that 
countries require the fiscal capacity to undertake reforms in order to absorb the 
transition costs. Figure 7.2 shows that the majority of countries undertaking a multi-pillar 
reform did so whilst running a budget deficit. This inevitably diminished the chances of 
long-term success for the reforms, once transition costs are added to an already weak 
fiscal position. The evaluation also highlighted the poor financial systems in many 
countries that had enacted multi-pillar reform citing Russia, Romania, Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine specifically, as countries without a sound financial system (2006 p. 23). In 
addition, the weak capacity of the government to implement reforms was argued to be 
prevalent across Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe.  
Figure 7.2 Budget Deficits as a Percentage of GDP 
 
 
Source: Independent Evaluation Group (2006) 
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Alongside cautioning against the Bank supporting multi-pillar reforms where initial 
conditions were not agreeable to reform, the evaluation also suggested that the World 
Bank should be careful not to oversell the benefits of reform. In the section, it points to 
the disappointing diversification of pension portfolios, demonstrating that the majority 
of assets are in government securities. The report presciently notes how these are 
vulnerable to political interference.  
 
“The outcome of the Bank assistance to multi- pillar reform falls short of 
achieving the objectives. To some extent, this reflects the short time since the 
inception of reform. But pension portfolios in many countries are concentrated 
in government securities. Only the Chilean, Colombian, and Peruvian pension 
portfolios are relatively well diversified. While parametric and multi-pillar 
pension reforms have improved the financial balance of PAYG systems, additional 
reforms are often needed. Multi-pillar systems remain open to political influence, 
especially in times of economic crisis. Multi-pillar pension reforms have not yet 
increased savings or substantially developed capital markets. High rates of 
interest on government bonds and regulatory limits on domestic equity 
investments may have stifled capital market expansion” (IEG, 2006 p. 41) 
 
In summarising global pension policy at this point in the mid-2000s, it is clear two 
developments were underway. The first, was a refocusing of efforts by the ILO to extend 
pensions coverage to those who had none. This meant it could vacate the debate on 
second pension pillars in middle income countries and focus on state provision in 
developing countries. The World Bank also began to shift its focus towards poverty of 
the old age poor in the developing world. In 2009, Robert Holzmann edited a volume 
entitled Closing the Coverage Gap which focused on the role of non-contributory 
pensions and their purpose in extending income security to the lifetime poor. Both 
organisations at this point began to move away from their conflicting priorities of 
sustainability for the World Bank versus adequacy for the ILO towards a more unifying 
focus on coverage. The second development was a much more critical approach to 
mandatory second pension pillars. Whereas, this criticism had been delivered in the mid 
1990s by the ILO, a decade later the same cautionary tales were now being voiced from 
inside the World Bank.  
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The Global Economic Crisis 
 
Both Chapters Five and Six outlined how the mandatory private pillars were scaled back 
or completely closed down in Latin American and Central and Eastern Europe at the 
onset of the global economic crisis. The immediate response to these dramatic reversals 
was muted from both organisations. Chapter Eight shows that in 2009 the Social 
Protection and Labor department was taken over by a director who was committed to a 
broader focus on social protection than a narrow focus on pensions. As a consequence, 
there was no formal position taken by the Bank on the pension reform reversals. In 
addition, Chapter Five argued the influence of the Bank in the region where the reversals 
were taking place had diminished significantly from the early transformation period. 
However, whilst Holzmann was still director an early response was published by the 
World Bank to the first reversals.  
 
First Response from the World Bank: The Financial Crisis and Mandatory Pension 
Systems in Developing Countries 
 
When Argentina renationalised its pension system in 2008, the World Bank immediately 
issued a technical note to other client countries with similar, multi-pillar pension systems 
(Dorfman, Hinz, & Robalino, 2008). It (correctly) assumed that more countries were likely 
to follow the example of Argentina and reform their pension system to alleviate short-
term fiscal pressures, and so therefore issued the note to caution against this course of 
action. It argued that economic crises of this magnitude were extremely rare and that its 
impact on financial returns was short-term. It warned against systemic reform that might 
be hurried and not adequately thought through. The technical note recommended 
support for retirees whose retirement income might have been adversely affected by 
the collapse in the value of equities, it claimed that this was a more rational course of 
action than a complete systemic reform of the entire pension system (Dorfman, Hinz, & 
Robalino, 2008). In the event, as has been determined throughout the thesis, more than 
half the countries that enacted multi-pillar reforms chose to ignore this advice. 
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ILO First Response: Pension Reform in Central and Eastern Europe in times of crisis, 
austerity and beyond 
 
It will be shown at the end of the chapter that it was not until late-2018 that the ILO 
finally published a stern response to the failure of the World Bank’s multi-pillar model. 
Its more immediate response was to describe the changes that had taken place, rather 
than to offer criticism of the entire episode. In interviews with ILO staff the mood within 
the organisation was not one of triumph that they ‘had been right all along’ or ‘won in 
the end’. Rather, the view was that many in the ILO did not support the reversals to the 
private systems, despite being opposed to their implementation. The opinion inside the 
ILO was that the reversals in Hungary and Poland, particularly, further eroded the trust 
in the pension systems in a region where trust was already low.  
 
“No, I did not support the reversals in Central and Eastern Europe, because they 
further eroded trust in the pension authorities and that is not a good thing” 
(interview with Elaine Fultz, former Director of the Russia, Central Europe and 
Central Asia Office of the ILO, January 2017) 
 
“I’m not sure I can speak on behalf of everyone, but I can speak about my view 
on these reversals. While I was always against these types of reforms, for a 
number of reasons, at the same time I didn’t like you know, especially the Polish 
case how it was done. I would probably support very strongly this reversal if it 
was done as a concern about benefits, about the level of pensions, the 
predictability of pensions etc. but this were not the concerns of the those who 
reversed the reforms. They did it purely for fiscal reasons not really caring what 
the consequences for the pension system, which requires some stability, long-
held trust and are undermining of trust and stability was very negative. It 
continues now with the new government, retirement age increases” (interview 
with Krzysztof Hagemejer, February 2018) 
 
The immediate response was published in 2011, a volume edited by its Director of the 
Country Office for Central and Eastern Europe, Kenichi Hirose. It was therefore too soon 
to document all of the changes that would take place in the region. The document noted 
that none of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe had increased pension 
contributions to assist in their sustainability. This was said to have been to reduce 
aggregate demand at a time of economic crisis. Nonetheless, the report highlighted the 
changes to the second pillar that had taken place at this time, at this point only Hungary 
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had renationalised its pension system. The only criticism present in the report was the 
way in which multi-pillar reforms had been carried out:  
 
“The lack of social consensus in the pension reform process of many countries 
raised serious concerns. A well-informed and participatory reform process is 
critical for making rational decisions based on broad consensus. Yet social 
dialogue was weak or sometimes absent in the pension reform processes of many 
countries, and many workers’ and employers’ organizations attempted to search 
for ways to influence pension policy with only limited success” (Hirose, 2011) 
 
It would be another seven years before the ILO offered a critical response to the series 
of reforms and counter-reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. In the meantime, the 
Department for Social Security – soon to renamed Department for Social Protection – 
would focus its efforts on promoting the Social Protection Floor. Old Age income security 
would now be focused on through the broader social protection floor agenda.  
 
The Campaign for National Social Protection Floors 
 
Chapters Five and Eight document the external and internal processes that led to the ILO 
championing national social protection floors. Deacon (2013, pp. 37-61) traces the 
development of the concept up to its adoption as the ILO Recommendation 202. His 
analysis shows that in many ways it represented a departure for the ILO from its 
traditional championing of wage-related social insurance benefits and left the issue of 
whether benefits should be universal or targeted, somewhat unresolved. However, in 
sidestepping this debate, it would also allow for more meaningful cooperation with the 
World Bank, rather than the outright hostility that characterised the 1990s. The concept 
was also not the sole creation of the ILO, as Chapters Five and Eight show, other UN 
agencies were also involved in the campaign for social protection floors. In seeking 
approval from the ILO’s tripartite governance structure, it would also undergo significant 
modification as a concept in order to satisfy the various preference of the ILO’s 
constituents. It was modified from a global social floor financed out of a global fund, to 
one financed by national governments, it would also evolve from a set of specified 
benefits to a set of specified guarantees or outcomes. Each would be nationally 
determined as governments of the global south were reluctant for the global north to 
impose standards on them for fear it was a form of indirect protectionism (Vosko, 2002).  
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The concept’s origins are disputed given the number of actors involved in the idea of a 
social floor (Deacon, 2013). It formed part of the World Commission on the Social 
Dimension of Globalisation, which called for a ‘global socioeconomic floor’ (ILO, 2004). 
However, as Chapter Eight details, a coalition of actors from various international 
organisations kept the idea alive in the mid-2000s before one its main proponents, 
Michael Cichon, became Director of Social Security and sought to make it institutional 
policy. At this point the idea consisted of a set of core benefits that every person should 
be entitled to consisting of access to basic healthcare, education and income security. It 
was referred to as a ‘global social security floor’ (ILO, 2006). It consisted of: 
 
 Access to basic healthcare through pluralistic national systems that 
consist of public tax-financed components, social and private insurance 
components  and community-based components linked to a strong public 
system. 
 A system of family benefits that permit children to go to school. 
 A system of self-targeting basic social assistance. 
 A system of universal old age pensions, disability and survivorship 
pensions that affect the whole family (ILO, 2006 p. 34). 
 
Over time, this evolved to become a set of guarantees of outcomes as the campaign 
shifted towards framing them in the language of social rights (see Cichon & Hagemejer, 
2007). The paper called for a new legal instrument such as an updated convention to 
102, that was outlined above. However, the convention idea was dropped, and a formal 
ILO Recommendation became the form of soft compulsion that the ILO Social Security 
Department began to campaign for. As Chapter Eight details, once Cichon became the 
director, he initially prioritised resources into developing sophisticated analytical tools 
used to convince countries that social protection was affordable for all countries (see 
Pal, Behrendt, Léger, Cichon, & Hagemejer, 2005). This analysis remains some of the 
most heavily cited work from the department at the time (interview with Krzysztof 
Hagemejer, April 2018).  As a consequence of this, the idea for a global fund to finance 
social protection for developing countries was dropped by Cichon and his team. This also 
won support from those who were conscious of the aid-dependency in the global south. 
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In the final analysis, a basic set of social protection rights was found to cost developing 
countries up to 3% of GDP (Pal, Behrendt, Léger, Cichon, & Hagemejer, 2005).  
 
In order to pass the ILC the concept of a social protection would undergo further 
modification. In order to avoid the concept being perceived as a form of protectionism 
by the Global North to undermine the Global South’s competitive low wages costs, the 
social protection floor became a concept that could be nationally determined. The 
concept therefore evolved from a global social floor, to national social protection floors. 
The floors would become known as a nationally defined set of four guarantees:  
 
 All residents have the necessary financial protection in order to be able to 
afford and have access to a nationally defined set of essential healthcare 
services, whereby the State accepts the general responsibility for ensuring 
the adequacy of the (usually) pluralistic financing and delivery systems; 
 All children have income security at least at the nationally defined poverty 
level, through family or child benefits aimed at facilitating access to 
nutrition, education and care; 
 All those in active age groups who are unable to earn sufficient income in 
the labour market should enjoy a minimum level of income security 
through social assistance or other social transfer schemes combined with 
employment guarantees and other labour market policies; 
 All residents in old age or with disabilities have income security at least at 
the nationally defined poverty level, through pensions for old age and 
disability. (ILO, 2010 p. 20). 
 
It was emphasised that these guarantees could be provided by governments through a 
choice of universal benefits or social insurance, contributory or non-contributory, social 
assistance or services in kind. This, in particular, marked a significant departure from the 
ILO’s traditional championing of Bismarckian principles. In practice it could mean that 
old age pensions consisted of targeted safety nets for the poor and market provision for 
everyone else. As a way to assuage those within the organisation who felt this diverged 
too far from the core principles of the ILO, a two-pronged strategy was proposed, as 
Figure 7.3 demonstrates: the horizontal element would focus on extending basic social 
security to all. However, to prevent the floor becoming a ceiling, the ILO would also 
campaign for deepening social security through the vertical dimension.  
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Figure 7.3 The Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of Social Protection Floors 
 
 
Source: ILO (2010 p. 20) 
 
The World Bank’s Social Protection and Labor Strategy 2012-2022 
 
The departure of the ILO from its traditional championing of wage-related social 
insurance schemes, enabled its agenda to align more closely with the World Bank. As 
Chapter Five explained, this was also being encouraged by the G20 as part of an 
international response to the global economic crisis. In 2012 the Social Protection and 
Labor department published its strategy for the next decade, it became  evident from 
this document that the two organisations were moving much closer together. The World 
Bank had completely ended its campaign for multi-pillar pension reform, its prioritisation 
of extending social protection to those without any chimed with the strategic priorities 
of the ILO.  
 
In preparation for the 2012 strategy document, a background paper on the World Bank’s 
pensions policy activity was published to inform the strategy (Dorfman & Palacios, 2012). 
The paper sets out the three strategic challenges that take precedence: coverage, 
adequacy and sustainability. These are the common criteria in which all organisations 
working on pensions seek to improve. However, it was clear from this paper that the 
emphasis of the World Bank was shifting towards pensions coverage and adequacy 
rather than sustainability. It was the first challenge set out in the introduction: 
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“The first [challenge] is addressing the coverage gap, defined as the share of 
workers that will not be able to count on any kind of pension income. In low 
income countries (LICs), roughly one in ten workers contribute to a pension 
program and this level has remained stagnant for decades despite substantial 
growth in per capita income” (Dorfman & Palacios, 2012, p. 4) 
 
In line with the ILO’s approach, the paper argues that the challenge lies with covering 
those in the informal sector. It cites social pensions as the best way to increase coverage, 
which is in line with the social protection floor’s philosophy. In addition, on sustainability, 
the paper argues that parametric reforms are a solution to making systems more 
sustainable. These were seen as inadequate when the Bank was promoting multi-pillar 
reform. Mandatory second pillars are only mentioned in the paper when referring to 
existing countries, they are not proposed as a reform priority for the Bank in the decade 
going forward: 
 
In the last few years, demand from younger and poorer countries as well as non-
traditional pension clients has been increasing while considerable ongoing 
demand for pension advisory assistance continues. For several years’ time, the 
largest number of participants attending the Bank’s pension course has been 
from Sub-Saharan Africa … Perhaps the most often cited issue, however, is 
coverage. In both low- and middle-income countries, Bank clients are seeking 
policy advice on the instruments that can expand coverage of elderly poverty 
protection in the short term and instruments that support savings for old age 
income protection for a much larger population in the medium term” (Dorfman 
& Palacios, 2012, p. 29). 
 
 
The coalescing of the two organisations around the issue of coverage was evident in the 
World Bank’s Social Protection and Labor strategy: Resilience, Equity and Opportunity 
(2012). The report’s sets out extending coverage as its main strategic aim:  
 
“The central challenge of fragmentation and the global gaps in coverage, 
responsiveness, and opportunity identified in the previous section establish a 
clear strategic direction for the World Bank’s SPL practice in the years ahead” (p. 
29). 
 
Moreover, the report signalled the beginning of the World Bank engaging substantively 
with the social protection floor initiative. The report was written prior to the 
establishment of the Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board (discussed in 
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Chapters Five and Eight). It demonstrates the idea had already permeated international 
organisations and was completely in line with the World Bank’s priorities for the 
forthcoming decade in 2012.  
 
“This emerging global consensus is manifested in numerous country actions and 
global initiatives, including the prominent One-UN Social Protection Floor 
Initiative (SPF-I), adopted by the United Nations Chief Executives Board in April 
2009. The SPL strategy and engagement is consistent with these core principles 
of the SPF-I, particularly through the strategy’s emphasis on building inclusive, 
productive, responsive SPL [Social Protection and Labour] programs and systems 
tailored to country circumstances. The World Bank has been a strategic partner 
in the One-UN Social Protection Floor initiative (SPF-I) and has an important role 
to play both in helping countries who sign on to the SPF-I to operationalize it and 
in knowledge sharing. The World Bank has been engaged in extensive strategic 
dialogue at the global level and partnerships at the country level. The World Bank 
also contributes to the initiative through knowledge generation and 
dissemination, developing data on the state of SPL across countries, and 
knowledge-sharing concerning good practice and results in SPL. (World Bank, 
2012 p. 14) 
 
The aligning of the two agendas was put on a firmer footing in 2016 when the World 
Bank and ILO launched the global partnership for social protection. This partnership 
embeds social protection within the Sustainable Development Goals of the UN. In a 
concept note released alongside the signing of the partnership the alignment is firmly 
embedded in the rationale for the partnership: 
“For the World Bank and the ILO, universal social protection refers to the 
integrated set of policies designed to ensure income security and support to all 
people across the life cycle – paying particular attention to the poor and the 
vulnerable. Anyone who needs social protection should be able to access it.” (ILO, 
2016) 
 
Points of Contention 
 
As this chapter has outlined, the rivalry between the ILO and the World Bank has 
subsided significantly since the heated debates in the mid- 1990s. The shifting of the 
debate away from sustainability versus adequacy towards a focus on coverage has meant 
that the secondary debates over defined benefit versus defined contribution and public 
versus private have given way. Both organisations agree that the best way to extend 
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pensions coverage is through publicly funded pensions. However, there are still points 
of incongruity between the two organisations. In particular, on how to define universal 
benefits and whether means-testing should form a part of the structure, as this interview 
with the current director of Social Protection and Labor at the World Bank outlines: 
 
“I think it is fair to say we share objectives, we have a lot of things to discuss in 
terms of how to get there, and I see disagreement as facilitating discussions, so I 
don’t expect conflict, I expect discussion. For instance, when we discuss 
universality, for us the starting point is what is happening on the ground, given 
the starting point is 90% informality in any given country. How to improve 
working conditions, how to improve security, what would be the shape of any 
type of insurance given these contingencies and then how they can grow, so they 
can meet the standards of formality whatever they may be. Sometimes 
colleagues in the ILO will start in the 10% of the formal labour market and their 
mental process is to try to work out how to expand this, which is not the process 
we consider effective to begin to tackle these issues. So, you see, we share 
objectives, but we start at different ends. Perhaps they have got something, but 
we believe we are much further, so I believe it is a process in which we have 
different starting points, different mental models maybe different sympathies, 
different values but we share the objectives and except is very impatient, they 
want to declare universal ASAP.” (interview with Michal Rukowski, December 
2016). 
 
These different points of emphasis are clear in recent publications from both 
organisations. In the World Social Protection report, the ILO has given examples where 
universal social pensions have been successful in increasing pensions coverage. The 
report emphasises this as a successful way to expand coverage. It also speaks of a 
‘demographic dividend’ for Africa with its young population offering benign conditions 
for old age pensions coverage.  
 
“While there is still room for improvement, a significant number of countries 
across the world have achieved substantial progress in terms of effective pension 
coverage in recent years… The experiences of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Zanzibar (United Republic of Tanzania) show 
that universal, non-contributory social pensions for older persons are feasible 
and can be financed by governments of low‐ and middle‐income countries (ILO, 
2017 pp. 80-81).” 
 
The report also describes the process of pension privatisation reversals. It argues there 
are number of lessons to be learned from the experiences; specifically, that multi-pillar 
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reform had a significant number of negative outcomes: low coverage, high 
administration costs, low benefits, fiscal costs and a lack of social dialogue (2017, pp. 93-
98). 
 
 
The World Bank on the other hand, continues to see the virtues of targeting public 
resources on the those who need it most. In its recent report on the State of Social Safety 
Nets (2018). It argued that means testing was more effective at reducing poverty in old 
age social pensions (World Bank, 2018 p. 83). For now, the rolling out of coverage to 
those who have none, fosters close collaboration between the two organizations, since 
both are primarily focused on creating coverage. However, these differences in 
interpretation and orientation may have implications in for activities in the field and the 
technical advice given, particularly in the years to come as the vertical dimension of 
social protection takes precedent. 
Finally, in what may prove to be the final word on multi-pillar pension reforms from both 
the ILO and the World Bank, at the end of 2018 the ILO published its seminal report on 
the reversals titled: Reversing Pension Privatizations: Rebuilding public pension systems 
in Eastern Europe and Latin America. The ILO’s critique is expressed much more 
forcefully than at any time since the Beattie and McGillivray article two decades  earlier. 
It describes pension privatisation as “three decades of failure” (Ortiz et al., 2018 p. 3). 
The reasons for the failures are given as the following: 
 
“The reasons are multiple, ranging from high fiscal and administrative costs, to 
low coverage and benefits, to the unpredictability of old- age income due to 
capital market risks, as documented in this chapter and in the country cases in 
this book. While some governments repealed privatization early, the large 
majority of reforming countries turned away from privatization after the 2007-
2008 financial crisis, when the drawbacks of the private system became evident 
and had to be redressed”  (Ortiz, et al., 2018 p. 3) 
 
Moreover, the ILO asserts that is was right all along about pension privatisation. The 
approach contrasts greatly with the Colin Gillion volume in 2000, which tacitly accepted 
many of the arguments of Averting. It can only be surmised that the ILO feels much more 
 239 
 
 
confident in expressing itself in this manner because there is a global consensus that the 
multi-pillar pension model, with a mandatory second pillar carved out of the public pillar, 
has failed.  
 
“Ultimately, over time the arguments advanced by the ILO proved correct. Even 
in European countries – with large older populations – the pension systems are 
sustainable with adequate parametric adjustments and some limited public 
budget support (European Commission, 2015). Private pension systems under- 
performed, as shown in the next section. Despite pressures from the financial 
industry, requests from governments to IFIs for support for structural pension 
reforms reduced. The World Bank abandoned the pension privatization push, 
replaced the leadership of the Bank’s Social Protection Department, and since 
the mid-2000s there have been no stand-alone pension reform projects within 
the World Bank loans portfolio (p. 10)”  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has outlined the positions of the ILO and World Bank on pension provision 
from the origins of both organisations’ entry into the global agenda setting arena of 
pensions policies. It has shown how the ILO initially took the lead in global pensions 
policy at the end of the Second World War. It established a number of legal instruments 
such as Convention 102 on minimum standards to assist in the role out of social security 
across the globe. The main preoccupations during this period were an extension of 
coverage and a focus on the adequacy of benefits. The ILO’s global leadership on 
pensions remained largely unchallenged for four decades. The entry of the World Bank 
into the pension reform arena pushed the issue of sustainability high onto the global 
agenda; alongside secondary objectives of capital market development and labour 
market efficiency. The two organisations engaged in a heated debate in which the World 
Bank initially gained the upper hand.  
 
Over time, the two organisations’ ideas began to converge. The ILO dropped its hostility 
to multi-pillar pension reform, while the World Bank began to evaluate the benefits of 
multi-pillar reform more critically. Both organisations moved towards viewing pensions 
coverage as the most important issue for the international policy setting agenda. This 
has encouraged more meaningful cooperation between the one-time rivals. However, 
 240 
 
 
differences remain. In particular, the role of means-testing and how to define 
universalism.  
 
The shifting of priorities of both organisations was not solely a rational exercise of 
evaluation of the different pension models. As Chapters Five and Six have shown, the 
external environment has been a significant influence over the dominant ideas on 
pension reform. It has also been shaped by the internal politics of both organisations and 
it to these internal dynamics where the thesis now turns.  
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Chapter Eight 
 
 
 
Internal Politics at the World Bank and ILO 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the internal politics of the World Bank and the International Labour 
Organisation. It represents the agency component of the ASID framework. It 
demonstrates that the internal political battles and the promotion of key personnel has 
been influential in shaping the global policy debate on pensions and social protection. 
Chapter Seven outlined how the positions of the World Bank and ILO have come closer 
together over the past two decades. The analysis here shows that this was not simply an 
intellectual exercise of evaluating the performance of different pension models and 
revising the guidance, it was also a consequence on internal political battles and 
ideological struggles within both organisations.  
 
Gillion et al (2000) argued that pension designs are as much about normative values as 
they are about economics, therefore the values of key change agents within 
international organisations can be instrumental in shaping the agenda of the 
organisation. It is rarely noted by global social policy scholars how small departments 
within international organisations can be. For example, in the ILO there are only 24 
members of staff in the Social Protection Department in the Geneva Headquarters.  
Within such a small group the values and priorities of those who lead the department 
can be instrumental in shaping the approach of the entire organisation. This chapter 
focuses on the key change-agents within both organisations drawing specifically on the 
elite interviews that were conducted. 
 
Alongside a closer alignment of pension and social protection ideals between the two 
organisations, the global pension policy agenda has also been shaped much more 
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extensively by the ILO over the past decade than in the decade prior. This chapter shows 
how the ILO was able to reassert itself as a prominent actor in global pension and social 
protection debates. It demonstrates that a unified and coherent policy stance enables 
an international organisation to have greater influence over national social policy 
making. It compares two different periods, one in which the World Bank was dominant 
and one in which the ILO renewed its influential position. In both instances, internal 
restructuring and the appointment of key personnel gave the dominant organisation an 
upper hand, while its rival organisation was characterised by internal fragmentation and 
lack of a coherent message. In both cases, internal shifts predated major changes in the 
global pension policy. Yet internal debates within international organisations are often 
overlooked in debates on global social policy, despite the pioneering work of Bob Deacon 
and others in this area (Deacon, 2007, 2013; Deacon and Stubbs 2010). Scholars more 
often have analysed debates between international organizations than within them 
(Mesa-Lago 1996; Queisser 2000; Ervik 2005).  
 
A unified and coherent message for an international organisation is not enough in itself 
for the organisation to have an impact or gain an upper hand against rivals in global 
policy debates. The analysis here augments Chapter Five, which analysed the global 
political economy of pension policy. It shows that internal coherency within both 
organisations at different points created a unified message that aligned itself with the 
prevailing paradigm or zeitgeist. It was both the internal coherency and the 
accommodating external environment that allowed for policy impact. This can also 
supersede resources as an explanatory variable. The resources of international 
organisations will always be important for their influence, the analysis here shows they 
are not sole-determinant of influence.  
 
The World Bank: 1994-1999 
 
Chapters Five and Six showed how the collapse of the communist system represented 
favourable conditions for the World Bank. It was a time when neoliberal policy 
prescriptions were at their zenith. It was active in a region keen to signal its market-
oriented fervour and sympathetic to the arguments of the World Bank’s policy 
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advocates. It was noted in Chapter Six how the countries engaged in a process of 
‘competitive signalling’ in order to attract foreign investment. This signalling entailed 
enacting what Appel and Orenstein (2018) have coined ‘avant-garde’ neoliberal policies. 
These are policies that are more neoliberal than those implemented across the 
developed world (for example, flat tax systems and pension privatization). However, an 
enabling external environment was not enough to guarantee the World Bank’s influence, 
it also required a well-organised internal structure.  
 
As an interview with a senior World Bank economist and co-author of Averting, Robert 
Palacios revealed, the World Bank entered the pension reform arena as a response to 
the needs of the transition economies: 
 
“I think it’s very clear to me the reason the World Bank became active in pensions 
in the 1990s, because we had to have answers and good policy advice to the new 
countries who were coming to us from Eastern Europe, because for the first time, 
and still today, we were dealing with countries that were spending 5-10% and 
more on pensions. We’ve never had that experience prior. And if you are lending 
to a country and the country is running deficits on the pension system of several 
percentage points of GDP, you can’t ignore it, you have to become 
knowledgeable about the subject, so that was why it started, why it got moving 
in that way” (Interview with Robert Palacios, World Bank, January 2017). 
 
These new clients for the Bank had very different needs to its traditional client base of 
developing countries. As Chapter Six argued, the Bank found itself making 
recommendations for industrial countries in mainland Europe whose expenditure on 
pension provision was substantially higher than in the developing countries who 
traditionally used Bank assistance. For this reason, the Bank concluded it needed a 
formal document and position on pension policy. 
 
The publication of Averting in 1994 represented the Bank’s formal response to the new 
post-socialist landscape it found itself operating in. It initiated significant internal debate 
(Singh 1996; Müller 1999; Holzmann 2000; Brooks 2005; Weyland 2005; Orenstein 2008, 
2013). Averting was commissioned by the Chief Economist Lawrence Summers. Director 
of Research Nancy Birdsall appointed Estelle James, an academic economist, to lead the 
publication. The research was carried out under the supervision of Michael Bruno, the 
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Vice President of Development Economics, who signed the foreword at the beginning of 
the document. The Development Economics Vice Presidency came into conflict with 
work by Bank Staff and consultants in the Bank’s Eastern Europe operations division, 
together with outside academics, who favoured parametric reforms to the existing 
system (Deacon, 1997). At the same time as the publication of Averting, a rival document 
with a more cautious approach to pension privatization was published from this division. 
It argued for parametric reforms to the pension system and a focus on poverty relief 
(Barr, 1994).  
 
An internal political battle ensued. However, the rival visions for Central and Eastern 
European pension systems did not have equal resources. Averting had a $250,000 
marketing budget. The alternative proposals had no publicity budget. In addition, 
Averting drew support from the financial market and development sector of the Bank. 
As the quote below shows, Nick Barr agues it offered the promise of not only financial 
sustainability in the pension system, but also the chance to develop nascent capital 
markets in Central and Eastern Europe: 
 
“I think it was promoted at the World Bank for several reasons. One, it was 
promoted at the bank because the people pushing it were financial market 
development people - who understand financial markets, but not pensions. I 
mean the objective of pensions as old age security, that’s a different objective 
from developing financial markets. The second reason why the World Bank 
pushed it was simply, ideology – this was a neoliberal Washington Consensus 
ideology. When I went to the World Bank in 1990 working on social safety nets in 
Eastern Europe, I was much more naïve than I am now, but I was actually in a 
position where somebody said to me ‘I’m not going to allow you to say that, I’m 
senior to you’. Now I can understand institutional positions, but it wasn’t. Well, 
brief anecdote - I came back from Poland in 1991 having been presented with a 
radical pension privatisation proposal, at a time when there was no financial 
market regulation, because there were no financial markets and the monthly 
inflation rate was 80%, so my report back to the bank said ‘interesting proposal, 
medium term priority, immediate priority, unemployment benefits and poverty 
relief’. [I]Went to the review meeting, it was amazing the amount of nasty stuff 
that hit the fan, how anyone could question that radical privatisation was 
anything but an immediate short term priority, my boss took me back to his office 
afterwards, marvellous man, shut the door, pinned me up against the door, I’m 
exaggerating slightly, ‘right Barr’, he said, ‘stand it up,’ and for two hours it was 
like a PhD viva and that the end of it he said ‘you’re right, we’re not gonna change 
it’, but this was very rare in the bank, in the pensions area, that people were 
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prepared to be led by the arguments. So, if you look at the history of bank 
publications, 1994, Averting the Old Age Crisis, the same year as Averting, a 
World Bank book that I edited called Labour Markets and Social Policy in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The pensions take in those two documents were 
dramatically different, as you can imagine. Averting had a publicity budget of a 
quarter of a million dollars. We had a publicity budget of zero, supplemented by 
my boss who sort of nicked $900 from another budget to get us an illuminated 
poster in the window of a World Bank bookshop. There wasn’t a consensus, it 
was a punch up and it was never a done deal” (Interview with Nicholas Barr, 
World Bank Consultant, December 2016).  
 
Soon after this internal battle, a unified and coherent message came out from the Bank 
for a sustained period of time (Orenstein, 2008). Chapter Seven showed how Averting is 
a document with a degree of different interpretations. Its core message is that in the 
context of ageing populations, public pension systems are not sustainable. It also argues 
that private pension provision has additional economic benefits. It therefore calls for a 
multi-pillar pension system. For some, it simply stresses the advantages of risk 
diversification in a multi-pillar pensions system. For others, it advocates a Chilean style 
pension system across the globe (see for example, James, 1996). Those who drew this 
hard interpretation, such as Estelle James, were more likely to vehemently pursue 
reforms and were the most passionate in arguing for the benefits of a Chilean style 
reform. The Estelle James approach also had the backing from other quarters inside the 
Bank, as the following quote demonstrates: 
 
“Personally, I feel there was a big push to follow the Estelle James approach. 
Which I thought was rather extreme at the time and that one size does not fit all” 
(interview with Emily Andrews, World Bank, August 2017).  
 
In the years that followed, Robert Holzmann was appointed as Director of the newly 
created Social Protection and Labor Department in 1997. The main bulk of pension 
reform technical advice and publications would now come from one department. In 
contrast to James, Holzmann was more pragmatic than ideological: 
 
“The Robert Holzmann philosophy who was not as dogmatic as Estelle was and 
he did provide objectives with a host of other people who did countries that could 
see how well the Bank did in terms of meeting its own objectives. Its own 
objectives were not as strict as Estelle’s desire to have a Chilean pension system 
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in every country in the world.” (interview with Emily Andrews, World Bank, 
August 2017).  
 
In sum, a coherent pension policy stance came from the Bank for a sustained period of 
time.  The campaign for multi-pillar pension reforms won out internally due to the 
superior resources available to the team behind Averting, the institutional backing of 
other powerful elements of the Bank, like the financial market personnel and the 
establishment of a supportive department active in pensions, the Social Protection and 
Labor Department. The department also had a degree of flexibility around the 
interpretation of Averting, which enabled it to work with more countries. This internal 
consistency and coherency were necessary to enable the Bank to take its message to the 
rest of the world with a unified approach.  
 
The ILO 1994 - 2000 
 
The ILO opened up a Budapest Office in 1993, specifically tasked to offer technical 
assistance and to influence on the transition process (ILO, 2018). However, on pensions, 
as Chapters Five and Six showed, it found itself in an unaccommodating policy 
environment when the World Bank launched its campaign for pension privatisation. The 
ILO was trying to defend a pension system demonstrably failing, such as high 
contributions but low benefits and diminishing coverage, in a region with politicians 
unsympathetic to the public sector and a public suspicious of the government’s 
commitment to honour pension promises (Fultz, 2012). 
 
The Social Security Department of the ILO had been deeply opposed to the message of 
Averting. It was outlined in Chapter Seven that its initial response to Averting was low-
key, coming in the form of a journal article in collaboration with the ISSA (Beattie & 
McGillivray, 1995). This is because the internal structure of the ILO precluded the 
development of a more significant alternative to Averting (Baccaro & Mele, 2012). The 
ILO has a tripartite governance structure of employer, trade union and country 
representatives. A formal position developed by the ILO’s bureaucracy (the International 
Labour Office), must have the support of all of these constituents. Whilst the Social 
Security Department vehemently opposed Averting, not all constituents did. In 
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particular, the quotes below demonstrate how some of the employers’ representatives 
supported the idea of funded pension systems, partially as a result of lobbying from 
representatives of the FIAP - International Federation of Pension Funds Administrators. 
This lobby had an interest in expanding individual accounts as a way to generate more 
business. 
 
“You have to remember the ILO is a tripartite organisation and actually through 
the employers pillar we had a strong presence of the global association of the 
pension funds as a lobby group in the ILO. I don’t remember the name of 
federation, a Chilean guy actually, they put a lot of effort in organising 
conferences, funded support for the funded model. And every time there was a 
debate on funded pensions at different ILO conferences, they were there.” 
(interview with Krzysztof Hagemejer, ILO, February 2018). 
 
In addition, Reynaud claimed the Latin American bloc of government representatives 
also tended to favour funded pensions, given their recent reform experience (interview 
with Emmanuel Reynaud, ILO, April 2018). 
 
“You have to understand, the ILO is a tripartite organisation, and if you don’t 
know it already you should know, that within the employers group the Latin 
American had a very important role and of course the Chilean employers and so 
in a certain sense the hand of the ILO was limited by the tripartite dimension.” 
(interview with Emmanuel Reynaud, ILO, April 2018). 
 
As Chapter Seven argued, when the ILO finally developed a response to Averting, it 
produced a document broadly in line with the message of Averting. Specifically, the ILO 
recognised a role for both defined benefit and defined contribution pensions, alongside 
a role for the private sector in pension provision (Gillion, 2000). Inside the ILO there was 
some dissent at the direction of the organisation following the publication of the Gillion 
volume from the soon-to-be branch director:  
 
“If I would have come earlier to the ILO and been responsible I would have not 
gone in the direction of the Gillion book, it would not have been my approach” 
(interview with Emmanuel Reynaud, ILO, April 2018). 
 
Reynaud was not alone in opposing the new direction of the ILO. As the quote below 
shows there were others in the ILO who believed that the organisation was moving in a 
direction too far out of step with its traditional stance and too close to the ILO’s agenda.  
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“The direction of the ILO at this time ceded too much ground to the World Bank 
on the issue of pensions adequacy” (interview with ILO source, January 2017). 
 
For them, by conceding too much ground to the World Bank, it represented a threat to 
the adequacy of social security across the globe. However, despite this, it was also 
recognised that the power imbalance between the two organisations was too difficult to 
overcome and so the ILO needed to end its open confrontation with the World Bank: 
 
“When I arrived at that department, the assessment I made was the ILO was not 
in the position to face the World Bank in opposition to pensions. Unfortunately, 
even though the Bank had a bad reputation it had direct links with the Ministry 
of Finance in many countries, whereas the ILO has a relationship with the 
Ministry of Labour and it is not the same in terms of the balance of power. So, 
even if the reputation of the World Bank in some circles was pretty low, it still 
had leverage through the Finance Ministry. The ILO was and is pretty weak 
compared to the World Bank” (interview with Emmanuel Reynaud, ILO, April 
2018). 
 
 
The Campaign for National Social Protection Floors  
 
The next stage of global pension policy breakdown and the emergence of a new form of 
consensus was established over a long period of time. This section will outline the 
developments before the global economic crisis. For the ILO, it went from a fragmented 
position in the aftermath of Averting to a unified stance. In contrast, the World Bank’s 
unified and coherent position would break down as a result of continued internal debate. 
The onset of the global economic crisis would lead to a complete breakdown of the 
World Bank’s three-pillar pension model, whilst initiating favourable conditions for the 
ILO.  
 
The ILO: 2000-2007 
 
Averting had damaged the confidence of the ILO in exerting influence in the global policy 
process in one of its key areas of social policy expertise. In the words of one of its branch 
directors at the time: 
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 “We had lost the battle and there was not a possibility to get back on the 
battlefield and so my strategy was to change the battlefield” (interview with 
Emmanuel Reynaud, ILO, April 2018).  
 
It was partly for this reason that the ILO began to focus on extending the coverage of 
social protection (including pensions) in developing countries. It was also a functional 
response to a growing policy problem. As was discussed in Chapter Seven, the ILO had 
traditionally championed wage-related social security in the formal sector as the best 
way to develop a comprehensive social security system. It had envisaged the formal 
sector growing in parallel with economic development. However, this had not happened 
and there was substantial evidence of the informal sector continuing to grow. The ILO 
estimated that only 20% of the world’s population had adequate social protection 
(Reynaud, 2002). It therefore needed to develop a new policy to expand coverage to the 
informal sector. A campaign was initiated by the ILO as an attempt to place extending 
coverage onto the international agenda. The theme of its 2001 International Labour 
Conference was “extending social security to all.” The main conclusion from the session 
was ‘highest priority should go to policies and initiatives to extend social security to those 
who have none’ (ILO, 2001: v). 
 
The new focus for the ILO in the area of social security on coverage developed at a time 
of internal disorganisation. The Director-General of the ILO, Juan Somavia, had 
undertaken a considerable reorganisation of the ILO hierarchy. This entailed a flattening 
of the managerial structure. This would create problems for the social security 
department as it would break down into smaller silos. This was argued to be a huge 
mistake by Reynaud: 
 
“I can tell you the reason if you want and you can even quote me, it basically was 
a big mistake of Somavia when he came in as Director-General, it was not just for 
the social security department, it was for all the departments that were 
destroyed, he got rid of all the D29 when he came in, and if you look at the article 
by Guy Standing, he says the same thing, he was very critical of the ILO.” 
(interview with Emmanuel Reynaud, April 2018). 
 
                                                     
9 D2 was the level of Technical Director in the ILO.  
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As a consequence, the Social Security Department lost its director when Colin Gillion 
retired. His retirement came at a time of intense rivalry between the different branches 
of the department.  
 
“The closer we were coming to the date of retirement of the director of the 
department, it became an issue of personality, during the ten years from 1990-
2000, there were different chiefs of branches and everything was ok but the last 
few years, I think it was 1996-2000 the chiefs of the two branches had different 
ideas about where it should go and more and more the director of the 
department was losing interest in imposing anything and there was this problem. 
It was ok until two personalities became head of branches” (interview with 
Krzysztof Hagemejer, ILO, February 2018 ) 
 
“When Colin Gillion was retiring, again this is my interpretation of this story, is 
that simply the people at the top of the ILO tried to avoid the decision of 
appointing the new director as there was a rivalry between the two heads of 
branches and that was the reason they decided to establish these two separate 
units with two separate budgets” (Interview with ILO source, August 2017). 
 
The two branches of the department (one dealing with social security policy design and 
standards, the other with social security financing and quantitative policy analysis) joined 
the new Social Protection Sector, one of four technical sectors of the International 
Labour Office. The new social protection sector also had a small team working on socio-
economic security. The two branches of the previous Social Security Department and the 
socioeconomic security project each effectively became their own silos, competing with 
separate visions for social security (Deacon, 2013).  
 
The more dominant unit was Social Security Policy and Development (SOC/POL). It was 
headed by Emmanuel Reynaud and was seeking to develop micro insurance as one of 
the ways to expand coverage (see Reynaud, 2006). The other unit was the Social Security, 
Financial, Actuarial and Statistical Services (SOC/FAS). It had more involvement in the 
field. Its team supported the development of social insurance schemes in developing 
countries by offering technical assistance. At the same time, it was searching for policy 
solutions to enable the extension of coverage beyond those in formal employment. The 
leader of this smaller branch, Michael Cichon and his team were much more involved 
than other units in criticising the World Bank pension reform stance, using its economic, 
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financial and actuarial knowledge capacity to challenge Bank models and assumptions. 
They were also sceptical about micro insurance. Cichon and his team were part of an 
emerging global coalition of actors who were seeking to promote the concept of a floor. 
It first entered the global discourse as a ‘global social floor’ during the ILO’s contribution 
to debates on a social dimension of globalization (ILO, 2004). However, at this point it 
had no institutional support and remained one of several policy ideas in the primeval 
soup. The idea was kept alive by Cichon and a small group in international policy circles 
(Deacon, 2013). A smaller branch, headed by Guy Standing, the InFocus Program on 
Socioeconomic Security (IFP/SES), championed a more radical citizen’s income (Maier-
Rigaud, 2009). Therefore, despite having a unified objective of extending social security 
provision, substantial disagreement on the means to achieve it meant that stasis was a 
feature of the ILO’s social policy stance (interview with Krzysztof Hagemejer, ILO, 
February 2018).  
 
This stasis lasted for around five years. In 2005 Juan Somavia reverted back to a structure 
similar to the one he had reformed. The two branches of the Social Security Department 
were once again subsumed into one department. Reverting back to one structure meant 
a promotion for one of the branch directors, Michael Cichon, and it was therefore highly 
political.  
 
“I think there might have been three things that were important for Cichon’s 
selection. One is what you just said, he had been crying in the wilderness on 
universal pensions for years. I think the leadership of the ILO realised there was 
some change needed because the three-pillar model was prevailing for a while 
and it looked like the World Bank was the winner and the ILO was the loser, so 
when it filtered up to the highest levels in the ILO, they thought ‘oh jeez, what do 
we do? Are we out of touch, are we old-fashioned?’. So, there was a need for 
some change of focus there, so I think from the point of view of the leadership. 
Now, you know about the 2001 a new consensus on Social Security, was managed 
by Reynaud, and that document says all the right things. It says coverage, that 
increasing coverage is the most important priority for social security, more so 
than the type of social security. So, it took a new perspective, a new consensus 
and Reynaud managed that, he was in charge of the 2001 deliberations, 
However,  Reynaud was still was more affiliated with the old ways. He was closely 
tied in with the French trade unions. He managed that report and it was a good 
report, I think it was seen that Cichon was cutting more edge. And the second 
thing is, Cichon had strong German backing for his promotion whereas Reynaud 
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had French backing and that matters. I would say that the German government 
backing was stronger, because the German government was very much stronger 
at backing candidate’s promotions within the ILO. I know of other instances 
where they pushed and pushed so hard, it’s kind of like a badge of prestige that 
other governments don’t feel so strongly about. So, I think the German 
government was very, very strong, And the third thing is field experience. I don’t 
know if it’s true now, but it was back then that if you want to get promoted in 
the ILO, you need to go to the field. You need to spend some years in the field to 
get a higher-level job. some people hate it and when come back and expect to 
get a better job. Cichon had been in the field, he had worked in Budapest. 
Reynaud had not done any field work.” (Anonymous interview, ILO, August 2017) 
 
 
The intervention of the German government in the internal affairs of the ILO is 
significant. Chapter Two outlined the different theoretical approaches to international 
organisations from international relations theory. The constructivists argue that 
international organisations have autonomy from nation states, allowing them to create 
policy in their own right, acting as purposive social actors (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). 
Realists, on the other hand, argue that the international organisations are simply the 
subordinates of nation states with no real autonomy (Hawkins et al., 2006). Germany is 
the largest donor to the ILO and therefore would have more leverage over other 
countries in influencing the decisions of the Office. However, the intervention with 
regards to internal promotions was not policy related. The German government was not 
seeking to influence the policy direction of the Office. Rather, it was simply about 
nationality and wanting a German in a more senior position. From the perspective of 
someone who supported Cichon’s rival, his promotion was not related to his policy 
stance, but rather him being the only German at D1 level who was viable for promotion 
to D2. Furthermore, from their perspective it was not down to explicit German backing 
or Cichon would not have got the job:  
 
“My view is that it was not the German backing, the Germans, I don’t know if they 
were clever enough, but they didn’t back him, because if they had of backed him 
he would have not got the job. There were only two D1 Germans and the other 
one was not adequate for some reason. In my view, the Director-General’s 
approach was closer to Reyanud’s approach than Cichon’s. So, it was not at all 
with regard to Cichon’s strategy from a political point of view that got him the 
job, it was his nationality. They needed to have a German D2 and so it was him.” 
(Anonymous interview, ILO, April 2018). 
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When Michael Cichon was appointed director he began to move the stance of the 
department in line with his vision for the extension of social security. Cichon came from 
the development tradition in the ILO. He framed social protection in the language of 
social rights (Cichon & Hagemejer, 2007). This represented a break from the tripartite 
heritage of the organisation. A departure of this nature would inevitably be met with 
considerable opposition from within the department. For many in the department, a 
focus on minimum protection posed a threat to the adequacy of social insurance benefits 
and ceded too much ground to those, such as the World Bank, who advocated a residual, 
social safety net policy (Interview with Elaine Fultz, ILO, May 2017). Cichon would 
therefore have to convince his department, as well as the governments, trade unions, 
and employer associations that ultimately determine ILO policy, and then the world.  
 
Internally Cichon was able to convince the department of the utility of social protection 
floors by framing them in the traditions of the ILO. He argued that the concept built upon 
two previous ILO Recommendations: No. 67 on universal income security and No. 69 on 
universal medical care. It was also an accompaniment to the ILO Convention 102 on 
minimum standards. In addition, the social protection floors strategy was to be two-
pronged: a horizontal dimension focused on a universal minimum, and a vertical 
dimension, committed to extending social protection beyond a minimum in the 
traditional contributory way of the past (Deacon 2013).  
 
The campaign for social protection floors was both an internal one, within the ILO, and 
a wider global campaign. More detail on the internal campaign will be outlined in the 
next section on the ILO below. The external campaign began before the social floor was 
official ILO policy. In 2007, Cichon convened a meeting with representatives from 
UNDESA (United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs), UNICEF (United 
Nations Children’s Fund) and Help Age International. The meeting formalized the 
Coalition for a Global Social Floor (2007). It sought to be a steering committee to bring 
together a movement for social protection floors under the UN umbrella. It was 
established in the context of debates around a fairer globalisation and global 
inequalities. In addition, these debates were taking place in parallel with the positive 
experiences of modern forms of universal social policy in the global south, such as the 
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conditional cash transfer programs being rolled out in Latin America (Huyse et al., 2017). 
As it will be shown below, the campaign would be given further impetus in the response 
to the global economic crisis, with the ILO’s role in policy debates substantially enhanced 
and formalized. However, it is important to note that the ILO’s reorganization took place 
prior to the onset of the global financial crisis.   
 
The World Bank: 1999-2008 
 
While the ILO was shifting to a new consensus on social protection, the World Bank was 
undergoing substantial internal debate on its promotion of a multi-pillar pension model. 
As Chapter Seven argued, Opposition to Averting was first brought into the spotlight at 
the end of the 1990s with a provocative paper co-authored by its Chief Economist titled: 
Rethinking pension reform: Ten myths about social security systems (Orszag & Stiglitz, 
1999). Whilst the paper proved controversial, it did not immediately affect policy change, 
not least because, Andrews argued it had been undertaken without consulting the Social 
Protection and Labor Department.  
 
“By the way did you see the Joe Stiglitz writing critiquing the reform? You know 
it was funny, Joe was brilliant, I met him once years and years ago, he was so 
brilliant, but I was so furious at him because he actually had the arrogance – some 
of these arrogant guys are absolutely brilliant, Larry Summers is another one – 
but he had the arrogance of not speaking to any of the people who were actually 
doing the reforms in the field. So, he just went off and did his own thing without 
engaging with the staff working in the area. Joe is eccentric and does his own 
thing. As I said it’s absolutely brilliant, but you know he should talk to people and 
this is why a lot of people in the department didn’t take it seriously because he 
never consulted them and so they thought it didn’t matter.” (interview with Emily 
Andrews, World Bank, August 2017).  
 
As more criticism from inside the World Bank came in the form of a report in 2005 titled 
Keeping the Promise of Social Security in Latin America, its assessment was not 
universally accepted within the Bank. Some were critical that the project did not consult 
industry or policy makers in the region: 
 
“I was highly critical of the Latin American piece [Keeping the Promise of Latin 
America], not because… at the end of the day, the first draft was terrible some of 
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things should have happened, most importantly those who wrote the book did it 
essentially without consulting with the industry there and without consulting 
with the governments. This is simply not a good way of doing it, I’m always willing 
to listen to the arguments, but the arguments were often not in line with reality 
and for this reason, the final version: yes was it critical, It asked good questions, 
but my sense was those who wrote thought it was a way now to get a profile, 
international, which actually didn’t happen.” (interview with Robert Holzmann, 
World Bank, December 2016).  
 
The report was not translated into Spanish, which is significant given it is the spoken 
language of most of the continent, including all of the countries that had adopted multi-
pillar reforms. This was argued by Barr to be a result of internal World Bank politics.=: 
 
“The other one I respect is Keeping the Promise. That was a group of people 
working in the Latin America region, which internal bank politics tried very hard 
to stop being published. It was only published because the chief economist or 
vice president of Latin America (can’t remember which) went to bat for the book. 
It needed high level protection to reach publication at all. It was never translated 
into Spanish. Which is why when someone offered to translate mine and Peter 
Diamond’s book into Spanish we jumped at the chance. I mean it had exactly the 
right messages: Individual accounts all fine and dandy, what about poverty relief? 
Answer is, the Bank was not monolithic. Even within the Bank there was hostility 
towards it.” (interview with Nicholas Barr, World Bank Consultant, December 
2016). 
 
When Nick Stern became Chief Economist at the World Bank, he initiated an update to 
Averting. This new volume would be a joint cross-sectoral report by the World Bank to 
explain to the rest of its staff, and the world, its position on pensions (Holzmann & Hinz, 
2005). As Chapter Seven explained, whilst it largely reasserted the case for a multi-pillar 
framework of public and private provision, as a way to diversify risk, it acknowledged 
that more needed to be done on poverty alleviation and coverage. The report was 
reviewed by five external experts, including prominent critics of Averting, Nicholas Barr 
and Peter Diamond. It was during this review that the idea for a formal evaluation of the 
World Bank’s pension projects was born: 
 
“I take some pride in that because when Nick Stern became chief economist at 
the Bank he asked Robert Holzmann to write a position paper on pensions which 
is what grew into the Holzmann and Hinz volume. Nick then said to Robert, ‘be 
good to have an international advisory committee’, which included Peter 
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Diamond and me, good people. There was enough money to invite us all to 
Washington for one visit to comment on the draft, and without any pre-
consultation, we all trashed it, for exactly the same reason. I’d arranged to meet 
Peter for a drink afterwards (this is before we began writing together, we’d met, 
but didn’t know each other that well) and over a drink, he wondered if the bank 
ever evaluates its own work. I said only on a project by project basis, but doesn’t 
do it across all sectors, I said that ‘would be good if it did an evaluation of all its 
pension projects ‘and Peter said ‘I’ll mention it to Nick, I’m having dinner with 
him tonight’ and that was the origin of that 2006 evaluation by Emily Andrews, 
when I read it, I was hugging myself, these are exactly the points to be looking at, 
and you know introducing funded accounts when there is a large budget deficit 
or when inflation is running away is just barking mad. So that was in a way, not 
the Bank changing its view, but Nick Stern in his quiet and effective way nudging 
things along” (interview with Nicholas Barr, December 2016). 
 
The Independent Evaluation Group was led by Emily Andrews who was approaching 
mandatory retirement at the Bank. As Chapter Seven showed, her report argued that 
some of the benefits of multi-pillar reform had been oversold by the Bank. It called for 
greater attention to parametric pension reforms and echoed the findings on the Latin 
American report that of multi-pillar reform had been disappointing in its promise to 
extend coverage of pension provision. It argued that much greater attention needed to 
be paid to initial conditions before advocating multi-pillar reform (Independent 
Evaluation Group, 2006).  
 
The appointment of Andrews to lead the Evaluation was because of her pragmatism in 
the field. She was part of a group within the Bank who would use judgement, and not 
simply enact the core message of the Headquarters. The privatisation of the Kazakh 
pension system was cited by numerous interviewees inside the Bank such as Robert 
Holzmann, Mamta Murthi and Emily Andrews as an example of a country where many 
they thought it was not sensible to pursue a Chilean style pension reform, as the initial 
conditions were not right for such a dramatic reform. For example, Kazakhstan did not 
have a functioning capital market for funds to invest in:  
  
“My first job in 1997, I was asked for assistance by Kazakhstan, where the 
president there wanted to introduce a funded system reform and it wasn’t ready 
for reform. But I decided to go as it was better to be involved than not, as they 
had made the decision and it might turn into a catastrophe. By coming along, it 
enabled us to implement a number of reforms, so a number of projects were 
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initiated, which otherwise wouldn’t have been. We assumed if they made the 
decision to do that they might make the other reforms which did not turn out to 
be the case” (interview with Robert Holzmann, World Bank, December 2016). 
 
 
This distinction between the views of the Headquarters and the actions in the field is one 
that has been underexplored in the literature in global social policy. A recurrent theme 
in interviews with staff was the autonomy in the field and the mismatch between official 
policy and actions on the ground. It was noted above how Averting drew different 
interpretations. These differing views could have consequences for the type of reform 
that a country would pursue following World Bank assistance.  
 
“I think if we tailored more to country needs depending on, you know, there was 
a variety of people, I think Robert Palacios would have gone further towards the 
Estelle James view and there are other people who went less. You know I worked 
on the Kazakhstan reform and there were a group of people who wanted me to 
work on it there because they knew I wasn’t dogmatic about it” (interview with 
Emily Andrews, World Bank, August 2017). 
 
In summary, in the years prior to the global economic crisis, it is clear the consensus on 
Averting that had been formed in the mid-1990s was beginning to break. Internal politics 
at the World Bank had initiated internal critiques of many of the central propositions 
that had dictated Bank policy. In addition, the varying interpretations of Averting on the 
ground was also diluting the controversial aspects of pension privatisation. Alongside the 
critique of multi-pillar pension systems, the World Bank was also beginning to shift its 
focus towards coverage. Holzmann and Hinz (2005) recognized this as an area where the 
Bank had more work to do. In 2009, this was expressed more explicitly in Closing the 
Coverage Gap, which focused on the role of non-contributory pensions and minimum 
pension guarantees (Holzmann et al., 2009; Deacon 2013). 
 
A new global consensus on social protection?  
 
The convergence of both organizations around the issue of coverage prior to the crisis 
opened up an opportunity for increased dialogue and cooperation in the years that 
followed. This was partially a consequence of the internal dynamics of both 
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organizations. The World Bank would cease to vigorously campaign for multi-pillar 
pension reform. The ILO, on the other hand, ceased to solely champion wage-related 
social protection and developed a coherent policy stance with Recommendation 202 on 
National Social Protection Floors. This section outlines the internal politics of these 
developments and offers some concluding thoughts on the new era of collaboration 
between the two organizations.  
 
The World Bank from 2008 onwards 
 
In 2009, Robert Holzmann reached a mandatory service cap and was replaced as Director 
of the Social Protection and Labor Department. His successor, Arup Banerji, did not have 
a background in pensions, and so the momentum of a director focused on pensions, 
ended.  
 
“Ok, now I want to say a little bit, I contributed to Averting, but as a consultant, I 
was not a key person. I liked many of the key messages, but had always had some 
reservations to financial markets, perhaps it’s my central European upbringing. 
My 2005 paper is different. It is a much smoother message than Averting. But 
when I left, at this time many people at the Bank resented that someone without 
a financial background was in charge of pensions. When I left my successor, he 
was not interested in pensions. So essentially there was no policy. 
 
INT: So the shifting of the Bank away from pensions is result of personnel 
basically? 
 
“Exactly. Yes, there was no one to lead it. There were changes at the president 
level with all the issues I’m sure you read about, the structural changes internally” 
(interview with Robert Holzmann, former Director of Social Protection and Labor, 
December 2016) 
 
 
Under Banerji, the department took a broader focus on social protection. The Social 
Protection and Labor Strategy, published in 2012, outlined the role social protection can 
play in managing risk. It focused on three core principles: Resilience, Equity and 
Opportunity. It argued that social protection offers resilience against the new social risks, 
equity in reducing poverty and opportunity through human capital investment. 
Importantly, the strategy made extensive references to the ILO Social Protection Floor 
and spoke of an ‘emerging global consensus’ (World Bank, 2012: 14).  
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The shifting away from pensions by the Social Protection and Labor Department came at 
a tumultuous time for the organization at large. In 2012, the World Bank formally elected 
Jim Yong Kim to serve as its president. Upon assuming office, Kim initiated a restructuring 
of the Bank that proved highly controversial. It was noted in Chapters Five and Six, how 
the region of Central and Eastern Europe had become less dependent on the Bank’s 
finance. This was also true of the many of the world emerging economies. In order to 
remain relevant, Kim sought to breakdown the regional silos that, he argued, 
discouraged the sharing of best practice (Lowrey, 2014). His reorganisation consisted of 
abandoning the geographical structure of the Bank to replace it with global practices, 
with technical expertise in specific policy areas. It was believed this would keep the 
Bank’s lending channels alive to emerging markets for specific projects, alongside lending 
to those locked out of international capital markets (Financial Times, 2014). The 
reorganisation was conducted over two years and was unpopular with World Bank staff. 
Alongside concerns about losing the local expertise necessary for policy implementation, 
it coincided with a high turnover of senior departures. To illustrate the level of 
dissatisfaction, in an emergency town hall style meeting with the President, 8000 out of 
10,000 staff were present, including 5,000 tuning in online from across the globe 
(Birdsall, 2014).  
 
As a consequence of this controversial restructuring, the World Bank was arguably 
inward looking at a time when one of its flagship pension schemes was being abandoned 
across the globe. In 2008, the World Bank issued guidance on the crisis and funded 
pillars. At this point only Argentina had closed down its second pillar and the Bank was 
(correctly) fearful of more countries doing the same. It cautioned against dramatic 
systemic responses to short-term shocks (Dorfman, Hinz, & Robalino, 2008). However, 
this was when Holzmann was still the director. When countries did begin to carry out 
reform reversals in Central and Eastern Europe, no response came from the Social 
Protection and Labor Department and the Bank took no formal view on the 
developments. A somewhat informal response came from Mamta Murthi, the Bank’s 
regional director for Central Europe and the Baltics, in the form of a blog post (Murthi, 
2014). Here she gave an overview of pension developments in the region and suggested 
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why countries had opted to scale down or close their second pillars but stopped short of 
criticizing them.  
 
“I was fielding calls from Brussels and other places asking me what was going on 
in Central and Eastern Europe as the reversals started to happen. I was given no 
instructions from the headquarters on what our position was. In the end I decided 
to write a blog post explaining what was happening. In some cases I could 
understand the reversals, like Kazakhstan did not have a good system, it was 
essentially cycling T bills [investing in government bonds]” (interview with Mamta 
Murthi, Country Director for Central Europe and the Baltic Countries, June 2017). 
 
A candid assessment came from outside the Bank by its former Social Protection and 
Labor Director. Writing a in a personal capacity, the position paper acknowledged many 
of the challenges for multi-pillar pension reforms such as market volatility, exorbitant 
fees and the possibility of a new permanent low in returns on assets (Holzmann, 2012).   
 
In sum, as a result of personnel changes, internal disruption and an unaccommodating 
external environment, the World Bank’s promotion of multi-pillar pension reform broke 
down. In addition, the client base of the Bank was now primarily developing countries, 
where the establishment of social pensions or the so-called zero pillar was the priority. 
This sharpened the focus on coverage and systems development to administer non-
contributory benefits.  
 
The ILO from 2005 onwards 
 
Once the Social Security Department had reached a unified position on social protection 
floors, it was able to move the campaign to the next stage. The campaign for social 
protection floors had three dimensions (interview with Krzysztof Hagemejer, ILO, 
February 2018). First, it needed to convince all interested parties about the affordability 
of a social protection floor for low income countries. Here the department developed 
sophisticated modelling exercises to demonstrate that social protection floors were not 
out of reach for even the world’s poorest countries (Pal, et al., 2005).  
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The next stage in the campaign was to convince the rest of the ILO of the importance of 
social protection. The social protection department is much smaller than other ILO 
departments and does not carry the same authority as employment and labour rights 
(Huyse, et al., 2017). Cichon was able to raise the status of social protection by aligning 
his agenda with the wider Decent Work agenda promoted by the Director-General Juan 
Somavia. The Decent Work Agenda has four pillars: full and productive employment, 
rights at work, social protection and the promotion of social dialogue (ILO, 2012: 9). 
Cichon campaigned to give social protection the equal weight as the other four pillars.  
 
Finally, the task was to convince the constituents of the ILO in order to adopt a 
recommendation at the ILC in 2012. Cichon demonstrated pragmatism in this process. 
He abandoned the campaign for a singular concept of a social protection floor, to the 
plural concept of national social protection floors. The concept of a social protection 
floor was also refined from a set of benefits to a set of guarantees, that could be 
delivered in a variety of ways (Deacon, 2013). This diluted the concept as it allows 
national governments to interpret minimum standards. However, it shielded the ILO 
from criticism from the global south that it was a tool of the global north to impose 
protectionist standards. In the event, these trade-offs resulted in the ILO 
Recommendation 202 being unanimously adopted by the ILC in 2012. The ILO had a 
unified position on social protection, which had been endorsed internationally all of the 
ILO’s member states.  
 
Shortly after the passing of Recommendation 202, Cichon retired as Director of Social 
Security. However, unlike in the instance of the World Bank where retirement stalled the 
policy development, his replacement, Isabel Ortiz was something of a continuity 
candidate with the ILO’s stance on social protection floors. In her previous roles at 
UNDESA and UNICEF she had been part of the Coalition for a Global Social Floor. The 
Department of Social Security was renamed the Department for Social Protection 
(SOCPRO) to bring its name in line with the terminology used in global policy documents. 
In addition, the department shifted focus slightly from technical assistance to global 
advocacy. This was done by reorienting existing capacity away from highly specialized 
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technical positions to a larger number of junior profiles to support global advocacy 
campaigns (Huyse et al., 2017).  
 
The outcome of the increased resources dedicated to global advocacy has been effective 
for the ILO. It was successful in its efforts to influence the UN Sustainable Development 
Agenda. This agenda will largely determine the orientation of development-related 
resources both globally and nationally. After lobbying from the ILO, social protection was 
integrated into five of the seventeen sustainable development goals. This means that 
social protection is now a key focus of the development agenda for many years to come. 
Notably, goal 1.3 explicitly mentions social protection floors. As a response, the ILO, in 
collaboration with the World Bank, launched the Global Partnership for Universal Social 
Protection. This will be one of the main mechanisms for delivering the Sustainable 
Development Goals on social protection, with the ILO as a lead actor. It brings together 
a large number of international organisations and development partners, presenting 
itself as a follow up to earlier global universalism initiatives on universal education and 
universal health coverage.  
 
A new partnership or old rivalries? 
 
The Global Partnership is symbolic of the development of the relationship between the 
ILO and World Bank. As this chapter and the previous ones have shown, at one time the 
two organisations were in heated opposition in their visions for pension policy. The 
evolution of positions in both organisations has paved the way for a much more 
collaborative relationship over the past decade. However, whilst both organisations use 
similar discourse on universal social protection and social protection floors, differences 
remain. A key difference is the interpretation of “universal.” For the World Bank, 
universal means everyone having some form of coverage, for the ILO it means everyone 
having the same coverage.  
 
“Our President and the Director-General of the ILO jut signed at the UN General 
Assembly, they signed an agreement on the working of the universal social 
protection, and I see that as a boost to our cooperation towards the objective of 
universality. It is going quite well, we already have different initiatives, so I will 
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be focusing on working with them, it is very important, we share objectives, we 
have a lot of things to discuss in terms of how to get there, and I see this 
agreement as facilitating discussions. For instance, when we discuss universality, 
for us the starting point is what is happening on the ground, given the starting 
point is 90% informality in any given country. How to improve working conditions 
etc. Sometimes ILO colleagues will start in the 10% of the formal labour market 
and try to work out how to expand this, which is not the process to begin to tackle 
these issues. So, we share objectives, but we start at different ends. Perhaps we 
have different sympathies, different values but we share the objectives” 
(interview with Michal Rutkowski, Director or Social Protection and Labor at the 
World Bank, December 2016). 
 
“I think the issue in the last five years is the coverage issue. Because after all these 
years we see no progress on coverage and the formalisation of the economy. You 
go back 50 years in documents you can see from the ILO, there is this assumption 
that eventually the formalisation of the economy will bring people into the 
system and that’s not happened so that’s led countries to find ways to deal with 
the ageing and other risks for the large informal sector. That I think is, and that’s 
being done in a number of ways and what’s most important in terms of 
magnitude is the expansion of non-contributory pensions.” (interview with 
Robert Palacios, World Bank, January 2017) 
 
This brings the role of means testing into sharp focus. In a recent report, the World Bank 
argued that means testing was more effective at reducing poverty in old age social 
pensions (World Bank, 2018: 83). For now, the rolling out of coverage to those who have 
none fosters close collaboration between the two organisations, since both are primarily 
focused on creating coverage. However, these differences in interpretation and 
orientation may have implications in for activities in the field and the technical advice 
given, particularly in the years to come as the vertical dimension of social protection 
takes precedent.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The internal dynamics of international organisations can be instrumental global policy 
agendas. At critical moments in global political economy, change agents in the World 
Bank and ILO were instrumental in shaping debates and orienting action. When ideas 
align with the prevailing paradigm, a coherent, organised message can supersede rival 
ideas. This analysis has shown how the World Bank gained superiority in global pension 
debates during the 1990s. These ideas aligned with the dominance of neoliberal ideas 
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across the globe. However, they were also dependent upon an organised internal 
campaign within the Bank and an accommodating internal structure. The ILO, which was 
frozen out during the World Bank’s campaign for pension privatisation, realigned its 
priorities and organised for impact with the restructuring of its Social Security 
Department. The global economic crisis gave the social protection floor the impetus it 
needed both within and outside of the ILO. However, this would not have been possible 
without the promotion and ascendancy of Michael Cichon and his team, who prepared 
the ground for the idea to take off. As Deacon argued, the biographies of actors can be 
instrumental in the global social policy process (Deacon, 2013). This chapter has 
developed this argument through the framework of an external environment and the 
internal dynamics of international organisations 
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Chapter Nine 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter draws together the four previous chapters in order to outline the key 
arguments of the thesis. They offered a multi-faceted analysis of global pension policy; 
this type of analysis is necessary to capture the multi-dimensional nature of the making 
of pension policies within international organisations and how they interact with 
national institutions. International organisations operate within, and simultaneously 
influence, the global structural environment in an iterative fashion.  It is therefore 
necessary to capture the micro and macro foundations of the policy field. The main 
findings set out below were an interplay between the global structural environment, the 
institutions in which global pension policy ideas were implemented, the evaluation of 
different pension systems produced in reports by the World Bank and ILO and the 
internal politics at each organisation. This discussion sets out the following arguments 
that are the key contributions to knowledge of the thesis: 
 
 The World Bank and ILO are cooperating much more closely on their pension and 
social protection policies, than in the past. Global pension policy is no longer 
characterised by contestation. 
 The main focus of international organisations in pension policy is pension 
coverage. Entrenched positions on adequacy and sustainability have given way 
to a new shared objective. 
 Central and Eastern Europe was the site where pensions innovations around the 
second pillar were experimented; the subsequent reversal of many of these 
pillars has influenced global policy ideas on pension provision. 
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 Pension institutions, with their path dependencies, can act as an independent 
variable on policy ideas. Traditional institutional analysis has treated policy ideas 
as the independent variable, shaping institutional change. This analysis shows a 
more iterative relationship between institutions and ideas. 
 The global structural environment influences the types of pension policies 
pursued by international organisations. 
 Internal politics at both organisations, that aligned with the prevailing paradigm 
were able to have global influence over policy debates. 
 Internal coherency on a policy message can supersede resources in the battle for 
policy influence. 
 The application and adaptation of the ASID framework in global pension policy. 
 
The Emerging Cooperation of the World Bank and ILO  
 
The entry of the World Bank into the global pension reform arena in 1994 brought it into 
direct conflict with the ILO. Chapters Five, Seven and Eight showed how the World Bank 
imposed itself on the traditional policy domain of the ILO with a radically different set of 
objectives and priorities. This contestation for policy influence has been the traditional 
way in which global social policy has been portrayed in the literature. As Chapter Three 
demonstrated, it has been portrayed as an arena in which international organisations 
and transnational actors compete to influence the welfare reform trajectories of national 
governments (Charlton and McKinnon, 2002; Deacon et al., 1997; Fergusson and Yeates, 
2014; Orenstein, 2008). Deacon described this contestation as “something a ‘war of 
position’ between those agencies and actors within them who have argued for a more 
selective, residual role for the state with a larger role for private actors in health, social 
protection and education provision and those who take the opposite view” (Deacon, 
2007 p. 171). In their seminal work in the field, Deacon and colleagues (1997) painted a 
picture in Central and Eastern Europe as a battleground, with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank on one side arguing for a liberal approach to social policy, 
against the corporatist approach favoured by the ILO and European Union (EU).  
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However, Kaasch (2013) has challenged this approach of global social policy, as an arena 
solely characterised by contestation. In the field of health policy, there is not one 
dominant model for international organisations to promote as a beacon for others to 
aspire to. In addition, international organisations are pressured to justify their own 
activities in the field. There are therefore better incentives for cooperation rather than 
competing for the exclusive right to shape the policy. The policy environment portrayed 
in this thesis demonstrates growing similarities with health in the global pension and 
social protection field. One of the main findings of the thesis is therefore the end of direct 
contestation in the pension reform arena.  
 
The closer alignment of the two organisations in the pensions and social protection field 
has been shown in this analysis to have been the outcome of a multitude of factors. In 
Central and Eastern Europe, international financial institutions had significant leverage 
over the region in the early phase of the transition. It gave the World Bank the 
opportunity to pursue multi-pillar pension reforms in a region with mature pension 
systems. However, that leverage through lending diminished over time as new sources 
of capital became available to countries in the region in the form of the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and through Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). Indeed, on the eve of the global economic crisis, Central and Eastern Europe was 
the region with the largest inward investment of FDI in the world (Appel & Orenstein, 
2018). As a consequence, demand for World Bank expertise in the field of pensions and 
social protection has come from developing countries that are not yet ready for a multi-
pillar pension system. Therefore, the majority of World Bank work on pensions is now 
on first pillar reforms, particularly in expanding coverage. A clear overlap with the ILO’s 
agenda.  
 
A second reason for increased cooperation is the delegation from nation states (Deacon, 
2013). Chapter Five showed how the global economic crisis enhanced the importance of 
social protection in global policy circles. One of the outcomes of this was the 
establishment of the Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board (SPIAC-B) by the 
G20. It tasked the ILO and World Bank to work collaboratively on social protection, 
including on pensions. The two organisations are the lead organisations, hosting a forum 
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of other international organisations interested in social protection such as the IMF, 
OECD, UNDESA, WHO and many others. It also includes bilateral agencies such as the 
UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) or the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). At the time of publication, there have been 
ten meetings of SPIAC-B. One of the major outcomes of the forum is the establishment 
of the Global Partnership for Social Protection announced during the UN General 
Assembly week in September 2016 (ILO, 2016).  This will be one of the main mechanisms 
for delivering the Sustainable Development Goals on social protection, with the ILO as a 
lead actor. It brings together a large number of actors and development partners, 
presenting itself as a follow up to earlier global universalism initiatives on universal 
education and universal health coverage.                                     
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
The increased collaboration of the two organisations has also been brought about by an 
evolution of both policy positions and evaluations of pension models promoted by both 
organisations. Averting drew a line in the sand on pension provision, shifting the debate 
towards sustainability and promoting defined contribution pensions as the dominant 
pension model. After initial hostility, the ILO shifted towards the World Bank’s model by 
accepting defined contribution systems as part of the pension architecture (Cichon, 
2004; Deacon, 2007). Over time the World Bank modified its position on pensions taking 
a critical approach to some aspects of its earlier positions (Béland & Orenstein, 2013; 
Orenstein, 2008). This continued evaluation of positions and a shift towards focusing on 
coverage brought both organisations closer together in the pension models they 
advocate since both are focused on expanding the public pillar.  
 
Finally, the internal politics of both organisations fostered closer collaboration. Changes 
in personnel within both organisations meant that those most hostile to the other 
organisations position on pension provision no longer work in their respective 
departments. The World Bank’s Social Protection and Labour Department was taken 
over by someone much more in line with the ILO’s vision for social protection once 
Robert Holzmann retired. It meant the momentum for a continued campaign for 
privatisation was lost and the focus of the department shifted towards expanding 
publicly financed social protection. Both organisations moved away from the heated 
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politics of pensions to a more harmonious advocation of the expansion of social 
protection. To date, the appointment of a former proponent of pension privatisation, 
Michal Rutkowski as Director of the Department at the World Bank has not initiated a 
major change in direction from Arup Banerji . The failure of the model in Central and 
Eastern Europe has modified the World Bank’s approach. This is an example of how the 
institutions within the region have shaped pension ideas globally. This will be explored 
in more detail in the next section.  
 
Ideas, Institutions and Resources 
 
As chapter three outlined, a growing number of scholars have begun to focus on ideas 
as explanatory variables in the process of institutional development and change (Béland, 
2005; Béland & Cox, 2011; Blyth, 2002; Hall, 1993; Hay, 2008). These scholars have 
stressed that change is not driven (solely) by material conditions and fixed preferences, 
but rather by how actors interpret their material conditions. From a constructivist 
perspective within international relations theory, international organisations act as 
purveyors of policy ideas. Through their power of classification, they can influence how 
actors interpret their surroundings and what social problems and solutions make it onto 
the political agenda  (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Kingdon, 2014). The burgeoning 
literature on ideas was argued in Chapter Two to be a response to the overly 
deterministic and static approach of historical institutionalism. Blyth (2002) argued that 
ideas act as blueprints for change under uncertainty. Ideas could therefore enact change 
by changing how actors interpret their interests. They have traditionally been posited as 
independent variables in a process of institutional change.  
 
However, the analysis within this thesis offers a more dynamic approach, with a more 
iterative relationship between ideas and institutions. The multi-pillar pension reforms in 
Central and Eastern Europe challenged traditional scholarship on pension reform and 
path dependency (Myles & Pierson, 2001; Pierson, 1994) this stressed continuity within 
public systems given the ‘double payment problem’. One strategy for reform was 
through a gradual transition using institutional layering (Hacker, 2005). Yet, within in 
Central and Eastern Europe, a more radical transformation was undertaken through the 
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ideational influence of the World Bank (Orenstein, 2008). It seemed that the obstacles 
to radical pension reform could be overcome. 
 
It was the interaction of privatisation policy ideas with the existing PAYG pension 
institutions that would eventually reshape global ideas on pension reform. The difficulty 
of transition, particularly the double payment problem, was underestimated by the 
proponents of pension privatisation. In addition, the ease with which political actors 
were able to reverse the pension reforms completely took its proponents by surprise. 
The accumulated assets were not viewed as private property by pension contributors as 
the World Bank had assumed. In addition, the assets represent a growing and continued 
temptation for governments to relieve themselves of transition costs and a way to either 
reduce the national debt, enact tax cuts or spending increases. These are strong 
incentives for political actors with short-term time horizons compared to the long-term 
horizons of pension systems. These path dependent issues, which had previously been 
posited as obstacles by historical institutionalists, would eventually influence policy ideas 
at the global level. There is no longer a campaign for partial privatisation coming from 
the World Bank. As Chapter Six showed, the limits of what could be achieved within the 
constraints of Central and Eastern European pension institutions, has shifted the 
perspective of actors within the World Bank who were originally strong proponents. This 
analysis contributes to the scholarship on ideas and institutions by showing that ideas 
are not only an independent variable which can enact institutional change (eg Hudson et 
al., 2008), they are also dependent variables, shaped and refined by institutional logics 
and preference structures. It also shows a huge lacuna in the global social policy 
literature. There is surprisingly very little engagement historical institutionalism within 
the global social policy literature. Exceptions include (Béland, 2009), however, this 
focuses on how global ideas can initiate institutional change rather than how institutions 
can shape policy ideas.  
 
A further contribution of the thesis within the field of policy ideas is on the debate 
between resources and ideas. The influence of international organisations has often 
been characterised through the power of their lending capacity and ability to enact 
conditionality (Collier, et al., 1997; Levitsky & Way, 2006). This gives international 
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financial institutions more leverage over states than other organisations (Müller, 1999). 
With a multitude of ideas on the menu of policy options, the reasoning behind which 
ideas are selected is often under-explored. If those with superior resources are able to 
push their ideas onto the agenda or coerce states to adopt their ideas, then ideas 
become redundant as an explanatory variable, and material resources become the most 
important factor. The analysis in this thesis shows that internal coherency and 
organisation, alongside an enabling zeitgeist, can supersede resources. Chapter Eight 
showed that the interaction between internal politics within organisations and the 
prevailing paradigm or zeitgeist can be influential over global policy agendas, irrespective 
of resources. The internal coherency and aligning ideas with the current zeitgeist were 
shown to be decisive in the ILO superseding the World Bank as the primary international 
organisation setting the social protection agenda. The findings echo those by Appel and 
Orenstein (2013) who also showed that ideas can be an explanatory variable for policy 
change.  
 
Internal Politics Matter 
 
Within the global social policy literature, scholars have more often analysed debates 
between international organisations, rather than within them (Mesa-Lago 1996; 
Queisser 2000; Ervik 2005). There is often the implicit assumption that international 
organisations have a fixed position. However, the analysis in this thesis shows that 
internal politics is also an important determinant of global pension policy. In both 
instances where an international organisation was influential, it was in no small part due 
to a successful internal campaign prior to an external campaign. The literature has 
tended to overlook the different positions within organisations, instead characterising 
them largely as monolithic. Chapter Eight showed that extensive debate took place 
within both the World Bank and the ILO. In addition, even when a fixed position had 
been asserted, this did not end the debate. As the chapter showed, internal debate and 
opposition to the World Bank’s three-pillar model continued after the publication of 
Averting. This led to critical evaluations in 2005 and 2006. These evaluations were not 
simply an outcome of policy analysis and evaluation, but also a consequence of internal 
debate and politicking. In addition, internal politics also attempted to suppress the 
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evaluations. In particular the Latin American analysis required institutional support from 
the Latin American division to reach publication. However, it was not translated into 
Spanish which no doubt subdued its impact across the region.  
 
These insights also have a methodological significance. The analysis of the internal 
politics shows that triangulation through a mixed methods approach to policy analysis is 
necessary. For example, a document analysis would not have been a strong enough 
analysis to capture all of the nuances of global pension policy. Chapter Seven offered an 
analysis of the evolution of the different pension positions of each organisation. 
However, this was not the whole story. The elite interviews enabled the story behind the 
documents to be told; how the documents came to be published is equally important as 
their content in understanding the dynamics of global pension policy. As Atkinson & 
Coffey (2004) have argued, documents are not simply a ‘window into reality’ they have 
an ontological reality of their own, a ‘document reality’.  
 
The Global Structural Environment Facilitates the Shape of Global Pension Policy 
 
Alongside the internal politics of international organisations, global political economy is 
also an important factor in determining global pension policy. Chapter Five traced the 
development of social security at the global level and showed how the global structural 
environment was important in influencing the nature of global pension policy. Global 
political economy can influence it in a number of ways. One of the primary ways in which 
it influences global pension policy is through the creation of a zeitgeist or prevailing 
paradigm. In the early post war period, chapters five and seven showed how the 
importance of social security for maintaining social order was preoccupation of political 
leaders. The Atlantic Charter and Bretton Woods ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie, 1982) 
within the welfare institutions of the developed world in order to protect the legitimacy 
and support of capitalist institutions. Both Churchill and Roosevelt recognised the 
importance of social security for peace and stability. This influenced the actions of the 
ILO, which at this point was the primary international organisation responsible for 
promoting pension provision. Its central mission with regards to social security was to 
promote public funded (and managed) social security systems.  
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The World Bank-led critique of public pension systems came at a time of a growing 
ascendancy for those who promoted the market as the best way to organise the 
economy and society. Averting was published at a time when neoliberalism was at its 
zenith. The previous four chapters showed that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse 
of communism were critical events in global social policy. The perceived failure of 
socialism acted as a symbolic marker for the primacy of the market. It also opened up a 
battleground in Central and Eastern Europe for international organisations to compete 
to influence social policy. The burgeoning expenditure on pensions in the region offered 
an idealised critique of PAYG pensions for those who wanted to reform them. The global 
conditions were therefore advantageous for market-based reforms in the late 1990s.  
 
However, this prevailing paradigm would also be challenged by the global economic 
crisis. The crisis questioned the orthodoxy of the market, particularly in the early stages 
of the crisis. A consensus was reached at the G20 whereby the role of social protection 
in providing automatic stabilisers at the time of a crisis, meant that it should be bolstered 
and extended.  A prevailing paradigm that highlighted the potential for publicly funded 
social protection systems against the threat of market volatility, offered the ILO a 
window to promote its social protection floor policy on the national stage. These global 
conditions also enhanced the advocacy of those within the ILO campaigning for a social 
protection floor. The crisis convinced many sceptical employers’ representatives of the 
virtues of extending social protection.  
 
Policy Learning  
 
Alongside the internal and external political and economic influences over global pension 
policy, there have also been policy evaluations and functional reasons for the evolution 
of the positions of the main international organisations involved in global pension policy 
making. As chapter seven showed, both the ILO and World Bank have refined their 
entrenched positions on pensions. The World Bank’s entry into the pension reform arena 
has been shown to have significantly shifted the debate on pension provision. It was 
argued to be built on a number of assumptions and partly through the Bank’s own 
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evaluation, partly through internal and external events, some of these assumptions have 
proved to be not as conclusive as the Bank assumed and therefore shifted its policy 
stance.  
 
Administration Costs 
 
The shifting away from viewing multi-pillar pension reform as a panacea for all pension 
systems has come from a result of evaluating the performance of multi-pillar models 
against their proposed benefits that were posited by the Bank. There is also a growing 
realisation that the organisation needs to pay more attention to political economy issues 
that may prevent the realisation of theoretical pension models (interview with Robert 
Holzmann). On the performance of multi-pillar systems, a number of assumptions were 
made that have not been realised and challenge their perceived superiority, even within 
the organisation. One of the main issues in Latin America has been the exorbitant fees 
on individual accounts. This was one of the issues highlighted in both Keeping the 
Promise of Latin America and by the Independent Evaluation Group. Alongside making 
pension systems more sustainable, the World Bank argued that pensions would be more 
generous under a multi-pillar system because market returns are superior to the returns 
with a PAYG system (r > g). However, this calculation did not factor in the administration 
costs, which can eat up a significant proportion of an accumulated pension pot (Calvo, 
Bertranou, & Bertranou, 2010; Casey & Dostal, 2008; Pensions Commission, 2005).  
 
Many of these fees are the functional costs of individual accounts, which are more costly 
than the simple administration of a PAYG system (Pensions Commission, 2005). For 
example, the start-up costs of funded pension system are significant. With individual 
accounts, there are economies of scale that can only be realized with a larger funded 
element of the system (Broeders et al, 2015). Alongside the buildings to house staff, 
there are marketing, training and labour costs of running individual accounts. The 
smaller the size of the private pillar, the larger these costs are as a proportion of the 
returns on the accumulated funds. Empirical evidence of fund providers shows a U-
shaped relationship between costs and size the pension fund (Ambachtsheer, 2010). 
None of the pension funds in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe reached the 
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optimum size.  Moreover, the notion of a U-shaped cost function is challenged by Bikker 
(2013), who argues that some economies-of-scale remain constant, suggesting 
administration fees could continue to fall with a larger pension fund.  
 
International comparisons of funded systems show that the smaller the number of 
providers, the lower the costs (Whitehouse, 2000). Given that the marketing costs of 
providers in competition with each other increase the overall administration fees, this 
encourages concentration of providers rather than competition between providers. 
However, this violates the idea of market competition in pension provision, one of the 
key benefits espoused by proponents (World Bank, 1994). Further economies-of-scale 
can be found by having the collection of fees administered by a single organization rather 
than the pension providers themselves (Tapia & Yermo, 2008). For example, in Poland, 
ZUS continued to collect the contributions. However, this keeps in place the public 
pension infrastructure, easing the process of reversal, which have strong incentives that 
are highlighted below. Bolivia and Sweden also reduced administration charges in this 
way (Arza, 2008). A further cost-increasing mechanism involves the high cost of 
investment in equities over government bonds. International comparisons show that 
pension funds that have a higher proportion in investments of equities tended to have 
higher fees (Tapia & Yermo, 2008). However, by having a portfolio made up primarily of 
government bonds renders a funded system operating in a similar fashion to PAYG one 
in all but name (Guardiancich, 2011).  
 
In the move towards a funded system there exists an inherent tension which reinforces 
the direction towards the status quo of a PAYG system. To establish a viable sized private 
pillar, that can capitalise on efficiencies to reduce costs, requires a larger reduction in 
the size of the public pillar, raising the cost of transition. If a concern for transition costs 
constrains the size of the private pillar then the fixed cost nature of some of the fees will 
lead to them absorbing large proportions of the accumulated pension funds, leading to 
disappointing returns. This gives ammunition to opponents of the reforms and increases 
the chances of a reform reversal (Orenstein, 2013).  
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Investment in Government Bonds 
 
The shift to a funded system was argued by its proponents to improve the sustainability 
of pension systems in the face of an ageing population (World Bank, 1994). Its core 
philosophy entails the setting aside of additional resources to finance pensions in older 
age, alongside the funding of the current generations. By investing in equities as 
resources for income in retirement, it was also believed the system would aid the 
development of capital markets of countries in transition from state planned socialism 
to capitalism (World Bank, 1994). However, the insistence that pension providers invest 
large proportions of the portfolio violated these principles and ensured the funded 
systems of Central and Eastern Europe operated as PAYG systems in all but name.  
 
Policy makers had several options to finance the transition to a partially-funded pension 
system (Fultz, 2012). Government expenditure could be retrenched in other areas to 
ensure the move to a funded system was revenue neutral. Taxes could have been raised 
to finance the transition costs (Fultz, 2012). A further option was to use the revenue 
generated from the sale of state-owned enterprises to finance the transition. Instead, 
the governments of Central and Eastern Europe chose to finance the transition costs 
primarily through borrowing. By doing so they failed to fundamentally change the 
institutional logic of the PAYG pension system. Whereas in the past contributions to the 
public pension system were paid in to the public scheme and used to finance current 
expenditure. Now, the only difference entailed some new intermediaries, but essentially 
contributions to the funded system were still being used to finance current pension 
expenditure on the unfunded system (Guardiancich, 2011). 
 
As a result of this continued institutional logic, governments seeking re-election still had 
the same incentives to expand the first pension pillar since the costs were met primarily 
by future tax payers, whilst credit for expansion or lack of retrenchment was immediate. 
In Hungary these incentives led to the introduction of the 13th month pension 
entitlement (Simonovits, 2011). In Poland, this manifested itself in the continued 
provision of branch privileges to certain classes of employees (Armeanu, 2010). Chapter 
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six showed how these dynamics began to be interpreted by previous proponents of 
multi-pillar reform.  
 
Accumulated Pension Funds 
 
The continued high cost of transition had been systematically underestimated by 
proponents of multi-pillar reform. In summary, this cost acted as a constant thorn in the 
side in the fledgling private pillars. It raised the budget deficit, forcing the governments 
of Central and Eastern Europe to borrow to finance it (Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012; 
Fultz, 2012). It also incentivised them to encourage pension funds to hold a significant 
share of government bonds as a proportion of the total portfolio (Datz & Dansci, 2013; 
Guardiancich, 2011). Moreover, the transition costs constrained the size of the private 
pillar and therefore limited the efficient functioning of the pillar by restricting the gains 
from economies-of-scale in reducing the cost of administration of managing individually 
funded accounts (Broeders, van Oord, & Rijsbergen, 2015).  
 
Yet, alongside these costs of pension reform, there was a substantial parallel benefit, 
which could be realized by closing down the private pillar – accumulated pension funds. 
As the debt to GDP ratio grew year-by-year, so too did the size of the accumulated 
pension fund as a growing incentive to reverse the reforms. The ease with which the 
governments of across the globe have seized the accumulated pension assets has 
violated many of the propositions that proponents of multi-pillar pension had posited.  
 
One of the principles that supposedly underpinned the rationale for multi-pillar pension 
reforms was one of individual property rights. Individual accounts were considered the 
private property of  contributors. It was believed this rendered them free from 
government manipulation (World Bank, 1994). Indeed, the justification for multi-pillar 
reform was to diversify risk. The use of the private sector in pension provision was 
thought to mitigate against the risk of government interference in the private element 
of the pension system (Holzmann, 2000). This was evidently incorrect.  
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This issue highlights the difference in time horizons between politicians seeking re-
election and policy entrepreneurs advocating their view of an optimal pension system. 
The proposed benefits of multi-pillar pension reform take decades to materialise, yet 
politicians are motivated by the electoral cycle (Casey, 2014; Pierson, 2004). Their 
incentives are therefore much more focused on the short-term. In Central and Eastern 
Europe, governments that are locked within the fiscal parameters of financing the 
transition costs, there is built-in a double incentive to renationalise the pension system. 
The first is the elimination of transition costs, the second is the appropriation of the 
accumulated pension assets. In the case of Poland, which seized only the government 
bonds, this reduced the national debt by 8 per cent of GDP (Atkins, 2014). In Hungary, 
where all accumulated assets were seized, the size of the accumulated fund was about 
9 per cent of GDP (Simonovits, 2011). Although, unlike Poland, this was not all used to 
play down the national debt (Simonovits, 2011). For office-seeking politicians this 
incentive structure proved hard to resist. In the case of Hungary this act was carried out 
by a long-term opponent of the multi-pillar pension system. However, in Poland the 
reform was conducted by the economically liberal Civic Platform (PO), previous 
supporters of the pension reform. This suggests this action is not limited to long-term 
opponents of pension privatisation. 
 
The nationalisation of pension assets is not limited to the governments of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Whilst the closing down of the second-pension pillars demonstrated an 
overt nationalisation, it is a propensity that has also been carried out in Western Europe 
as well, to alleviate fiscal pressures in the wake of global economic crisis. In Ireland, 
€4.4bn of the country’s national pension reserves were used to finance the bank bailout 
(Altman, 2013). Meanwhile, France and Spain also used pension reserve funds to finance 
current expenditure (Casey, 2014). In the UK, the Coalition Government nationalized the 
pension assets of the Royal Mail (Williams, 2012). The privatisation of the Royal Mail had 
been a long-term goal of the Conservative Party. However, an obstacle to the process lay 
in the pension liabilities the private sector would have obligations for once it took 
ownership. As a way to circumvent this obstacle, the Coalition Government agreed to 
honour the pension liabilities of Royal Mail freeing the private sector from these 
obligations. Whilst this entailed long-term obligations for the state, in the short-term, 
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£28 billion of pension assets were subsumed by the state. In a similar fashion Portugal 
nationalized the pension assets of Portugal Telecom (Altman, 2013). This series of 
nationalisation of private assets points a growing trend of government action in both 
mandatory and voluntary pension pillars (Casey, 2014).  
 
Pension Coverage  
 
Chapter Seven showed that the main convergence between the ILO and the World Bank 
has been on pension coverage. This is a result of an evaluation of both of their previous 
pension positions failing to expand coverage. The ILO traditionally championed wage-
related social security as a way to expand coverage. The thinking was that it would allow 
the development of cross-class coalitions to expand the welfare state. However, the 
labour market has not formalised in the way that proponents of this strategy had 
envisaged. Indeed. the informal sector of the economy has been growing in recent years. 
Over time, the ILO accepted that generous welfare benefits for a small number of 
beneficiaries may constrain the growth of the formal labour market, or at the very least, 
focusing on the benefit generosity of a small proportion of the labour force (those in the 
formal labour market) ignored the vast majority of the labour force who participate in 
the informal market. Therefore, a strategy to extend coverage to all needed a new 
framework than the traditional focus on social insurance. 
 
This was how the concept of social protection floors was born (Deacon, 2013; Cichon, 
2013), which emerged from a protracted focus by the ILO on extending coverage. The 
organisation concluded that its traditional cooperation and advisory services in the 
global south which sought to transfer the Bismarckian social insurance concepts to the 
global south had largely failed to extend coverage in any meaningful way. This was 
because it had been considered a long-term process determined by the pace of the 
formalisation of the labour market. This was how social insurance had originally been 
extended across Europe in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century. The 
social security recommendations and conventions that followed the Declaration of 
Philadelphia largely focused on the formal economy either in the wording, or in the 
interpretation (Cichon, 2013). A recognition by the ILO that this had largely failed to 
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extend coverage to most of the world’s population initiated a series of measures to begin 
to extend coverage. The ILO began to focus on a bottom-up approach, acknowledging 
that focusing on central government did not have much chance of success. It began to 
deploy innovative ways of expanding traditional social insurance through schemes such 
as micro-insurance (ILO, 2000). This largely failed to extend coverage in any meaningful 
way.  
 
In the same way that Chile had inspired the World Bank, Mexico and Brazil inspired the 
ILO through their Conditional Cash Transfer (CCTs) programmes. Chapter Eight showed 
that these schemes were used to debunk a prevailing idea in international development 
circles: that developing countries could not afford universal social security. As chapter 
five also showed, the global economic crisis would give these ideas impetus. It was this 
evaluation of the failure to expand social insurance schemes into the informal economy 
that led to the social protection floor initiative, allowing the World Bank and ILO to work 
much more closely together as their agendas began to align. 
 
The World Bank also evaluated its policy stance with a recognition that its flagship 
pension model had failed to expand coverage in the way it envisaged. Averting had 
assumed that coverage would expand under a multi-pillar system as the incentives to 
save for a pension were different to paying tax in a public scheme.  
 
The ASID framework 
 
This thesis has utilised and amended the Agency, Structure, Institutions and Discourse 
(ASID) framework (Moulaert & Jessop, 2006). It was proposed by Deacon and Stubbs as 
a way to strengthen the field of global social policy and address its cultural northern bias 
(2013, p. 13). This thesis has refined this method and in doing so, strengthens the 
analytical capacity of global social policy studies. In Deacon’s version of ASID, he defines 
Structure and Discourse in a similar way to this thesis, the structure chapter here gave 
an outline of the global political economy of pension reform and the discourse chapter 
outlined the policy positions of both organisations (chapters five and seven respectively). 
However, Deacon used the institution part of ASID to give an analysis of the ILO as an 
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institution. This thesis has collapsed the different organisations into the agency chapter, 
along with the actors within them. For institutions, it has focused on the welfare 
institutions of Central and Eastern Europe where multi-pillar pension reform was 
implemented by transnational actors. This has a number of advantages in its application; 
primarily, as argued above, it enables studies on institutionalism to be embedded within 
global social policy studies. This moves the sub-discipline beyond an analysis of the battle 
of ideas and the actions of transnational actors, to one that is more firmly embedded in 
the local, the regional and the global. It allows ideas to become more iterative with 
institutions and a better synthesis with comparative social policy. 
 
The empirical chapters of the thesis show the utility of the ASID framework. The analysis 
of global pension policy required a multi-faceted approach to capture all its various 
components. Any analysis that ignored one of them would not be complete. It also allows 
for several types of analyses within the framework since each component interacts with 
the others in various ways. Standard structuration theory is possible within this 
framework. It has been shown how structure and agency interact to reproduce structure, 
but also how agents can alter the structure at key moments. Agents and ideas also 
interact with institutions at the meso level, the thesis shows an iterative relationship 
between the two. Ideas can recast institutions and institutions can reform ideas too.  
 
The thesis could have adopted a number of different approaches to the analysis of global 
policy. These will now be discussed in order to develop a more comprehensive 
assessment of the framework’s usefulness in global social policy studies. In Heneghan 
and Orenstein (2019), a much simpler framework was used to analyse the relationship 
between the World Bank and ILO over the past 25 years. The framework in that approach 
was a more parsimonious analysis of the external and internal dynamics of international 
organisations and global pension policy. It drew largely on the insights in Chapters Five 
and Eight, demonstrating how the internal politics in each organisation interacted with 
the global external political and economic environment in order to shape global pension 
policy. It demonstrated how the internal and external dynamics had brought about an 
increase in cooperation between the Bank and the ILO. In addition, it demonstrated how 
agency can be decisive in setting the global agenda.  
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The analysis in Heneghan and Orenstein (2019) never focused on the more functional 
analysis of multi-pillar pension reforms and the internal analyses of their utility that was 
covered in Chapter Seven. Chapter Eight demonstrated the political nature of how the 
evaluations came about. However, it is possible the evaluation of the performance of the 
second pillar pension reforms may have happened without politicking. The issue of 
coverage was rising up the agenda inside the Bank. In addition, by ignoring the discourse 
component of the global pension story, it ignores an important aspect of the entire 
discursive struggle between the World Bank and ILO. Discourse as used in this thesis has 
been defined as the positioning of a ‘strategic debate’. This type of analysis pays careful 
attention to the framing of policy problems and the solutions the framing leads towards. 
For example, Chapter Seven showed how the framing of Averting around sustainability 
and economic development, used the cognitive authority of the Bank to nudge domestic 
actors into viewing market solutions as the best option to alleviate the problems and 
opportunities for pension systems outlined in Averting.  
 
A simple analysis of the internal and external impacts on global pension policy also only 
superficially deals with the institutional analysis that forms one of the major 
contributions of the thesis. The ASID framework allowed for a full discussion on historical 
institutionalism, path dependency, increasing returns, constructivist institutionalism and 
the role of ideas in institutional stability and institutional change. It enabled a reversal of 
the standard causal relationship between ideas and institutions. Within constructivist 
institutionalism, ideas have been deployed as independent variables that have led to a 
change in political actors’ understanding of institutional logics and enabled institutional 
change. The analysis in this thesis shows that ideas can also be dependent variables in 
their interaction with institutions. The path dependency inherent in public pension 
systems and the resulting transition costs in seeking to partially privatise them, led to 
ideational change. Previous proponents of the partial-privatisation reassessed the idea 
after analysing its interaction with existing pension systems.  
 
The thesis could also have adopted the analytical approach of Organisational Ecology, 
which has been used in International Relations theory to analyse the role of international 
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organisations in specific policy fields. It draws on the biological sciences and was adapted 
for use in the social sciences by Hannan and Freeman (1977; 1989) and applied 
specifically for analysis of international organisations by Abbot, Green and Keohane 
(2016). It deploys two approaches: the organisational environment and intrinsic 
features. The intrinsic features approach focuses on the endogenous features of 
international organisations to analyse how international organisations are capable of 
acting within a given environment. This is very much similar to how Deacon proposed 
the institutions component of ASID to be used. For example, one of the intrinsic features 
of the ILO is its tripartite governing structure. As Chapter Eight showed, the need to build 
consensus between representatives of employers, employees and national 
governments, curtailed a rapid response from the Department of Social Security of the 
ILO to the entry of the World Bank into its traditional domain. The membership rules also 
shape the authority of an international organisation. If the membership us universal in 
nature such as the UN organisations, it enhances its moral authority by appealing to 
universal values. An organisation with restricted membership, such as the OECD, tends 
to rely more on expert authority as a source of power and influence. However, given the 
focus of the thesis was the World Bank and ILO – which both have universal membership 
structures – this distinction was not an important part of the thesis. Within the thesis, 
the intrinsic features of the ILO and World Bank were collapsed into the Agency part of 
the ASID framework, and so this aspect of the framework was not missing. Furthermore, 
a focus on intrinsic features overlooks individual actors, which have been shown to have 
been decisive in the global pension policy story. For instance, Chapter Eight showed how 
decisive it was for Michael Cichon to be promoted for the social protection floor to 
become such a large part of international organisation involvement in pensions.  
 
The second aspect of Organisational Ecology is the organisational environment. It is 
related to the sociological concept of the organisational field. It is concerned with the 
characteristics of the field itself, the number of actors in the field and their relationship 
to each other. This type of analysis is different to the analysis in this thesis in one 
significant way: had the thesis adopted this approach it would have focused on a larger 
number of international organisations. The organisational field of global pension policy 
has the OECD and European Union as actors. The OECD’s focus in the 1980s on the 
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sustainability of the welfare state and its economic impact, paved the way for the World 
Bank to make these arguments in the 1990s to a much broader audience than the 
developed world that the OECD focused on. Similarly, the EU has often acted in tandem 
with the OECD and has engaged in debates on the sustainability of pension systems. This 
aspect of global pension policy is largely absent in the thesis. However, as it was stated 
from the outset, the thesis traded the breadth of analysing a large number of 
international organisations, for depth. By focusing on a smaller number of international 
organisations it allowed for a deeper analysis of the internal politics and the actors that 
constitute each department and how that fits within the larger organisation. An external 
focus on a large number of international organisations and how they all interact would 
not feature this aspect. Moreover, whilst the EU and OECD have been involved in global 
pension debates, their restrictive membership limits the extent to which they can be 
considered global players. For this reason, the limiting of the analysis to the ILO and 
World Bank was justified. Like the internal-external approach, the organisational ecology 
approach excludes institutions and discourses, both of which have been argued to be 
important aspects of global pension policy. 
 
So far, the discussion of the ASID framework has outlined how it was more 
comprehensive than an internal-external framework and organisational ecology. It 
encompasses more components for analysis. It also has one further advantage over 
them: it allows for the analysis to adopt a conjunctural approach. Thinking conjecturally 
involves an examination of the different, overlapping and sometimes divergent 
processes that occur at any one moment in time.   
 
A conjuncture can be long or short: it’s not defined by time or by simple things 
like a change of regime – though these have their own effects. As I see it, history 
moves from one conjuncture to another rather than being an evolutionary flow. 
And what drives it forward is usually a crisis, when the contradictions that are 
always at play in any historical moment are condensed, or, as Althusser said, ‘fuse 
in a ruptural unity’. Crises are moments of potential change, but the nature of 
their resolution is not given. It may be that society moves on to another version 
of the same thing (Thatcher to Major?), or to a somewhat transformed version 
(Thatcher to Blair); or relations can be radically transformed (Hall and Massey 
2010 p. 57) 
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The global economic crisis certainly played a part in the development of global pension 
policy by triggering a large number of reversals. However, the development of global 
pension policy was not simply a result of the crisis. There were a number of overlapping 
processes that came together to shape the development of a new consensus on the roles 
of the state and the market in pension provision. The multi-faceted analysis ASID analysis 
allows for a temporal analysis with the longue durée processes analysed at the same 
time as the more immediate trigger points. For example, in considering the rise of the 
social protection floor as a dominant idea in pension provision, the structural elements 
of global pension policy will be very long-term in nature. These include the 
informalisation of the labour market in the developing world, the waning of the 
importance of international organisations in Central and Eastern Europe and 
deregulation of financial markets that led to the crisis. In addition to the long-term 
processes that would crystallise during the global economic crisis, internal politics in the 
ILO were moving towards the policy of the social protection floor. 
 
In summarising the usefulness of the ASID framework, as stated from the outset, it 
enabled a more multi-faceted analysis of global pension policy as it focused on a number 
of overlapping processes that shape policy-making at the global level. This enabled the 
analysis to shine a light on the discursive battles over policy and the framing of problems 
and solutions, the political battles between individuals, the structural processes that 
shape the environment transnational actors operate in, and the institutions that mediate 
global policy proposals, which in turn, shape them.  
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Chapter Ten 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter revisits the research questions set out in Chapter One that have guided the 
thesis. It draws on the analysis of the four empirical chapters, and the discussion, to 
outline how these have answered the specific inquiry they initiated. Each of the 
questions draws on the multi-faceted framework the thesis has employed. They 
therefore utilise all of the empirical chapters in some form.  
 
What Processes Led to the Pension Reforms and Counter-Reforms in Central and 
Eastern Europe? 
 
The thesis has shown how the pension systems of Central and Eastern Europe have 
undergone significant upheavals since the turn of the century. Their initial reforms 
violated the assumptions of social policy scholars who hypothesised that mature public 
pension systems were extremely difficult to privatise (Pierson, 1994; Myles and Pierson, 
2001). The analysis in this thesis has shown they were an outcome of a series of complex 
interactions between agency, structure, institutions and discourses. Taking each of these 
in turn gives a comprehensive insight into the multi-pillar pension systems that emerged 
in the late-1990s and early-2000s across the region.  
 
Beginning with agency, Chapter Eight explains how the transnational campaign for 
pension privatisation began inside the World Bank in the early-1990s. It was initiated by 
Lawrence Summers and spearheaded by Estelle James who led the team behind the 
publication of Averting the Old Age Crisis (1994) placing pension reform onto the global 
agenda, in particular for middle-income and low-income countries. This internal 
campaign was able to suppress descent from inside the Bank through its superior 
resources, which interviews revealed, endowed Averting with a generous marketing 
budget and support from other influential departments, such as the financial markets 
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sector, which was eager to promote privatisation as  way to open up new markets. This 
contrasted with the ILO, which was shown to have not had the resources to compete 
with the World Bank in the early 1990s and was characterised by fragmentation and 
internal fighting as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were privatising their 
pension systems (Deacon 1997; Orenstein, 2008).  
 
The internal campaign for pension privatisation of the World Bank also aligned with an 
accommodating external environment, as it matched the prevailing paradigm of the 
moment (Stiglitz, 20002). The global structural conditions were therefore favourable for 
the World Bank’s policy. It was a period in history when market-based ideas were at their 
zenith (DeMartino, 2002). The failure of communism and the fall of the Berlin Wall 
represented a symbolic victory for the market over the state (Fukuyama, 1989). The 
perceived success of the US and UK economies resulted in many countries wanting to 
emulate their market-based policies (Williamson J. , Democracy and the “Washington 
consensus”, 1993).  
 
Averting promoted a discourse of sustainability. The argument presented a bleak picture 
for public pension systems which were argued to be unsustainable and on the verge of 
collapse. It urged low- and middle-income countries to act immediately before their 
systems reached the levels of maturity of OECD countries. Alongside this message of 
fear, it also presented a message of hope. Namely, that a multi-pillar system not only 
made pension systems sustainable, but also that it could enhance economic growth 
through its impact on capital markets and the labour market (Holzmann, 2007; James, 
1996; World Bank, 1994). The ILO was shown to have taken a significant amount of time 
to formally respond to Averting. In the event, its formal response largely accepted the 
way the arguments had been framed by Averting. It accepted a role for the private sector 
in pension provision and for defined contribution schemes to form part of statutory 
provision. In addition, the framework of pillars was also adopted although the ILO’s own 
terminology referred to them as ‘tier’s (Gillion et al., 2000).  
 
Finally, the institutional conditions of Central and Eastern Europe shaped the reforms in 
a number of ways. The large costs of the transformation, in particular, the huge rise in 
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the number of pensioners, placed radical ideas for pension reform on the agenda 
(Müller, 199). The region was also uniquely susceptible to market ideas given its recent 
experience of communism. In addition, the region was completely starved of capital. 
Pension privatisation enabled the countries of the region to engage in a process of 
‘competitive signalling’ in order to attract international investment (Appel and 
Orenstein, 2018). A privatisation of the pension system signalled to international 
investors the market credentials of the country and an increase in investment usually 
followed the reforms. However, institutional factors also constrained the degree of 
reforms. No country in the region opted for a full privatisation like Chile. The maturity 
and extensive coverage of the communist pension system rendered a full privatisation 
too costly given the large transition costs it would entail. Instead reformers opted for a 
‘layering’ (Streeck & Thelen, 2005),  whereby the new individually funded accounts were 
layered on top of the existing public pension system, with the hope of one day replacing 
them.  
 
The series of reform reversals in Central and Eastern Europe in many ways represent a 
mirror image of the processes that led to their inception. Beginning with the global 
structural dynamics, transnational actors had lost influence in the region by the time the 
reversals were being considered. During the early transformation period, the countries 
in the region were heavily dependent on capital from international financial institutions 
such as the World Bank and IMF (Roaf et al., 2015; Orenstein, 2008). This gave them 
leverage into the reform process. However, over time this dependence waned as new 
source of finance became available. The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, in particular, became an important lender for the transition countries; 
alongside international private capital, which was much abundant prior to the crisis. 
When the global economic crisis hit, it proved to be a significant contributor to the rapid 
reversal of the multi-pillar pension model (Drahokoupil & Domonkos, 2012). The steep 
downturn across the globe was felt acutely in Central and Eastern Europe. The region’s 
export led growth model rendered it particularly vulnerable to a collapse in global 
demand and to capital flight as global investors flocked to safe havens. This had two 
adverse implications for the pension systems in the region. Firstly, it affected the value 
of accumulated pension assets as returns collapsed declined across the globe. Second, 
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and more importantly, the downturn exacerbated budget deficit problems across the 
region. This was particularly problematic in Central and Eastern Europe as membership 
of the European Union required governments to keep budget deficits below 3 percent 
of GDP and National debt below 60 percent of GDP.  
 
Related to the global structural dynamics, are the specific pensions institutions of Central 
and Eastern Europe. The analysis has shown how only a partial privatisation was 
undertaken in the countries in the region as a result of the maturity of the communist 
pension system. This was necessary due to the large transition costs that arise from 
diverting contributions into the second pillar (Pierson, 2000). However, the partial 
privatisation meant that the size of the second pillar was below the optimum size to take 
advantage of economies of scale, therefore the administration charges of the private 
pillar were substantial. In addition, the propensity of countries to stipulate that pension 
providers hold a large share of the portfolio in government bonds meant the system was 
effectively operating on a PAYG basis – albeit a very expensive one with large 
administration costs (Guardiancich, 2011). The accumulated pension funds also offered 
a temptation for governments in the region to renationalise them as they offered an 
immediate source of funds (Casey, 2014). This was used to reduce the national debt in 
Kazakhstan and Poland but used for immediate spending in Hungary (Simonovits, 2011).  
 
In the case of agency within international organisations, by the time the reform reversals 
were taking place, the previous proponent of the reforms, the World Bank, was in very 
different shape. Key personnel had left the Department of Social Protection and Labor. 
Interviews revealed the department was headed by Arup Banerji who was not as 
committed or interested in multi-pillar pension reform. It meant that no formal and 
organised opposition to the counter-reforms came from the World Bank. Instead, a less 
formal blog post was the only real public message from the Central Europe and Baltic 
division of the Bank (Murthi, 2013). This simply explained the process, rather than 
voicing an opposition to it. Indeed, in an interview with the regional director, she was 
shown to have completely agreed with the rationale of those undertaking the counter-
reforms.  
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The breaking down of an organised bloc within the Bank to promote pension 
privatisation aligned with the shifting discourse on its benefits over time. This leads onto 
the second research question which will now be outlined in detail.  
 
How has the perspective and development of pension policies evolved at the World 
Bank and ILO? 
 
The thesis has shown how the pension policy positions of the World Bank and ILO have 
changed and developed over time. These positions have been shaped by Agency, 
Structure, Institutions and Discourse, to varying degrees. The policy positions of both 
organisations have been evolving for some time. Whilst the multi-pillar reform reversals 
no doubt have shaped the perceptions of both organisations, this process was underway 
long before the reversals. The counter-reforms however, did alter the perceptions of the 
one-time chief proponents of the idea.  
 
The global structural dynamics inevitably played a significant role in the development of 
pension policies of both organisations. Pension policies have tended to run parallel with 
the prevailing global paradigm. In the immediate post-war period the ILO was the main 
international organisation concerned with pension provision at the global level. Its 
policies were part of a global consensus on the necessity of social security for peace and 
stability (Esping-Andersen, 1996). A consensus emerged that these systems were best 
provided by the state on a PAYG in a unified social administration (ILO, 1944). These ideas 
were inspired in particular by the Beveridge Report in the UK, which was referenced in 
the ILO’s support for the newly created welfare state in Czechoslovakia (Schoenbaum, 
1945).  
 
The first challenge to the welfare consensus, from a rival international organisation, 
came from the OECD, as it began to articulate a critique of the welfare state as a burden 
on the economy (Walker, 1990). However, these ideas were targeted at the mature 
welfare states of the OECD’s membership. The first real global challenge to the ILO’s 
pension model came in 1994 with the publication of Averting. As Chapter Seven showed 
in detail, this publication promoted a discourse of sustainability. The central message 
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from Averting was that the pension systems of OECD countries were unsustainable and 
therefore middle-income and developing countries needed to act immediately; in order 
to avoid making the same mistakes it argued had been made with the PAYG pension 
systems of Europe and North America. It advised that a multi-pillar pension system was 
desirable, making the system more sustainable. It was also argued that a multi-pillar 
system would provide superior returns as capital market returns exceeded economic 
growth rates. In addition, public pension systems were argued to be regressive in 
developing countries, only covering more affluent urban workers. The secondary 
message was that pension systems could be a tool for capital market development. A 
discourse was of sustainability was bolstered by a discourse of economic efficiency. This 
discourse was shown to align with the prevailing paradigm of the time and the global 
political and economic climate which was absorbing the demise of the communism.  
 
The entry of the World Bank into the pension reform arena shaped the ideas and 
priorities of the ILO. Initially the ILO sought to shift the debate away from sustainability 
towards a discourse of adequacy and security. The central argument was that multi-pillar 
pension systems replaced the burden of risk onto the individual offering no guarantees 
of adequacy of income in retirement (Beattie & McGillivray, 1995). However, it was 
shown in Chapter Seven that after an initial hostile reaction to the message of Averting, 
a more conciliatory position emerged; accepting a role for the different pillars of the 
pension system and a role for defined contribution schemes as part of the pension 
system architecture (Gillion, at al., 2000). However, whilst the ILO was dropping its 
hostile opposition to the World Bank’s model, internal opposition to its central premises 
was growing. The idea that funded schemes were more sustainable was challenged, as 
were its assumptions on the benefits to the macro economy (Barr, 2000; Orszag & 
Stiglitz, 1999). Further critcism from inside the Bank was shown to challenge the 
orthodoxy of multi-pillar pension reform. In particular, the poor coverage across and high 
administration charges Latin America (Gill, Packard, & Yermo, 2005), the poor returns on 
pension asset and the high administration costs (Independent Evaluation Group, 2006). 
 
Meanwhile, the ILO was beginning to shift its preoccupations. Instead of fighting a losing 
battle trying to protect PAYG pension systems in Central and Eastern Europe, the Social 
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Security Department in the ILO shifted its focus towards extending the coverage of 
pension provision and social protection in the developing world (ILO, 2001). This was 
borne out of the recognition that those who were employed in informal sector were 
unlikely to be covered by the formal social protection systems of the developed world 
(Reynaud, 2002). The discourse of the ILO was therefore shifting away from the 
protracted debate of adequacy versus sustainability to a more consensual message on 
extending pensions coverage to all. The thesis has shown how, after an intense debate 
inside the ILO, the organisation came to a strong position on national social protection 
floors. It then took the debate to the world, culminating in Recommendation 202 on 
Social Protection Floors.  
 
Structural and institutional dynamics would further shift the position of the World Bank 
on mandatory second pension pillars. The global economic crisis changed the global 
zeitgeist (Farnsworth & Irving, 2011). The optimism for the organising of the economy 
on market-based principles was challenged by the crisis. At the same time, in the 
immediate crisis period, the role of the state in mitigating the economic costs of 
economic downturns was recognised by the global leadership of the G20. Over time, this 
was replaced by an austerity agenda. Both processes would have implications for the 
pension institutions of Central and Eastern Europe, which would shape the development 
of pension policies at the World Bank.  
 
The thesis has shown the interaction between institutions and neoliberal pension ideas. 
Chapter Six showed how this had shaped pension ideas in three ways: First, the large 
transition costs had been underestimated by proponents of mandatory second pension 
pillars. These costs proved to be a constant challenge to the viability of continuing with 
a second pension pillar. Whilst some proponents of mandatory second pillars argued that 
the European Commission should have been more accommodating of the transition 
costs within the Maastricht Criteria, there was still a recognition that a multi-decade 
challenge of carving out a proportion of public pillar contributions into individual 
accounts is extremely challenging. These findings suggest that the arguments made by 
scholars that stressed the stability of public pension systems, still applied even when 
they had seemingly been reformed (Pierson, 1994; Myles & Pierson, 2001).  
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Second, the poor performance of the second pillar reforms has also altered the 
perception of their desirability. Reformers in Central and Eastern Europe had a choice 
between stability and risk in the regulation of pension portfolios in the region. They 
chose to prioritise the former by mandating that pension funds must hold the majority 
of government bonds (Guardiancich, 2011). This was argued to be necessary given the 
nascent capital markets of Central and Eastern Europe (Holzmann R. (., 2009). However, 
it meant that returns were disappointing. The scheme effectively ran as a PAYG system 
with an expensive intermediary fund manager cycling pension contributions into current 
spending.  
 
Third, the major shift in ideas of transnational pension actors has been on the 
assumption that private pensions would be thought of as private property and therefore 
would be more resistant to political manipulation (World Bank, 1994). The ease with 
which pension assets have been subsumed into the state coffers has taken transnational 
actors by surprise. It has raised barely any reaction from contributors (Simonovits, 2011). 
There were minimal protests from workers and ineffective opposition from the pensions 
industry. The ease with which these reforms were reversed has significant ontological 
outcomes that may negate some of the microeconomic arguments that were espoused 
by proponents of multi-pillar reform. For example, it was argued that public pension 
provision has an adverse impact on the labour market as taxes distort labour supply 
(World Bank, 1994). The argument continued that contributions into mandatory second 
pillars would not be viewed as a tax and therefore would not distort the labour market 
in the same way. Yet if contributors never distinguished the public and private elements 
of their pension provision then it is likely that second pillar contributions were also 
viewed as a tax. The entire demonstrates the opaqueness of pension provision is, which 
holds for both public and private pensions.  
 
The shifting of the World Bank’s position has been two-pronged. The experiences of 
multi-pillar reform in Central and Eastern Europe have nudged it away from promoting 
a model of mandatory second pillars, as explained above. In addition, as a Bank, the 
World Bank’s activities are largely governed by the demand for its services and loans. As 
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middle-income countries have become less dependent on World Bank loans, the 
majority of World Bank activity has been in developing countries (World Bank, World 
Bank Lending (Fiscal 2017), 2017 ). These have very different needs to the transition 
countries and often require loans and assistance in setting up social protection schemes. 
The emphasis for assistance in these countries is to extend coverage. The vast majority 
of World Bank activity on pensions is now in the public sector. The World Bank’s focus 
on the extending coverage of public pensions has brought its agenda much closer to the 
ILO’s. This is the focus of the third research question. 
 
How has the Relationship of the World Bank and ILO Evolved? 
 
Orenstein (2008) told the story of a great rivalry between the ILO and the World Bank 
over pension reform. In the 1990s the World Bank supplanted the ILO as the dominant 
actor in global pension policy, the ILO was caught in a rear-guard action as country after 
country opted for the World Bank’s vision of pension provision(Orenstein, 2005; 2008). 
The development of the relationship has been told through the thesis, in contrast to the 
situation in the late 1990s both organisations now cooperate more closely on pension 
provision. This has also been a consequence of the structural, institutional, discourse and 
agency dynamics.  
 
Chapter Five outlined how the structural implications of the global economic crisis raised 
the stature of the ILO in global governance circles (Deacon, 2013). Alongside the shifting 
ideas that have been outlined above, there were also actions taken by the UN Chief 
Executives Board (UNCEB) and the G20 which delegated authority to the ILO on a number 
of issues. Firstly, the Social Protection Floor Initiative (SPF-I) was the UNCEB’s response 
to the crisis, it called upon the ILO and the World Health Organisation to work together 
to further develop the idea of a social protection floor. The initiative was given further 
impetus by the then President of France, Nicholas Sarkozy who was keen for the idea to 
take off. The SPF-I commissioned the former president of Chile, Michelle Bachelet to 
author a report on social protection floors in 2009. As was noted in Chapter One, 
Bachelet would go on to win the presidency of Chile again. In 2010, Bachelet’s report 
was published; it was aimed at the G20 with the message calling for a formal board to 
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be created to coordinate the inter-agency activity on social protection in order to better 
use the resources of international organisations and to prevent duplication of the same 
tasks. The G20 heeded this message and created a semi-formal structure, the Social 
Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board (SPIAC-B). This board is chaired by the ILO 
and the World Bank. It is highly symbolic of two things: firstly, the enhanced role of the 
ILO in global social policy on social protection, including pensions; secondly, on the 
increased cooperation between the ILO and World Bank on social protection issues.  
 
The increased cooperation between the two organisations is not only the result of global 
structural dynamics but also a result of agency as Chapter Eight outlined on the internal 
politics of both organisations. The hostile relationship between the two organisations in 
the mid-1990s was ended largely as a result of the internal politics of both organisations. 
The ILO shifted in direction after a period of stasis on social security between 2000 and 
2005. The breaking up of the social security department into three smaller units, each in 
opposition and working effectively as silos meant that a coherent message from the ILO 
did not emerge during this time frame. However, when the department was eventually 
reformed in 2005, internal politics saw Michael Cichon named as director. His vision for 
the ILO’s stance on social security moved the organisation away from its Bismarckian 
traditions and paved the way for a much closer relationship with the World Bank. The 
Social Protection Floor idea with a universal minimum is closer to the World Bank than 
the previous policies of the ILO. For some inside the ILO, this shift is too far away from 
its core principles. However, it has meant a closer cooperation with the World Bank. 
Cichon’s successor, Isabel Ortiz, was part of the original campaign for Social Protection 
Floors and renamed the department the Department for Social Protection instead of 
Security to ensure a consistency with terminology.  
 
The internal politics of the World Bank also paved a way for a closer cooperation in the 
immediate global economic crisis period. When Robert Holzmann reached a mandatory 
service cap his successor, Arup Banerji, did not have a pensions background. As a result, 
he was not as wedded to the idea of multi-pillar pension reforms as his predecessor. This 
meant that the campaign for pension privatisation drew to a halt during his tenure. 
Banerji was more interested in the broader social protection of developing countries, 
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which has been argued in the thesis to now be the main client base of the World Bank. 
This softening of both stances and the shift in discourses away from sustainability versus 
adequacy towards extending coverage means a much more cooperative relationship has 
emerged. Indeed, the World Bank’s Social Protection and Labour Strategy for 2012-2020 
mentions the social protection floor, which is a mark of the new relationship between 
the one-time rivals. In addition, the signing of the Global Partnership on Social Protection 
in 2016, between the two organisations, is highly symbolic of this new relationship.  
 
The thesis has therefore told the story of how the ILO was able to reassert itself into the 
pensions debates through its Social Protection Floor agenda. A significant finding is it did 
this despite the superior resources of the World Bank, which had previously given the 
Bank the edge when the two organisations competed to influence reform trajectories in 
the 1990s. it suggests that material resources are not the only factor that determine 
success for international organisations seeking to set the international agenda. If an 
organisation has internal coherency over a policy area that aligns with the global 
prevailing paradigm, it has a chance of influencing the agenda. This was the case with 
both the World Bank in the 1990s and the ILO during the onset of the global economic 
crisis.  
 
Furthermore, the expert authority (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004) of the World Bank has 
been damaged by the entire multi-pillar episode. In the words of Nicholas Barr, a former 
consultant and critic of multi-pillar reform, “it has been seen to fail and lose the 
argument by people who care about the argument” (interview with Nicholas Barr, 
December 2016). By default, this raises the expert authority of the ILO in relation to the 
World Bank, given its criticism of the reforms. It has taken until the end of December 
2018 for the ILO to confidently offer a full-scale critique of the experience in Latin 
America and Central and Eastern Europe, despite the counter-reforms beginning a 
decade earlier (ILO, 2018). In addition to expert authority, the moral authority of the ILO 
has also enhanced its influence over setting the agenda. The passing of Recommendation 
202 in 2012 gave the ILO an instrument to compel national governments to act on 
spreading social protection coverage, given the consensual nature of the passing of an 
ILO Recommendation. This enhancing of the expert and moral authority of the ILO has 
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given the organisation the ability to position itself as an equal partner to the World Bank 
in the social protection agenda. This is despite the superior resources of the Bank. 
 
Final Thoughts 
 
The thesis has deployed a multi-faceted analysis as a way to comprehensively capture 
the dynamics of global pension policy. It has focused on the international pensions 
agenda-setting activity of the two main organisations in the field of global pension policy, 
the World Bank and the ILO. It has analysed the debates that take place inside the 
headquarters of the two organisations and the policies that emerge as a consequence. 
It also analysed the global structural and institutional environment in which these 
policies emerge and are implemented, demonstrating how the policies are complex 
interaction between all of these processes. Global pension ideas have been shown to be 
recast by their interaction with institutions.  
 
However, the global policy ideas that emerge from these processes are still only one 
component of a much wider policy process. These ideas are then contested at the 
domestic level where other actors become involved, such as organised interests for 
labour and capital. As the introduction first set out, these domestic processes are beyond 
the scope of this thesis, and present to varying degrees in different countries, with little 
development of organised interests in Central and Eastern Europe. Still, there is also a 
global pension policy aspect that has yet to be explored. The focus of this thesis has been 
at the headquarters level of analysis. Here it has been made clear that there is much 
more cooperation between the World Bank and the ILO on pensions and social 
protection. However, international organisations also work in the field, offering technical 
support and guidance. Further research would need to explore the relationship between 
the ILO and the World Bank in the field. It is not clear whether the increased cooperation 
between the two social protection departments translates to cooperation on the ground, 
where field experts are often granted significant autonomy and discretion. The 
coherency of policy between field and headquarters is a completely underexplored area 
of global social policy.  
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Appendix B: Example Invitation Letter and Information Sheet 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Research Title: Global pension policy after the global economic crisis 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project on pension reform since the global 
economic crisis. Participation in the project is entirely voluntary and you would be free 
to withdraw at any time. This information sheet gives all the details on what participation 
entails. If you have any further enquiries please feel free to contact me by email at 
m.heneghan@sheffield.ac.uk 
 
The project 
 
This project is funded by the ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council) in the 
department of Sociological Studies at the University of Sheffield, in the United Kingdom. 
It is being undertaken for my doctoral thesis, which is being supervised by Dr Liam Foster 
and Professor Alan Walker. The project is governed by the ethical and good-practice 
guidelines of the university and the ESRC.  
 
The research is interested in exploring the process of pension reform since the global 
economic crisis. In particular, reforms to the second pension pillar that have been 
undertaken across Central and Eastern Europe. The speed, scale and depth of second 
pillar reforms have caught scholars on pension policy by surprise. It was not envisaged 
that reforms to the PAYG pension systems that were carried out in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s would be reversed so suddenly and so soon afterwards in many countries. It 
therefore offers a unique opportunity to better understand the best model for pension 
systems in the 21st century by analysing the recent pension reforms. I am seeking a range 
of views from policy makers within government and from staff that advise on pension 
provision in international organisations. 
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What will taking part involve? 
 
Participating in the research will involve agreeing to be interviewed for around 30 
minutes on pension reforms before and after the global economic crisis. Depending on 
the person being interviewed, the research will be interested in the decisions that led to 
the reforms or opinions on the reforms to date. The interviews will take place at a time 
that is most convenient to participants in late 2016 or early 2017. Interviews will be 
recorded using an audio device but you will be free to request that this device is not used 
for all or part of the interview. Follow up interviews may be desired depending on the 
data collected and the development of pension reforms in the region. 
 
Agreeing to participate in the research gives the participant the benefit of contributing 
to a better understanding of pension provision in the 21st century. The reversal of the 
World Bank’s prescribed pension model in many countries calls for a new analysis on 
how best to achieve a balance between the sustainability and adequacy of pension 
systems. This project hopes to be at the forefront of this new understanding. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
 
You have been chosen because of your involvement in the pension reforms or your 
knowledge of the reforms that took place.  
 
Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. All identities used in interviews will be immediately anonymised. All recordings and 
transcripts will be stored securely which only the researcher will have access to.  
 
 
 
 332 
 
 
What if something goes wrong? 
 
If you are concerned with any aspect of the research and wish to make a formal 
complaint or further inquiry you can contact me by email at 
m.heneghan@sheffield.ac.uk or my supervisor, Dr Liam Foster at 
l.foster@sheffield.ac.uk. Furthermore, the University of Sheffield can be reached by 
email at registrar@sheffield.ac.uk or by post at Office of the Registrar and Secretary, 
Firth Court, Western Bank, Sheffield S10 2TN. 
 
Further Information 
 
If you require further information please feel free to email me at 
m.heneghan@sheffield.ac.uk or alternatively I can be contacted by post at University of 
Sheffield, Department of Sociological Studies, Elmfield, Northumberland Road, Sheffield, 
United Kingdom, S10 2TU. Or by telephone on +447747058797. Thank you once again 
for taking the time to read this information sheet.  
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Department of Sociological Studies 
 
Martin Heneghan 
Doctoral Researcher 
Department of Sociological Studies, University of Sheffield 
Elmfield Building, Northumberland Road 
Sheffield, S10 2TU 
Tel: +447747058797 
Email: m.heneghan@sheffield.ac.uk 
 
13 December 2016  
 
Invitation to Participate: Research into Pension Reforms Since the Global Economic 
Crisis  
 
Dear Michal Rutkowski 
 
I am writing to invite you to act as a participant in my doctoral research on pension 
reforms since the global economic crisis.  
 
I am specifically interested in the reforms that have taken place in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Your instrumental role in leading the reform in Poland and your current senior 
role in the World Bank make you an invaluable insight into global pension trends. I am 
also interested in how the World Bank seeks to shape these trends going forward, 
something which you are at the forefront of. 
 
Enclosed with this letter is an information sheet containing more details about what 
participating in my research entails. Should you have any further questions about being 
involved in the research please feel free to contact me using the details provided.  
 
I understand that your schedule must be extremely demanding and so I would like to 
reassure you that participating in the research would involve no more than thirty 
minutes of your time.  
 
Yours sincerely  
 
Martin Heneghan 
